Adelaide Desalination Plant Safety - death of Allen O'Neil - poor investigation by SafeWork SA - poor justice system. By VOID voice of industrial death.
2. 2
Just a quick recap on some of the media
reports that have been made in relation to
the death of Allen O’Neil.
They said the incident happened out of normal
work hours and was not related to work activity.
He said that the department conducted a
thorough investigation…
And that the employer had relevant procedures
and systems in place.
6. 6
Gosh so this does really beg for a look at just how
thorough this investigation was…
…and just what steps had been taken by the company
(McConnell Dowel Built Environ Joint Venture MDBE-JV) to
prevent such an incident happening again?
Let’s have a look shall we?
7. 7
SafeWork SA conducted a thorough
investigation ?
The accident happened outside normal
working hours ?
The accident happened as a result of non
work-related activity ?
The employer had taken reasonable steps
to avoid such an incident happening and
had relevant procedures in place ?
8. 8
This is SafeWork SA’s Case File Report – an internal file that
tracks the progress of an investigation.
Please do make a mental note now to watch out for GO BACK
TO
Slide 13 … and when you have read that, please feel
SLIDE 4
free to go back and read the bottom section on Slide 4
again - or go back and read it again now because you
may not get another chance!
Dreary me, so in September 2010 did SafeWork SA know
when the incident was reported?
Did anyone actually open the file and read any of the
documents?
Prey tell we do hope the investigation is a little less clumsy
than what we’ve seen so far …
9. 9
Case File Report
Document # 59 – Page 8
17/12/2009
NOTIFICATION RECEIVED
18/01/2010
MORE THAN 1 MONTH LATER
A PHONE CALL IS MADE
12/02/2010
ANOTHER MONTH LATER
SOMEONE GETS IN A CAR!
10. 10
Case File Report
Document # 59 – Page 7
17/12/2009
NOTIFICATION RECEIVED
18/01/2010
MORE THAN 1 MONTH LATER
A PHONE CALL IS MADE
12/02/2010
ANOTHER MONTH LATER
SOMEONE GETS IN A CAR!
24/02/2010
ALLEN O’NEIL HAS PASSED
AWAY A WEEK AGO
03/03/2010
NOW AN INVESTIGATION
FINALLY PROCEEDS
11. 11
SafeWork SA waited until Allen O’Neil was dead before it
decided to conduct a proper investigation?
Do we understand this correctly?
Allen O’Neil is placed in a medically induced coma from
the moment he is hospitalised and no one thought this
matter was serious enough to launch something that
remotely looks like an investigation?
Oh there simply must be more to this …
12. 12
Case File Report
Document # 59 – Page 6
17/12/2009
NOTIFICATION RECEIVED
18/01/2010
MORE THAN 1 MONTH LATER
A PHONE CALL IS MADE
12/02/2010
ANOTHER MONTH LATER
SOMEONE GETS IN A CAR!
24/02/2010
ALLEN O’NEIL HAS PASSED
AWAY A WEEK AGO
03/03/2010
NOW AN INVESTIGATION
FINALLY PROCEEDS
17/03/2010
THE FIRST VISIT TO GATHER
EVIDENCE 3 MONTHS AFTER
NOTIFICATION!
13. 13
Statement of SafeWork SA Inspector
Document # 50 – Page 2
12/12/2009
13/12/2009
NOTIFICATION OF INCIDENT
NOTIFICATION
17/12/2009
NOTIFICATION RECEIVED
18/01/2010
MORE THAN 1 MONTH LATER
A PHONE CALL IS MADE
12/02/2010
ANOTHER MONTH LATER
SOMEONE GETS IN A CAR!
24/02/2010
ALLEN O’NEIL HAS PASSED
AWAY A WEEK AGO
03/03/2010
NOW AN INVESTIGATION
FINALLY PROCEEDS
17/03/2010
THE FIRST VISIT TO GATHER
EVIDENCE 3 MONTHS AFTER
NOTIFICATION!
14. 14
Immediately Notifiable Work Related Injury Form
Document # 4
13/12/2009
NOTIFICATION?
17/12/2009
NOTIFICATION FORM ?
18/01/2010
MORE THAN 1 MONTH LATER
A PHONE CALL IS MADE
12/02/2010
ANOTHER MONTH LATER
SOMEONE GETS IN A CAR!
