Signals in Peloponnesian War

The Criticality of Understanding the Target’s Perception of Strategic Signals;
Case Study: The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War
LtCol David Varick Ready, USMCR
Joint Forces Staff College
Advanced Joint Professional Military Education
Class 09-04
January 5, 2009
Faculty Advisor: LTC Bridget Powell, USAF

1
Table of Contents
Biography………………………………………………………………………………….2
Thesis……………………………………………………………………………………...3
Threats to Peace between the Peloponnesian & Delian Leagues, Sept 433 to 432 BC …...4
The Siege of Potidaea and the Spartan Decision for War 432 BC………………………....8
The Peloponnesian League Assembly & the Start of the War Sept 432- March 431 BC…13
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………18
Appendix I: Political Background…………………………………………………………19
Appendix II: The Corcyran Crisis 436/435 .………………………..…………………….25
Appendix III: The Crisis Unfolds, Summer 433 BC …………………………..……….....27
Appendix IV: The Battle of Sybota and Aftermath, September 433 BC………………….30
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………….33

2
Biography
Lieutenant Colonel David Varick Ready, USMCR is the Communications Officer for the
25th
Marine Regiment in Ft Devens, MA. He received a reserve commission through
Officer Candidate School and holds masters’ degrees in Business Administration (Yale
University) and History (University of Dublin, Ireland). Prior to his current assignment,
LtCol Ready has served on active duty for approximately 7 years, with another 9 years in
the reserves, as a communications, civil affairs, and an information operations officer.
He is a graduate of and instructor at the Canadian Joint Command and Staff Program in
Toronto, Ontario. He is a veteran of the Kosovo and Iraq campaigns and speaks German.
He has been selected to command Marine Air Control Squadron 23 commencing in
September of 2009. In civilian life, he owns and operates a civil construction firm, and
has a beautiful wife and three wonderful children, with a fourth coming in March of
2009. His interests are physical fitness and studying history and international relations.

3
Thesis:
Formulizers of national strategy must be aware that what may seem like a rational,
limited message to the sender, may be received by its intended audience as something
perhaps more starkly menacing or, conversely, supinely feckless. Therefore, the
employment of national power must take into consideration the target’s perception of the
message: it is critical to understand the target’s perception or potential perceptions of
strategic signals. Where there is a misalignment of the message, there is the potential for
unintended and potentially grievous consequences.
This paper will examine key political, diplomatic, and military events in Greece from 433
to 429 BC, the years shortly after Sparta’s and Athens’ Thirty Year Peace of 445 BC that
ended the First Peloponnesian War, to just prior to and at the beginning of the Second –
or what is usually referred to as “The” - Peloponnesian War. During this period Athens
headed the Delian League, perhaps better thought of as an Athenian maritime empire.
Sparta heads the Peloponnesian League, a coalition of landward military powers, though
not to the degree as Athens dominates the Delian League. We will compare what
message was meant to be conveyed and the preconceived expected reactions with what
the target perceived and their actual reactions.
We will examine the actions of the key protagonists using the Diplomatic –Informational
– Military – Economic principle of applying all elements of national power and evaluate
how they reached or failed to meet their objectives. Due to their close association at the
time, the Diplomatic and Informational aspects of DIME will be fused into “DI”.
The key protagonists we will look at are (1) Athens, personified by Pericles1
and (2)
Sparta, and the Peace Party, personified by King Archidamus II.2
Though Pericles and
Archidamus were both opposed to war, war did erupt,3
as the machinations of Corinth
and the Spartan War Party, coupled with Pericles’ mistakes, and, ultimately, unprovoked
Theban aggression, ensured that war could not be avoided.
1
Opposed within Athens by the Athenian war party, led by Cleon. Cleon is not much of an actor at this
stage as Pericles had Athens firmly under his control until the plagues of 430-426 BC, outside the scope of
this paper.
2
Opposed within Sparta the Spartan war party, led by Sthenelaidas.
3
This paper assumes that most readers will not necessarily be familiar with the world of 5th Century BC
Greece. To this end, we have included an appendix that covers a brief description of the political landscape
and its key nation states. To this end, this paper includes Appendix I which gives a brief outline of the
Civitae Dramatis that play key roles in this discussion. Moreover, due to a somewhat limited scope, this
paper covers the initial events from 436 to 433 BC in Appendices II, III and IV. It may behoove some
readers to start with the Appendices.

4
Threats to peace between the Peloponnesian and Delian Leagues, September 433 to
mid 432 BC
Pericles of Athens and King Archidamus of Sparta did not wish to get drawn into a war
that advanced neither of their state’s interests. Further, both rulers were bound by the
Thirty Years Peace4
not to go to war with each other. However, the rational calculations
that were the bedrock of their policies were running into powerful passions and irrational
responses. The Corinthians, a major Peloponnesian League power twice defeated at sea
by their erstwhile colony Corcyra (the second time with the aid of two small but decisive
Athenian fleets) signaled they were not willing to give up the fight and come to an
accord.5
Logically, Pericles wished to maintain what he perceived as Athens’ Center of Gravity6
(CoG): Naval Power. To do so, he had to maintain Athens’ ability to wage a naval war,
even if this required temporarily evacuating all of Attica7
outside of Athens’ formidable
walls, thereby negating, to a large degree, the Peloponnesian League’s CoG: Military (i.e.
Land) Power. To initiate, maintain, and repeat when reinvaded these evacuations,
Pericles needed money to replace the income lost from Athens’ farms and recoup the
costs of subsidizing imports for the displaced rural population. To shore up Athens’
economic ability to wage war, he curtailed his magnificent building program.8
On the offense, but still within the strictures of the Thirty Year Peace, Pericles issued an
economic embargo against Megara, a state that had aided the Corinthians with ships and
who were a historic enemy of Athens. Pericles’ “Megarian Decree” is the first known
example of a peace time embargo and was not, technically, a violation of the Thirty
Years Peace.9
Pericles’ purpose was to punish Megara and warn other powers within the
Peloponnesian League that even without breaking the Peace, Athens could punish
malefactors.
Pericles’ second offensive action, also within the strictures of the Thirty Years Peace,
was to demand that Potidaea, a Corinthian colony that was part of the Delian League, pull
down its substantial walls on the water side, send hostages to Athens, and expel all
Corinthian epidemiourgoi.10
Although Potidaea had done nothing to overtly warrant any
Athenian action, it appears that Corinth had been “revenging themselves”11
by some anti-
4
The Thirty Years Peace ended the First Peloponnesian War.
5
By taking a Corcyran colony, Anactorum.
6
See Clauswitz if unfamiliar with this parlance. A more readily digestible version is found in Centers of
Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak
the Same Language, Dr. Joe Strange, Marine Corps University Perspectives on Warfighting Series, Number
4, Second Edition, 1996.
7
Attica is the province that contains most of Athens landward territories, including the capital.
8
Which included, among other buildings, the Acropolis
9
See Fornara, Charles W. (editor), Translated Documents from Greece and Rome: Archaic Times to the
end of the Peloponnesian War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1983, p 141 for the alleged
causes of the Megarian Decree.
10
Representatives or magistrates sent annually.
11
J.B. Salmon, Wealthy Corinth, A History of the City to 338 BC, Oxford University Press, New York,
1997 p 293

