This document summarizes research exploring the complexity of policy design for Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) systems. The research team from Instituto Superior Técnico, Universidade Técnica de Lisboa aims to understand BRT decision making processes, develop a framework for retrospective policy analysis, and create a systems dynamics model to identify effective policy packages. The document outlines preliminary analysis of Transantiago, Santiago's BRT system, including its objectives, issues with the prior system, key policy features, implementation challenges, and stakeholder analysis. It also presents an analytical framework and initial evaluation of Transantiago's policy package.
1. EXPLORING THE COMPLEXITY OF POLICY DESIGN
January 2013
Research team:
Rosário Macário (coord)
Luís N. Filipe
Maria Spandou
Vasco Reis
Luis Martinez
Instituto Superior Técnico
Universidade Técnica de Lisboa
2. Project objectives
• Understand the main decision making processes in
BRT systems
• Develop a formal structure for retrospective analysis
of the various interplaying policy components, and
relations between institutional design and
performance
• Develop a systems dynamic model to search for well‐
designed and promising BRT policy packages
3. • Luis N. Filipe, Rosário Macário, “A first glimpse on policy
packaging for implementation of BRT projects” in Research
in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 150 – 157
• Spandou M., Macário R., Decentralization as an institutional
determinant for the performance of urban mobility
systems, VREF CoE Workshop 26‐29 October 2011, Beijing,
China
• Macário R. Thinking on public accountability: How to
address quality of policy design and decision‐making? 12th
Thredbo Conference, 11‐15 September 2011, Durban,
South Africa
• + working reports
6. Objectives and goals of TS
• Improve the existing public transport system of Santiago, addressing
and solving the failures of the former system
• Capable of maintaining or increasing the modal share of public
transport while being environmentally, socially and economically
sustainable (Muñoz & Gschwender, 2008)
7. Old transport system – issues to be
addressed
(Allende, I., et. al., 2007; Muñoz & Gschwender, 2008; Brione, 2009)
• Defective business structure, with many small companies operating
only a few services; companies organized into powerful cooperatives
that were able to capture the government
• No formal working relations, driver’s income linked to the number of
passengers ‐ tax evasion, promotion of abusive practices,
discrimination of subsidized passengers, on‐street competition
• Payments done directly to drivers, who were subject to constant
assaults
• Defective network: 80% of the routes used one of the 6 main city
streets; very long routes (average 60km), leading to high operating
costs, bus bunching, congestion
8. Old transport system – issues to be
addressed (cont.)
(Allende, I., et. al., 2007; Muñoz & Gschwender, 2008; Brione, 2009)
• No integration (fore or physical) making transfers expensive and low use
of the metro
• Old / uncomfortable and badly maintained buses, causing passenger
discomfort, high air pollution and noise emissions
But...
• Relevant positive features in the old system:
(Allende, I., et. al., 2007; Brione, 2009)
• high network density and capillarity
• high frequencies
• low or no need for transfers
• no subsidies
• Flexibility to serve new residential areas
9. Main features of the TS Plan
(Muñoz & Gschwender, 2009)
• Organised as trunk and feeder system with the metro as the backbone
• Specifications defined to minimize total social cost, operate without
subsidies and subject to a maximal fare, with an average travel time
similar to former system
• Drivers’ salaries independent from the number of passengers – eliminate
aggressive driving techniques
• Operators receive the same for all passengers ‐ discrimination against
poorer/subsidized passengers
• Fares and services integration, including the metro – increase metro
ridership
10. Policy Packaging in BRT
TranSantiago Case Study
Main features of the TS Plan (cont.)
