1. Evaluation of the Poverty
Reduction Scheme in Central
Asia
Lot No
4 -Sectorial and project evaluations -
CONTRACT FOR SERVICES No.
2006/129514 Version 1
Final report
Volume II
Client: European Commission
ECORYS Nederland BV
Arto Valjas
Erik Klaassens
Emilio Valli
Chnara Mamatova
Nemat Makhmudov
11. 1 Project Evaluation Report A
1.1 Project data
Project name Addressing social consequences of Transition in the Ferghana Valley –UNDP
Reference number 85399
Source of financing TACIS Central Asia Action Programme 2002
Project location Ferghana Valley, Kyrgyzstan
Starting date 14 April 2005
End date Planned: 14 February 2007 Actual: 31 December 2006
Budget Contracted: € 2,239,098 Disbursed: €1,446,197 (per 15/12/06)
1.2 Summary of conclusions
1. Relevance and quality of design B
2. Effectiveness B
3. Efficiency B
4. Expected impact C
5. Potential sustainability C
Note: a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies
Key observations
The project scope was ambitious: the three components (water, agriculture and social safety net) were
implemented in parallel but not always in coordination with each other.
Start-up delays (mostly related to recruitment difficulties) were mostly overcome in the 2nd
year, but the
pressure to carry out most activities in one year forced the project to concentrate on output delivery
(especially hardware) rather than on the supporting ‘software’. It was therefore uncertain which project
results will prove sustainable and which will collapse after a short life.
Project was helpful in strengthening relationships between local government and more remote village
communities.
The project suffered from inflexible positions and sometimes confusing interventions from both EC and
UNDP, and the ambiguous position of the Tacis Monitor vis-à-vis the project.
The continuing presence of UNDP in the region gave some assurance as to the sustainability of project
results
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia 11
12. 1.3 Description of actual situation
The project partner UNDP is implementing a Poverty Reduction Programme in
Kyrgyzstan. The Programme supports the priorities set forth by the Government for
economic development and poverty reduction through i) providing policy support to the
Government in developing and implementing pro-poor socio-economic strategies and
policies; and ii) increasing access of the poor in urban and rural areas to employment and
economic resources.
Project status
The project was financed under the TACIS AP2002 and implemented under a direct
agreement with UNDP. As a result of start-up delays, project implementation was only
able to make progress from September 2005 onwards. However, during the last year the
project managed to achieve the majority of results, although this had some implications
for sustainability. The project was closed as of 31 December 2006, although some
controversy surrounds the closing date. According to the contract the project ends on 15
February 2007. However, the TACIS AP 2002 stipulates that all activities financed under
the programme cannot extend beyond 2006. Altogether, this project was lacking the
necessary flexibility to become fully feasible.
1.4 Brief description of the project objectives
According to ToR, the project was launched to increase the standard of living in a
recently created oblast in the Ferghana valley and to contribute to internal and cross-
border stability between Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It was
implemented in 30 target villages in the Batken and Leylek rayons of the Batken oblast.
The project consisted of three interconnected components together with their sub-
components: i) Agriculture Development; ii) Water Management; and iii) Social Safety
Net.
The overall objective of the project was to alleviate poverty, especially amongst more
vulnerable groups including women and youth in selected rural areas, through
improvements in their socio-economic situation, better health and sanitation and
increased employment and incomes. The project’s purpose was to improve rural
livelihoods through the provision of better on-farm advice and the construction and
rehabilitation of potable and irrigation water supplies as well as the reduction of
unemployment in Batken and Leylek rayons of the Batken Oblast.
Each of the project’s components stood rather like a separate project with its own Overall
Objective, Specific Objective and Outputs. For the three components, the overall
objectives were as follows:
• The agricultural component was to support the design of a coherent action plan on
Agricultural development as integral part of the Batken Oblast poverty reduction
strategy.
• The water component was to improve rural livelihoods in Batken and Leylek rayons
of the Batken Oblast through the provision or rehabilitation of village potable water
supplies and the rehabilitation of irrigation and drainage infrastructure.
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia12
13. • The social safety net component was to improve livelihood in the Batken oblast
through reduction of unemployment and to improve the capacity of vocational
training system.
1.5 Relevance and quality of design
The project was conceived in the framework of the UNDP Poverty Reduction Programme
to assist the Kyrgyz Government and communities in realizing the Millennium
Development Goals. The project addressed four development priority needs: poverty
reduction through sustainable development; promoting good governance; strengthening
human security; and enhancing regional cooperation. The project objectives were relevant
and fully in line with the country’s guiding policy documents on economic and social
development, such as the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and PRSP.
The project was also highly relevant to the situation in the targeted areas.
In general, the project purpose was ambitious, and although the project has been able to
deliver the majority of results (see below), a less ambitious project may have been more
effective in terms of ownership and sustainability. The design in terms of expected results
and activities was less relevant in relation to the project’s expected contribution to
security in the region and regional cooperation between Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan.
The project was designed around three components, each with their own overall
objective, specific objective (results) and outputs. This design appeared first in the
documents shared between the EC and UNDP during the period before the project
contract was signed. This format (3 parallel components) did not follow the Logframe
methodology (which at the time was not a requirement). Although the individual
components provided for some logic between the three levels of intervention, there was
no logical connection between the components. In addition, the design contained too
many results and associated activities to become an effective instrument for
implementation, and it failed to define (quantifiable) OVIs. This latter defect was
remedied in September 2005, when the project drafted three separate documents on
component indicators: some of these were quantified but others were not (about 50% was
quantified).
Following recommendations of a monitoring visit, there was also an attempt on the part
of UNDP to streamline the components and to create a unified logical framework with 11
results. However, the proposed project revisions (that had originally been welcomed and
accepted by the EC) could not be affirmed by an amendment to agreement since there had
been no amendment to the budget which had been submitted simultaneously.
1.6 Effectiveness
The project was able to deliver the majority of outputs and the target population had
ample access to the delivered project results. Villagers benefited from the small
infrastructural grant projects using roads, bridges, electricity, pure drinking water etc.
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia 13
14. Participation in training courses allowed them to launch their own businesses such as
bakery, sewing workshops, hairdressers etc. 395 Local Self Help Groups (LSHG)
received micro-credit through the UNDP funded micro-finance facility. The amount of
the micro-credits was between 300 and 400 €. Each LSHG consisted in average of 7
persons. Loans were mainly used for animal feeding. These actions were well
complemented by access to non-collateral credits from KaFC, MCAs and internal saving
funds, created within associations of LSHGs (6 revolving seeds funds were established in
the Leylek district, each with a start-up capital equal to 6.000 EUR). Only in a few cases,
such as the business incubator in Batken and the restructuring of a vocational school in
Leylek, results were still not achieved by the time of the Evaluation. According to the
ARIS Regional Office manager in Batken, the impact of the small grants could have been
enhanced through co-ordination with ARIS in selecting priorities for small rehabilitation
projects.
However, given the rather ambitious scope of the project, it failed to reach the specific
objectives as described in the original “3 component” structure. In case of Agricultural
development, the recently completed infrastructures could not contribute much to the
improvements of “agricultural income and households' livelihoods in the targeted areas”.
In addition, the training courses which were delivered to the rural field advisor staff of
AICs were found to be too short. Also, the draft strategy on Water Management was not
(yet) able 'to increase capacity of the government to design, implement and monitor
policies and programmes for water supply and management'. Thirdly, the actual level of
improving ‘the capacity of vocational training system in terms of jobs creation' remained
very modest.
