1. 1 ACMC Paper 2/2013 > Policing – The Face of Peace in Afghanistan
Policing – The Face of Peace
in Afghanistan
or mitigate corruption. Police of course are not alone in the
rule of law space; the judiciary, corrections services, other
government agencies and non-government agencies all
play an important part. This notwithstanding, in the day-to-
day life of an average Afghan, there is no other government
instrumentality with the same breadth and depth of
responsibilities as the police.
At its core, policing is about a government attempting to
keep its population safe and secure from crime and disorder.
This is a task which has been undertaken in various forms
since the eras of the ancient empires. While today, the
exact way in which policing services are delivered varies to
certain degrees between jurisdictions, all modern civilian
policing structures emanate from one of two service delivery
paradigms that evolved about 200 years ago.
The one we are most familiar with in Australia is the model
born in the 1829 creation of a police force in London by
Sir Robert Peel. Peel’s ‘bobbies’ embraced the philosophy
> Paper 02/2013
Superintendent Jason Byrnes
This paper outlines the critical challenges in regards to the
evolution of the Afghan National Police (or ANP). Rather than
lessons learned per se, the paper argues that the lessons
to be learned from the Afghan experience are that the
militarisation or securitisation of nascent civilian capabilities
is problematic. For a model of civilian policing to be effective,
it has to be one that the community desires and/or accepts.
For Afghanistan, this also requires a true unity of effort on
the part of the international community in supporting an
Afghan initiated civilian policing model, even if aspects of
the model are not regarded as ideal to the Western eye.
Let us start with the proposition that police are the face
of peace.
For the rule of law to be operable, police must not just be
effective, but must be seen to be effective, and accepted
(if not embraced) by the general population as being a
legitimate and beneficial part of the community. Issues of
freedom and order always intersect at the police.1
Police are
the public manifestation of government authority; they are
the government institution that most directly impacts on
people’s daily lives. Police create a stable environment in
which industry and commerce can thrive, in which education
can flourish and in which communities can stabilise and
grow. Police can also represent a force that checks the
illegal use of power by government, and can disrupt, counter

2. 2 ACMC Paper 2/2013 > Policing – The Face of Peace in Afghanistan
that the police are the public and the public are the police.
In this community policing paradigm, police officers are
the only members of the public who are paid to give full-
time attention to duties which are incumbent upon every
citizen. This policing by consent or community policing
model has been extremely influential in international police
development, particularly in the democratic nations of what
is considered the Anglo world, including Australia, New
Zealand and the United States of America.
The gendarmerie model of policing consolidated in
19th
century continental Europe, but was (and is) used
throughout the world. A version of it, the so-called
constabulary model, was utilised by Great Britain in
several colonial settings during the 19th
and 20th
centuries.
The gendarmerie model is where policing is performed
by military or quasi-military bodies. These bodies may
be specifically tasked to conduct policing duties, or
those duties may be incidental to their military tasks. The
advantages of this model include the ability to conduct
unit expeditionary operations in remote or rural areas,
particularly where the rule of law is challenged or lacks
popular support. Often such operations involve coercion
or at least a heavily regimented presence.
While many gendarmerie organisations have moved
substantially away from their military origins over the
past century, their mode of operations still represent a
degree of militarisation that modern militaries find readily
complementary to their own practices. It is important to
note two vital developments in the gendarmerie model;
the first is that in many localities they operate in addition
to separate urban-based community police forces.
Additionally, several gendarmeries have embraced the
community policing concepts of police professionalism in
regards to providing policing capabilities that are within the
reasonable and proportionate framework of operations.
While there are some significant operational and conceptual
differences between the community policing and
gendarmerie paradigms, as a general rule, the best agencies
of both paradigms regard themselves as undertaking a
genuinely unique profession which is both responsive to the
needs of the community and subject to external (particularly
government) oversight.
