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Surviving 0-days
reducing the window of exposure
Andreas Lindh, 44Con 2013
About me
• Security analyst/architect

• Defender by day
• @addelindh on Twitter
The TL;DR
0-days
The window of exposure

Unknown

Out of our control

Discovery

Disclosure

In our control

Patch available

Patch deployed
Common protection
• Patching

• Virtual patching
• Uninstall
How hard can it be?
Pretty hard!
What if you can’t patch?
• Legacy systems

• 3rd party systems
• Insufficient tools
HD Moore’s law

Unknown

Out of our control

Discovery

Disclosure

In our control

Patch available

Patch deployed
Defense in depth
Concept
Implementation
Meanwhile...
Which leaves us with...
Are we on it?
"Put another way, n people want to fix
security holes, 10n people want to exploit
security holes, and 100000n want Tetris.”
(Dan Kaminsky)
What to do?
Root cause
• Over-reliance on patching

• Network-centric defense
architecture
• All about prevention
Firewall all the things?
Things to consider
• Exposure

• Attack likelihood
• History
• Patch status
Approach
• Prevention
• Mitigation
• ( Detection)
1. Build
Focus
• Proactive

• Inside -> out
• Onion style
• Reusable (ideally)
An example
Software
restriction
policy

OS security
features
Sandbox

Intermediary
channels

Software

User
permissions
Endpoint protection

IPS
Pros and cons
• Pros
– Improved security baseline
– Reduced impact
– Pro-active

• Cons
– Generic

– Added complexity
2. React
Incident timeline
React!

INCIDENT!
Focus
• Specific vulnerability

• Fast implementation
• Input to #1
Pros and cons
• Pros
– Timely mitigation
– Focused approach
– Compliments #1

• Cons
– Limited time

– Reactive
Wrapping it up
• Patching takes time

• Can’t patch the unknown
• Traditional controls are
often insufficient
Let’s build!
Thank you for listening!
Questions?

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44CON 2013 - Surviving the 0-day - Reducing the Window of Exposure - Andreas Lindh

Notas del editor

  1. Software vulnerabilitiesProtectionRelying on a combination of patching + defense in depth modelA proposal on how to get better