According to the Akim of the Batken district, the Project had contributed to strengthened
relationships between the local government and more remote village communities. This
can be seen as an ‘unplanned’ positive result.
1.7 Efficiency
There were serious delays during the first year of the project and the delivery of project
inputs fell behind schedule (at least 3 months). However, the project managed to increase
the implementation pace and by December 2006, most of the inputs had been delivered.
The day-today management of the project was executed by a Project Management Unit in
Batken. The first year saw severe problems in terms of hiring staff of adequate quality.
With the appointment of a UNDP staff member as project manager towards the second
year, the situation improved and implementation speed picked up.
It should be mentioned that the relationship between the Bishkek offices of UNDP and
EC have been strained during much of the implementation period. Although there are
many reasons for this, the Evaluation Team limits its assessment to two observations: i)
there had been little previous experience in dealing with a direct contract between the EC
and UNDP and ii) the project would have gained significantly by more flexibility on both
sides. What has clearly been difficult for UNDP was to interpret the authority of the
various “voices” from the EC, as there were the EC Task Manager in Bishkek, the EC
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia14
15. Delegation in Almaty and the EC external Monitors. Particularly in the case of the
Monitors, the EC Delegation should have made the role and mandate of the Monitors
clearer to the UNDP and should not have allowed the Monitors to establish an advisory
relationship with UNDP, as this is what seems to have occurred. In a number of cases,
UNDP referred to FAFA as the ruling agreement between the two organisations, whereas
the EC viewed the contract as the binding agreement.
The strained relationship had a negative effect on the timely delivery of results, especially
where the two organisations disagreed on the interpretation of project instruments or
expected results. A case in point has been the attempt of the EC to lower the interest rate
charged to the potential beneficiaries by the selected micro-credit institution. The issue
took almost two months to resolve, a very long period, in view of the overall life-span of
the project.
There is little evidence that the project Steering Committee convened on a regular basis in
the first year. Only in the second year did it become active. It is not clear why this
occurred. According to the Monitor’s report, good communication had been established
with the EC Task Manager but the relation did not go beyond information and
participation in the SC meetings. The Evaluation Team was not able to verify this
observation.
Project beneficiaries provided for substantial co-financing (up to 50% in small grant
projects). This strengthened the level of ownership and made a major contribution to
enhancing sustainability. As far as the evaluators can judge, UNDP also provided funds
in access to their agreed contribution.
Visibility of project materials and sites was very clear, but at times the EC could have
played a more active role in presenting itself as a major funding partner for the project (in
terms of publicity).
1.8 Expected impact
There were noted improvements in areas such as access to clean water, electricity and
improved infrastructure, and a notable result was the reported drop in intestinal diseases,
typhoid and hepatitis as a result of availability of cleaner water combined with the
promotion of hygiene rules. However, in most other cases it was too early to expect
impact. In the case of credit, the investments will only start yielding tangible results after
a few years, and some other activities such as the business incubator were still in the
process of being set up.
1.9 Potential sustainability
The late start of the project forced management to ‘speed up’ implementation and
concentrate on concrete outputs (hardware) rather than the supporting ‘software’. It is
therefore uncertain which project results will prove sustainable and which will collapse
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia 15
16. after a short life. The continuing presence of UNDP in the area and its commitment to
maintain, use and build on project outputs is encouraging in terms of sustainability.
The strength (and sustainability) of self-help groups is often determined by their ability to
obtain credit. In Kulundu, out of a total of 21 LSHGs created with the project support, 7
dissolved after the rejection of their credit applications.
1.10 Strength / weaknesses
Strengths of the project
• Choice of a contractor which was already active in the area and which was able to
carry forward the results of the Project.
• Effective management (in the 2nd
year) in terms of implementation (‘getting things
done’).
• The practical use and application of project outputs.
Weaknesses of the project
• The project proposal did not provide a clear analysis of the issues and bottlenecks to
be addressed. It remained at a fairly general level of noting the shortcomings of the
region in general and referred to a number of policy documents in place.
• Inter-linkages between components were weak or not present.
• Inflexibility in managing relations between the contractual partners.
• Unclear ‘lines of communication’ from EC to UNDP and role of Tacis Monitors.
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia16
17. 2 Project Evaluation Report B
2.1 Project data
Project name Creation of a Regional Web-Portal and Development
of a Communication Strategy
Reference number 124274
Source of financing TACIS Central Asia Action Programme 2003
Project location Batken Oblast, Kyrgyzstan
Starting date September 2006
End date June 2007
Budget 188 300
2.2 Summary of conclusion
1. Relevance and quality of design D
2. Effectiveness C
3. Efficiency C
4. Expected impact D
5. Potential sustainability D
Note: a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies
Key observations
The decision to split a larger project into three small ones, among them this Project, was a risky one and at
the end the three small projects suffered from the lack of synergies between them.
The ToR were badly formulated and the link to the overall poverty reduction objectives of the EC was
missing in the Project concept and ToR.
While internet can be an appropriate mean to inform potential investors and donors, it can hardly be used
to inform rural population in general.
The delay in the procurement process meant that cooperation with the two other FWCs became
complicated.
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia 17
18. 2.3 Description of actual situation
The Project had initially been an integral part of a larger “cross-border trade facilitation
project” which was to be financed from the 2003 Action Programme with a contracting
deadline of 25 August 2006. Due to the change of personnel in charge of the larger
project in the EC Delegation and the transfer of project files to the newly opened EC
Office in Bishkek, there was no time to organise a tender for a service contract before the
deadline. In order not to lose the funds, the EC decided to split the larger project into
three Framework Contracts (FWCs) and a supply tender (see also Interregional Trade
Facilitation Project number 131392). One of the three FWCs maintained the original
project location on both sides of the Kyrgyz/Tajik border and two FWCs, among them
this Project, decided to operate only on the Kyrgyz side.
Within this evaluation, the three FWCs were looked at separately as per the EC decision
to split the original larger project. The three FWCs were supposed to complement each
other and be implemented in parallel.
The Project started in September 2006 and was originally supposed to be completed in
March 2007. An Inception Report was presented in November 2006. The Inception
Report introduced minor changes to the work plan. The duration was however extended
by 2 months until June 2007 in order to allow time for the procurement of two computers
in line with the EU procurement rules. The computers were purchased in April 2007.
During the visit of the evaluators to the Batken oblast in March 2007, the counterpart
person of the oblast administration could not elaborate on the contents of the portal. The
international expert was supposed to return to Batken with a ready-made design of the
portal. The evaluators were told that the portal would be operational by May 2007.
As the project was on-going by the time of the evaluators’ visit and most of the planned
outputs were still to be delivered, the evaluation was limited to the original project design
and to what could be concluded in terms of implementation prospects.
2.4 Brief description of the project objectives
There was no clearly defined overall objective in the ToR. Under “Gobal Objective” the
ToR referred to the consolidation of existing web-sites into a single web-portal for the use
of farmers and for agribusiness development in Ferghana Valley, both in the Batken and
Soghd Oblasts. In addition, the Inception Report referred to increasing access to
information that foster transparency of local government administration, including access
to information on procedures, legal base and administrative structure of the local
government.
The specific objectives were described as (i) the establishment of a single and unified
web-portal, (ii) the dissemination of information on legal and administrative framework,
(iii) the development of a Communication Strategy to support the dissemination of
information, and (iv) the creation of a section on training for farmers in the portal,
including the results of the agribusiness training project 124292.