5
Athenian measures in that area. By issuing this demand, Pericles was sending a
diplomatic signal to any of its Delian League members with sympathies for Corinth that
any such leanings would not be tolerated. Pericles, it seems, was trying to prevent any
defection from the Athenian cause by sending a forceful diplomatic message.
Both of Pericles’ offensive actions were rationally designed to send a message to
opponents to not interfere with Athens. Moreover, they were in accord with the Thirty
Year Peace. However, all they did was stir up fear, anger, revolt, and desire for revenge
against the Athenians, as the metric of what was rational was different in his audience
than it was to Pericles.
By issuing the Megarian Decree, Pericles supposed that Megara would be discouraged
from lending Corinth naval support against Corcyra, and Athenian interests. However,
all the Megarian Decree seemed to do was cause hardship in Megara and earn the
perception in Sparta and other Peloponnesian powers that Athens was using its power in
an unrestrained fashion to harm members of the Peloponnesian League, Peace or no
Peace.12
As noted, Pericles wished to make an example of Potidaea to ensure loyalty to the Delian
League. Pericles mistake was that he issued the ultimatum from a position of temporary
weakness. He had no immediate forces present near Potidaea to give his demands any
real credibility. His rational calculus that Potidaea would not risk war with Athens due to
the high risk did not overcome the anger and resentment that the Potidaeans felt upon
receipt of the ultimatum. Thus, they conspired with the Peloponnesians13
and then
revolted. Had Pericles issued the ultimatum as an Athenian fleet bore down on Potidaea,
he would have probably achieved his goal, as the Potidaean emotions of anger and
resentment would have been tempered by the fear that an overwhelming Athenian force
would have presented.
Corinth took the ultimatum to Potidaea as an insult. Its former colony was being stripped
of its defenses and the Corinthian representatives cast out. Corinth was thereby
motivated to seek revenge upon Athens and took steps with Sparta to see this done.14
The secondary effect of Pericles’ actions was that King Archidamus, proponent of peace
with Athens, was no longer has control of Spartan foreign policy, as the recent Athenian
actions had thrust the Spartan War Party under the ephor Sthenelaidas into power. The
War Party then promised the Potidaean embassy that Sparta will invade Attica if Athens
attacked Potidaea.15
This change of policy is a remarkable occurrence, as an invasion of
Attica would be a breach of the Thirty Years Peace, something very atypical for
conservative Sparta.
12
Much like Britain or Germany in WWII, injuries to civilian populations often harden resolve to fight.
13
Potidaea sent an embassy to Athens to protest the ultimatum and dissemble; Simultaneously, it sent an
embassy to Sparta seeking support if attacked by Athens. Then, upon receipt of Spartan assurances of aid,
Potidaea revolts, not understanding that by revolting they negated the Spartan assurance of aid if attacked
by Athens.
14
Megara, relatively powerless without aid, complains to Sparta about its treatment by Athens.
15
Note that this was not a Spartan guarantee to invade if Potidaea revolted; only if Athens attacked.

6
Threats to peace between the Peloponnesian and Delian Leagues, September 433 to
mid 432 BC
Actor Action/DIME
Athens (Pericles) Curtail Athenian construction expenses to ensure a large war chest
(E); Issue Megarian Decree (E and DI); Issue ultimatum to
Potidaea (DI);
Potidaea Sends embassy to Athens to protest ultimatum and dissemble
while awaiting response from Sparta (DI); Sends embassy to
Sparta – a power outside of the Delian League --seeking support if
attacked by Athens (DI); Prepares to resist Athenian Attack (M);
Revolts (M)
Corinth Sends signals – taking Corcyran colony -- that it will not give up
the fight (DI/M); Sends embassy with Potidaeans to Sparta to ask
for intervention against Athens if Athens attacks Potidaea (DI);
Raises and Dispatches a “corps of volunteers” to aid Potidaea (DI
and M)
Sparta (War Party) Sthenelaidas and the War Party, in a position of power due to fear
of an ascendant and uncompromising, aggressive, Athens,
promises the Potidaean embassy to invade Attica if Athens attacks
Potidaea. (DI)

7
Measured/Logical
Action
Advocates/Actor Expected
Response/Outcome
Actual
Response/Outcome
Pledge of Support to
Potidaea if attacked by
Athens
Sparta (War
Party)
Containment of
Athens
Potidaea revolts;
Athens besieges
Potidaea; Sparta
stays out of conflict
Build up finances,
Economic sanctions on
Megara; Ultimatum
upon Potidaea
Athens Preparation for war;
signal to
Peloponnesian
League that Athens
is committed to its
ally Corcyra and
not to interfere;
Punishment of
Megara for entering
conflict; Security
within Delian
League from
rebellions
War Party assumes
position of
dominance in
Spartan politics;
Potidaea revolts
Stirs up unrest in
Potidaea; Mercenary
Corps to support
Potidaea’s revolt;
pressure on Sparta to
militarily intervene
Corinth Humbling of
Athens; Message to
Athens to stay out
of Corinth’s affairs
Potidaea revolts,
tying up substantial
Athenian forces
and monies for
years; War Party
ascendant in Sparta
Emotional or
Unmeasured Action
Response/Outcome
Actual
Response/Outcome
Revolt from Athens Potidaea Independence from
Athens; Spartan and
Corinthian invasion
of Attica
No Spartan invasion
of Attica as Athens
did not attack until
Potidaea revolted;
limited Corinthian
assistance;
Athenian siege

8
The Siege of Potidaea and the Spartan Decision for War 432 BC
In the summer of 432 BC Pericles dispatched an expedition to Potidaea. Athens now
undertook a siege upon Potidaea, an event that would last two years and drain a
considerable portion of the Athenian treasury.16
Potidaea was almost certain to fall. However, the Potidaeans responded with revolt
because Pericles failed to make his threat manifest by backing up the ultimatum with
immediately available force. Therefore, Potidaea disregarded the rational answer that
they must accede to Athens demands and chose the irrational, emotional response of
revolting.
The siege of its colony Potidaea infuriated Corinth and made it extremely eager to
humble Athens. Corinth then redoubled its efforts to get the Peloponnesian League to
enter the conflict against Athens. In July of 432 BC, the Spartan ephors17
responded to
pressure and called a council wherein anyone who had a complaint against Athens could
voice it.
The Spartans had discouraged Corinth from pursuing the war with Corcyra. Corinth had
disregarded this Spartan advice and now found itself in a limited conflict with Athens
over Corcyra and now Potidaea. In short, Corinth arrived in this conflict with Athens by
trying to advance solely its own interests. Furthermore, there were no legal or rational
grounds for Sparta breaking the Thirty Years Peace and declaring war on Athens. This
lack of a proper casus belli, coupled with Pericles’ personal friendship with Archidamus,
was the bedrock of Archidamus’ rational approach to dealing with crises. As events
would prove, emotion trumped his rational policies.
During the Spartan Assembly, Corinth’s ambassador presented a non-rational and
emotion based argument to the ephors and assemblymen. They conveyed that the
Athenians were a grave and dynamic threat that will grow in relative power against the
staid and unmoving Spartans. The ambassador’s words are worth quoting:
“You have never considered what sort of men you are going to fight and how totally different than
you. They are revolutionary and quick to formulate plans and put them into action, while you
preserve what you have, invent nothing new, and when you act do not complete what is needed…
they are daring beyond their power, run risks beyond wisdom and are hopeful amid dangers, while
it is your way to do less than your power permits, to distrust your surest judgments, and to think
you will be destroyed by any dangers… one would be correct in saying that is in their nature to
neither enjoy peace nor to allow it to other men”
18
16
Instead of emerging as an empowered hegemon from its concentration with Potidaea, Athens emerged as
a power who was struggling to maintain order in its Delian League Empire. This failure is directly
traceable to Pericles’ misunderstanding of rationale and emotional responses to threats and insults.
17
Magistrates that balance the power of the assembly and the duoarchy.
18
Thucydides 1.70; Version used in this writing is The Landmark Thucydides, A Comprehensive Guide to
the Peloponnesian War, edited by Robert B. Strassler; Touchstone, New York, 1998 p 40