(Muñoz & Gschwender, 2009)
• Totally new fleet, with facilities for disabled riders
• A new information system to passengers, based on GPS technology
• Smartcard transaction, thus eliminating money handling in buses –
reducing assaults to drivers
• Money administered by AFT (financial and technological manager)
• Awards and penalties scheme on operators’ contracts
• Network of segregated bus corridors and high quality bus stops ‐ increase
in average speed
11. Policy Packaging in BRT
TranSantiago Case Study (WP3)
Implementation
• Transition plan foreseen for a seamless transition from the old system
• Several delays (e.g. AFT implementation ) led to postponements which in
turn led to relaxing of planned features (e.g. flat fare)
• Changes in political power led to important changes to the plan (e.g.
reduction on the scope of the information system; allowing companies to
rent buses)
• Despite extensive planning several problems arose on the starting date
(Feb 10th 2007), causing the Chilean parliament to produce a massive
report (Cámara de Diputados, 2007) used by several parties and
associations to dissect the project
13. Some Institutional issues
• Plan emerged from a very high and closed hierarchy with no independent
members or technicians, leading to low public participation (Brione, 2009)
• Different members of the committee had different (sometimes opposing)
agendas, according to their backgrounds
• No clear definition of responsibilities of each of the members of the
Committee (Cámara de Diputados, 2007)
• CGTS was created following the model of the agency responsible for road
concessions (Coordinadora de Concesiones), assuming the concession
process for roads and for bus operations were similar
• Transport Authority with proper attributions could have helped
overcoming some of the institutional issues identified (e.g. Allende et. al.,
2007)
14. Analytical framework to the policy
package
Analytical Dimensions Associated evaluation criteria
Dimension 1 Clarity of objectives and goals;
Objectives and goals Measurability of goals;
Effectiveness against goals;
Compatibility with parallel objectives/goals.
Dimension 2 Breadth and diversity of potential measures;
Primary measures and causal Accuracy of causal assumptions;
assumptions Accuracy of distributional effects.
Dimension 3 Exploitation of potential synergistic relationships;
Inter‐measure interaction Mitigation of potential contradictory/redundant relationships;
Skilful incorporation of quantitative and qualitative assessment.
Dimension 4 Financial viability;
Policy design process, technical Stakeholder engagement.
and financial considerations
Dimension 5 Ex‐ante mitigation of barriers and unintended effects;
Barriers and unintended effects Ex‐post package flexibility.
Source: AustriaTech GmbH et al., 2010
16. Preliminary conclusions ‐ Package
evaluation
Objectives and goals
• Objectives and goals of the project were clearly defined
• The plan effectively addressed all the faulty issues identified in the
former transport system
• The plan lacked measurable targets
• Positive aspects of the former system disregarded by the plan
• high network density and capillarity
• high frequencies
• low or no need for transfers
• no subsidies
• flexibility to serve new residential areas
-5 0 +5
17. Preliminary conclusions ‐ Package
evaluation
Inter‐measure interaction
• Synergetic relations, e.g. between the new bus system and the
metro in order to increase ridership of the latter well explored and
between
• Literature shows detailed studies and modelling were conducted
to determine system specifications (Muñoz & Gschwender, 2008),
although some also argue that modeling used was sometimes
defective (Brione, 2009)
-5 0 +5
18. Preliminary conclusions ‐ Package
evaluation
Policy design process, technical and financial considerations
• Very weak public participation, claimed to be one of the major
limitations of the project (Muñoz & Gschwender, 2008; Brione, 2009)
• Faulty institutional design (Allende, I., et. al., 2007 ; Brione, 2009)
• Very closed and limited team of experts (Brione, 2009)
Barriers and unintended effects
-5 0 +5
• Financial viability affected by the diversion of investment to metro
and urban highways around Santiago when a new Minister took
power
-5 0 +5
19. Stakeholders
(besides the actors presented before)
• Operator companies (associated into cooperatives ‐ gremiales) – in the
old system functioned as a cartel and had the power to influence and
capture governments’ actions during the creation and implementation
of Transantiago; some were incorporated in the new system (TS)
• Bus Drivers’ – had vary bad working conditions in the old system; were
explored by the owners (operators) and had a vary bad reputation by
the citizens who accused them of system’s failures;
• Citizens – the ones affected by the plan
• NGO’s – had an important role in creating awareness about the
problems in the transportation system and had an important role in
influencing the political agenda
20. Preliminary conclusions
• Project had several problems, not caused by policy package but by
implementation issues
• Delays in several areas, causing the postponement of the project;
• Postponement of technology and infrastrucutre (segregated
busways and stops)