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia18
19. 2.5 Relevance and quality of design
The development of the agriculture and processing enterprises is considered as a high
priority for the Kyrgyz economy as per national policy documents, e.g. Draft Country
Development Strategy and Draft Agriculture Development Strategy. In this context,
provision of information and extension services are relevant. Such link, however weak,
between project level objectives and the national ones, was not discussed in the ToR as
there was no overall objective defined for the Project.
The Batken administration seemed to have considered the web portal important in order
to provide people with access to information on Batken administration activities and the
government regulation framework. Another justification for the project was that farmers
require market information in a consolidated format and in one place. Thirdly, the
international donor community and potential investors should be able to find information
easily on regional and local project initiatives.
The link between the above information activities and poverty reduction in the rural areas
is weak. Secondly, the choice of technology can be questioned: reliance on internet is odd
as the people in the rural areas do not have access to it. While potential investors and
businessmen might eventually use internet to seek information on the Batken oblast,
farmers and small businessmen do not normally have access to internet. If they travel
considerable distances to visit the oblast administration, they will appreciate more
personal assistance than the possibility to use a computer in the office of the
administration.
With regard to cooperation with the two other FWCs, the agricultural training materials
of project 124292 were in the possession of the Batken administration by the time of the
evaluators’ visit. They could thus be inserted in the portal when it becomes operational.
The single administrative window project 125379 was in delay and its eventual
contribution to the portal appeared to be limited.
2.6 Effectiveness
As project activities were largely dependant on the availability of computers and an
internet connection, there had been a slowdown in project implementation prior to the
procurement of the two PCs. The procurement had been implemented in accordance with
the EU procedures which meant that 2 months were required to purchase the two PCs. It
was hence too early to assess the effectiveness of the Project. However, the Project would
have gained greater effectiveness via synergies with and complementarities from
activities envisaged within the original larger project.
From the time of the evaluators’ visit until the end of the Project, the focus seemed to be
on two outputs, the single web-portal and a strategy for its development. They were
supposed to be completed by June 2007. While the first output was a tangible product and
dependant mainly on the Project itself, the second required a clear vision by the Batken
oblast administration on the future role and objectives of the portal. The evaluators could
not find evidence of this during their visit.
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia 19
20. 2.7 Efficiency
In general, the Project was implementing the ToRs as efficiently as they could. However,
the ToR were badly formulated and the Project neither provided value for money nor
contributed substantially to poverty reduction.
2.8 Expected impact
It was too early to assess the impact of the Project but considering that effectiveness,
efficiency and relevance were weak, there would most probably not be a positive impact
either.
2.9 Potential sustainability
Sustainability was also a concern. It was envisaged that the Interregional Trade
Facilitation Project (IRTF, project number 131392) would provide the required internet
connection for the oblast administration. However, the up-dating of the portal with new
information was still an unresolved issue. The Project had intended to train a few people
from the oblast administration and from the IRTF project so that they could insert new
information in the portal. However, the Team Leader was concerned that the oblast
administration might not have appropriate staff who were computer literate enough.
2.10 Strength / weaknesses
Strengths of the project
-
Weaknesses of the project
Unclear ToR, including a missing link of project objectives to the general poverty
reduction objective of the EC and a missing overall objective.
Potential synergies with the other FWCs were lost when the projects were not
implemented simultaneously.
Choice of inappropriate technology, internet, for informing rural population.
Sustainability of the portal and lack of local capacity to implement the web-portal
strategy.
Delays caused by the procurement of computers which complicated cooperation with
another FWC.
2.11 Other observations / recommendations
The decision to split the original larger project into three FWCs and a supply tender was a
controversial one. The prospects of the three separate FWCs to achieve the original
objectives were meagre from the beginning and the split was difficult to undertake. The
ToR for the three FWCs became unclear. Due to delays in procurement, the subject
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia20
21. Project was delayed and there were doubts whether the planned results could be
produced. The Project risked harming the image of EC assistance in the region. In the
future, careful consideration should be given to the prospects of individual projects to be
successful, without letting administrative considerations such as the risk to lose the
money, to determine the course to be taken.
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia 21
22. 3 Project Evaluation Report C
3.1 Project Data
Project name Development of a Farming and Agribusiness Oriented
Training and Capacity Building Programme
Reference number 124292
Source of financing TACIS Central Asia Action Programme 2003
Project location Batken Oblast/Kyrgyzstan, Sughd Oblast/Tajikistan
Starting date September 2006
End date March 2007
Budget 199 800
3.2 Summary of conclusions
1. Relevance and quality of design C
2. Effectiveness C
3. Efficiency B
4. Expected impact C
5. Potential sustainability C
Note: a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies
Key observations
The decision to split a larger project into three small ones, among them this Project, was a risky one and at
the end the three small projects suffered from the lack of synergies between them.
The ToR were not clear: e.g. the link to the overall poverty reduction objective of the EC Scheme was
missing.
The planned training activities of the Project were delivered efficiently and the Project exceeded the targets
set in terms of farmers trained. It excelled in the participatory identification of subjects for training and in
cooperating with other projects (except for the two other small projects).
The effectiveness of the training suffered from the lack of means to put the knowledge gained into practice.
The choice of internet technology for farmers’ follow-up activities was inappropriate.
Being a short-term intervention with a limited scope and time-frame, the project’s impact and sustainability
at the level of the two target regions were limited.
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia22
23. 3.3 Description of actual situation
Originally, the project had been an integral part of a larger “cross-border trade facilitation
project” which was to be financed from the 2003 Action Programme with a contracting
deadline of 25 August 2006. Due to the change of personnel in charge of the larger
project in the EC Delegation and the transfer of project files to the newly opened EC
Office in Bishkek, there was no time to organise a tender for a service contract before the
deadline. In order not to lose the funds, the EC decided to split the larger project into
three Framework Contracts (FWCs) and a supply tender (see also Interregional Trade
Facilitation Project number 131392). Among the three FWCs, this Project was the only
one to maintain the original project location on both sides of the Kyrgyz/Tajik border.
The other two FWCs decided to operate only on the Kyrgyz side.
Within this evaluation, the three FWCs were looked at separately as per the EC decision
to split the original larger project. The three FWCs were supposed to complement each
other and be implemented in parallel.
The project was completed in March 2007 and a Final Report was submitted to the EC
and the local Partner, the Batken oblast administration. Unlike the two other Framework
Contracts, this project did not have major complications in implementation. Time wise, it
was finalised as foreseen in the original Terms of Reference. However, it suffered from
the delays of the two other FWCs as they were not ready for the kind of collaboration this
project would have required from them (see next chapters).
3.4 Brief description of the project objectives
The overall objective of the Project was not clearly defined in the ToR. During the
inception phase, the overall objective was described as to develop a farming and
agribusiness orientated training and capacity building programme for both Sughd and
Batken Oblasts which was aimed at (i) training individual operators including farmers
and agribusiness men; and (ii) training, as far as possible, professional association
managers and local community leaders as trainers, in order to ensure the sustainability of
the Project.
Specific Objectives of the Project were to (i) establish a farmers’ capacity building
educational programme to develop vocational training in farmer business techniques
(input procurement, production, packaging, storage, transport, distribution); in business
management forecasting and planning; and in the research and development of export
outlets; (ii) developing and managing an interactive website which would allow the
participants of the training events to continue their exchanges and consultations after the
conclusion of the various workshops.