9
Though there may be some truth in the characterizations, Athens had done nothing to
expand its territories since the 450s. Moreover, since 445 BC and the Thirty Years
Peace, Athens had subscribed to the letter of this accord. Only in the past year had
Athens taken aggressive actions and these had been in response to Corinth’s assaults on
its ally Corcyra, actions that were in no way in Sparta’s interest.
The Corinthians ended their peroration with this veiled threat: If Sparta failed to honor its
promise to support Potidaea,19
“you betray your friends and kinsmen to their worst
enemies and turn the rest of us to some other alliance.”20
There was, of course, no other
alliance, excepting Athens itself.21
Corinth was using fear, besmirch of honor, and
simple prejudice to overcome the fact that Athens had broken no truce.
An Athenian, conveniently there on “other business22
” but clearly sent by Pericles to
present his case, then spoke. He argued in a factual tone that Sparta should not be led
astray by unfounded arguments from self-advancing allies and to demonstrate that Athens
had gained its Delian League Empire through legitimate means. He finished by pointing
out that in accordance with the Thirty Year Peace, if Sparta had a perceived casus belli
with Athens, it should submit its dispute to arbitration.23
The Athenian emissary finished
by noting that if the Spartans should refuse to arbitrate “with the gods as our witnesses,
we will try to take vengeance on those who have started the war when you have led the
way.”24
Pericles had every reason to believe that this rational and strength-based
approach, which offered Sparta a face savings channel to enter arbitration and thereby not
leave its allies unsupported, might succeed. Moreover, Pericles knew that Archidamus
was not only a personal friend, but also was predisposed toward peace.
The Spartans then debated among themselves. Corinth’s influence25
now urged war. The
Spartan assembly was angry and fearful of the apparently growing Athenian threat and
was inclined towards breaking the peace. Then Archidamus, “a man with a reputation for
wisdom and prudence”26
spoke up and urged to send an emissary to Athens to make
official complaints, while simultaneously sending for aid to Persia and Greek Sicily for
naval support. He advanced the rational course that Sparta could potentially sway the
Athenians and avoid war and, if they could not, then Sparta could use the next two or
three years to build up the financial resources, navy, and key alliances needed to have a
chance at defeating Athens.
19
Sparta was not bound to intercede as Athens did not attack until after Potidaea revolted.
20
Thucydides 1.71.4; pp 40-41
21
Or perhaps Argos, a neighboring mid-sized landward power. A discussion of Argos is beyond the scope
of this paper, but it suffices to say it had had tensions with the Peloponnesian League and was independent
of the Delian League.
22
Thucydides 1.72.1; p 41
23
Arbitration was a then-new concept that appears to be one of Pericles’ rational creations.
24
25
In 440 BC Corinth urged peace over the Samian Rebellion.
26

10
However, the Spartan War Party under Sthenelaidas argued that Sparta must act now lest
Potidaea27
would fall. Arbitration would not help Corinth, either, indicating, perhaps,
just how much influence Corinth had with Sparta. The danger to Sparta -- an overbearing
and arrogant Athens -- drove the majority of the Spartans to the side of the War Party.
They insisted that Athens must be humbled. Sthenelaidas’ words are poignant:
“… if we are wise, we will not look on while they wrong our allies, nor will we delay seeking vengeance;
for our allies are already suffering. Others may have much money, ships, and horses, but we have good
allies whom we must not betray to the Athenians. Nor should we submit to judgments by courts or words,
for we have not been injured by words. Instead we must take swift vengeance with all our forces. And let
no one tell us we must take the time to consider when we have been wronged; rather let those who
contemplate doing a wrong reflect for a long time. So vote for War, Spartans, in a manner worthy of
Sparta. Do not allow the Athenians to grow stronger, but let us, with the help of the gods, march out
against the wrongdoers.”28
Sthenelaidas uses a counterfactual argument as: (1) Potidaea is already an Athenian Ally
and by punishing them, Athens is not growing stronger; (2) Corinth made the decision to
pursue war against Corcyra despite dissuasion from Sparta and only in accord with
Corinth’s interests; (3) There is no indication as to how Sparta had been wronged; (4)
From a military perspective, the Spartans will not be able to simply march out and deal
with the Athenians. To suppose so indicates a gross misunderstanding of Athens’ walls
and it ability to employ its maritime power.
Sthenelaidas couples his counterfactual argument with emotion, rendering it all that more
effective propaganda, something that Pericles never quite mastered or understood the
consequences that could result from the artful manipulation thereof. Specifically,
Sthenelaidas plays on the Spartan concept of the maintenance of honor, fear of an all
powerful Athens, and contempt for words, negotiation and, implicitly, strict legal
interpretation of treaties, which he thinks unmanly and unworthy of Sparta. By not
understanding how these emotions could be manipulated, Pericles miscalculated.
Moreover, Athens’ ambassador’s cool, factual demeanor only stoked the emotions of the
Spartan war party. In July of 432 BC, the Spartan Assembly voted for war. Neither
declaration nor any hostile action had yet been taken, but the intent of Sparta was clear:
they would try and humble Athens. It would be very difficult for peace advocates to
avoid a general war.
27
An ally of neither Corinth nor Sparta.
28
Thucydides 1.86; p 48. Quotation translation text is taken from Kagan’s The Outbreak of the
Peloponnesian War, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1989; pp 304-5. Credit is due to Kagan for this
aspect of this paper’s argument as he clearly pointed the way.

11
The Siege of Potidaea and the Spartan Decision for War 432 BC
Athens (Pericles) Besieges Potidaea (M); Continues Embargo of Megara (E); Makes
legalistic and logical based presentation to Sparta that Athens has
not broken the Thirty Year’s Peace and is acting legitimately (DI);
Invokes Arbitration Clause of Thirty Years Peace with Sparta (DI)
Megara Complains to Sparta about Megarian Decree and urges that Sparta
go to war with Athens (DI)
Potidaea In concert with Corinthian mercenaries, resists Athenian Siege
(M)
Corinth Presses Sparta for war at Spartan Assembly by invoking the
specter of an aggressive, unrestrained Athens (DI); Assists
resistance of Potidaea through mercenary volunteer corps (DI and
M)
Sparta
(Sthenelaidas)
Holds assemblies to hear sides for and against war with Athens,
including diplomats from Corinth, Megara and Athens; (DI) Based
on fear of an overly aggressive Athens and honor for Sparta’s
dominant role in Greece, disregards caution, logic, and even
Archidamus’ practical war preparation advice and votes for war;
(DI); Summons whole Peloponnesian League Assembly to review
if war is to be pursued. (DI)

