5. Sr.
No
Title of Paper Year
of
pub.
Conferences Idea Result Future work
1 Preventing
AODV Routing
Protocol from
Black Hole
Attack .[1]
May
2011
International
Journal of
Engineering
Science and
Technology
(IJEST)
Large
difference
between the
sequence
number of
source node or
intermediate
node who has
sent back RREP
or not to find
weather it is a
malicious node
or not .
The
PDR
decreases,
the
percentage
of packets
dropped
increases
Intend to
develop
simulation by
the
performance of
the proposed
solution based
on the various
security
parameters
mean delay
time, packet
overhead,
memory usage,
mobility,
increasing
number of
malicious node,
increasing
number of
nodes.
6. Sr.
No
Title of Paper Year
of
pub.
Conferences Idea Result Future work
2 Black-Hole
and
Wormhole
Attack in
Routing
Protocol
AODV in
MANET[2]
Feb
2012
International
Journal of
Computer
Science,
Engineering
and
Applications
(IJCSEA)
Vol.2, No.1.
Watchdog
Mechanism
During
blackhole
Counter of
dropped
packets was
noticed to
decreases at
the node,
After watchdog
method
implementation
counter of
successfully
forwarded
packets are
been done, PDR
increases at an
marginal rate.
Try to
Improve the
data security
in mobile ad-
hoc network.
7. Sr.
No
Title of Paper Year
of
pub.
Conferences Idea Result Future work
3 Risk
Mitigation of
Black Hole
Attack for
AODV Routing
Protocol[3]
July-
Aug.
2012
IOSR Journal
of Computer
Engineering
(IOSRJCE)
ISSN: 2278-
0661 Volume
3, Issue 3
(July-Aug.
2012), PP 12-
15
The route
confirmatio
n request
(CREQ) and
route
confirmatio
n reply
(CREP) to
avoid the
black hole
attack.
Presence of
malicious node
is Detected and
protect the
network from
degradation.
PDR increases,
End to end
delay
decreases,
throughput
increases.
Try and
reduces the
Time delay,
much
network
overheads
because of
newly
introduced
packets.
8. Sr.
No
Title of Paper Year
of
pub.
Conferences Idea Result Future work
4 Simulation of
AODV under
Black hole
Attack in
MANET [4]
Feb
2012
International
Journal of
Advanced
Research in
Computer
Science and
Software
Engineering
Research
Paper
Source
sends a
spoof
packet to
the
destination
For
detecting
malicious
node.
Packet Delivery
Ratio increases,
Average end to
end delivery
increases.
Incase of
blackhole - In
AODV the packet
delivery ratio is
reduced to 80%.
After prevention
- There is nearly
21% increase in
PDR .
Try and
increase
prevention
during a
blackhole
and to
improve data
security.
9. Sr.
No
Title of Paper Year
of
pub.
Conferences Idea Result Future work
5 Performance
Analysis of
Aodv Protocol
under Black
Hole Attack
[5]
Aug-
2011
International
Journal of
Scientific &
Engineering
Research
Volume 2,
Issue 8 1
ISSN 2229-
5518
Route
discovery
packet
method
The
performance of
the network is
decreased. The
PDR and
Throughput of
the network
has decreased
drastically.
Try to
improve the
performance
in later
Stages.
10. Sr.
No
Title of Paper Year
of
pub.
Conferences Idea Result Future work
6 Black Hole
Detection in
MANET Using
AODV Routing
Protocol. [6]
Jan-
2012
International
Journal of
Soft
Computing
and
Engineering
(IJSCE)
Using
promiscuous
mode of the
node.
The throughput
of network is
decreased,
proposed
algorithm
giving the good
throughput
with black hole
attack. End to
End delay
decreases.
Propose a
more feasible
solution to
detect the
black hole
attack.
11. Sr.
No
Title of Paper Year
of
pub.
Conferences Idea Result Future work
7 Securing and
Preventing
AODV Routing
Protocol from
Black Hole
Attack
using Counter
Algorithm[7]
July -
2012
International
Journal of
Engineering
Research &
Technology
(IJERT)
Vol. 1 Issue
5, ISSN:
2278-0181
Counter
algorithm or
prior
Receive-
Reply
algorithm
Significant
improvement
of packet
delivery ratio
(PDR) and an
average End-
to-End
delay.
