An overview of the relationship between DoD 5000.02 and Resource-Informed Army Modernization. Specifically addresses Reset, Brigade Combat Team Modernization, and Ground Combat Vehicle planning. Emphasizes the importance of product support and technology insertion.

1. DoDI 5000.02 and Resource-Informed
Army Modernization
Prepared for the RMS Partnership
Government-Industry Training Seminar, November 17-18, 2009
“DoDI 5000.02 and You: The Impact on RMS/L & Systems Engineering”
Dr. Russell Vacante, President
William D. Bajusz, Ph.D.
Senior Logistics Consultant
William.Bajusz@goldbeltwolf.com
www.LinkedIn.com/in/williambajusz
Goldbelt Wolf, LLC.
An SDB 8(a) Alaska Native Corporation
5500 Cherokee Avenue
Suite 100
Alexandria, VA 22312
www.goldbeltwolf.com

2. Purpose
• To provide a basis for discussion of how DoDI 5000.02 relates to resource-
informed Army modernization – from an RMS, logistics, and systems
engineering perspective
RMS Partnership’s President’s Editorial
•Are there “lessons learned” from less than a year’s
application of DoDI 5000.02?
•Is there a common understanding between Services and
industry partners?
• How compatible is technology insertion with Performance
Based Life Cycle Product Support requirements?
Fluid Environment
•Downward pressures on DoD budget
•Reexamination of Product Support
•Level of troop commitment to, and strategy in Afghanistan
•Retrograde from Iraq
•Imperatives for full scale Army modernization 2

3. Agenda
• DoDI 5000.02 – Selected Excerpts
• Future of Performance Based Life Cycle
Support
• Resource-Informed Army Modernization
• Precepts
• Concluding Observations
3

4. DoDI 5000.02 – Selected Excerpts
“Evolutionary acquisition is the preferred DoD strategy for the rapid
acquisition of mature technology for the user. An evolutionary approach
delivers capability in increments, recognizing up front the need for future
capability improvements.”
Enclosure 2, 2.a
“PMs for all programs shall formulate a viable Reliability, Availability,
and Maintainability (RAM) strategy that includes a reliability growth program
as an integral part of design and development. RAM shall be integrated with
the Systems Engineering processes, documented in the program’s Systems Engin-
eering Plan (SEP) and Life Cycle Sustainment Plan (LCSP), and assessed during
technical reviews, test and evaluation (T&E), and Product Support Reviews (PSRs).
Enclosure 2, 5, d (5)
“Life-cycle sustainment planning shall be considered during Materiel
Solution Analysis, and shall mature throughout Technology Development. An LCSP
shall be prepared for Milestone B.”
Enclosure 2, 8, c (1), (a)
“The PM shall work with the user to document performance and sustain-
ment requirements in performance agreements specifying objective outcomes, measures
Resource commitments, and stakeholder responsibilities. The PM shall employ effective Per-
formance Based Life-Cycle Product Support (PBL) planning, development, implementa-
tion and management.”
Enclosure 2, 8, c (1), (d)
4

5. Total Life Cycle Product Support Cost Reduction
5
• Hon Jack Bell (DUSD L&MR) Delivered the Defense Department’s
Keynote Address on “Maintaining Warfighter Readiness” at the Annual DoD
Maintenance Symposium – October 28, 2008
• Army Business Case Analysis Policy issued 18 Aug 2005
– Implements guidance necessary to conform with USD/ATL BCA Policy Memos issued in
2004
– Identifies Type I (Feasibility) and Type II (Formal) BCAs
• Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (ATL) PBL Guidance Document on
“Implementing a Life Cycle Management Framework” Memorandum for
Secretaries of the Military Services – July 2008
Weapon System Acquisition Reform Product Support
Assessment
• Life Cycle Product Support Vision and Guiding
Principles
• New Business Model
• Resource Misalignment
• Governance
• Partnership Sub-optimization
Emphasizes and reinforces the use of Performance-Based Product Support strategies
Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-23), signed May 22, 2009
DoDI 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, signed December 8, 2008

6. Driving Costs Down, Performance Up
6The Process OSD PBL Maturity Model

7. Perspective on the Army
Enterprise-Wide
Holistic
Sustain Prepare Reset Transform
Core Enterprises
•Readiness (FORSCOM)
•Human capital (TRADOC)
•Services and infrastructure (IMCOM)
•Materiel (AMC)
Organizing Principle: What are pragmatic RMS, logistics, and engineering actions to enable Readiness
and Strategic Flexibility and to continue to meet rapidly changing current
demands at lowest possible cost?
Resource-Informed Modernization Strategy
7

8. Defense Acquisition Management System
8

9. First Principles
Congressional
Funding
Financial
Infrastructure
Warfighter
Needs
Accountability
?
Sub-optimized Tracking Systems Cause Needless Environmental Instability for the Government PM
9