A form of civilian policing emerged in Afghanistan in the
mid-20th
century, during the reign of King Amanullah. The
relatively limited numbers of police officers were mostly
located in urban centres, with occasional patrols or a
limited presence in the rural areas. Although the system
was not particularly sophisticated or effective, it compared
favourably to other South Asian policing systems of the
time.2
Communist rule and Soviet occupation both politicised and
para-militarised policing; it then disintegrated during the
civil war and Taliban rule of the 1990s.
Efforts to implement a workable civilian policing system in
Afghanistan since the West’s intervention in 2001 have of
course been undertaken against the backdrop of a vicious
and seemingly intractable insurgency in a country affected
by decades of warfare and terror, with a population that
is insular, traditionally hostile or indifferent to central
government, barely literate and poorly educated.
For the Afghan National Police (ANP), efforts since 2001
have been bloody and fraught with danger and despair.
Over 3,000 ANP officers have been ‘martyred’ (i.e. killed/
murdered) with thousands more injured. The casualty ratio
for Afghan police in comparison to the Afghan National Army
is astonishingly high, around 2:1 or even 4:1 depending upon
the criteria used and period covered. The ANP is copping the
brunt of the conflict, and this is partly reflected in high rates
of desertion (although these are reducing).
The most significant strategic challenges for policing
in Afghanistan during the transition period of 2014 and
beyond include: sourcing adequate funding, defining and
consolidating a professional ethos, and overcoming the
degree of militarisation it has been subjected to since 2002.
The ANP was created as, and remains, a product of a
military counterinsurgency mindset. This development was
initiated by the International Community, and in particular
the US Army,3
and was subsequently embraced by Afghan
authorities.
As a consequence, the ANP – actually six different
organisations4
– was subsumed into the Afghan National
Security Force (ANSF) architecture. Indeed, even today,
official documentation and discussions often use the term
ANSF when actually referring to police specific matters.
This is problematic as, even in a country wracked by war,
not every policing matter is a national security issue and
not every national security issue is a police matter.

3. 3 ACMC Paper 2/2013 > Policing – The Face of Peace in Afghanistan
From their first days in training, Afghan police recruits spend
as much if not more time on military or battlefield related
skills as on core policing skills. Just over two weeks is spent
on theoretical and practical police subjects such as law,
human rights and arrest procedures. The remaining six
weeks are spent on assault rifle training, combat first aid,
checkpoint and marching drills, as well as literacy training.
It is readily acknowledged that this is a better situation than
existed pre-2011 where most recruits, if they were trained
at all, received maybe a week on police specific issues.
Nonetheless, it still serves as a dramatic indicator of the
competing tensions at play. This raises the issue of whether
training is supporting the inculcation of a policing or military
mindset.
Today, up to 60 per cent of the ANP is a quasi-light infantry
force used in accordance with counterinsurgency doctrine
to ‘hold the ground’ taken by military forces. Given there are
around 150,000 men (plus only 2,000 women) employed
as ‘police’ in Afghanistan, this represents over 80,000
undertaking duties which are not civilian policing in nature.
An informative example of the realities of this point is
the experiences of the Afghan National Civil Order Police
(ANCOP). In providing this example, citations are drawn
from the Special Report written earlier this year by Robert
Perito of the United States Institute of Peace, an organisation
established by the US Congress.5
ANCOP was conceived as the result of a series of deadly
riots in Kabul in 2006. At the time the ANP did not have a
way of providing large numbers of police to undertake crowd
control or public order duties. ANCOP’s logistics, command
and operational structures were within a gendarmerie
(paramilitary) paradigm – large numbers of trained tactical
police were to deploy in formed police units.
It is perhaps for this reason that during ANCOP’s formative
training phases, the group was redirected to a series of
counterinsurgency taskings, including the aggressive
military-style patrolling of districts dominated by insurgents.
In 2010 an ANCOP battalion was placed in a crucial holding
role during coalition surge operations in Helmand Province.
The result was euphemistically referred to by Mr Perito as a
‘mistake’. In short, the battalion disintegrated; it wilted under
the type of combat conditions for which it was not prepared.