24/02/2010
ALLEN O’NEIL HAS PASSED
AWAY A WEEK AGO
03/03/2010
NOW AN INVESTIGATION
FINALLY PROCEEDS
17/03/2010
THE FIRST VISIT TO GATHER
EVIDENCE 3 MONTHS AFTER
NOTIFICATION!
15. 15
So it was the Immediately Notifiable Work
Related Injury Form that was lodged 5 days
late…even though it is supposed to be
lodged within 24 hours of an oral
notification.
Still…maybe this document is full of
information that may explain why things
made no sense?
Surely the administrative side to the
investigation has been conducted in a
manner that …
Well, let’s have a look shall we?
16. 16
Immediately Notifiable Work Related Injury Form
Document # 4 – Page 1
There are no entries
to identify who
created this file or
when it was created
Nothing here either – OOPS – did someone
forget or ….?
17. 17
Immediately Notifiable Work Related Injury Form This is Page 2 of 2 of the
Document # 4 – Page 2 form…
• Note: under
IMPORTANT NOTICE
• There’s a check box
there – and of course
this remained
unchecked.
So are we to assume
this was why MDBE-JV
proceeded to remove
evidence on site?
18. 18
Regulation 418 – (Extract from OHS&W Regulations (2010)
Back to the Statement of SafeWork SA Inspector
Document # 50 – Page 2
If an employee suffers an immediate notifiable work related injury, the employer must not,
without the permission of an inspector –
a) alter the site where the injury occurred; or
b) reuse, repair or remove plant, or reuse, repair or remove any substance, that caused or was
connected with the occurrence of the death or injury.
So what happened here?
On 13th December 2009 McConnell Dowell alleged that the
activities of this injured employee were unauthorised…that
what he was doing was not authorised.
SafeWork SA didn’t question these claims.
MDBE-JV then conducted its own internal investigation;
interviewed its own employee witnesses and took statements;
took its own photographic evidence … while SafeWork SA
stayed home.
19. 19
Photographs taken by the company MDBE-JV of the site area as
it appeared ROUGHLY at the time of the incident were obtained
by SafeWork SA in March 2010 (3 months after the incident).
That’s okay …who needs independent evidence anyway?
It doesn’t matter that the generator in question was sent back
the day after the incident was formerly notified (SLIDE 21) .
Allen O’Neil’s father and a friend attended Valve Pit 1 on the
Monday following the incident and after seeing these
photographs both say the area did NOT look like this.
But hey – it doesn’t matter…it’s only justice and a man’s
reputation that’s at stake here.
20. 20
The evidence of photographs taken by MDBE-JV
Document #15 (2 of 4) Allen O’Neil’s work vehicle and a small section of the lunch room
Most of the photo’s taken
by MDBE-JV seemed fairly
pointless but this one
deserves a mention:
1. We draw your attention
to what looks like a fuel
cell next to Allen’s work
vehicle.
2. Problem here is that Mr
O’Neil and Mr McNickle
attended the area very
soon after Allen was
hospitalised. There was
no sign of a fuel cell.
The trench was also
exposed and not neatly
covered over.
2. The amenities room is far
right - the generator was
located within that area
but it would seem either
the genset was long
gone or – they forgot to
take a picture of it?
Ooops again …
22. 22
SafeWork SA Inspector McCallum’s Photo Log (Taken 17th March 2010)
Document # 17 – Photograph 1
Here’s a photo
taken for
evidence in
March 2010
when SafeWork
SA conducted
its investigation.
…??...
Lucky the
company
conducted its own
investigation ey?
23. 23
Now moving from this to the
claim that the incident that
occurred outside of normal work
hours …
That’s interesting …
29. 29
So based on SafeWork SA’s own media release in
December 2010, Allen O’Neil was no less acting out of work
hours than someone at an after hours work event.
Similarly, not convinced there would be any work-related
activities carried out at an after work Xmas bash either … so
wonder why they would bother with this media release.
Is anyone else scratching their head?
Confused?
30. 30
Now let’s look at what systems and
procedures were in place when the
SafeWork SA inspectors arrived in
March 2010 – 3 months after
the incident…
31. 31
Safety Systems and Procedures?
Field Notes taken by SafeWork SA Inspector (17/03/2010)
Document # 18 - Page 18
33. 33
Safety Systems and Procedures?