12
Measured/Logical
Action
Response/Outcome
Actual
Response/Outcome
Cautions against
pursuing war
immediately ; urges
mediation and
preparation for war
Sparta (King
Archidamus)
Arbitration with
Athens and, if war
does come, Sparta
will be well
prepared with a
strong navy, allies,
and finances to
support its army
Spartan War Party
ignores logic and
votes for war
Besieges revolting
Potidaea; Continues
embargo of Megara;
Makes legalistic
argument to Sparta that
Athens has not broken
peace and suggests
arbitration
Athens Potidaea subdued
and hegemony
within Delian
League maintained;
containment of
Megara and signal
to others not to
intervene;
arbitration with
Sparta
Siege of Potidaea
continues; Megara
presses Sparta for
relief; Spartan
assembly refuses to
arbitrate and votes
for war
Incites Sparta to War
through specter of an
ascendant, aggressive,
and hegemonic Athens
Corinth Sparta will enter
war in support of
Potidaea and
Corinth; Athens,
now humbled, will
stay out of
Corinthian affairs
Although Sparta
votes for war,
Sparta will not take
offensive action
until Peloponnesian
League also votes
for war and then
declares war
Emotional or
Unmeasured Action
Response/Outcome
Actual
Response/Outcome
Votes for War now by
citing the fear of an
alien and aggressive
Athens
Sparta (War
Party)
Containment of
Athens; support of
allies (Corinth and,
falsely, Potidaea);
maintenance of
Spartan hegemony
in Peloponnesian
League.
Sparta realizes that
they do not have the
means to compel
Athens without
significant allied
support; calls
Peloponnesian
League assembly

13
The Peloponnesian League Assembly and the Start of the War September 432-
March 431 BC
In August of 432 BC Sparta’s allies convened. Corinth, diplomatically artful, had already
lobbied each to vote for war.29
Nonetheless, quite a few Peloponnesian states favored
peace.30
The Corinthians argued that their war aims were limited, that enough money
could be gathered from the collected to build up the needed fleet, and that one solid naval
victory would do in the Athenians. Moreover, since many of the Athenian sailors were
from the Delian League states, they could be bribed away and hired. Further, Sparta and
the land powers of the Peloponnesus could invade and ravage Attica and leave a fort
there to ensure that the Athenians capitulated. They even assured that Apollo31
approved
of war. Finally, the Corinthians argue that the war is unavoidable and must be
undertaken proactively. After the Corinthian speech a majority of those Peloponnesian
states present32
voted for war.
Apparently, quite a few Peloponnesian states voted no. Moreover, as Archidamus
counseled, war preparations were needed, particularly in regards to money and ships,
before the Peloponnesians had a chance at winning. Sparta’s Peace Party, or perhaps,
portions of the War Party had not yet given up a settlement, then sent embassies to
Athens. The first embassy, sent just after the August 432 Spartan assembly, was
insincere, demanding that Athens “drive out the curse of the goddess”33
or coded speech
for exiling Pericles, as his family was supposedly cursed for a generations-previous
assault in Athena’s temple.34
The second embassy was sincere. It made some demands that Athens withdraw from
Potidaea and another state, but contained the explicit line “… there would be no war if
they (Athens) withdrew the Megarian Decree.”35
Pericles, however, now hard-headed in his insistence on the arbitration mandated in the
Thirty Years Peace, turned the embassy away. Pericles miscalculated that by concluding
that by giving in to this one concession, he would be undermining Athens. In truth, the
demand and promise to settle indicates that Corinth and Sthenelaidas were not able to
completely corral the whole Peloponnesian League into belligerence, as Megara, for
example, was willing to settle for a restoration of normal economic relations with Athens.
Sparta was willing to settle all of the other grievances if the economic embargo that
29
Donald Kagan, Outbreak, p 311.
30
Outbreak p 312
31
Delphi was under Peloponnesian control.
32
Indicating that not all were present.
33
Outbreak p 317
34
The Spartans, it seems, reckoned they could undermine the strength of the Athenian government by
bringing into question Pericles’ hard nosed logic and perhaps cause Athens to adopt a more appeasing
politic. However, Pericles was not unseated and continued to steer Athens along a firm course of not
backing down. Pericles’ logic, it seems, was that if Sparta wanted to negotiate it should submit to
arbitration, as the Thirty Year’s Peace demanded. Athens must not make unilateral concessions in light of
Sparta’s refusal to abide to the Peace. Such concessions would only invite deterioration of Athens power
and hegemony.
35
Thucydides 1.139; p 79

14
Athens had placed on Megara was removed. And the Megarian Decree was merely a
diplomatic and economic tool to advance policy. If its revocation achieved Athens’
political goal, then it was a worthy tool.
Athens would have lost nothing by revoking the Megarian Decree. But Pericles, with his
hidebound refusal, would not make concessions based on his perception Sparta’s illegal
action: its refusal to arbitrate. Pericles’ refusal would mark the last chance for avoiding
war. He won his arguments in the Athenian Assembly and his agents told the Spartan
Embassy that they could not take down the Megarian decree that had been passed and
posted.36
Another Spartan embassy followed, but offered no reasonable terms, as the
Spartan Peace Party had been discredited by Pericles’ refusal to come to terms on so
small a matter.
It was still many months before Sparta went to war, so the Spartan Peace Party was
apparently not out of the equation. Moreover, when war does breakout in March, 431
BC, it was not due to Sparta’s active decision. Rather, it was because of their allies –
Thebes – made a surprise assault on the at-peace Delian League/Athenian ally Plataea.
Even after this clear breach of the Thirty Year’s Peace, Archidamus sent an embassy to
Athens to try and prevent war. The ambassador was refused by Pericles and, passing out
of Attica, remarked “This day will be the beginning of great evils for the Greeks.”37
During his subsequent invasion of Attica, Archidamus deliberately conducted a limited
war, with incremental ravaging in an attempt to bring the Athenians out from behind their
walls and to the negotiation table, but to no avail. As Archidamus predicted, this would
be a war that both Athens and Sparta would pass onto their sons. The war, quite
avoidable in the instance, would last twenty-seven years and would be total in its
execution.
36
The Spartans, laconically, replied that the Athenians then need not take it down, but may simply turn it
around. Outbreak p 324
37
Outbreak p 342

15
The Peloponnesian League Assembly and the Start of the War September 432-
March 431 BC
Athens (Pericles) Besieges Potidaea (M); Continues Embargo of Megara (E);
Refuses to revoke Megarian Decree due to strict adherence to
legal proprieties of the Thirty Years Peace, despite the explicit
assurance from Sparta that such a revocation would mean no war
and despite that Athens had no major state interest at stake (DI and
E); Continues to invoke Arbitration Clause of Thirty Years Peace
with Sparta (DI); Maintains that Athens has the maritime might,
money, and the fortifications to be unbeatable by the
Peloponnesians and therefore refuses to yield (DI, M, and E)
Megara It appears that they press Sparta to do what is needed to get
Athens to revoke the Megarian Decree, even if that means seeking
peace and abandoning Corinth’s insistence for war. (DI and E)
Potidaea In concert with Corinthian mercenaries, resists Athenian Siege
(M)
Corinth Presses Peloponnesian League Member States for war at
Assembly by invoking the specter of an aggressive, unrestrained
Athens (DI); Assists resistance of Potidaea through mercenary
volunteer corps (DI and M)
Thebes Takes advantage of the situation to attack its Delian League
neighbor Plataea, thereby breaking the Thirty Years Peace (M)
Sparta (King
Archidamus)
After Spartan War Party’s sends initial hot-headed embassy, sends
an embassy with real offer of peace if the Megarian Decree is
revoked (DI and E); Apparently, keeps Peloponnesian Army from
invading Attica until after Thebe’s unprovoked attack on Plataea
(DI and M); Sends final embassy (DI) and even after invasion of
Attica conducts limited razing of crops, buildings, etc to bring
Athens to negotiations (DI, E, and M)