At the beginning of the Project, it was agreed that the most appropriate implementation
structure was based on three phases, (i) Consultation Phase (identification of the target
groups, of topics to be covered, and assessment of level of knowledge), (ii) Planning and
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia 23
24. Development Phase (design of training programmes), and (iii) Implementation Phase
(carrying out the training, monitoring and evaluation, development of the interactive web-
site).
3.5 Relevance and quality of design
According to the relevant Kyrgyz and Tajik national policy documents such as the
PRSPs, the draft Country Development Strategy and Agriculture Development Strategy
in Kyrgyzstan, poverty reduction in the countries is strongly linked to the growth of the
agricultural sector. Such growth should be based on increased productivity in agriculture.
That in turn is dependant on the use of modern knowledge and innovations. Following
this rationale, training in agriculture and agribusiness practices could be considered as a
relevant element of poverty reduction. This link was however unclear in the ToR as there
was no overall objective defined for the Project.
Increased modern and innovative knowledge of farmers is considered to be very
important by the donor community in general. However, the local administration and the
farmers themselves view activities creating such knowledge from a different angle. This
difference in appreciation may be explained by the different states of the economies:
while in the transition economies like those of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, access to
capital and other inputs (seeds, machinery, etc) is still restricted, in western market
economies such access is relatively easy. Thus, it is easier to apply the increased
knowledge in the case of the developed marked economies than it is in the transition
economies. This came clearly out from the farmers’ assessment of the training
programme: although they had themselves identified the subjects of the training, they
considered that the training alone was still not enough as long as they did not have access
to farming and processing inputs which would allow them to apply in practice what they
had learned. Some of them went even further by suggesting that the per diems, travel
costs, lunches and coffee-breaks at the end became more important reasons to attend the
training than the possibility to learn modern and innovative techniques.
Another flaw in the project design was its reliance on internet technology while the rural
people do not in general have access to internet. While potential investors and
businessmen might eventually use internet for searching information on the Batken
Oblast (as foreseen within the web-portal project), farmers do not have access to internet
in rural villages and they will not travel to the oblast administration to use an interactive
web-site there. The technology chosen originally during the project design phase was thus
inappropriate.
The Project was supposed to be implemented simultaneously with the two other FWCs
“Setting up of a Single Administrative Information Window” (contract number 125379)
and “Creation of a Regional Web-Portal and Development of a Communication Strategy”
(contract number 124274). For example, the training and capacity building programme
established through the Project was supposed to “strongly support the regional
information and orientation business centre” to be organised through project 125379.
Similarly, the interactive training website mentioned above was supposed to be
established in close cooperation with project 125379. As the implementation of projects
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia24
25. 125379 and 125379 was delayed, the training programme of this Project was set up and
implemented independently from them. The Project did however collaborate closely with
other EC and donor funded projects such as the extension service providers of the
ACTED-MEDO Project in Tajikistan, the managers of the Resource Centres developed
by the EC-UNDP Projects and the Rural Advisory Services (RAS) Field Advisors
supported by the Swiss Government and the World Bank.
3.6 Effectiveness
In general, it can be considered that the Project fulfilled its Terms of Reference to the
extent possible without being able to rely on synergies with the two other FWCs. The
Project would have gained greater effectiveness via synergies with and complementarities
from activities envisaged within the original larger project.
The Project was required to train at least 20 Tajik and 20 Kyrgyz trainees in each
identified topic in order to disseminate the farmers’ capacity building educational
programme and to ensure a sustainable standard level knowledge in farming business
techniques, business management forecasts and planning and exports outlets research and
development. The Inception Report anticipated that at least 20 separate training courses
would be held, encompassing some 30 training days, for a total of 300 participants. Based
on the Final Report, 25 training courses were completed by the end of the Project. 17 of
these courses were conducted in Kyrgyzstan and 8 in Tajikistan. A total of 42 training
days were provided. A total of 468 participants attended the various training courses. The
participants came from 82 different villages in Kyrgyzstan and from 27 different villages
in Tajikistan. Most of the participants came from villages where other EU funded Projects
were operational.
The Project was required to develop and manage an interactive website allowing the
participants of the training events to continue their exchange and consultations after the
workshops in order to enhance the sustainability of the Project. This was supposed to be
done in cooperation with the project "Creation of a regional web portal and development
of a communication strategy". As the web-portal project was delayed, the Project
developed the training materials and left them with the Batken administration so that the
administration could later on transmit them to the web-portal. There was however no
evidence of the planned interactivity of the training package. The Final Report fell short
of explaining what happened with the planned interactive training web-site: this specific
objective appears to have been somehow forgotten during the course of the Project. This
may be explained by the inappropriateness of the technology chosen.
3.7 Efficiency
In general the Project implemented the requirements of the ToRs efficiently. However,
the splitting of the original larger project into three small ones undermined the efficiency
of the EC assistance.
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia 25
26. 3.8 Expected impact
Human resources development and capacity building in general have considerable time-
lag in having an impact on poverty reduction, hence it is too early to assess the impact of
the Project. The Final Report mentions that “there is a major requirement for training
within both Sughd and Batken Oblasts. It is obvious that this Project has made a small
contribution towards satisfying this need but at present, the demand for training
considerably exceeds the supply of training courses”. In other words, training of a limited
number of farmers and other stakeholders within a short period of time could not be
expected to have a great impact at the level of the two oblasts. The limited impact
prospects were further aggravated by the fact that the farmers did not have access to the
required agricultural inputs to put their enhanced knowledge into practice.
3.9 Potential sustainability
There were concerns that the training had limited practical use due to the fact that the
instruments to utilize the training were not in place. The Final Report refers to the
increased interest in the subjects of training and recommended that larger interventions,
such as Interregional Trade Facilitation Project number 131392 would “be able to follow-
up this work and convert this interest into concrete activities”. This was to some extent
being realised through a supply tender which would provide the kind of processing
equipment (e.g. for tomato drying) the farmers had been trained on to the Business
Incubator in Batken. It remained however open how the trained farmers could access this
equipment as they largely came from outside the Batken town.
3.10 Strength / weaknesses
Strengths of the project
The timing of the Project seems to have been well chosen as it did allow farmers to
pay full attention to the training without being distracted by agricultural activities in
their fields.
The Project cooperated with other EU (except the other FWCs) and donor projects
which allowed it to achieve synergies with them.
The Project tried as much as possible to tailor training provision to the needs of the
target group.
Weaknesses of the project
Unclear ToR including a missing overall objective and link to the general poverty
reduction objectives of the EC.
Potential synergies with the other FWCs were lost when the projects were not
implemented simultaneously.
Choice of inappropriate technology, interactive web-site, for farmers to continue
exchanges and consultations after initial training.
Lack of practical training and lack of instruments and/or incentives to utilize the
skills and knowledge gained.
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia26
27. 3.11 Other observations / recommendations
The Project made the following observations which are supported by the evaluators: (i)
the two countries must be treated separately, even when it comes to training, due to the
differences in the reform agenda and their implementation, (ii) budget of such projects
must be carefully designed, as in the case of this Project the geographical coverage for
training was two Oblasts in two countries and it increased travel budget significantly
compared to initial allocations, (iii) in the future, the training must be provided in a
sustainable manner, i.e. with attached practical part to it and with designed mechanisms
to make the training practical and applicable (i.e. credit or grant mechanism, equipment
and machinery leasing, etc).
The decision to split the original larger project into three FWCs and a supply tender was a
controversial one. The prospects of the three separate FWCs to achieve the original
objectives were meagre from the beginning and the split was difficult to undertake. The
ToR for the three FWCs became unclear. The subject Project managed to deliver the
planned training but by the time of the evaluation the other two projects had not yet been
completed. This affected negatively the subject Project.