• Diversion of funding to metro and road projects
• Reduction of the information system
• Operational deficit
21. Preliminary conclusions (cont.)
• Problems affecting implementation related to weaknesses in
institutional design, namely:
• Implementation hierarchy highly dependent from political power
• No authority officially committed to the implementation of the
system
• No clear definition of responsabilities and overlaping roles (in the
Transantiago Directorate)
24. WP3 Case studies
Santiago (Transantiago), Belo Horizonte, Bogotá (TransMilenio), Guangzhou BRT,
Chile Brazil Colombia China
Annual demand
102 392 540 n.d.
(million pass. / year)
Annual fare revenue
85,17 398,29 370,44 175,2
(US$ millions)
Commercial speed (kph) 26,18 16,5 27 18
Corridors 14 7 8 1
Daily demand
340,8 130,8 1800 800
(thousand pass. / day)
Fare integration Yes Yes Yes n.d.
Maximum user fare (US$) 1,19 1,45 0,98 0,6
Minimum user fare (US$) 1,19 0,16 0,98 0,6
Modal split
35 38,9 59 n.d.
(% Public transport)
Overtaking lanes Partial Partial All Partial*
Peak frequency
185 500 320 10
(buses / hour)
Peak load (pphpd) 12700 35000 43000 29900
Pre-board fare collection Partial Partial All Yes*
Real time information No No Yes Yes*
Standard fare (US$) 1,19 1,45 0,98 0,24*
Station boarding level Low-level platform & On-street,
On-street, no level boarding High level platform Level boarding on some buses*
no level boarding
Station spacing (m) 416 325
783 880
System length (km) 91,85 24,9 106 22,5
User rating Good Average Good
All data Global BRT Data (http://www.brtdata.org/) except *China BRT (http://www.chinabrt.org/en/)
25. Case studies
Janmarg (Ahmedabad), New Delhi, Lyon, Goteborg,
India India France Sweden
Annual demand
15,6 16 n.d. n.d.
(million pass. / year)
Annual fare revenue
5,52 5,51 2,57
(US$ millions)
Commercial speed (kph) 25 17 17 21
Corridors 2 1 1 4
Daily demand
52 53,5 4,7
(thousand pass. / day)
Fare integration n.d. No
Maximum user fare (US$) 0,3 0,49 $1,50
Minimum user fare (US$) 0,3 0,1 $1,50
Modal split
17 48
(% Public transport)
Overtaking lanes None
Peak frequency
30 104 20
(buses / hour)
Peak load (pphpd) 1055 5500
Pre-board fare collection None
Real time information Yes
Standard fare (US$) 0,2 0,49
Station boarding level On-street, no level boarding
Station spacing (m) 550 644
System length (km) 39 5,8 4
User rating Good
All data Global BRT Data (http://www.brtdata.org/) except *China BRT (http://www.chinabrt.org/en/)
26. National Cultural Dimension
•Individualism (IDV)
the degree of interdependence a society maintains
among its members.
•Masculinity / Femininity (MAS)
what motivates people, wanting to be the best
(masculine) or liking what you do (feminine)
•Uncertainty avoidance (UAI)
the extent to which the members of a culture feel
•Power distance (PDI) threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations and
the extent to which the less powerful have created beliefs and institutions that try to avoid
members of institutions and these
organizations within a country expect
and accept that power is distributed •Long-term orientation (LTO)
unequally the extent to which a society shows a pragmatic future-
oriented perspective rather than a conventional
historical short-term point of view
Source:
Hofstede Center (geert-hofstede.com/united-states.html)
29. Theoretical framework
The concept of (individual or
corporate) actor presupposes
the following assumptions:
•The resources brought to an
action situation by the actor
•The valuation that actors assign
to states of the world and to
actions
•The way actors acquire, process,
retain and use knowledge INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT
contingencies and information
FRAMEWORK (adapted from Ostrom, 2005)
•The process actors use for
selection of particular courses.