Photograph taken by SafeWork SA Inspector (17/03/2010)
Document # 17 – Photo No. 7
The lock and flap
designed to control
access to the
generator’s diesel
fuel supply.
NOTE
Fuel access remains
unrestricted in
March 2010.
34. 34
Come on!
The inspector even makes
notes on the complete
lack of access controls in
the field notebook!
Look how easy it would
have been to control the
fuel access. Flap closed –
key locked – problem
solved.
35. 35
• An eye witness and former employee confirmed that diesel was occasionally
siphoned from on site generators and this was ‘common knowledge’ and the
company should have provided a safer means of siphoning.
• Comments made to VOID by the supervisor suggested that siphoning diesel
from gensets was something senior staff were aware of.
• Regardless of whether the practise was considered authorised or not, what
measures were taken to curtail it? Any warning signs? Any memo’s, emails or faxes
to issue cautions that the habit of siphoning diesel was not allowed / authorised?
• There was nothing in the bundle of documents that gave any indication that
MDBE-JV or the contractor had raised the matter nor is there a document that
contains any such information that was refused under secrecy provisions.
• MDBE-JV had prior knowledge of diesel fuel being siphoned from these gensets
leading up to the incident. Why did the company not simply ensure fuel access
was restricted?
• Fuel access control was as easy as using the flap and padlock provided. Look
at the photographs of the genset taken in March 2010. The inspector makes
direct comment in the field notes that there was no fuel access restrictions.
36. 36
The bundle of documents received from FOI showed zero references to any document
to any safety systems, procedures or controls relating to the removal of fuel from
machinery or equipment.
If such a document exists, we would love to see it.
The company documents that related to Allen O’Neil and his induction showed only that
the administrative process was rushed and incomplete.
Clearly SafeWork SA have relied heavily on the ‘statements’ provided by management
and its employees. Every witness statement (without exception) provided in the bundle
obtained by FOI was hidden from O’Neil’s family under secrecy provisions.
SafeWork SA took these witness statements 3 months after the incident.
That is an unacceptable lapse of time to make any reasonable determination given the
witnesses and all the physical evidence were by this time completely contaminated by
rumour, hearsay and internal influences.
VOID is NOT comforted by the notion that the company was allowed to conduct an
internal investigation. It was allowed to grill, (sorry) interview people that it pays! It took
its own photographic evidence leaving out crucial pieces of evidence. It removed and
tampered with the only evidence that could determine the real circumstances
surrounding the death of Allen O’Neil.
37. 37
In spite of SafeWork SA media comments in August and September 2010, there was
evidence in the documents to support that Allen O’Neil was still at work in his capacity as a
leading hand to lock up Valve Pit 1 area.
What happened to the portable generator in the back of Allen O’Neil’s work vehicle?
What happened to the siphon hose that Allen O’Neil was allegedly using?
Where is the evidence to support the allegation that Allen O’Neil was taking the diesel for
personal use?
The only eye witness revealed to VOID that Allen O’Neil was siphoning the diesel for the
company work vehicle. A vehicle that O’Neil had a fuel card for…
If O’Neil really wanted diesel fuel for personal use, why not just fill a jerry can at the service
station? Pay for it with the company fuel card? That sounds a lot easier and far less messy.
Is it possible that O’Neil’s work vehicle was low on fuel?
Is it possible that his vehicle was so low on fuel that he needed to siphon diesel so that he
would confidently make it to the service station to refuel? Perhaps deliver a portable
generator?
38. 38
Remember, MDBE-JV said it could not restrict access to the generator
fuel supply from Allen O’Neil because he was a supervisor and he had
a ‘key’.
Really?
There is a key that operates the generator and there is a key that locks
fuel access so to which key does MDBE-JV refer?
It does not matter because only one key controls the fuel access and it
hangs from a padlock NOT utilised … both before and after O’Neil is
admitted to hospital – and well after his death in March 2010.
The MSDS on Diesel Fuel supplied by MDBE did summarise the risk of
death if inhaled or ingested – but this appeared not to hit the radar of
the management - either before … or after the incident on 12/12/09.
39. 39
We note that SafeWork SA has provided an updated submission to the
Select Committee Inquiry in August 2011 in response to our evidence.
…and we do have
a little something to
say about that.