Try to
improve the
performance
in later
Stages.
12. Sr.
No
Title of
Paper
Year
of
pub.
Conferences Idea Result Future work
8 Discovering
a Secure
Path in
MANET by
Avoiding
Black/Gray
Holes [8]
August
2012
Internationa
l Journal of
Recent
Technology
and
Engineering
(IJRTE) ISSN:
2277-3878,
Volume-1,
Issue-3
Large difference
between the
sequence
number of
source node or
intermediate
node who has
sent back RREP
or not to find
weather it is a
malicious node
or not . Using
OPNET.
Increase in
number of
nodes
Lesser the
End to End,
greater the
PDR and
Throughput.
Try to
improve
performance
s with less
number of
nodes.
13. Sr.
No
Title of Paper Year
of
pub.
Location Idea Result Future work
9 Detection and
Prevention
from Black
Hole attack in
AODV
protocol for
MANET.[9]
July
2012
International
Journal of
Computer
Applications
(0975 –
8887)
Volume 50 –
No.5,
Adding an
IDS node to
AODV
protocol.
During
blackhole
attack- PDR is
only 0.14%.
Used IDS_AODV
in the same
network, the
packet delivery
fractioned is
increased up to
99 %.
Extended to
other
proactive
and reactive
routing
protocols.
We can also
extend this
research to
secure
routing
protocols
against other
attacks such
as Wormhole
attack,
Jellyfish
attack etc.
15. When/Why do we need AODV?
• Basically when there is one node that wants to
communicate with another node that is not in range,
it finds a route through other nodes. In the example
below node 1 is not in range with node 3, so it simply
talks to node 3 through node 2.
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3
16. How does it work?
• AODV Routing works by using Route Request Messages
(RREQ) and Route Reply Messages (RREP). If a node is not in
range with a node that it wants to talk to, it sends a RREQ to
its neighbors. The RREQ contains source IP address and
sequence number, and destination IP address and sequence
number, as well as the life span of the RREQ. If a neighbor of
the source doesn’t know a route to the destination, it
rebroadcasts the RREQ. If a neighbor does know a route to
the destination, it sends a RREP back to the source. Below,
Node 1 is trying to talk to node 5.
Node 3 Node 2 Node 1 Node 4 Node 5
RREQRREQ
RREQ
RREP
17. How does it work? continued
• As seen in the last slide, node 4 had a route to
node 5, so it sent node 1 a RREP. Once node 1
receives the RREP, it notes the route to node 5
and sends the packet on that route.
• SUCCESS!!
NODE 5 received
the packet.
Node 1 Node 4 Node 5
RREQ
RREP
Packet Packet
18. Node 1
Node 2
Node 3
Node 4
Node 5
RREQ
RREP
Now we can see it
all in action!
19. Flooding for Control Packet
Delivery - Example
Y
Z
B
A
H
S E
C
G
I
F
M L
J
D
K
N
Represents a node that has received packet P
Represents that connected nodes are within each
other’s transmission range 4-13
20. Flooding for Control Packet
Delivery
Y
Broadcast transmission
Z
B
A
H
S E
C
G
I
F
M L
J
D
K
N
Represents a node that receives packet P for
the first time
Represents transmission of packet P
4-14
21. Flooding for Control Packet
Delivery
Y
Z
B
A
H
S E
C
G
I
F
M L
J
D
K
N
Node H receives packet P from two neighbors:
potential for collision
4-15
22. Flooding for Control Packet
Delivery
Y
Z
B
A
H
S E
C
G
I
F
M L
J
D
K
N
Node C receives packet P from G and H, but does not forward
it again, because node C has already forwarded packet P once
4-16
23. Flooding for Control packet
Delivery
Y
Z
B
A
H
S E
C
G
I
F
M L
J
D
K
N
Nodes J and K both broadcast packet P to node D
Since nodes J and K are hidden from each other, their
transmissions may collide
=> Packet P may not be delivered to node D at all,
despite the use of flooding 4-17
24. Flooding for Control Packet
Delivery
Y
Z
B
A
H
S E
C
G
I
F
M L
J
D
K
N
Node D does not forward packet P, because node D
is the intended destination of packet P
4-18
25. Flooding for Control Packet
Delivery
Y
Z
B
A
H
Flooding completed
S E
C
G
I
F
M L
J
D
K
N
Nodes unreachable from S do not receive packet P (e.g., node Z)
Nodes for which paths go through the destination D
also do not receive packet P (example: node N) 4-19
26. Flooding for Control Packet
Delivery
Y
Z
B
A
H
S E
C
G
I
F
M L
J
D
K
N
Flooding may deliver packets to too many nodes
(in the worst case, all nodes reachable from sender
may receive the packet)
4-20
27. • AODV is a packet routing protocol designed for use in
mobile ad hoc networks (MANET)
• Intended for networks that may contain thousands of
nodes
• One of a class of demand-driven protocols
• Each node maintains a routing table that contains
information about reaching destination nodes.