Desertion and drug use was widespread, and the battalion
lacked the numbers, training and equipment necessary to
provide security in a combat environment. This should not
have been a revelation given that ANCOP was raised as a
civilian police unit for undertaking crowd control duties
with batons and shields. In the wake of this event and other
incidents in 2010, a substantial program was undertaken to
reequip and retrain the ANCOP, not for crowd control duties,
but for further counterinsurgency taskings. Meanwhile
the ANP still lacks an effective large scale crowd control
capability.
Moving from the past to the future, it is important to
highlight that senior Afghan and coalition officials are
actively discussing how to shape the ANP into the future.
Several senior coalition figures have publicly acknowledged
that insufficient focus has to date been placed on ANP
development – sentiments also shared by Afghan
authorities. No doubt the pending transition deadline
of 2014 is helping to focus minds on future options.
The most important strategic question or challenge is the
issue of what type of policing model should be adopted, or
more fundamentally, what type of policing service is both
suitable and sustainable beyond 2014?
This is ultimately a decision for the Afghans to make
themselves, and it will be driven by a range of cultural,
political, financial and associated factors.
A snapshot of the complexity of the challenge at hand in
relation to defining what type of police the Afghans want,
and how that compares with what has occurred to date,
can be seen in a perceptive report delivered in January 2012
by the research and analysis organisation CNA Analysis &
Solutions.6
It highlighted that Afghan residents in the south-
west find it difficult to imagine a police force of the type
envisaged by the Coalition, as the concept of community
policing (as defined by the West) has not previously existed;
neither has a the gendarmerie model, nor has the other term
commonly used within the country: democratic policing.
This highlights the complex issues at play; first is the need
to identify what type of police service delivery models the
community will accept or embrace; second, reconcile that
against the priorities of the local, regional and national
governments; thirdly, evaluate how that outcome would be
best served either by a community policing or gendarmerie
models. Indeed, it may actually represent an impetus for an
alternative, Afghan specific model.
Finally, the preferred model has to be implemented as
part of a functioning (not necessarily perfect) rule-of-law
framework, while at the same time the government and its
forces has to meet community expectations and out-smart
the insurgency. It is no easy task.

4. 4 ACMC Paper 2/2013 > Policing – The Face of Peace in Afghanistan
Arising from this challenge is the issue of establishing a
viable, effective and professional policing culture. The
term police culture is often misunderstood, derided and
criticised, but the reality is that like all organisations, police
forces need an effective culture to ensure that there is
organisational resilience, capacity and effectiveness. This
is particularly the case when the police force is operating
in the midst of, and is the target of, a violent insurgency.
It should never be forgotten that Afghans have been
asked to develop a comprehensive policing system in
just over a decade, even though such systems have taken
the West over 50 years to develop. Additionally, much
of the coalition’s police development efforts during the
past decade have been focused on logistics and enablers
(i.e. ensuring the right numbers of guns and trucks are
delivered, and that tashkils7
are filled) rather than fostering
consideration and debate on issues such as an appropriate
police ethos or what type of police the ANP wants to be.
An associated issue is how the ANP is managed and led.
To the Australian eye it is peculiar that there is no police
commissioner or chief police officer equivalent position
within the ANP; its numerous generals are answerable
directly to the Ministry of the Interior and the Minister
himself. It is not a wrong or incorrect model, but it is one
that has certain impacts on the operational independence
of the police, the workload for the Minister, and the power
and influence of the Ministry. The recent appointment of a
serving Police General to the position of Minister – the first
time this has occurred in the life of the current government –
is therefore an interesting and promising development well
worth watching.
However, perhaps more than any other single factor, the
issue of funding will be the significant determinant in
shaping future police structure, capabilities and operational
mindsets.
Throughout the world, policing is expensive. This is
particularly the case in Afghanistan which has a police to
population ratio of around 1:190 – a figure almost double
the internationally accepted norm, and even higher than the
ratio in many of the countries neighbouring Afghanistan. In
fact the total cost of maintaining both the ANP and Afghan
National Army amounts to 3 per cent of the nation’s Gross
Domestic Product (GDP). Without continuing donations from
the international community, Afghanistan simply cannot
afford its current and projected policing commitments.8
As
the quantum of aid declines in future years, the size of the
Afghan police (and military) will inevitably reduce unless
alternative funding can be sourced. Innovative solutions,
including decoupling policing from the counterinsurgency
paradigm as well as managing the impact of any potential
demobilisation program, will become essential, if the
Government of Afghanistan wants to stay ahead of the
curve and future-proof policing.
