1. Latin American Olympics: Comparing Mexico City 1968 with Rio 2016
Emily Glankler
March 17, 2015
Texas State University
HIST 5398
Dr. Kenneth Margerison

2. 1
Introduction
Latin America has only hosted two Olympic Games: Mexico City in 1968 and Rio de
Janeiro (soon to be held) in 2016. Both countries are appropriate ambassadors for their region’s
passion for sports but Mexico and Brazil also have other less festive aspects in common. Each
country’s government and Olympic committee attempted to utilize the publicity associated with
the spectacle of the games in their nations to alter the global perception of their respective
countries. Although they both attempted to showcase their countries as peaceful, harmonious,
and modern, in the end the more disturbing domestic realities came to the surface: corruption,
undemocratic practices, and frustration with overspending and lack of transparency regarding the
organization and presentation of the events. Interestingly, while Brazil has subconsciously
followed in Mexico’s footsteps with regards to their marketing campaign, they have chosen to
break from the Latin American Olympic tradition in Mexico’s one area of pure success: a
positive cultural experience. Neither country was able to successfully combine its Olympic
vision with the domestic reality. However, Mexico was able to showcase its diverse national
culture more successfully than Brazil, which has made little attempt to incorporate multicultural
identities into its Olympics in a real and meaningful way.
A Brief History of Sporting Mega-Events in Latin America
Latin America is a region characterized by passion, sports, and festivity. Not surprisingly,
the nations of this region desired to host sporting mega-events throughout the twentieth century,
but they have only been mildly successful, at best. Havana’s half-hearted effort to host the 1920
Olympic Games, which it lost to Antwerp, was Latin America’s first attempt at an Olympic bid.
More bids (and more losses to “modern” and “western” nations) were to follow: Rio de Janeiro

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and Buenos Aires lost in 1936 to Berlin; Buenos Aires in 1956 to Melbourne; and Mexico City
in 1960 to Rome. Therefore, 1968 was a momentous year as Mexico City became not only the
first Latin American country, but also the first nation from the so-called developing world to host
an Olympics. Almost a half-century later, the eyes of the world are again on the region as Brazil
prepares for the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro.
Apart from the Olympics, Latin America has played host to a variety of international
multi-sport events. The Pan American Games, essentially the Olympics for the Western
Hemisphere, has occurred successfully many times across the region. Brazil’s successful 2007
Pan-American Games helped to convince the IOC that Brazil was capable of hosting a major
sporting event at the same time that the IOC was determining the winner of the 2016 Olympic
bid. The World Cup has also found a frequent home in Latin America. The first ever World Cup
tournament was held in Uruguay in 1930 and since then the region has been awarded the Games
on six more occasions, second only to Europe’s ten events.
Although most countries desire to host the most prestigious sporting event in the world,
many scholars agree that the fierce competition to become an Olympic host is a strange
phenomenon considering that the vast majority of host countries have experienced extreme
financial loss.1 However, the Mexican and Brazilian governments deemed the international
spotlight worth the risk, which should come as no surprise considering Latin American politics
has always found a persuasive ally in the sporting world.
1 Stanley Engerman, “Hosting the Olympics and the World Cup: What Price
Prestige?,” ReVista: Harvard Review of Latin America (Spring 2012).

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The Role of Sports in Mexico and Brazil
Sports play an intrinsic role in shaping national identity in both Mexico and Brazil. After
the revolution in the early twentieth century, the new Mexican government quickly recognized
the significance of festivals and sporting events as an important factor in nation building.
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s Mexico used sports as a means of national unification,
constructing a National Stadium in May 1924, sending its first group of athletes to the Paris
Olympics, and creating the “Revolutionary Games” in 1930.2 All of these instances are examples
of an attempt to create one Mexico out of many regional identities and to provide regular
opportunities for Mexicans to celebrate as one people. The 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games
was, of course, the culmination of this strategy of using sports to create national identity.
Even more so than Mexico, Brazilian-ness is intrinsically linked to sports, especially
soccer. Sports writer Dave Zirin explains that in Brazil soccer is the national identity. He
describes it as “the connective tissue in a country defined by different cultures crashing together
in violence and beauty.”3 According to Zirin, “the embrace of the Afro-Brazilian style” in soccer
is the best example of the creation of a new national identity.4 Soccer has become a source of
pride for all Brazilians, especially those of the lowest classes, because anyone can participate in
the sport and, in theory, it provides an opportunity to escape, mentally or, rarely, literally, from
the everyday life of Brazil’s poor. For many in Brazil, the soccer player is the ultimate citizen, as
evidenced in an excerpt from a poem written for the 1938 World Cup:
2 John R. Gold and Margaret M. Gold, Olympic Cities: City Agendas, Planning and the
World’s Games, 1896-2012 (London: Routledge, 2007), 238.
3 Dave Zirin, Brazil’s Dance with the Devil: The World Cup, the Olympics, and the
Struggle for Democracy, (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2014), 87.
4 Zirin, 2014, 91