16
Measured/Logical
Action
Response/Outcome
Actual
Response/Outcome
Besieges revolting
Potidaea; Continues
embargo of Megara;
Makes legalistic
argument to Sparta that
Athens has not broken
peace and suggests
arbitration; fortifies for
war.
Athens (Pericles) Subdue Potidaea;
maintenance of
Athenian hegemony
in Delian League;
arbitration with
Sparta to maintain
Thirty Years Peace;
readiness for war
Huge expenditure
of monies, ships,
and manpower at
Potidaea; failed
arbitration;
empowerment of
Spartan war party;
encouragement of
Thebes to attack by
seeming
inevitability of war
Sends conciliatory
embassy to Athens
indicating peace if
Megaran Decree is
withdrawn; restrains
military action.
Sparta (King
Archidamus)
Athenian revocation
of Megarian decree;
arbitration through
non-Thirty Years
Peace mechanisms;
Maintenance of
peace; restoration
of peace on status
quo ante bellum
Athenian rejection;
discrediting of
Spartan peace party;
empowerment of
war Party
Incites Peloponnesian
League to War through
spectre of an ascendant,
aggressive, and
hegemonic Athens
Corinth Peloponnesian
League will enter
war in support of
Potidaea and
Corinth; Athens will
stay out of Corinth’s
sphere of influence
in the west
Although
Peloponnesian
League votes for
war, Sparta will not
declare war or take
offensive action
after it realizes that
there is no
immediate casus
belli and that Sparta
is not prepared for
war
Emotional or
Unmeasured Action
Response/Outcome
Actual
Response/Outcome
Rejection of Spartan
offer to maintain peace
if Megaran Decree
Athens (Pericles,
miscalculation)
Force Sparta to
arbitrate in
accordance with the
30 Years Peace
without giving in
anything up ahead
of arbitration.
Discrediting of
Spartan peace party
and portrayal of
Athens as
unreasonable and
threatening;
empowerment of
war party

17
Refusal to arbitrate in
accordance with Thirty
Years Peace
Sparta
(Archidamus
miscalculation)
Believes Megarian
compromise will
make this
unimportant
Pericles insists on
arbitration and
refuses to revoke
the Megarian
Decree without
arbitration
Attacks Delian League
Neighbor
Thebes Defeat of Manitea;
improve position
before “inevitable
war”
Theban defeat; start
of war

18
Conclusion
Both the rulers and much of the populations of Athens and Sparta did not want war.
Sparta, despite the wise counsel of King Archidamus, allowed itself to be drawn into war
by the self-serving actions of its allies and the fomenting of fear and insecurity among
less circumspect members of their governing body. In Athens, Pericles sent signals based
on rationale when signals founded in brute strength would have served better. Moreover,
he refused to yield to compromise over the Megarian Decree, citing principle over
practicality, and, perhaps, forgetting that a diplomatic tool can be shelved at little cost if
by shelving that tool one achieves one’s -- or most of one’s -- goals. Furthermore and
critically, he failed to understand the themes that he was communicating to his adversary
were being manipulated by effective Spartan War Party and Corinthian propaganda.
Had both sides done a better job of using the proper signals, gauging the potential
reception of those signals, interpreting the signals of their adversary and, in Sparta’s case,
restraining headstrong allies, then the cataclysmic Peloponnesian War could have been
averted.
As Archidamus and Pericles could attest, rational responses to rational actions are not
assured. Formulizers of national strategy must be aware that what may seem like a
limited message to the sender, may be received by its intended audience as something
starkly different. In the case of the Megarian decree or the siege of Potidaea, Athens was
perceived as starkly menacing. In the case of Athens initial demands upon Potidaea not
being backed up by potential immediate military action, the message conveyed was of
Athenian weakness or lack of resolve.
Sparta’s assurance to remain at peace if the Megarian Decree was revoked was
reasonable to Archidamus, but Sparta’s refusal to arbitrate per the Thirty Years Peace
made such revocation unreasonable to Pericles. Therefore, the employment of national
power must take into consideration the target’s perception of the message conveyed and
tailor one’s message accordingly. Where there is a different perception message, there
exists the threat of the unintended escalation of a confrontation. Had, for example,
Archidamus agreed to arbitration under the Thirty Years Peace or Pericles to remove the
Megarian Decree, then this war could have been avoided or, at a minimum, forestalled
for some period at little cost.

19
Appendix I: Political Background
The Greek world in 436 to 429 BC is – with a few key exceptions -- divided into two
halves, the Peloponnesian League led by Sparta and Delian League led by Athens. Both
parties had united in the Hellenic League between from 480 to 478 BC to drive the
Persians out of Europe. Sparta then decided to return to its affairs in southern Greece and
leave Persia to dominate Ionian Greece38
. Athens with a vested interest in maritime
activities, continued the long war with Persia and eventually made peace39
with Persia in
449 BC, keeping the Persian threat back to “three days march” from the coast of what we
would today call western Turkey. Sparta and Athens and their respective allies, jealous
of each others encroachments, fight a brief, limited war in 45840
and then sign a Thirty
Years Peace that demands arbitration of all disputes before initiating hostilities and
forbids a member of either league from joining the other league, one of the main causes
of the war. Tensions continue, but both sides are at peace with each other until events in a
remote corner of the Greek world.
The Major Powers
1. Athens
38
Ionian Greece is what we would today call the coastal strip of western Turkey and the Greek and Turkish
Islands in the Ionian Sea.
39
The Peace of Callias
40
The First Peloponnesian War

20
Athens’ Government
Athens, located in the Attic peninsula in east central Greece, is a wealthy imperial41
democracy where all citizens can partake in the government. Almost all political
positions are decided by lot, not by election. The only elected positions are those of the
ten generals, each annually reelected. They have no power outside of military operations
and are subject to regular review by the Athenian assembly. The leading man in Athens is
Pericles, a general who has been elected each year for many years. However, Pericles
holds power only through constitutional means and has no power outside of what is voted
unto him. The cornerstone of Pericles national security policy is control of the seas, as
Athens is dependent on foreign imports and pays for many of its expenditures through
money gained from its island and littoral empire, the Delian League. Moreover, Athens
itself – though on the Greek mainland – is much like an island as its walls are near
impervious.
Athens’ Military
Athens has a mid-sized but excellent army42
and an extremely powerful navy. Athens is
one of only two states to maintain a fleet. Athens, although on the Greek mainland,
can be thought of as an island as it is connected to the sea by its long walls (see
diagram below). Moreover, much of its population can shelter within these walls, though
this would mean their farms will be destroyed.
41
Imperial in the sense that it enforces obedience from all members of the Delian League, prevents
secession, controls taxation and expenditures, and formulates most of the foreign policy of the Delian
League
42
Beginning of PP War: Athens had 13 k hoplites/infantry and 16k garrison troops