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia 27
28. 4 Project Evaluation Report D
4.1 Project data
Project name Setting up of a Single Administrative Information
Window in Batken Oblast of the Kyrgyz Republic
Reference number 125379
Source of financing TACIS Central Asia Action Programme 2003
Project location Batken Oblast, Kyrgyzstan
Starting date October 2006
End date June 2007, possibly extension until September 2007
Budget 199 962
4.2 Summary of conclusions
1. Relevance and quality of design D
2. Effectiveness D
3. Efficiency D
4. Expected impact D
5. Potential sustainability D
Note: a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies
Key observations
The decision to split a larger project into three small ones, among them this Project, was a risky one and at
the end the three small projects suffered from the lack of synergies between them.
The ToR were badly formulated, in particular they foresaw the physical establishment of a business centre
but no funds for the purpose.
Even the revised outputs seemed to have been abandoned and the Project was going to achieve very little
or nothing.
Without funding from sources other than the Project, the Project risked not having impact and sustainability
at all.
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia28
29. 4.3 Description of actual situation
The Project had initially been an integral part of a larger “cross-border trade facilitation
project” which was to be financed from the 2003 Action Programme with a contracting
deadline of 25 August 2006. Due to the change of personnel in charge of the larger
project in the EC Delegation and the transfer of project files to the newly opened EC
Office in Bishkek, there was no time to organise a tender for a service contract before the
deadline. In order not to lose the funds, the EC decided to split the larger project into
three Framework Contracts (FWCs) and a supply tender (see also Interregional Trade
Facilitation Project number 131392). One of the three FWCs maintained the original
project location on both sides of the Kyrgyz/Tajik border and two FWCs, among them
this Project, decided to operate only on the Kyrgyz side.
Within this evaluation, the three FWCs were looked at separately as per the EC decision
to split the original project. The three FWCs were supposed to complement each other
and be implemented in parallel.
The Project started in October 2006 and an Inception Report was submitted to the EC
Delegation by the end of the month. The Inception Report was approved only after 4
months of consideration by the EC due to the changes proposed to the work plan.
In particular, the ToR of the Project originally referred to the physical and legal setting up
of a business centre in Batken, including the hiring and training of local staff for the
centre and equipping it with all relevant information tools, so that the centre would be
able to perform as a One-Stop-Shop for small-business support. In the Inception Report,
the Contractor stated that there was no budget provision to cover the related costs. The
EC Delegation argued that at least some of these costs should be covered from the
contractor’s overheads. As a result, project implementation was delayed. By the time of
the evaluators’ visit, the contract was being considered to be extended, either to June or
September 2007.
As the physical establishment of the centre was impossible with the project funds only,
the Inception Report proposed as revised outputs (i) the preparation of all the
documentation necessary for the establishment of the business centre in Batken, (ii) the
preparation of a business and work plan for the first two years of operation for the centre,
and (iii) the facilitation of the establishment of the centre and its promotion. Accordingly,
the experts were supposed to return to the Project area in April-May 2007 in order to start
working on these outputs.
As the project was on-going by the time of the evaluators’ visit and most of the planned
outputs were still to be delivered, the evaluation was limited to the original project design
and to what could be concluded in terms of implementation prospects.
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia 29
30. 4.4 Brief description of the project objectives
The Overall Objective of the Project as defined in the ToR was “the creation of a regional
single information and orientation window used as a bilateral Tajikistan/Kyrgyzstan
regional information and orientation business centre”. In the Inception Report, the
Overall Objective was described as “to facilitate the improvement of the overall business
climate in the Batken oblast of the Kyrgyz Republic, by establishing the Single
administrative window in Batken city”.
The Specific Objectives included (i) improved access to information on cross-border
trade by farmers and entrepreneurs of Batken Oblast of the Kyrgyzstan, Isfara Raion of
Tajikistan, and the Soghd enclave of Uzbekistan, (ii) improved access to other related
information for the development of commercial activities (e.g. access to credit, access to
grants, etc). However, the specific objectives as described in the ToR were not very
clear.
The original outputs included (i) the establishment of an operational regional information
and orientation business centre giving free access to farmers and other economic
operators from, but not limited to, Sughd and Batken oblasts, (ii) technical information
and orientation advisors are trained and will provide basic legal information and orientate
operators to appropriate public or private service suppliers recorded on custom made data
bases, (ii) to establish and maintain close cooperation with the project "creation of a
regional web portal and development of a communication strategy" in order to assure
wide promotion of the single administrative information window. As described above, the
original outputs were revised in the Inception Report.
4.5 Relevance and quality of design
The development of agribusinesses and other small enterprises is considered a high
priority for the Kyrgyz economy as per national policy documents, e.g. Draft Country
Development Strategy and Draft Agriculture Development Strategy. In this context,
provision of information and orientation services could be considered relevant. Such link,
however weak, between project level objectives and the national ones, was not discussed
in the ToR as the overall objective of the Project was defined at a much lower level.
A survey by UNDP identified cumbersome and bureaucratic procedures of trade
operations and lack of information on customs rules and regulations as one of the main
obstacles for cross-border trade in the region. The provision of information to businesses
on import and export rules, as well as the provision of help in filling necessary
documents, could thus be of significant help to local enterprises. The local entrepreneurs
seemed to have welcomed the establishment a business centre providing such services in
Batken. The survey could thus be considered to confirm the relevance of the Project.
The project design however did not foresee who would finance the centre. The Inception
Report referred to local and central government institutions as well as to private partners
and international donors as potential sources of funding for the centre. While the
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia30
31. commitment to fund the centre’s activities had not been clearly stated by any of them at
the time of the Inception Report, the Report presumed that the positions of these
stakeholders might become more positive after the preparation of a concept and a budget
for the centre.
Because of the above-mentioned delay in the approval of the revised work plan, the
Project was lagging behind its original schedule by the time of the Evaluation. However,
the other FWC number 124274 “Creation of a Regional Web-Portal and Development of
a Communication Strategy” with which the Project was supposed to coordinate was also
in delay. As a result, the two projects could still be completed in parallel. In particular,
the project 124274 was about to deliver two computers to the oblast administration. The
Inception Report assumed that the computers were to be used for the business centre.
Although the idea of the business centre appeared to have been relevant to the target
groups, the Project design had not sufficiently considered who would fund the centre.
This should have been set as a precondition or at least as an assumption or risk in the
project design. There was a risk that nothing tangible was going to come out from the
Project.
4.6 Effectiveness
In the Inception Report, the Project was proposed to go ahead with the preparations for
the centre on the assumptions that (i) there was an interest among the beneficiaries and
the target groups to establish the centre, and that (ii) the administration of the Batken
oblast, alone or together with other stakeholders, were ready to establish and initially
fund the centre. In addition, the EC Delegation expected that the Contractor would
contribute to the establishment of the centre with some office furniture to be paid from
the Contractor’s overheads.
Later on, it seemed to have been decided to drop the idea of the centre completely.
Instead, the Project should together with the web-portal project concentrate on
establishing the web-portal physically, on making it operational and on training the staff
of the oblast administration to use it. The value added to the web-portal project seemed
marginal.
The Project team was collecting legislative and other documentation necessary for the
portal and there were no constraints for this. Whether it was still necessary to prepare a
business plan and a work plan for the single administrative window for two years (the
second output) was not clear. The effectiveness of the Project seemed to be highly
questionable.