40. 40
SafeWork SA Submission Update – August 2011
Page 8
You got that right!
What? No matters to raise about the incident taking place out of work
hours anymore? Did the department have a sudden change of heart on
that front or did you actually read your own files?
41. 41
SafeWork SA Submission March 2011 – August 2011
Page 9
Well now there’s a surprise…
VOID had communication with this employee too.
This witnesses comments were precisely why VOID became concerned
that SafeWork SA was not protecting employees from company
management inquisition and speculation relating to on site safety issues.
MDBE-JV had no business investigating itself when there is a perfectly
capable safety regulator available to do the job!
42. 42
SafeWork SA Submission March 2011 – August 2011
Page 10
So which is it – the 13th or the 17th? Remember SLIDE # 4 – how did the
department come up with the 5 day delay?
If not for the incompetence of your own public comment, VOID would have
had no reason to question the timeline. However now that you mention that
Case File Report document – surely you’re not suggesting that this document
is untrustworthy – unreliable – isn’t it part of the Coroner’s file of evidence?
43. 43
SafeWork SA Submission March 2011 – August 2011
Page 10
Go back and read your own comments to The Advertiser Sept 1st 2010
and reassure us please you’re not making this up as you go?
Oh…am finding statements like this hard to stomach from a department
that is charged with workplace safety.
Allen O’Neil did not break a toe or strain his wrist, he was placed in a
medically induced coma! That is a serious matter – yes – no?
SafeWork SA should have taken this matter far more seriously than it did -
period.
44. 44
SafeWork SA Submission March 2011 – August 2011
Page 10
…and this is supposed to instil us with confidence…how exactly?
Perhaps SafeWork SA needs to become more acquainted with Safety
Data on diesel fuel. It outlines pretty clearly the risk of death when
ingested.
At any rate, do you think after a week or so in that coma that the
outcome was looking less favourable and perhaps someone should
initiate some further inquiries?
45. 45
SafeWork SA Submission March 2011 – August 2011
Page 12
…and was your investigation also told that the small amount of fuel that
was in that vehicle had been put in it AFTER Allen O’Neil had been rushed
to hospital?
Your department made this determination in December 2009 based solely
on the word of MDBE-JV management.
SafeWork SA allowed a self invested business to determine the
circumstances surrounding a serious incident on their work site with no
attempt made by your department to gain reliable timely evidence !
46. 46
SafeWork SA Submission March 2011 – August 2011
Page 14
Would these be the reliable witness statements given by workers who
had been under the influence of MDBE-JV and its management for 3
months before SafeWork SA took those statements?
Please, you are going to have to do be smarter than that.
YET ANOTHER OHS EPIC FAIL !
Notas del editor
The aim of this presentation is to step through some of the reported claims made by Government safety regulator SafeWork SA and inconsistencies that have arisen from the investigation into the death of Adelaide Desalination Pipeline Project worker Allen O’Neil on February 15th 2010.
I just want to quickly recap on some of the media reports that have been made in relation to the death of Allen O’Neil.You will note here Bryan Russell starts the run with these departmental comments – He said this incident happened out of normal work hours and was not related to work activity.He said that the department conducted a thorough investigation…And that the employer had relevant procedures and systems in place.
I just want to quickly recap on some of the media reports that have been made in relation to the death of Allen O’Neil.You will note here Bryan Russell starts the run with these departmental comments – He said this incident happened out of normal work hours and was not related to work activity.He said that the department conducted a thorough investigation…And that the employer had relevant procedures and systems in place.
The following day THE ADEVERTISER :Once again – more verbatim type dialogue – this time from a department spokeswoman.Hmmm…that’s interesting. Here SafeWork SA advised the public that the incident was reported 5 days later - on the 17th December 2010. Allen O’Neil was hospitalised on the 12th December 2010 – incidentally, he was placed into an induced coma.
Even the Legislative Council carried the same comment almost word for word .. Gosh that really is interesting. I wonder what steps had been taken to avoid such an incident happening again?
I just want to quickly recap on some of the media reports that have been made in relation to the death of Allen O’Neil.You will note here Bryan Russell starts the run with these departmental comments – He said this incident happened out of normal work hours and was not related to work activity.He said that the department conducted a thorough investigation…And that the employer had relevant procedures and systems in place.