OBJECTIVE
The action situation:
•Participants
•Positions Analyze the individual
•Outcomes components of the case
•Action-outcome linkages (or allowable study institutional design and
actions) highlight strengths and
•Control the participants exercise
•Information weaknesses that affect policy
•Costs and benefits assigned to outcomes and performance
30. NEW YORK CITY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Economics and
Statistics Administration U.S. Census Bureau
http://www.nycgo.com/neighborhoods
32. Socio‐economic diversity
New York's five boroughs overview
Jurisdiction Population Land area
1 July 2011 square square
Borough of County of Estimates miles km
Manhattan New York 1.601.948 23 59
The Bronx Bronx 1.392.002 42 109
Brooklyn Kings 2.532.645 71 183
Queens Queens 2.247.848 109 283
Staten Island Richmond 470.467 58 151
City of New York 8.244.910 303 786
State of New York 19.465.197 47.214 122.284
[1][2][3
Source: United States Census Bureau
County Borough Density Bachelor's Language Homeowners Households, Persons per Median Total number Mean
Persons degree or other than hip rate, 2006‐2010 household, household of firms, 2007 travel time
per sq. higher, % of English 2006‐2010 2006‐2010 income 2006‐ to work
mile, 2010 persons age spoken at 2010
mins ,
25 , 2006‐ home, pct age
2010 5 , 2006‐ workers
2010 age 16 ,
2006‐2010
New York Manhattan 69.467,5 57.0% 40.0% 22.8% 732.204 2,09 $64,971 307,128 30,1
Kings Brooklyn 35.369,1 28,8% 45,9% 30,3% 903,991 2,68 $43.567 253.129 41,6
Richmond Staten Island 8.030,3 28,5% 29,6% 70,3% 164.279 2,76 $71.084 37.844 42,0
Bronx The Bronx 32.903,6 17,6% 56,0% 20,7% 472.464 2,79 $34.264 111,028 41,7
Queens Queens 20.553,6 29,5% 56,2% 45,5% 774.311 2,81 $55.291 236.900 42,0
New York City 27.012,5 33,3% 48,3% 33,0% 3.047.249 2,59 $50.285 944.129 39,2
New York State 411,2 32.1% 29,2% 55.2% 7.205.740 2,59 $55,603 1.956.733 31,3
33. Metropolitan
Transportation Stakeholders
Authority*
Authorities
New York City Transit
Associations
MTA Bus Company Advocacy Groups
Long Island Rail Road
Metro‐North Railroad New York's Public Transit
Bridges and Tunnels Union*
The Port Authority of
New York & New Jersey Permanent Citizens
Advisory Committee*
New York City
Department of
Transport Straphangers Campaign*
New York Metropolitan
Transportation Council Citizens Budget
(MPO)* Commission*
New York State
Department of Transportation
Transportation Alternatives
New York State
Comptroller Manhattan Institute
Federal Transit
Administration etc
* Interviews with stakeholder representatives were conducted during field visit
34. FEDERAL
Department
Agency
STATE
New York City REGIONAL
LOCAL NOTE: This is a very simplified representation of NYC´s
Public Transit Institutional design. There are three types of
financial flows (Federal, State and Local); individual
financial mechanisms are still under investigation.