4.7 Efficiency
As stated earlier, there had been a four-month-delay in the approval of the Inception
Report. The ToR were revised and the major part of the project activities were still to be
delivered by the time of the Evaluation. At the end, it seemed that the Project might
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia 31
32. deliver only a tiny fraction of the planned outputs. Even the revised limited outputs, such
as the concept and work plan for the centre, risked not to be delivered as nobody would
take any use of them. The Project represented very low if no value for money at all for
the EC.
4.8 Expected impact
As the Project was not yet finalised it was too early to assess its impact. As there was no
commitment to fund the centre and the Project seemed to achieve very limited results,
there was a risk that it would not have any impact at all.
4.9 Potential sustainability
Without the funding commitment, the Project was lacking sustainability. It could happen
that project outputs became “another” report on the shelves of the local administration.
The weak project design, combined with the Government’s restrictive budgetary policy
and other donors’ limited funding possibilities, undermined the sustainability prospects of
the Project.
4.10 Strength / weaknesses
Strengths of the project
-
Weaknesses of the project
Weak project design, including the overall and specific objectives and the lack of
consideration of preconditions and assumptions/risks.
Weak ToR which foresaw physical establishment of the business centre but no funds
for the purpose.
Even the revised outputs, preparation of a concept and a work plan for the centre,
seemed to have been abandoned and the Project was going to achieve very little.
Risk for not having impact and sustainability at all, as additional funding for the
centre could not be found.
4.11 Other observations / recommendations
The decision to split the original larger project into three FWCs and a supply tender was a
controversial one. The prospects of the three separate FWCs to achieve the original
results were meagre from the beginning and the split was difficult to undertake. The ToR
for the three FWCs became unclear. The subject Project was supposed to establish the
centre physically but no funds were allocated for the purpose within the Project. The
Project risked achieving very little. It also risked harming the image of EC assistance in
the region. In the future, careful consideration should be given to the prospects of
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia32
33. individual projects to be successful, without letting administrative considerations such as
the risk to lose the money, to determine the course to be taken.
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia 33
34. 5 Project Evaluation Report E
5.1 Project data
Project name Rehabilitation of drinking water supplies, irrigation and
melioration systems in Osh Province
Reference number 125083
Source of financing TACIS Central Asia Action Programme 2003
Project location Village communities Kyrgyz Ota and Kenesh, Naokat
district, Osh region, Kyrgyzstan
Starting date 22 August 2006
End date 21 August 2007
Contract value 100.000 EUR
5.2 Summary of conclusions
1. Relevance and quality of design C
2. Effectiveness B
3. Efficiency C
4. Expected impact C
5. Potential sustainability B
Note: a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies
Key observations
The scope of the project design, combining small infrastructure rehabilitation, local institutional
development and participatory planning, was in line with the approach required by the call for proposals but
it was too ambitious for the limited duration of the Project.
The project purpose was not clearly and logically formulated and not all project results were appropriate for
the purpose and achievable within the project duration.
Implementation of activities was lagging behind, mainly because of delays in the procurement process.
Potential sustainability was good as relevant cross-cutting issues, notably environmental issues, were
adequately addressed both in the design and implementation of activities.
The visibility of the actions was weak, notably the EC visibility.
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia34
35. 5.3 Description of actual situation
The applicant and partner one is the international NGO Deutsche
Welthungerhilfe/German Agro Action (GAA). GAA has a total of 183 employees. Its role
in the current project is chiefly procurement of materials/equipment, supervision and
reporting.
Implementation of activities is the main responsibility of partner two, i.e. the local NGO
Agro-Foundation for Development (AFD), which also led identification and formulation
of the project proposal. AFD has a total of nine employees.
AFD has been GAA’s partner in two previous projects, namely “Agricultural
rehabilitation Project in Osh, Djalal-abad and Batken 2002-05” and “Assistance to private
farmers through creation of marketing co-operatives”. Both projects were entirely funded
by GAA.
This EC-funded intervention is part of a broader on-going multi-annual programme
implemented by GAA in partnership with AFD, GTZ and HIVOS (NL) in Southern
Kyrgyzstan, including the target communities of Kyrgyz Ota and Kenesh. The
programme aims at increasing the incomes of local farmers mainly through the
development of new potato seed varieties and the establishment of potato seed co-
operatives and of two marketing co-operatives.
Project status, Activity 1- Rehabilitation of the irrigation system in Kyrgyz-Ota and
Kenesh
The activity aims at rehabilitating a 1.5 km canal for irrigation which would benefit 1.134
farmers working on 512 ha of land and at developing local institutional capacity for water
management through the establishment and training of a Community Interest Group
(CIG). The CIG was established for the revision of the construction plan of the canal.
However, there is no evidence that a PRA session had been carried out before the
formation of the group, as anticipated in the work plan of the Project.
The revised construction plan was submitted and approved by local authorities.
Preparatory works (cleaning of the sections of the old canal to be rehabilitated) were
being implemented under the supervision of the CIG. All labour inputs were being
provided by non-remunerated community work (“ashar”). However, trainings in water
management and efficient water use for the members of the CIG had not yet taken place
and a training schedule was not available.
Construction works were not yet initiated, pending implementation of a local tender for
the procurement of cement. The tender was first launched during Autumn 2006, but the
contract with the selected supplier was not finalised requiring the tender to be re-
launched, which was scheduled again for mid-Spring 2007. A factor which partially
explained the delay in the conclusion of a supply contract after the first tender, was the
uncertain instructions received by the applicant and concerning the requirement of a
certificate of origin for the cement.
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia 35
36. Activity 2- Rehabilitation of the Drinking Water Supply System in Kenesh
The activity aims at rehabilitating the health threatening and polluting drinking water
supply system of the village of Arbin (3.300 inhabitants) and at developing the local
institutional capacity to manage the rehabilitated system through the establishment and
training of a Drinking Water Users Association (DWUA).
A Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) session was carried out in Arbin by the project
partner resulting in the establishment of a CIG which later developed into a DWUA.
Training in water management, sanitation and hygiene was provided by the project
partner to the members of the DWUA (70 persons). DWUA was subsequently legally
registered as a Public Association.
The plan to rehabilitate the drinking water system received authorisation by the
appropriate local authorities. Nevertheless, works had not yet started as of end March
2007 due to protracted bad weather conditions. Equipment (i.e. plastic pipes, materials
and tools for wells rehabilitation) had been delivered during the winter season when
construction works could not be implemented, and bad weather conditions were still
affecting the area at the end of March. The members of the DWUA were confident,
however, that works could be started in late April and be completed by June 2007.
Activity 3- Melioration of 24 ha of land
The activity aimed at draining high ground waters in the agricultural land surrounding the
village of Kyrgyz Ota (80 farming families), enabling cultivation of 24 ha of arable land.
An excavator was rented by the project partner and drainage works started in mid-March
2007. At the time of the visit by the Evaluation Team, drainage works were at an
advance stage and completion of the works was scheduled by mid-April 2007.
5.4 Brief description of the project objectives
The overall objective of the project was to improve the livelihood of the people living in
the village communities of Kyrgyz Ota and Kenesh, i.e. two rural municipalities (ayil-
okmotys) in the district of Naokat, in the Osh region.
The purpose was twofold: first to increase yields and incomes of the target populations
through enhanced water management and land melioration and second, to improve
hygienic conditions through rehabilitation of the drinking water supply system.