Our primary focus during this presentation will be:How thorough the investigation actually was…was it conducted in a timely manner? What evidence was collected?Whether or not this happened outside of normal work hours – and what constitutes normal? Was Allen O’Neil still working or was he not?How did SafeWork SA manage to determine whether this was work-related activity or not?And just whatrelevant systems and procedures did the McConnell Dowel Built Environs joint venture have in place both before and after the incident?
Document 59 – this is the Department’s Case File Report …Page 8 shows us that the notification was recorded as being the 17/12/2009 which was indeed 5 days after the incident.Note on the 17th December the matter is referred to the Response Team.1 month later there is another entry – all the while there is a man that has been on life support now for 4 weeks. On the 12th February 2010 – 3 days before life support is terminated someone gets in a car and heads to the site!
On page 7 of the Case File ReportOn the 24th February 2010 it would appear SafeWork SA are now realising that they have a fatality on their hands.On the 3rd March 2010 finally there is a little ‘action’. Why on earth there are sections of the case file hidden in secrecy provisions is beyond us but there you have it, 81 days after the incident, SafeWork SA are now thinking about proceeding to an investigation.
Now to Page 6 …17th March 2010 – now SafeWork SA moves to collecting evidence. More than 3 months and 5 days go by – in all that time the said worker has been in a deep coma. Hmmm…3 months – really, now I ask you, how thorough can that investigation be?
BUT WAIT! What’s this? Just a minute – let’s just flash back to slide 3 for a moment …Okay, so in September 2010 when the media began questioning the death of Allen O’Neil, SafeWork SA came out publically defending their decision not to charge MDBE for their failure to notify because – well, lucky for everyone (except Allen O’Neil of course) that the injury (and consequent death) was deemed not to be work related anyway … phew. Question? Do the people at SafeWork SA actually even talk to each other? Here we have a matter in the hot hands of the media and one has to question whether anyone even bothered to read the file on Allen O’Neil’s death. I mean, it was never a very big case file was it? Oh … surely this document existed in the file prior to September 2010 didn’t it? Hmmm?
So the Case File Report (D 59) takes us to yet another file (document 4)The ‘Immediately Notifiable Work Related Injury Form’ Right! Maybe this document might tell us something?
Page 1Well now that’s fascinating. Admin forgets to include any relevant details that pertain to dates…
This is Page 2 of 2 of the form…It says *IMPORTANT NOTICE* - this should be read to the client? Nothing at the site is to be altered….There’s a check box there to ensure the statement is read and understood – and of course this remained unchecked.So are we to assume this was why MDBE-jv proceeded to remove evidence on site?
Regulation 418 outlines fairly clearly what an employer’s legal responsibilities are in relation to OHS Regulations in altering the work site where an employee has been hospitalised or killed.So what happened here?Back to the inspector’s statement – read the highlight text again …From the 13th December, the company gave clear indications as to why Allen O’Neil was in hospital.Before anyone had even had time to start any form of questioning, it was deemed non-work related and deemed unauthorised.And if the company that might have been investigated said this from Day 1 – then it must be true, right?Even more unbelievable was the fact that MDBE then conducted its own investigation – tampering with the only evidence that might have been of any assistance in a properly conducted investigation.MDBE took the photographic evidence on site.MDBE – the employer, consented itself to question employeesMDBE had the most crucial pieces of evidence removed from site within days.The one that should have been investigated is allowed to conduct the only real investigation.ALL witness statements relating to this incident have been suppressed (secrecy provisions) but the photographs are here … so … let’s have a look at those (which incidentally are not dated)
The only photographic evidence of any use was actually taken by the company. The photographs were not dated. Most of them seemed quite pointless (unless a macro view of Allen O’Neil’s vehicle number plate is vital…given it was in all the other photo’s of his car) but this one was perhaps worth showing.I draw your attention to what looks like a fuel cell next to Allen’s work vehicle. The only problem here is that Eric O’Neil and Mr AlisterMcNickle attended this area very soon after Allen was hospitalised. There was no sign of a fuel cell. The trench was also exposed and not neatly covered over.The amenities room is far right with the temporary fencing surrounding it … the generator was located within that area. ……But it would seem MDBE-jv didn’t consider the genset worth photographing. We’re busting to know why not? Is it because it had already been removed from site?