21
Athens’ Economy
Although Athens has poor to middling agricultural capabilities, Athens has a large annual
income from its own and Delian taxation and trade revenues43
. Athens is dependent on
imports of foodstuffs from the Ukraine area and Egypt and becomes more so when its
farmlands become occupied or devastated by Peloponnesian Forces. To counter this
vulnerability, Pericles has built up a large war chest44
in case of prolonged hostilities.
Athens’ Politics
Within Athens, there are basically two parties relative to relations with Sparta: the peace
party and the war party. Pericles, a man of the established traditional elite houses, is the
leading voice in the peace party and, it seems, Cleon, a “new man” who hated or
distrusted the established families, was the leader of the war party. The peace party
advocates maintaining the status quo and seeks to limit expansion. The war party seeks
aggressive expansion and, if that brings Athens into conflict with Sparta and its allies,
then so be it.
Athens Relations with the Delian League
43
1,000 Talents of income; 400 internal from Athens and 600 from its empire. See Donald Kagan,
Pericles of Athens, Macmillan Press, New York, 1991, p 232.
44
6000 talents in silver were in Athenian treasury; Another 500 in uncoined gold and silver and 40 more on
the Statue of Athena, see p 232 Pericles. To put these numbers in perspective, a talent will cover the costs
of feeding/paying 200 men to operate a trireme for one month. Given that there are 8 sailing months a
year, one trireme will take 8 talents to operate for a year. Athens had 200 ships in service in 431 BC. At one
talent a month for 8 months per year, this equals 1600 talents for naval expenses alone.

22
Athens is the hegemon of the Delian league. Several times in recent years members of the
Delian League have rebelled from Athenian sovereignty and have had to be dealt with by
Athenian expeditions. As the Athenian dominance and taxation is considered irksome by
many Delian constituent states, given the opportunity, more states will revolt.
2. Sparta.
Sparta’s Government
Sparta has a combined oligarchic, judicial, duarchic (two kings), and limited democracy
government. The one king of any influence was Archidamus,45
a personal friend of
Pericles and a proponent of peace. However, their existed a war party amongst the other
sections of the government led by the ephor Sthenelaidas whose goal it was to humble
Athens and strip it of its empire. The ruling class – the Spartiates – performed only
soldiering and governance functions.
Sparta’s Military
Sparta has the best infantry in the world, with, including allies, around two to three times
the number of hoplites the Athenians could field46
and was backed by excellent allied
cavalry and auxiliaries in 431 BC. Sparta does not have a navy to speak of. Further,
Sparta’s siege abilities are minimal, meaning that the walls of Athens were a significant
barrier. Sparta is very reluctant to send major portions of 4,000 or so Spartiate infantry
far away or for extended periods from the Peloponnesus, as their deployment would
increase the danger of a helot revolt.
Sparta’s Economy
Sparta has a basic agrarian economy where the lands are worked by helots (serfs).
Rudimentary manufacturing and trading for basic needs is performed by freemen called
pereoikoi. Sparta did not allow gold or silver currencies in its territories and had access
to extremely limited financial assets. Sparta is faced by repeated threats of or actual
revolts by its enserfed helot population. These helots were former free Greeks from
neighboring states who were defeated in battle by the
Sparta’s relations with the Peloponnesian League
Sparta is the major power of the Peloponnesian League. Other powers have significant
might, but it is Sparta that enjoys the foremost position in the league. However, Sparta
does not wield the same power as Athens does in the Delian League, if for no other
reason that Athens is able to concentrate its power relatively easily through naval
maneuver into any one location of its empire, whereas Sparta would have some difficulty
marching to any but the closest locations.
45
The other, Pleistoanax, was exiled after being accused for taking bribes from Athens during the First
Peloponnesian War and abandoning the Spartan advance on Athens in 458 BC. The alleged briber was
Pericles.
46
See Kagan Peloponnesian War page 57. Also See Pericles of Athens page 231, which quotes Plutarch as
there being 60,000 Spartans and allies in the field. Kagan reckons this number is a little high, but remains
convinced that the Spartan led Army far larger than the Athenian led army.

23
Other Peloponnesian League Powers.
Corinth
Corinth is a member of the Peloponnesian League and an ally of Sparta. It is a wealthy
oligarchy with rich agricultural lands and a large merchant fleet but no standing navy to
speak of. In the past, it has built up a mid-sized navy relatively quickly and could do so
again, but such a navy would take time to develop the proficiency of those of Athens or
Corcyra, who both maintain active fleets. Corinth occupies a strategic position straddling
the route between Athens and Sparta and also allowing Corinth to drag ships from the
Aegean Sea to the Gulf of Corinth, giving it a unique advantage that it can quickly and
safely shift any navy from the east of Greece to the west of Greece. It has a mid-sized
army that it contributes to the overall Spartan-led army. Corinth has multiple colonies
throughout the Greek world, notably Corcyra. Relations with Corcyra, however, are very
poor. Corinth also has strained relations with Megara, another Spartan ally. Corinth’s
relations with Athens are mixed, with respect and rivalry combined. It is an enemy to
Argos, an unallied neighboring state in the Peloponnesus that is still under a mandated
peace treaty with the Peloponnesian League.
Thebes. Thebes, the major power of Boeotia, is an oligarchy and a member of the
Peloponnesian League and a titular ally of Sparta, though a clear rivalry exists between
them. It has a mid sized army with exceptionally fine cavalry (a specialty of Boeotia, the
region north of Attica). It has no navy to speak of. It has very poor relations with Athens
and was an abettor of Persia during the Persian Invasion of Greece. It has bad relations
with Plataea, a small democratic power between Thebes and Athens.
Megara. A mid sized land power just south of Athens. Controls key mountainous routes
into the Peloponnesian Peninsula. Seceded from the Peloponnesian League at the onset
of the first Peloponnesian War (458 BC) and joined the Delian League. Subsequently
withdrew from the Delian League, betraying Athens, and rejoined the Peloponnesian
League. Megara is an enemy of Athens and somewhat hostile to Corinth, its ally, as well.
Other Delian League Powers
Samos. Samos is a mid sized island power who in 440 BC revolted from the league but
was besieged and then submitted to Athens under reasonable but expensive terms,
including stripping it of its navy and a very large fine.
Plataea. Plataea is a small Boeotian democratic city between Athens and Thebes. It is
very loyal to Athens in past wars with its small but capable army. Plataea has banished
some of its citizens with oligarchic sentiments, who have then found refuge and backing
in Thebes. Tensions between Plataea and Thebes are high.
Potidaea. A small well-fortified Corinthian colony on a peninsula in the Thracian area
near Macedonia and that is part of the Delian League. It has loyalties toward Corinth, but