36. passenger trips
Passenger miles
Unlinked
Traffic and
Mobility
Characteristics
‐New York‐Newark
NY‐NJ‐CT‐
Data Source: Texas
Transportation Institute
37. Traffic and
Mobility
Characteristics
‐New York‐Newark
NY‐NJ‐CT‐
Data Source: Texas
Transportation Institute
VMT = Vehicle Miles
Travelled
39. Commuters
Commuters to Manhattan
Figures adapted from Moss, M.L., Qing, C.Y. and Kaufman, S. (2012). Commuting to Manhattan: A study of residence location trends for Manhattan workers
from 2002 to 2009. Rudin Center for Transportation Policy and Management, New York University Wagner School of Public Service, March 2012
41. State and Local Government Finances
(Revenue sources) http://www.census.gov/govs/
2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010
42. State and Local Government Finances
(Expenditures)
2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010
http://www.census.gov/govs/
43. State and Local Government Finances
(Outstanding debt)
2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010
http://www.census.gov/govs/
45. MTA 1991‐2011 Total Funding Sources
Data source: National Transit Database
Fund Source 1991‐2011
FaresOp 35,56%
StateOp 19,22%
LocalCap 17,47%
LocalOp 12,44%
FederalCap 10,76%
Other Op 2,91%
OtherCap 0,68%
StateCap 0,66%
FederalOp 0,31%
ReconciliationOp 0,00%
TOTAL 100,00%
46. NOTES:
•The services of MTA Long Island Bus are operated since 2011 by a private operator,
Nassau Inter-County Express (NICE), i.e. Veolia Transport, after Nassau County´s
decision.
•MTA Staten Island Railway is a division of MTA New York City Transit Data source: National Transit Database
47. Total operating
expenses
=
Vehicle operations
expenses
+
Vehicle maintenance
expenses
+
Non-vehicle
maintenance
+
General administration
expenses
Data Source: National Transit Database
New York City DOT = New York City
Department of Transportation
Directly operated (DO) Purchased transportation (PT)
Heavy rail (HR) rapid MTA New York City Transit
transit MTA Staten Island Railway
MTA Metro‐North Railroad
Commuter Rail (CR)
MTA Long Island Rail Road
MTA Long Island Bus
MTA Metro‐North Railroad
Bus (MB) MTA New York City Transit
New York City DOT
MTA Bus Company
Demand response MTA New York City Transit
MTA Long Island Bus
(DR) New York City DOT
MTA Metro‐North Railroad
Ferryboat (FB) New York City Department of Transportation
New York City DOT
48. A story of budgetary cuts
Governor Paterson Proposes Austere Budget to Close State
Deficit (NYT, December 16,2008)
M.T.A. Approves Austerity Budget (NYT, December 17,2008)
“The board of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority on Wednesday
approved an austerity budget for 2009 that calls for painful cuts in bus,
subway and commuter rail service and a steep increase in fares and
tolls, all aimed at plugging a $1.2 billion deficit”
PHOTO CREDIT: DNAinfo/Yepoka Yeebo
49. Ravitch MTA Rescue Plan
(December 2, 2008)
Assigned on June 10, 2008, by Governor David A. Paterson to recommend strategies to
fund MTA essential capital projects and operating needs.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Urgency for immediate action
Impose a New Regional Mobility Tax
Create the MTA Capital Finance Authority
Establish a Regular Cycle of Predictable Fare and Toll Increases
Impose Cashless Tolling on the East River and Harlem River Bridges:
Improve Bus Service in the Region:
• “the Commission recommends that the MTA implement a new and promising
bus strategy – Bus Rapid Transit to add a state of the art dimension that
promises significant travel time, efficiency and comfort benefits”
Strengthen Governance of the MTA
Increase Transparency and Accountability
Mitigate the MTA’s Proposed 2009 Fare and Toll Increase and Anticipated Service
Reductions
50. Payroll mobility tax
(Source: New York Post, 24Aug2012)
• Then‐Gov. David Paterson enacted it after the MTA faced a $1.8 billion
budget shortfall in 2009
• The tax adds a 34‐cent surcharge to every $100 an employer pays out,
and applies to the 12 New York counties served by the MTA.
• Governor Cuomo and the legislative leaders have agreed in December
6, 2012 to reduce the MTA payroll tax on small businesses while
maintaining the necessary funding for the MTA from other sources.