The Coates Hire Invoice – Document 42As you can see, this crucial piece of evidence was sent back to Coates Hire on the 18th December 2009….the morning afterthe Notification Form was lodged at SafeWork SA !What a remarkable coincidence!
To draw a comparison with what SafeWork SA inspectors saw when they arrived at Valve Pit #1 to gather evidence … 3 months later…Not that it would have made much difference – the area was being wiped clean before the ink had time to dry on the Immediately Notifiable Workplace Injury Notification Form!
Now to the question: Was Allen O’Neil was working at the time? SafeWork SA Internal Memo – Executive Summary (Document 56)On page 1 we note that as per VOID’s submission in January 2010, the information from Chris Tillbrook is correct and confirmed here. The executive summary includes reference to the portable generator and that Allen O’Neil needed help to lift this into his vehicle. On Page 2 – the executive summary also acknowledges the information VOID had obtained that Allen O’Neil returned to the area to lock up – as was part of his duties as a leading hand.VOID’s Submission in January (Page 7) outlined conversations with a Senior Supervisor of the area at the time – obviously employed by MDBE-jv. That staff returned VOID’s call to clarify some questions. He gave clear direction that suggested Allen O’Neil and Chris Tillbrook had no reason to be on site that afternoon. Based on this content of this executive summary, his information appears less than accurate.
Once again in the minutes regarding the Fatality Review, Page 1 – there is more reference made to Allen O’Neil needing to attend to a few matters … although it is conveniently ambiguous but based on the Executive Summary, there appears to be some acceptance that Allen O’Neil was still at work in his capacity as a leading hand employee …
So what does constitute a workplace injury?Please look at one example of a workplace tragedy which occurred out side of normal work hours – from the DAIS Annual Report – that being before being renamed to the Department of Premier & Cabinets.This report outlines a fatality that occurred in December 2004…Outside of normal work hoursThe employee no longer even worked there…This man’s death is not a result of work related duties…And yet SafeWork SA concluded that this man’s death does constitute a workplace fatality.It is perhaps worth noting that the death of the young boy a few months later would likely not have been associated with normal work duties either and yet also has been included on the stats.
And just in case SafeWork SA decided to change the criteria, we note quite recently this Media Release from the Department.So in the face of this, we would argue that the incident that ultimately claimed the life of Allen O’Neil should have fallen within the realm of a workplace injury and fatality. It happened on site. It happened whilst he was still performing work duties.But … of course this is a Government Funded project – perhaps the same rules don’t apply here?
Now we move to the 17th March 2010 – 3 months after the incident occurred and we’re looking at the hand written FIELD NOTES of a SafeWork SA Inspector (Document 18 – Page 18)…Page 18 in the absence of the generator in question, the Inspector has asked to view a similar generator …Of interest is this paragraph in her notes…Inspector McCallum feels compelledto make notes relating to the lack of provisions of access control to the fuel supply - padlock was unlocked …and hanging from a chain when we arrived.There was no site access control and the gate was open.So the lock that is designed to control access to the fuel is right there – but not being used.For 3 monthsMcConnell Dowell Built Environs management were aware of the hazard associated with poor security control over a generator’s fuel supply and yet, based on the observations of this inspector, they saw no need to change a thing?
On December 13th 2009 MDBE-jv were advised to ensure that fuel supplies in generators were secured to prevent unauthorised access by employees or the public! The response was that it was already done…but O’Neil had a key.What an absolute travesty to suggest that MDBE-JV could have done nothing more. The key – whether it be for the amenities area or the genset, it does not matter. The simplest form of access control was to use the fuel access lock that comes with the genset.
Here is the generator Inspector McCallum has photographed:On arriving – the flap is open and the padlock is hanging from a chain…which might suggest not much has changed since December 12th 2009.