24
has not yet displayed any outward signs of disloyalty to Athens, despite increased
tribute.47
Neutral Powers
Persia. Persia is the barbarian (meaning non-Greek) superpower to the east. Persia is
very wealthy and has a large fleet and a large army. However, it has numerous
commitments in Egypt and modern day Afghanistan that it must attend to. Moreover, its
army, however, is not able to stand up to the Greeks unless it can deploy its cavalry to
good effect. Its navy has been bested by the Athenians multiple times. Persia strives to
see Athens and Sparta wear each other out so that it can reclaim its coastal satraps
(provinces) in western Caria and Phyrgia (western modern Turkey).
Corcyra. Corcyra (modern Corfu) is a remote island power off of western Greece. It is a
colony of Corinth but, unusually, has antagonistic relations with Corinth. Corcyra
maintains a proficient mid-sized (120 triremes) navy and has enough wealth to not only
maintain this navy, but also pursue a policy of local imperialism and isolation from the
rest of Greek affairs. Internally Corcyra it is riven by two violently opposed political
factions, one that represents the landed or otherwise wealthy nobility – the aristocrats –
and the other that represents the demos (the radical democrats).
Epidamnus. Epidamnus is a small and remote city state on the coast opposite Corcyra,
its founding/colonizing mother city. As Corinth founded Corcyra, Epidamnus looks to
Corinth as its “grandmother” city.
Argos: Mid-sized independent land power near Corinth and Megara in the Peloponnesus;
A rival to Sparta, having fought a war with it recently; Bound by peace treaty with Sparta
to not go to war until approximately 420 BC.
47
Pericles p 210

25
Appendix II: The Corcyran Crisis 436/435 BC
In 436 BC, civil war started between the democratic and ruling aristocratic factions of
Epidamnus. The Epidamnian democrats soon cast out the aristocrats. These aristocrats
then appealed to their founding mother-city Corcyra for aid. Corcyra, not wanting to get
involved, declined to intervene.
Rebuffed, the aristocrats then appealed to Corinth, the founder of their founder Corcyra,
and offered to become a colony if Corinth aids them. Though colonizer and colony,
Corinth and Corcyra have “uniquely bad”48
relations. Despite knowing that intervention
will likely result in conflict, Corinth decided to intervene and sends an expedition that
restored the aristocrats.
Corinth, with no immediate threat to their interests, wished to humble their recalcitrant
colony Corcyra. Corcyra, although they had no stake in the Epidamnian civil strife,
elected to confront the Corinthian encroachments in their political sphere. Corcyra then,
with Epidamnian aristocrat aid, laid siege to Epidamnus.
Despite Spartan diplomatic pressure to not pursue hostilities, Corinth rejected Corcyra’s
peace entreaties and declares war on Corcyra. Corinth then built a fleet of 75 triremes and
sent soldiers and settlers from allied Peloponnesian states49
to deal with the Corcyrans.
En route, the Corinthian Fleet was intercepted by Corcyra in the Battle of Leucimne and
defeated resoundingly. Epidamnus fell to Corcyra the same day. Multiple constituent
states from the Peloponnesian League were now involved and the conflict had gone from
a remote corner to the center of the Greek world.
Initial Reactions to the Corcyran Crisis 436/435 BC
Corcyra Sent embassy to Corinth (DI) to seek arbitration; Prepared to fight
(M); Prepared to send Embassy to Athens (DI)
Corinth Refused Compromise (DI); Sent expedition against Corcyra (M)
Sparta (King
Archidamus)
Favored diplomatic peaceful resolution for fear that Athens will
intervene. Put diplomatic pressure on Corinth to resolve conflict
peaceably (DI).
Athens (Pericles) No known action; Too remote for standing policy.
Measured/Logical
Response
Response/Outcome
Actual
Response/Outcome
Declined to get
involved
Sparta Restraint by Corinth Corinth declared
war on Corcyra
Advocated arbitration,
restraint over
Corcyra Restraint by Corinth Corinth declared
war on Corcyra
48
Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, Harper Perennial, London 2005, p 25
49
Including Megara, Athens’ unfriendly neighbor.

26
Epidamnus
Emotional or
Unmeasured Response
Response/Outcome
Actual
Response/Outcome
Intervention, Military
expedition, assault
Corinth and local
allies (including
Megara)
Humbling of
Corcyra
Corinth Defeated at
sea

27
Appendix III: The Crisis Unfolds, Summer 433 BC
In the summer of 433 BC, a Corcyran diplomat presented his case in an open air forum --
the Pnyx – before the assembled citizens of Athens. Pericles wanted peace and was
disinclined to intervene. However, the diplomat played upon Pericles’ concern for naval
dominance. He claimed that it was better to have Corcyra on Athens’ side in the
“coming” war with the Peloponnesian League as:
“there are three fleets worthy of mention in Greece, yours, ours, and the Corinthians’; if the
Corinthian get control of us first, you will have to fight against the Corcyran and Peloponnesian (League)
fleets at once; if you accept us you will fight with our ships in addition to your own.”
50
Corinth’s diplomats then responded. They began by pointing out they had convinced
Sparta not to intervene against Athens when Samos, a Delian League member with a
strong navy, revolted in 440 BC. Corinth had recognized that the Aegean was Athens
sphere of influence and that Athens could attend to unruly states therein as it saw fit.
They asked that Athens return this diplomatic courtesy by acknowledging that the Gulf of
Corinth and the nearby Ionian Sea were Corinth’s sphere of influence.
Further, the Corinthians argued that war between the Leagues was not inevitable.
Moreover, Athens should not ally with Corcyra because, although Corcyra was neutral,
such an alliance would be a violation of the spirit of the Thirty Year Peace between the
Leagues, which forbade either league from aligning with former members of the other
league. They followed with a threat:
“for if you join with them it will be necessary for us to include you in our punishment of them.”
51
The Athenians then deliberated about what course to follow. On the first day, the
Corinthians emerged as favored, as by allying with Corcyra – who was already at war
with Corinth – Athens would become a combatant in that war and thereby break the
Thirty Years Peace. On the second day, Pericles, who reckoned he could not allow the
naval superiority of Athens to be overtaken, put forward a defensive treaty with Corcyra.
Athens would defend Corcyra, but not engage in offensive operations against Corinth.
This rational middle road was Pericles signal to Corinth to come to some sort of accord
with Corcyra. To back it up, he sent a small fleet of 10 triremes to Corcyra, followed 23
days later by 20 more when he was convinced by others he needed a stronger signal.
50
Thucydides 1.33.3. p 22
51
Thucydides 1.40.3-4; p 26

28
The Corcyran Crisis Unfolds, Summer 433 BC
Corcyra Sent embassy to Athens for military and political aid. Played on
Athens fear of losing control of the seas. (DI)
Corinth Built up new, larger fleet over two years, hired experienced rowers
from around the Greek world, including Athens (M); Sent counter
embassy to Athens to convince Athens that getting involved
would be imprudent, unnecessary, and counter to the good will
that Corinth had shown Athens by convincing Sparta not to
intervene during the Samian Revolt of 440 BC (DI)
Sparta (King
Archidamus)
Seemed to have pressured Peloponnesian League allies to stay out
of the conflict between Corcyra and Corinth52
(DI)
Athens (Pericles) Accepted Corcyra as a mutual defense ally; no aggressive action
against Corinth would be supported but defense against Corinthian
attacks would be provided (DI). He then decided to send a small
naval force (10 triremes) to support the Corcyrans in defensive
operations only; Pericles believed that the Athenian presence
would be a strong enough signal deter the Corinthians. (Mix of DI
and M);Other Athenians convinced him to send 20 more ships 23
days later to reinforce the initial signal force. (M)
52
Pericles, p 202