10. LMP
GCSS-A
F/T
AESIP
SALE
IT Infrastructure
•Legacy Systems
•CLOE
•AILA
•BCS3
•LIW
•IUID
•SIM
•RFID
CBM+
Decision Support
Tools, e.g., PFSA,
CASA
GTA
•ABCTM
•Ground
Combat
Vehicle
AC/RC
Rebalance
Support
to Other
Services
Support
From
Other
Services
Balance
CSS
(AC/RC)
Current Global
Commitments
OPLANS
CONPLANS
• NSS
•NMS
•GDF
•DODD
•DODI
Concepts
…
Q
D
R
JCS
• Joint Staff
•JPG
• JROC
• JCIDS
…
UCCs
• Regional
• Functional
Logistics CPM
OSD, e.g.,
•USD AT&L
•USD P&R
•Director, PA&E
Other Army
Logistics Initiatives
& Programs, e.g.,
• PBL
•Adaptive Logistics
•ILAR
•FLS
OSD Initiatives,
e.g.,
•DoD Logistics
Roadmap
•HCS
•IUID
•RFID
•CBM+
•RBS
DLA
(BRAC 2005)
Other Defense
Agencies, e.g.,
•DCMA
•DFAS
•APS
•Army Strategy
• ASPG
• ACP
•ARPL
• FMs
•ARs
• Memoranda
Army Staff
Army Secretariat, e.g.,
•ASA(ALT)
•DUSA B/T
AMC
ILS (TLCMS)
ASCC
DRU
AP3
FY 2010 DoD
PresBud
• Base Budget
• Overseas
Contingency Ops
Off-Year PPBE
•PCPs
•PDM
•BCPs
•PBDs
•OMB Submission
•Execution Review
PII (GPRA)
•E.O. 13450
•OMB PBB
•Outcome goals and
objectives
•PART
•Logistics Portfolio
AWCF
DWCF G
A
O
Congress
•DoS
•DHS
•DoJ
•DoA
•MNF-I
•NATO ISAF
•(UN), (GOI), (GOA),
(GOP)
Public Private
Partnerships
An RMS Perspective: Issues, Processes, Programs & Stakeholders
FORSCOM
TRADOC
Distribution
IMCOM
10

11. Pivot Points
• November 17, 2008: Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with
Government of Iraq calls for withdrawal of all US forces by
12/31/2011
– Redeployment
– Equipment retrograde
• April 06, 2009: Secretary Gates cancels vehicle component of
Army’s Future Combat Systems program
– Officially cancelled on June 23rd by Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition Carter
• Creation of Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Modernization effort
– Technology insertion increments
– For FCS “spin outs”
• Creation of new Ground Combat Vehicle Program
11

12. Army Force Development: Parallel Streams
Reset
• 300,000+ items of
equipment being
retrograded from Iraq
• Depots have had a 3-year
backlog for 4 years running
• Equipment being Reset to
“zero miles” standard
• Should Reset incorporate
technology insertion?
• Are the most cost-effective
product support strategies
in place for items being
Reset?
Brigade Combat Team
(BCT) Modernization
• Increment 1 well underway
• Increment 2 in definition
• Is the product support for
each element of the
increments the most cost-
effective from Total System
Life Cycle standpoint?
• Optimization of
partnerships?
Ground Combat
Vehicle (GCV)
Modernization
• Industry will play a major
role in defining options
• Initial focus on GCV Infantry
Fighting Vehicle (IFV)
• 2017
• Product Support Concept
for family of vehicles
Technology insertion arrangements for some vehicles sub-optimized – e.g., Stryker S Mod12

13. Precepts
• Current and emerging commitments drive Army acquisition (and organizational structure)
– FCS: counterinsurgency and close-quarters combat issues invalidated the engineering trade-space where lower weight, higher
fuel efficiency and greater information awareness were judged adequate to compensate for less armor
– MRAP: “urgent need” ~6,400 procured
– M-ATV: “urgent need” – JROC Requirement for 5,200, with ~2,200 now being produced
• Systems engineering process needs to be proactive and the SEP adaptive
– QDR and new GDF will help but
– Burden will be on the PM to be attuned to emerging issues
• Army PM needs to have greater stability in funding
– In macro: improved funding accountability systems and processes that are responsive to Congressional oversight requirements
– In micro: longer duration (5-10 years) contracts with performance incentives that induce industry to bear greater share of the
risk
• Incremental development with technology insertion is key in current environment
• Army PM has no ready access to technology maturation plan relevant to his/her program
– Distributed technology development
• In Army, e.g., LIA, RDECOM, PEOs
• Across Industry
– Information gathering and assimilation processes have been outstripped by the pace of technology
• Army PM doesn’t have a convenient “window” into all relevant Army guidance, related Army program developments, and
stakeholders
• Army PM does not have the ability to readily access pertinent information about OSD or other Service programs and
initiatives
– DoD Logistics Roadmap
13

14. Concluding Observations
• Given the “unusual” experience of the Army in the past year, it is difficult to draw
any durable “lessons learned” from the application of DoDI 5000.02
– Secretary Gates’ decision on FCS certainly consistent with tenets of DoDI 5000.02
• However, have learned that DoDI 5000.02 provides sound framework for
acquisition and RMS in an environment where the “unusual” has become the
norm
– Incremental modernization through technology insertion
– Up front consideration of product support in the acquisition cycle
• Is there a common understanding between the Services and their industry
partners?
– It depends on who you ask
– PM and PSI may agree on need for longer duration contract, but that perception may not be
shared by Service’s contracting authority or the Congress
• Technology insertion and product support are not only compatible, they are
inseparable in a resource-constrained environment
• Need to be paying greater attention to technology insertion and product support
in Reset, and product support in BCT Modernization
• GCV is an opportunity to “get it right” from a DoDI 5000.02 perspective
14

15. Quo Vadis?
DoDI 5000.02
DoD Weapon
System
Product
Support
Assessment
PSAT FY 10
Work Program
15