Back to our focus … and the determination by SafeWork SA that the accident happened as a result of non work-related activity…Doesn’t it seem reasonable that Allen had a key because there may have been times when he needed to access the fuel supply of the generator?Is it conceivable that in the spirit of keeping the project moving along, McConnell Dowell were indifferent to measures like this being taken – to keep the work moving along – no delays – no dramas … well fingers crossed anyway…Chris Tillbrook commented to VOID that Allen had siphoned diesel from the generator to get a tractor on site going again…Eddie Kingston commented that McConnell Dowell was aware that diesel was being removed from generators – even prior to this incident according to him when we spoke in October 2010 - and yet McConnell Dowell Built Environs failed to action this – failed to secure the generator’s fuel supply…the question has to be … why?And Eddie Kingston … of course his statement to SafeWork SA has been suppressed from us – but…
Now let’s speculate a little on these so-called safety systems and procedures that were reported by our safety regulator to be in place and adequate…and in this bundle of documents released by FOI – of those not buried in secrecy provisions…Not one reference in any of the documents to any safety systems, procedures or controls relating to the removal of fuel from machinery or equipment- There wasn’t even any sign of a circulated memo to employees or contractors after the fact.There was no measure in place to ensure if it needed to happen, that it could be done safely – for example a siphon hose that does not require suction from a human.There were no signs on or around the generator that made it clear that the activity of siphoning diesel was dangerous or was prohibited.The MSDS on Diesel Fuel supplied by MDBE did summarise the risk of death if inhaled or ingested – but this appeared not to hit the radar of the management - either before … or after the incident on 12/12/09.
Now let’s speculate a little on these so-called safety systems and procedures that were reported by our safety regulator to be in place and adequate…and in this bundle of documents released by FOI – of those not buried in secrecy provisions…Not one reference in any of the documents to any safety systems, procedures or controls relating to the removal of fuel from machinery or equipment- There wasn’t even any sign of a circulated memo to employees or contractors after the fact.There was no measure in place to ensure if it needed to happen, that it could be done safely – for example a siphon hose that does not require suction from a human.There were no signs on or around the generator that made it clear that the activity of siphoning diesel was dangerous or was prohibited.The MSDS on Diesel Fuel supplied by MDBE did summarise the risk of death if inhaled or ingested – but this appeared not to hit the radar of the management - either before … or after the incident on 12/12/09.
Now let’s speculate a little on these so-called safety systems and procedures that were reported by our safety regulator to be in place and adequate…and in this bundle of documents released by FOI – of those not buried in secrecy provisions…Not one reference in any of the documents to any safety systems, procedures or controls relating to the removal of fuel from machinery or equipment- There wasn’t even any sign of a circulated memo to employees or contractors after the fact.There was no measure in place to ensure if it needed to happen, that it could be done safely – for example a siphon hose that does not require suction from a human.There were no signs on or around the generator that made it clear that the activity of siphoning diesel was dangerous or was prohibited.The MSDS on Diesel Fuel supplied by MDBE did summarise the risk of death if inhaled or ingested – but this appeared not to hit the radar of the management - either before … or after the incident on 12/12/09.
Now let’s speculate a little on these so-called safety systems and procedures that were reported by our safety regulator to be in place and adequate…and in this bundle of documents released by FOI – of those not buried in secrecy provisions…Not one reference in any of the documents to any safety systems, procedures or controls relating to the removal of fuel from machinery or equipment- There wasn’t even any sign of a circulated memo to employees or contractors after the fact.There was no measure in place to ensure if it needed to happen, that it could be done safely – for example a siphon hose that does not require suction from a human.There were no signs on or around the generator that made it clear that the activity of siphoning diesel was dangerous or was prohibited.The MSDS on Diesel Fuel supplied by MDBE did summarise the risk of death if inhaled or ingested – but this appeared not to hit the radar of the management - either before … or after the incident on 12/12/09.
Now let’s speculate a little on these so-called safety systems and procedures that were reported by our safety regulator to be in place and adequate…and in this bundle of documents released by FOI – of those not buried in secrecy provisions…Not one reference in any of the documents to any safety systems, procedures or controls relating to the removal of fuel from machinery or equipment- There wasn’t even any sign of a circulated memo to employees or contractors after the fact.There was no measure in place to ensure if it needed to happen, that it could be done safely – for example a siphon hose that does not require suction from a human.There were no signs on or around the generator that made it clear that the activity of siphoning diesel was dangerous or was prohibited.The MSDS on Diesel Fuel supplied by MDBE did summarise the risk of death if inhaled or ingested – but this appeared not to hit the radar of the management - either before … or after the incident on 12/12/09.
