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- 1. Privacy and the Car of the Future Consideration for the coming connected vehicle
- 2. whoami • BSEE, digital communications • Many years as a network engineer • Santa Clara University Law student • Research assistant providing technical expertise on privacy audits and reviews • Contracted by auto consortium to review privacy of proposed vehicle to vehicle safety network
- 3. Standard Disclaimer IANAL (Yet) But if you know anyone looking for summer interns....
- 4. Non-Standard Disclaimer A current NDA covers some of my work here (but not very much) The focus will be on published information and standards.
- 5. What is This Project? • DSRC: Dedicated Short Range Communications • (Where “short” == 380m) • Vehicle to Vehicle • Vehicle to infrastructure in Europe - Not having to wait for a light on an empty street again. - Better traffic planning for better cities and roadways.
- 6. Why is It being Developed? Safety Photo Credit: Jason Edward Scott Bain
- 7. Non-trivial Impact on Auto Deaths • World Health Organization estimates 25% of vehicle deaths each year can be prevented. • Fatigue and distracted driving accidents reduced. • Blind Corners, fog and limited visibility accidents reduced. Photo: Public Domain
- 8. Will This really Happen? IT ALREADY IS
- 9. How Soon? • Hardware is already being shipped. • Software issues still entirely in the air • More is being done in software these days. • The US Dept. of Transportation is considering mandating this for all new cars. (Decision to come later this year.) • Has already deployed in trucks in Europe
- 10. What is DSRC • Basic safety messages sent out every 1/10 seconds. • All message carry a standard glob: values for pre-defined vehicle trajectory and operational data. • Cars process data and warn driver. • Equipment integrated into vehicle Photo Credit: US Dept. of Transportation
- 11. Photo Credit: NIST AfterMarket Installation A little cumbersome
- 12. What DSRC is not • CANbus • OnStar (or any other remote service) • (Direct) support for autonomous driving mechanisms. Photo Credit: US Dept. of Transportation
- 14. Radio protocol • 5.9GHz reserved in US and Europe • Signaling standard: IEEE 802.11p / 1609.4 / 1609.3 • Channels reserved for specific functions • No source address for vehicles defined by protocol • Recommendations include using certificates • Privacy challenges at each layer Photo Credit: NASA
- 15. Basic Safety Message • Standard: SAE J2735 • ~50 fixed data elements • “only” interface to radio (on this band)
- 16. Parameters for effectiveness • Density • Benefit derived from other vehicles’ use • Greater usage means greater effectiveness • Confidence • Most messages must be trustworthy • People must trust information broadcast
- 17. Validity? • All messages are cryptographically signed • Signing certificates issued by central authority • Issued based on system fingerprint • Revocation for “malfunctioning” Image source: US Dept. of Transportation equipment • System should invalidate itself if internal checks fail
- 18. Certificates • Limited time use to prevent tracking • Reused? • Periodically refreshed (and malefactors reported) • How often? • Permanent blacklist
- 19. Privacy?
- 20. MAC Layer • Changeable source (for vehicles) / no destination • Unrouteable! (mostly) • No significant privacy concern as is. • Any algorithm to make network routeable will make vehicles trackable.
- 21. BSM • “Temporary” ID could become persistent with bad app • Open source apps suggested for processing and acting on message data • Is this the only thing the unit will transmit?
- 22. Certificates • Identity/Validity conflict • Solution: constantly changing certificates • Revocation by fingerprint • Issuing authority?
- 23. Fingerprints • “No” correspondence between fingerprint and car • “hard coded” into device • If revoked, entire unit must be replaced to function Photo Credit: NIST
- 24. Certificate Delivery • Haven’t figured out how certificates are delivered to vehicle • Proposals include cellular, wifi, infrastructure links • So many opportunities for failure
- 25. Worrisome Noise • Manufacturers want to use this system for commercial apps • Advertising and other “funding” schemes to pay for CA • Fixed infrastructure potentially operated by data brokers
- 26. Problem: Law Enforcement • What can they do with this? • Correlate location, speed to independent identification? (cameras?) Photo Credit: Alex E. Proimos
- 27. What you Can Do • Hack the radios • Commercially available now • Hack the protocols • Become politically engaged • Most decisions are not being made by elected officials • Help find a way to fund the infrastructure without selling out!
- 28. Thank you
- 29. Acknowledgements • Professor Dorothy Glancy, who requested my help on this project • DC 650 (especially Charles Blas) who gave me a reality check with current security and privacy capabilities
- 30. Contact • Christie Dudley • @longobord • c.dudley@ieee.org
Notas del editor
- Current law student. Privacy professor needed help
- should not matter But I’m working on that whole “lawyer” thing.
- little information to complete the audit. can talk about most published standards
- DSRC is a series of protocols. Has changed over the years of development. Black Hat talk: protocols are no longer relevant
- collision early warning system. - prevent accidents. - Save lives NHTSA “ distracted ” 2009 (US) stats: Almost 5,000 deaths, est 448,000 injuries Not including other inattention involving physical/emotional state of driver
- Good Work - want it to happen . Anecdote: driving in pouring rain too afraid to slow down, too afraid not to.
- Large scale testing in Ann Arbor Michigan started last August. Auto makers have already invested heavily in this technology. A few startups here in Silicon Valley to implement this.
- American government won’t spend money on infrastructure May be related to “black box” recent US mandate. Trucks have no privacy concerns as they are commercial vehicles.
- A system of protocols Not like asn.1 - not data pairs - Map of data
- Designed claimed as a “sealed” system, with sensor integrity and accuracy checks.
- Automakers lesson from CANbus: insecurity caused no real problems No new tech to mech tech - needs human intervention. “ sealed” sensor system with integrity checks.
- HOW it works
- Japan doesn’t have the same spectrum available ETSI and FCC approved operating parameters (Biggest difference: US allows more power.) 33 vs 44.7 dBm
- Minimum requirement for system. Additional protocols considered in Europe. illustrates general and some specific fields data = whatever’s useful in avoiding collisions
- More use = more effective People must trust the system Not just received, but what is sent about them Privacy is important or people will disable it Technological trust is better than laws
- Signature and certificate management - on radio Sensor validation (beyond scope here)
- Still not nailed down Ann Arbor test: came pre-loaded
- This is where we start talking about the FUD
- Already pressure for other apps - that need routing. Tension between routing and identifiability
- F/OSS Apps kind of neat. Closer to autonomy... Fun: someone in blind spot: “I wouldn’t do that, Dave” - give your vehicle too much power? This is too neat a toy to not use for other things.
- Permanent Blacklist? - may not be problem as internet - must replace entire blacklisted unit.
- Another problem for anonymity Many schemes to deal with this. Current solution is “no paper trail” We already have certain mistrust of CAs
- IEEE 1609 family beyond scope, won’t work - raises many more privacy concerns By the way 9 data brokers took the 5th before Congress in 2006 when asked to reveal the sources of their data.
- Tracking, ticketing, whatever else they may want to do.
- Fund certificate authority - funding has power.