The State would compensate the MTA for the $250 million in lost
revenue.
(http://www.governor.ny.gov/press/1262011GrowTheEconomy)
• MTA payroll tax ruled unconstitutional by state Supreme Court on
August 22, 2012
• This would have a ripple effect that wipes away nearly $2 billion in
funding, a devastating blow that would lead to “extreme” fare hikes.
51. SBS line County Launched
PHASE I BRT PROJECTS
Fordham Road Bronx Jun 2008
First and Manhattan Oct 2010
Second
Avenues
34th Street Manhattan Nov 2011
Hylan Staten Island Sep 2012
Boulevard
Nostrand Brooklyn Service to
Avenue‐Rogers begin 2013
Avenue
PHASE II BRT PROJECTS
M60 (upgrade Queens planned
existing M60
to LaGuardia
Airport)
Webster Bronx planned
Avenue
http://www.nyc.gov/html/brt/html/routes/routes.shtml
www.mta.info/nyct/service/images/SelectBusServ1.gif
52. SPEED AND RELIABILITY
•Frequent service
•Station spacing (about every half a mile)
•Off-board fare payment
•Traffic Signal Priority (TSP)
•Bus lanes
PASSENGER COMFORT AND CONVENIENCE
•Enhanced stations
•Low-floor and up to three doors BRT vehicles
•Branding
www.mta.info/mta/planning/sbs/
Photo courtecy: Maria Spandou
53. Interesting Issues highlighted during the interviews (I)
CULTURAL / INSTITUTIONAL
• Cultural barriers ‐ “Public goods provided by the public sector”
philosophy
• Clarification of role ‐ Governor´s de jure and de facto role and
influence
• In people´s perceptions MTA is supervised by the City of New York,
instead of the NY State (Governor)
FINANCIAL
• Unstable and uncertain financial flows
• Competition within NY state counties for funding and financing, in the
form of negotiations
• Money availability ‐ Funds Appropriation processes are timely
• Debt increase ‐ Bond issuing affected strongly MTA´s financial situation
54. Interesting Issues highlighted during the interviews (II)
CAPACITY BUILDING
• MTA´s participation in a number of benchmarking networks (e.g.
Community of Metros – CoMET, International Bus Benchmarking Group)
PARTICIPATION AND COLLABORATION
• Awareness / accountability ‐ Informal “watchdog” role played by the
advocacy groups
• Public participation is encouraged through public hearings, prescribed by
law. Interviewees had different perceptions about effectiveness
• Relationships have been built between certain stakeholders that allow for
initiatives of collaboration when an issue/problem appears
CONFLICTS
• Tension between labor unions and MTA in face of the new contract
negotiations, due to MTA´s budgetary restraints.
56. Preliminary Conclusions (I)
• Soft Institutional changes are more probable than radical ones,
due to the conditions established by the legal framework
• There are no patterns of funding and financing, as depicted
from analysis of federal, state and local financial flows data
• Leadership and reputation are important elements of the
personal preferences of the decision‐makers
• Personal and corporate reputation are most of the times
incentive factors that influence positively the peroformance of
system
57. Preliminary Conclusions (II)
• Transparency and openness of information and data promote
accountability and constant formal & informal assessment of
the system´s performance
• Participation of the various stakeholders in a number of
networks, promote collaboration and capacity building. In
cases of “power/influence of scale” objectives are more
probable to be achieved
• New York City´s economic dynamic and attractiveness, Political
and financial/funding parameters and mobility culture are,
macroscopically, some of the most important determinants of
the system´s performance.
58. Thank you for your attention !
Prof. Rosário Macário
rosariomacario@ist.utl.pt
Luís N. Filipe (Transantiago)
lfilipe@ist.utl.pt
Maria Spandou (New York City)
Bus Rapid Transit
mariaspandou@ist.utl.pt Across Latitudes and Cultures
VREF Center of Excellence