Now let’s speculate a little on these so-called safety systems and procedures that were reported by our safety regulator to be in place and adequate…and in this bundle of documents released by FOI – of those not buried in secrecy provisions…Not one reference in any of the documents to any safety systems, procedures or controls relating to the removal of fuel from machinery or equipment- There wasn’t even any sign of a circulated memo to employees or contractors after the fact.There was no measure in place to ensure if it needed to happen, that it could be done safely – for example a siphon hose that does not require suction from a human.There were no signs on or around the generator that made it clear that the activity of siphoning diesel was dangerous or was prohibited.The MSDS on Diesel Fuel supplied by MDBE did summarise the risk of death if inhaled or ingested – but this appeared not to hit the radar of the management - either before … or after the incident on 12/12/09.
Now let’s speculate a little on these so-called safety systems and procedures that were reported by our safety regulator to be in place and adequate…and in this bundle of documents released by FOI – of those not buried in secrecy provisions…Not one reference in any of the documents to any safety systems, procedures or controls relating to the removal of fuel from machinery or equipment- There wasn’t even any sign of a circulated memo to employees or contractors after the fact.There was no measure in place to ensure if it needed to happen, that it could be done safely – for example a siphon hose that does not require suction from a human.There were no signs on or around the generator that made it clear that the activity of siphoning diesel was dangerous or was prohibited.The MSDS on Diesel Fuel supplied by MDBE did summarise the risk of death if inhaled or ingested – but this appeared not to hit the radar of the management - either before … or after the incident on 12/12/09.
Now let’s speculate a little on these so-called safety systems and procedures that were reported by our safety regulator to be in place and adequate…and in this bundle of documents released by FOI – of those not buried in secrecy provisions…Not one reference in any of the documents to any safety systems, procedures or controls relating to the removal of fuel from machinery or equipment- There wasn’t even any sign of a circulated memo to employees or contractors after the fact.There was no measure in place to ensure if it needed to happen, that it could be done safely – for example a siphon hose that does not require suction from a human.There were no signs on or around the generator that made it clear that the activity of siphoning diesel was dangerous or was prohibited.The MSDS on Diesel Fuel supplied by MDBE did summarise the risk of death if inhaled or ingested – but this appeared not to hit the radar of the management - either before … or after the incident on 12/12/09.
Now let’s speculate a little on these so-called safety systems and procedures that were reported by our safety regulator to be in place and adequate…and in this bundle of documents released by FOI – of those not buried in secrecy provisions…Not one reference in any of the documents to any safety systems, procedures or controls relating to the removal of fuel from machinery or equipment- There wasn’t even any sign of a circulated memo to employees or contractors after the fact.There was no measure in place to ensure if it needed to happen, that it could be done safely – for example a siphon hose that does not require suction from a human.There were no signs on or around the generator that made it clear that the activity of siphoning diesel was dangerous or was prohibited.The MSDS on Diesel Fuel supplied by MDBE did summarise the risk of death if inhaled or ingested – but this appeared not to hit the radar of the management - either before … or after the incident on 12/12/09.
Now let’s speculate a little on these so-called safety systems and procedures that were reported by our safety regulator to be in place and adequate…and in this bundle of documents released by FOI – of those not buried in secrecy provisions…Not one reference in any of the documents to any safety systems, procedures or controls relating to the removal of fuel from machinery or equipment- There wasn’t even any sign of a circulated memo to employees or contractors after the fact.There was no measure in place to ensure if it needed to happen, that it could be done safely – for example a siphon hose that does not require suction from a human.There were no signs on or around the generator that made it clear that the activity of siphoning diesel was dangerous or was prohibited.The MSDS on Diesel Fuel supplied by MDBE did summarise the risk of death if inhaled or ingested – but this appeared not to hit the radar of the management - either before … or after the incident on 12/12/09.
Now let’s speculate a little on these so-called safety systems and procedures that were reported by our safety regulator to be in place and adequate…and in this bundle of documents released by FOI – of those not buried in secrecy provisions…Not one reference in any of the documents to any safety systems, procedures or controls relating to the removal of fuel from machinery or equipment- There wasn’t even any sign of a circulated memo to employees or contractors after the fact.There was no measure in place to ensure if it needed to happen, that it could be done safely – for example a siphon hose that does not require suction from a human.There were no signs on or around the generator that made it clear that the activity of siphoning diesel was dangerous or was prohibited.The MSDS on Diesel Fuel supplied by MDBE did summarise the risk of death if inhaled or ingested – but this appeared not to hit the radar of the management - either before … or after the incident on 12/12/09.