This paper has outlined the challenges facing Afghan
policing, in part by drawing on past episodes and lessons,
as well as outlining how policing paradigms can impact
on service delivery. Afghanistan is a complex imbroglio in
which there are no easy solutions or outcomes – just many
challenges.
There are two key takeaways to this paper. The first is that
the process of implementing a sustainable policing model
must be Afghan-led and Afghan-owned. If it isn’t, then any
‘solutions’ will be discarded when international attention
shifts. The second takeaway is that there must be a true
unity of effort by the international community in supporting
what the Afghans want to implement. This will require some
difficult decisions to be made as to what the international
community will and will not accept in regards to acceptable
police practices/philosophies.
In conclusion, the following two issues should be considered
when assessing the challenges ahead, as well as progress
to-date.
The first is an argument put forward by respected police
academic David Bayley. In discussing whether policing is
effective in any society, he posed one question: do parents
teach their children that when they are away from home and
need help, they should seek out the police? In Afghanistan it’s
not known if this is the case – it is something that needs to
be asked and assessed by the authorities.
The second issue to consider arises from a newspaper report
in late 2012, mentioning security developments in Bamyan
Province. The article covered the pending withdrawal of
New Zealand military forces and the increasing instability
in the Province, which has historically been one of the most
secure regions. The article included comments from a local
ANP chief who pined for heavy machine guns, RPGs and
mortars. Given the risks of the situation, this officer’s desire
to ensure his men and families had the best protection
and tools available are understandable. The comments are
nonetheless illustrative of the important question of, how far
from the military mindset has the ANP has progressed?

5. 5 ACMC Paper 2/2013 > Policing – The Face of Peace in Afghanistan
Notes
1 David H Bayley, 2006, Changing the Guard: Developing
Democratic Police Abroad, Oxford University Press.
2 For a detailed overview of the history of policing in Afghanistan,
see: Antonio Giustozzi and Mohammad Isaqzedeh, 2011,
Afghanistan’s Paramilitary Policing in Context: The Risks of
Expediency, Afghanistan Analysts Network Website, available
at: <http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=2265>.
3 The Bonn Agreement of 2002 assigned Germany the
responsibility for developing Afghan policing. In 2005 the US
assumed lead responsibility after protracted disagreements
over the speed of institution building and the model to be
applied to the ANP.
4 The Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), Afghan Border Police (ABP),
Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), Afghan Anti-Crime
Police (AACP), Afghan Local Police (ALP) and the Afghan Public
Protection Force (APPF).
5 Robert M Perito, 2012, Afghanistan’s Civil Order Police: Victim
of its Own Success, United States Institute of Peace, available
at: <http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR307.pdf>
6 Catherine Norman, 2012, What do Afghans want from the
Police? Views from Helmand Province, CNA Analysis & Solutions,
available at: <http://www.cna.org/research/2012/what-do-
afghans-want-police-views-helmand-province>
7 Broadly, the equivalent of authorised or approved staffing levels.
8 For details of the grim predictions for Afghanistan’s finances, see
the World Bank Report Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond
2014.
About the author
Jason Byrnes has over 22 years of experience in the
Australian Federal Police (AFP). He has undertaken policing
duties in local, national and international environments,
including a posting to the United Nations Peacekeeping
Force in Cyprus. From mid-2011 to mid-2012 Superintendent
Byrnes was a member of the AFP’s contingent in Afghanistan.
At the time of presenting this paper he was the AFP
secondee to the Australian Civil-Military Centre.
This paper was drawn from a presentation given at the
8th International Lessons Learned Conference, Sydney
Australia, on 4 December 2012. The views expressed in
this paper are those of the author and do not represent
any official position of the Australian Federal Police or
the Australian Government.