29
Measured/Logical
Action
Response/Outcome
Actual
Response/Outcome
Non intervention by
Peloponnesian States
Sparta Restraint by Corinth Corinth escalated
Concluded defensive
alliance with Corcyra,
motivated by
preservation of naval
dominance; Small fleet
sent to Corcyra
followed by second
larger, but still small,
fleet
Athens Restraint by Corinth
some negotiated
end to hostilities;
maintenance of
Athenian naval
dominance
Corinth escalated;
Attempted to dissuade
Athens from intervening
by a spheres of
influence argument and
by pointing out that war
is not inevitable;
prepared fleet
Corinth Athens would
acknowledge that
Corcyra is in
Corinth’s sphere of
Interest and stay out
of the conflict
Athens formed
defensive alliance
with Corcyra and
sent small fleets to
support Corcyra
Prevailing Emotional
or Unmeasured Action
Response/Outcome
Actual
Response/Outcome
Ignored diplomatic
signals and sends
second Military
Expedition
Corinth,
supported by
Megara
Humbling of
Corcyra; Message
to Athens to stay
out of others affairs
Corcyra resolved to
resist, Athens sent
fleets to support
defense (only) of
Corcyra

30
Appendix IV: The Battle of Sybota and Aftermath, September 433 BC
In the summer of 433 BC, Pericles had miscalculated. He had thought that a signal from
a small Athenian fleet would resonate with the Corinthian Fleet and cause them not to
press home their attack against the Corcyran Fleet, as by doing so Corinth would be
escalating a local war into one that could involve Athens. His rational calculus failed to
anticipate that the 10 triremes Athens had dispatched to help its ally Corcyra would not
be enough to deter the Coronthians and only appear feckless. Corinth now entered a
course of thoughtless aggression toward Corcyra.
“Hatred for Corcyra had so warped the judgment of Corinth that she believed herself to be in the right in
chastising her rebellious colony – just as Athens had chastised Samos with Corinth’s help a few years
before.”
53
Corinth had a great deal of pride vested in defeating Corcyra. This pride, coupled with
Corinth’s anger for Athens’ interference in what was their historical sphere of influence
and a perceived lack of appreciation that for the support that Corinth had shown Athens
during the Samian Revolt, ensured that Pericles’ rational approach would falter. Wealthy
Corinth built of fleet of 150 new triremes, including allies54
and colonies and prepared to
put an end to Corcyran efforts to keep Corinth from taking over the Corcyran colony of
Epidamnus.
The Corinthian Fleet sailed to Corcyra and was met at the Battle of Sybota by 110
experienced Corcyran triremes, accompanied by 10 Athenian veteran crews. The
Athenians attempted to follow Pericles intent of signaling the Corinthians, as manifested
in their orders to get involved in defensive actions only. In short, the Athenian ships were
there not to fight, but only to signal Corinth the gravity of pursuing the fight against
Corcyra. Yet, the Corinthians bore down on the Corcyran fleet and engaged them
anyway, until the Corcyrans began to route.
At this point, having little choice, the Athenian ships engaged fully to try and prevent a
total defeat of their ally Corcyra,55
only to be forced back themselves. Suddenly, the
Corinthians broke off the attack and retreated. The now-damaged Corinthian ships had
seen an approaching fleet and would not know until later that it contained only the 20
ships that Athens had sent to reinforce Pericles’ initial force.
After the battle the Corinthians sent heralds to the Athenians.56
Corinth’s envoys were
explicit about not having broken the Thirty Year’s Peace and told the Athenians:
53
J.B. Salmon, Wealthy Corinth, A History of the City to 338 BC, Oxford University Press, New York,
1997 p 291
54
Among them, anti-Athens Megara.
55
56
Of note, the heralds did not carry the herald’s staff (a flag of truce or parley), as use of this staff would be
a formal admission of a state of war between Corinth and Athens.

31
“If you intend to prevent us from sailing to Corcyra… and in this way break the treaty, first seize us and
treat us as enemies.”57
The Athenians, following Pericles’ instructions, were circumspect in their answer:
“We are not beginning a war… nor are we breaking the treaty, but we have come to help our Corcyran
allies. If you want to sail anywhere else we will not hinder you, but if you mean to sail against Corcyra, we
will not permit it, insofar as it is in our power.”
58
Blows had been struck, but formal war had not yet been declared.
The Battle of Sybota and Aftermath, September 433 BC
Corcyra Defend against Corinthian Invasion Fleet (M); tried to get a formal
state of war between Athens and Corinth (DI)
Corinth Built and assembled a large fleet to attack Corcyra; Perceived
limited Athenian fleet (10 ships) as a sign of weakness; Was
narrowly defeated due to arrival of second Athenian Fleet (M);
After the battle sent emissaries to Athens to induce Athens to be
the one to break the 30 Years Peace or to withdraw its forces from
the theater (DI)
Sparta (King
Archidamus)
Sought not to get Peloponnesian League involved (DI)
Athens (Pericles) The Athenian fleet sought only to show the flag and not engage
(DI); When this failed they entered combat and, with the arrival of
the second fleet, caused the Corinthians to break off. (M)
After the battle, informed the Corinthians that Athens was not
starting a war, merely protecting an all and that the Corinthians
can avoid war by sailing away (DI).
57
Pericles p 204. Corcyra, of course, tried to get the Athenians to formally enter the war.
58

32
Measured/Logical
Action
Response/Outcome
Actual
Response/Outcome
Non intervention by
Peloponnesian States
Sparta Restraint by Corinth Corinth escalated
Limited Military
involvement meant to
signal Corinth
diplomatically rather
than crush militarily
fleet
Athens Restraint by Corinth
in face of Athenian
naval presence;
some negotiated
end to hostilities;
maintenance of
Athenian naval
dominance
Corinth escalated
and engaged
Corcyran and
Athenian fleet; 10
Athenian ships
indicated to Corinth
that Athens is not
serious about its
commitment to
Corcyra
Second Military
Expedition
Corinth,
supported by
Megara
Humbling of
Corcyra; Message
to Athens to stay
out of Corinth’s
affairs
Corinth narrowly
defeated at sea due
to arrival of second
Athenian Fleet;
Corinth resolved to
continue conflict
and draw
Peloponnesian
League into the
war.
Emotional or
Unmeasured Action
Response/Outcome
Actual
Response/Outcome
All Measures appear
calculated
NA NA NA

33
Bibliography
Fornara, Charles W. (editor), Translated Documents from Greece and Rome: Archaic
Times to the end of the Peloponnesian War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
UK, 1983
Hanson, Victor Davis, A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans fought the
Peloponnesian War, Random House, New York, 2006
Kagan, Donald, Pericles of Athens and the Birth of Democracy, Macmillan Press, New
York, 1991
Kagan, Donald, The Peloponnesian War: Athens and Sparta in savage conflict 431-404
BC, Harper Perennial, London, 2005
Kagan, Donald, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Cornell University Press,
Ithaca, NY 1989
Salmon, J.B., Wealthy Corinth, A History of the City to 338 BC, Oxford University Press,
New York, Special edition for sandpiper Books 1997.
Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War. Version used is The Landmark Thucydides, edited
by Robert B. Strassler with forward by Victor Davis Hanson, Touch Stone, New York,
1998

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