AODV Overview
28. • The basic message set consists of:
– RREQ – Route request
– RREP – Route reply
– RERR – Route error
– HELLO – For link status monitoring
Overview (continued)
29. • RREQ Messages
– A RREQ message is broadcasted when a node needs to
discover a route to a destination.
– The RREQ also contains the most recent sequence number
for the destination.
– A valid destination route must have a sequence number at
least as great as that contained in the RREQ.
AODV Operation – Message Types
31. • RREP Messages
– When a RREQ reaches a destination node, the destination
route is made available by unicasting a RREP back to the
source route.
– A node generates a RREP if:
• It is itself the destination.
• It has an active route to the destination.
– As the RREP propagates back to the source node,
intermediate nodes update their routing tables (in the
direction of the destination node).
AODV Operation – Message Types
33. Route Error Message:
RERR are used mainly when nodes get moved
around and connections are lost. If a node
receives a RERR, it deletes all routes
associated with the new error. Error messages
are sent when a route becomes invalid, or if it
cannot communicate with one of its
neighbors.
AODV Operation – Message Types
34. • HELLO Message:These are simple messages that
nodes send at certain time intervals to all its
neighbors to let them know that it is still there. If a
node stops receiving hello messages from one of its
neighbors, it knows that any routes through that
node no longer exist.
AODV Operation – Message Types
36. 36
RREQ Format
• Type: 1
• J: Join flag (reserved for multicast); R: Repair flag (for multicast)
37. 37
• G: Gratuitous RREP flag; indicates whether a gratuitous RREP should be unicast
to the node specified in the Destination IP Address field
• Hop Count: The number of hops from the Source IP Address to the node
handling the request
• Broadcast ID: A sequence number uniquely identifying the particular RREQ
when taken in conjunction with the source node's IP address.
• Destination IP Address: The IP address of destination for which a route is desired.
• Destination Sequence Number: The last sequence number received in the past
by the source for any route towards the destination.
• Source IP Address: The IP address of the node which originated the Route
Request.
• Source Sequence Number: The current sequence number to be used for route
entries pointing to (and generated by) the source of the route request.
39. • There are two phases
– Route Discovery.
– Route Maintenance.
• Each node maintains a routing table with knowledge
about the network.
• AODV deals with route table management.
• Route information maintained even for short lived
routes – reverse pointers.
AODV Routing
40. • Broadcast RREQ messages.
• Intermediate nodes update their routing table
• Forward the RREQ if it is not the destination.
• Maintain back-pointer to the originator.
• Destination generates RREP message.
• RREP sent back to source using the reverse
pointer set up by the intermediate nodes.
• RREP reaches source, communication starts.
Discovery
41. • Hello messages broadcast by active nodes
periodically HELLO_INTERVAL.
• No hello message from a neighbor in
DELETE_PERIOD, link failure identified.
• A local route repair to that next hop initiated.
• After a timeout ,error propagated both to originator
and destination.
• Entries based on the node invalidated.