Four results had been identified:
• The income of 1134 farmers has increased by 50% after the irrigation system is
fully functioning and water management has been introduced
• 3.300 persons in Arbyn (Kenesh) use the drinking water supply system and
improve their hygienic conditions
• 80 farming families take advantage from the melioration of 24 ha land
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia36
37. • CIGs and WUAs have been organised. They have achieved a legal status and
function.
5.5 Relevance and quality of design
The project objectives support the Scheme objective ‘to strengthen local economies’ as
they aim at increasing yields and income of small farmers through enhanced water
management, melioration of land (drainage of high ground waters) and rehabilitation of
drinking water system (hence reduction of water borne diseases -and assumingly higher
labour productivity- and of soil erosion).
The objectives also address the priority issues of access to safe drinking water and to
irrigation water highlighted in the relevant project fiche for track 3 of the Tacis Action
Programme 2003. Moreover, the work programme of the project supports the type of
activities outlined in the instructions of the call for proposals.
The project contributes towards the achievement of the overall priority goals of the
Country Development Strategy (CDS) which are ‘poverty reduction and enhancement of
living standards’ of the population. The project is also in line with one of the priority
focuses of the government strategy which is to support agriculture development including
through enhanced water management and village community mobilisation. Agriculture
development is also the main focal area for support identified by the CDS for the region
of Osh.
The target groups were clearly identified and the project intervention was designed to
benefit directly over 4500 persons, mainly small farmers and their families, out of a total
population in the target areas of approximately 25000 persons. The final beneficiaries of
the project were estimated at over 10000 persons.
The project objectives address clearly identified needs of the target groups. Indeed, there
is sufficient evidence from interviews with the target groups and local authorities that the
needs addressed by the Project intervention are highly relevant to the target groups. This
was mostly clear in the communities where a PRA had been implemented, notably in the
village community of Arbyn.
Only three results are appropriate in order to achieve the project purpose. The project
purpose is not clearly and logically formulated in the project application. One result, i.e.
that the income of 1134 farmers has increased by 50 %, is not appropriate. The result
should have been formulated as “1134 farmers have stable access to sufficient water
supply for irrigation”. Moreover, the result “the income of 1134 farmers has increased by
50%” is not achievable within the duration of the project because the time schedule for
the construction of the irrigation canal was not designed to coincide with the seasonal
cycle of the crops and vegetables production in the target areas.
Finally, the logical framework was not presented in accordance with the EC PCM
guidelines.
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia 37
38. 5.6 Effectiveness
With the exception of output 4, which had been partially achieved by the eight month of
the Project, all the other outputs were not yet achieved. Outputs 2 and 3 were however
likely to be achieved by the end of the Project. Achievement of output 1 within the
timeframe of the Project remained highly unlikely.
In general, the project had so far positively contributed to the building of the local
institutional capacity in water management and sanitation in the targeted communities
through the establishment and training of two CIGs and a DWUA. However, much was
still to be done in terms of institutional development and capacity building of the WUAs,
notably the second WUA for irrigation water was yet to be established.
Output 1- The income of 1134 farmers has increased by 50% after the irrigation system
is fully functioning and water management has been introduced. Progress towards the
achievement of this result was significantly delayed by the fact that the tender (see above)
for the procurement of materials (notably cement) had to be repeated. The delay
accumulated because of the procurement process had coincided with a rapid rise in
transport costs which in turn put in risk the procurement of the needed quantities of
cement, i.e. the financial feasibility of the approved construction of the irrigation canal.
Output 2- 3.300 persons in Arbyn (Kenesh) use the drinking water supply system and
improve their hygienic conditions. Construction of the drinking water supply system was
significantly delayed by the untimely delivery of equipment, which coincided with the
winter season, and by the prolonged bad weather conditions well into the spring season.
Nevertheless, the community was highly mobilised to start rehabilitation works
immediately after the weather conditions improved. It could be safely assumed that the
works will be completed well before the project end date, thus providing access to safe
drinking water for the local population.
Output 3- 80 farming families take advantage from the melioration of 24 ha land. The
excavator for draining the high ground waters was rented seven months later than
originally scheduled in the work programme without apparent justification for the delay.
Nevertheless, drainage works after two weeks of implementation were half way through
and the output was likely to be achieved by the project end date.
Output 4- CIGs and WUAs have been organised. They have achieved a legal status and
function.Two CIGs and one DWUA were established. The DWUA had a statute and was
legally registered. Training was provided to the members of the DWUA in sanitation and
water management. There was no evidence however that the DWUA had a work plan and
that training was provided in financial planning as anticipated in the project work
programme. A training manual for the CIGs and the DWUA was not available. No
evidence was provided that the second WUA for irrigation water was established. The
output could be fully achieved by the end of the project if the work programme and
schedule of project activities were appropriately revised. However, there were no
indications that this was being addressed.
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia38
39. 5.7 Efficiency
Project management appeared to be weak and an internal monitoring system was not in
place. Moreover, the project management had difficulties in coping with the EC
procurement procedures due to, as it appeared, an inflexible interpretation of the
procurement rules by the EC Delegation. This had resulted in significant delays in the
implementation of project activities. No further data were available on inputs utilisation.
5.8 Expected impact
The potential impact of the project was significant in terms of numbers of the final
beneficiaries but the actual impact to date was much lower due to slow progress of
implementation towards achieving the planned outputs.
5.9 Potential sustainability
The potential sustainability was high and the project had adequately addressed cross-
cutting issues, notably environment (soil erosion) already at the stage of design and later
during implementation. The PRA and capacity building activities had undoubtedly
reinforced the sense of ownership of the target groups and their institutional capability.
The communities visited showed a readiness to pay in cash to the WUAs in order to allow
for the payment of the services of a water engineer and in order to create a special fund
for maintenance requirements.
5.10 Strength / weaknesses
Strengths of the project
The project objectives supported well the Scheme and CDS objectives
The project objectives addressed clearly identified needs which were relevant to the
target groups
The potential sustainability of the expected results was high as the Project had
adequately addressed environmental issues and local institutional capacity building
Weaknesses of the project
One result is neither appropriate to the project purpose nor achievable within the
project time frame i.e. ‘the income of 1134 farmers has increased by 50 %’.
The other three project results remained largely unachieved due to delayed
implementation of activities.
Project management lacked sufficient experience with EC procurement procedures.
No internal project monitoring system was in place.
Impact to date was very limited due to slow progress in achieving results.
EC visibility guidelines were not being implemented.
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia 39
40. 5.11 Other observations / recommendations
It is recommended that future guidelines and instructions for small infrastructure
rehabilitation grants were designed to adjust the required approach with the project
duration, by narrowing the scope through putting an emphasis on rehabilitation activities.
The guidelines should also require that the proposals were self-contained i.e. with
objectives achievable within the project duration. Proof of adequate local institutional
arrangements and participatory planning should instead be pre-conditions for selection. It
is also recommended that periodical briefings were organized for the grantees by the EC
Contract and Finance team.
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia40
41. 6 Project Evaluation Report F
6.1 Project data
Project name ASCoT – Addressing the social consequences of
Transition in the Ferghana Valley
Reference number 85395
Source of financing TACIS Central Asia Action Programme 2002
Project location Ferghana Valley (Batken and Sughd), Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan
Starting date 18/11/04
Implementation start date 08/01/05
End date 18/11/06
Budget € 830.535 (€ 543.035 in KG and € 287.500 in TJ)
6.2 Summary of conclusions
1. Relevance and quality of design C
2. Effectiveness B
3. Efficiency B
4. Expected impact C
5. Potential sustainability C
Note: a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies
Key observations
The project suffered from a delayed start-up due to weak project management, political disturbances in
March 2005 (Kyrgyzstan) and difficulties in recruiting staff willing to work in a remote area.
In the context of the reduced timeframe and scope, the project was able to achieve good results.
Management had been efficient in ‘recapturing’ the project implementation after a lost first year
The project was not able to follow-up on the base-line monitoring exercise at the beginning of year 2.
Sustainability was good at village level (organisation of grass root organisations and technical support) but
less good at regional level and for business and marketing related efforts.
In some areas, the project is expected to make a marked difference in income for farmers (such as those
with apple varieties), but overall the impact is expected to be modest given the reduced scope of the
project, the patchy geographic approach and the commercial failure of some pilots.
The project produced ample documentation that is now widely available.
Project visibility was good on most locations.
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia 41
42. 6.3 Description of actual situation
The project which had its kick-off meeting on 8 January 2005 was closed since December
2006 and a final report was available. The current evaluation was done in relation to the
changes that were formally agreed between the EC and the contractor in the course of
2006. A mid-term review of the Project and a second kick off meeting were implemented
in January 2006 following the appointment of a new team leader at the end December
2005. An adjusted project strategy/synopsis with amended ToRs were drafted early 2006
and the related contract addendum was signed on 26 July 2006.
Project activities in the Batken oblast were suspended for 3 weeks between 18 March and
7 April 2005 due to the perceived risks posed by the unfolding of the political events in
the Kyrgyz Republic.
6.4 Brief description of the project objectives
The overall objective of the project was “to support economic and social development of
vulnerable populations in the Ferghana Valley in a participatory and sustainable way”,
and the specific objective “poor livelihoods in the selected rayons of Jabor Rasulov and
Isfara in the Sughd oblast in Tajikistan and in the Leylek and Batken rayons in the Batken
oblast in Kyrgyzstan are improved thanks to income generating activities, social service
rehabilitation and improved capacity of the local authorities”.
Before the contract was signed, a corrigendum to the ToR reduced the incidental budget
from €200,000 to €100,000. In addition, the Small Grants Facility was withdrawn and the
related result 4 was cancelled. The following expected results remained:
1. Local government staff is fully able to determine and implement strategies and devise
operational plans to reduce the incidence of poverty (Capacity building);
2. Small and micro businesses derive additional turnover and profits together with an
increase in employment through developing linkages between producers (and
producer groups) and final or intermediary markets (SME development).
3. Farm sales and incomes have increased thanks to better marketing channels
(Agricultural marketing and processing);
4. Poverty reduction and development models will be developed, which may be
replicated in other areas of the Ferghana Valley and beyond (Poverty reduction and
development models).
After the mid-term review at the end of 2005 and the change of Team Leader, the project
scope was further reduced. The rayon of Jabor Rasulov was no longer included, results 2
and 3 were merged considering a close linkage of both results to increased income of
farmers through marketing and micro-business activities, and one of the three project
offices located in Isfana (Kyrgyzstan) was closed. Finally, the development of poverty
reduction and development models, was also abandoned. Instead, the Project was to issue
a number of technical reports (i.e. fruit gardening, meat cutting etc).
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia42
43. 6.5 Relevance and quality of design
The scope of the original project design was too ambitious and the process of reducing it
already started before the contract was signed (see above). This process was intensified as
a result of weak management in the first year. The remaining project results represented a
realistic approach to accomplish a number of tangible outputs that would have a
reasonable chance at contributing to the project objective.
There were some concerns with reducing the scope of the capacity building, in particular
the training of rayon and regional government officials. Although they remained involved
in the process of strategy developments of rural associations (RAs), there had been no
direct training of government officials. This would have strengthened their capacity to
support the process of developing strategies at community level as well as their capacity
to engage in strategic and policy discussions at rayon and regional levels.
According to comments received by the evaluation team from Tajik government
representatives, the project was expected to have focussed more on restructuring the
Soviet style agricultural enterprises. When it became clear that the project was not
equipped to do this, their interest in the project was somewhat reduced.
The execution of a project on both sides of the border allowed a common approach to
issues that affected populations on both sides of the border. The exchange of information
between communities had been beneficial to increased stability in the region. As a
regional project the scope was limited to issues that could be addressed at the regional
level, which left some important issues outside the scope of the project, such as
administrative issues related to customs and transport.
The project supported the objectives of the EC Action Programme for 2002. The three
(remaining) results clearly contributed to the objectives objective of reducing the
potential for social conflict, strengthening local economies; and improving the equality of
wealth distribution and to a lesser extent to strengthening local governments’ capacity to
respond to community concerns.
The relevance to the national development policy was equally clear, as poverty reduction
was one of the overriding concerns of the Project.
In terms of target groups, three levels could be distinguished. First the community-level
organisations which received project support to develop their capacity for strategic
development and for service delivery. Second, the SME sector which was supported with
a focus on start-up businesses. Third, individual farmers received assistance in their
management of crops and livestock activities improving their potential for income
generation.
In summary, the redesigned project was relevant to the problems addressed although the
adjustments in scope were made in response to efficiency issues rather than in response to
the new situation which emerged on the Kyrgyz side after the March 2005 unrest. The
latter would have benefited from more cross border activities.
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia 43
44. 6.6 Effectiveness
The assessment was made against the revised project objectives as conceived by the
February 2006.
The project made an important contribution to strengthening and consolidating existing
local structures and schemes in the pilot areas and in providing advice and training.
Through these services, farmers are now better able to formulate needs and identify
resources, have access to innovative small-scale techniques and management practices for
agricultural production. However, the revised specific objective "to contribute to the
improvement of poor rural livelihoods in the target districts through new income-
generating activities and capacity building of local authorities and rural communities"
was achieved only to a limited extent, mainly due to the delays which occurred during the
first year.
Result 1. Local government staff is fully able to determine and implement strategies and
devise operational plans to reduce the incidence of poverty (Capacity building) At village
level the project actively supported the establishment and capacity building of four
“umbrella” village Rural Associations (RA) and of one “umbrella” RA for two villages
(one less than planned). The organisations all formulated a work plan and the ‘umbrella’
RA of the villages of Aikol and Gordoi raised the equivalent of 2000 USD from its
members. Training only took place in the final months of the project. At regional level,
representatives from the village RAs to the RAC were selected and 2 RACs were set up
and are working.
Training topics included strategy development and capacity building of RAs during
which a number of case studies in strategy planning were developed. As a result, at least
2 meetings (4 had been planned) were held with district administration and a number of
petitions were presented (o.a. to the district administration, the Minister of Culture, and
potential donors.
Result 2 Sales and incomes of small farmers and agricultural businesses in the selected
pilot areas are increased thanks to better market integration (Agricultural marketing and
processing). To support the diversification and enhancement of agricultural products,
agro-seminars were implemented at the demo-station in Kara-bulak on good practices in
fencing and pruning fruit orchards, and on nutrition management, irrigation and plant
protection in which 120 farmers participated (20 more than planned). Tests of prototype
solar dryers for fruits, tomatoes and peppers were carried out but test results were mixed,
and – more importantly - no additional value could be obtained in the market.
Testing of the European varieties of the apple young trees and rootstocks in the fruit
demonstration and experimental gardens showed good results, and in combination with
improved pruning techniques, the trees are expected to yield significant better yields than
the local varieties. Some 535 persons (35 more than planned) participated to the project
seminars on “small business management” and “financial planning”, representing start-up
small rural businesses (510), farmers’ co-operative groups (6), credit unions (2), and rural
associations (5).
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia44