Maintenance
42. Error Messages RERR
• RERR are used mainly when nodes get moved
around and connections are lost. If a node
receives a RERR, it deletes all routes
associated with the new error. Error messages
are sent either when a message (not RREQ or
RREP) is sent to a node that has no route to
the destination, or when a route becomes
invalid, or if it cannot communicate with one
of its neighbors.
43. • AODV route discovery latency is high
• AODV lacks an efficient route maintenance
technique
• AODV lacks support for high throughput
routing metrics
Limitation of AODV protocol
44. It gets complicated!
• Things get much more complicated with many
nodes. This is because nodes have many
neighbors so RREQ get rebroadcasted a lot!
That’s why sequence numbers and life spans
are so key.
45. 45
RERR Format
• N: No delete flag; set when a node has performed a local repair of a
link, and upstream nodes should not delete the route.
46. Second International Conference on Security in
Computer Networks and Distributed Systems (snds-
2014),THIRUVANANTAPURAM
Conference Date March 13 -14, 2014
International Conference on
Communication Network and Computing(CNC),CHENNAI
Conference Date: Feb 21-22, 2014
Conferences Where We Plan To
Participate In
47. MONTHLY PROJECT MANAGEMENT
Completed To be completed Not started
#DAY
S
Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec
LITERATURE SURVEY
165
days
LITERATURE SURVEY
ON MANET
15 days
LITERATURE SURVEY
ON AODV Protocol
23 days
LITERATURE SURVEY
ON BLACKHOLE ATTACKS
15 days
Study of NS-2 15 days
IMPLEMENATATION OF SIMPLE
DATA TRANSMISSION
PROGRAM
27 days
PAPER WRITING AND
PUBLISHING IN VARIOUS
CONFERENCES
70 days
Start EndToday
2013
GANTT CHART
Entire Lifespan of
the Project
15th Jul
Dec 2013
8th Aug.
23rd Aug
7th Sept.
14th Oct.
48. References.
[1] Jiwen CAI, Ping YI, Jialin CHEN “Preventing AODV Routing Protocol from Black Hole Attack .”,MAY 2011 24th
IJEST.
[2] Songbai Lu, Longxuan Li, Kwok-Yan, Lingyan Jia “Black-Hole and Wormhole Attack in Routing Protocol AODV
in MANET”,FEB 2012
[3] “Risk Mitigation of Black Hole Attack for AODV Routing Protocol” China JULY AUG 2012, IOSR Journal of
Computer Engineering (IOSRJCE) ISSN: 2278-0661 Volume 3, Issue 3 (July-Aug. 2012), PP 12-15
[4] “Simulation of AODV under Black hole Attack in MANET” International Journal of Advanced Research in
Computer Science and Software Engineering Research Paper FEB 2012
[5] Weerasinghe.H. “Performance Analysis of Aodv Protocol under Black Hole Attack ”, International Journal of
Scientific & Engineering Research Volume 2, Issue 8 1 ISSN 2229-5518 AUG 2011
[6] Dokurer .S, Y. M. Erten , Can Erkin Acar “Black Hole Detection in MANET Using AODV Routing Protocol.”,
International Journal of Soft Computing and Engineering (IJSCE) ,JAN 2012
[7] Deng, H., Li, W. “Agrawal, D., "Securing and Preventing AODV Routing Protocol from Black Hole Attack using
Counter Algorithm” International Journal of Engineering Research & Technology (IJERT)Vol. 1 Issue 5,
ISSN:2278-0181, JULY 2012
[8] K. Lakshmi1, S.Manju Priya2 A.Jeevarathinam3 K.Rama4, K.Thilagam5, Lecturer, Dept. of Computer
Applications, Karpagam University, Coimbatore.” Discovering a Secure Path in MANET by Avoiding
Black/Gray Holes “, International Journal of Engineering Research & Technology (IJERT)Vol. 1 Issue 5, ISSN:
2278-0181,AUG 2012
[9] Ming- Yang Su, Kun- Lin Chiang, Wei Cheng Liao. “Detection and Prevention from Black Hole attack in AODV
protocol for MANET.”, International Journal of Computer Applications (0975 – 8887) Volume 50 – No.5,
JULY 2012