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“to the decisive kick,
of the glory of the Fatherland.
Fix in the eye of the foreigner
The miraculous reality
That is the Brazilian man.”5
Soccer is such a basic part of Brazil’s national identity that women’s rights advocates
took issue with the lack, until recently, of a nationally sanctioned women’s soccer league. As one
writer explained, “To keep them from playing soccer was to exclude them from full participation
in the nation.”6 Sport is even protected by the Brazilian Constitution as a “social right” that
should always be offered by the government as part of its public policy.”7
Unsurprisingly, governments have capitalized on the fact that sports play an important
role in the formation of national identity. Around the world athletes and sporting events have
played a subtle role in the implementation, and sometimes resistance, of state policy. Hitler
capitalized on the 1936 Olympics to showcase Nazi strength and efficiency in the same way that
Beijing utilized its spotlight in 2008 to announce China’s arrival as a global superpower.
Similarly, Mexican politicians have seen sport as a “panacea for the political, religious, social
and ethnic tensions” that plague Mexico.8 But in few places is sport utilized as a tool for social
control more than Brazil. In 1961 President Jânio da Silva Quadros declared soccer star Pelé a
5 Alex Bellos, Futebol, (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014), 45.
6 Carmen Rial, “Women’s Soccer in Brazil,” ReVista: Harvard Review of Latin America
(Spring 2012)
7 Constituição Federal Brasileira, 1988, article 27
8 Keith Brewster, “Patriotic Pastimes: The Role of Sport in Post-Revolutionary
Mexico,” The International Journal of the History of Sport, no. 2 (March 2005), 140

6. 5
“national treasure” in an effort to gain popularity during his ill-fated seven-month presidency.9
Similarly, during the military dictatorship from 1964 to 1985, the government consistently
involved the national soccer team in ceremonies and political announcements to secure their own
legitimacy.10 More recently, in an attempt to establish Brazil’s preeminence in contemporary
Latin American affairs President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (lovingly known as “Lula”) sent the
Brazilian national soccer team to Haiti after President Aristide was deposed in 2004.11 Athletes
and sports teams have often become tools of the government in Mexico and Brazil. However, the
government is not the only group looking at sports as a means to an end; in both of these
countries sports has also become a tool of resistance for the people.
While the government often co-opts national sports teams and events for their own gain,
the people have fought fire with fire. In the 1930s Mexican peasants, hoping the government
would return some of their land, argued that it had been used as a sports field and was central to
their community. The peasants claimed that, “without [the land], they would not be able to
deliver to their community the benefits that [the revolutionary government] promoted.”12 In
doing so, the peasants took the government’s policies and used them to gain back some basic
rights. In the same decade a group of anti-leftist government advocates created a secret society
under the guise of sports. Named the Pentathlón Deportive Militar Universitario (University
9 Zirin, 2014, 99
10 Zirin, 2014, 101
11 Zirin, 2014, 76
12 Brewster, 2005, 151

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Military Pentathlon Club), they trained their members in political strategy in addition to athletics,
waiting for an opportunity to attack the government that never came.13
However, the best example of a group using the sporting narrative to gain reforms is the
student protest on the eve of the 1968 Olympic Games. Gathering in Tlatelolco square in Mexico
City, thousands of students led marches and demonstrations against what they considered
wasteful government spending and suppression of voices of dissent in favor of the Olympics.
The protest was violently suppressed, dozens of students killed and thousands arrested, but not
without significant attention from the international community, as will be discussed later in more
depth.
Similarly, in Brazil many groups have utilized the popularity of soccer to shed light on
necessary reforms, but none better than Brazilian soccer star and 1982 World Cup captain
Sócrates. He founded the Corinthians team that operated on democratic principles during the
oppressive military dictatorship. At the high point of his activism against the bureaucratic-
authoritarian government, “cheering for Corinthians or even wearing their colors became a focal
point for national discontent with Brazil’s military dictatorship.”14 He and his team became a
mainstay at street rallies and events pressing for political liberalization.
More recently Sócrates has been openly wary of allowing mega-events like the World
Cup and Olympics into Brazil. In 2010 he urged the need to “keep up public pressure for
improvements in infrastructure, transport, sewerage” in the face of “public money disappearing
13 Brewster, 2005, 152
14 Zirin, 2014, 105-106

8. 7
into people’s pockets.”15 Unfortunately, Sócrates passed away in 2011, but that does not mean
that his words went unheard. In 2013 during the Confederations Cup, a lead-up event for the
World Cup, thousands of groups took to the streets of São Paulo in what eventually became
known as “the month of popular discontent” in official Olympic documents.16 Protesting
everything from government overspending and corruption to the displacement of the poor,
Brazilians knew that the world was watching and they used the spotlight to their advantage.
Human rights groups got involved after riot police beat the protestors and eventually similar
street protests spread to all other major Brazilian cities.17 The protests were so successful that
President Dilma Rousseff immediately gathered twenty-seven governors and twenty-six mayors
from across Brazil to form a “national network…focused on transportation, health, education,
fiscal responsibility, political reform, and an end to corruption.”18
Brazilian frustration with the arrival of sporting mega-events has effected change, at least
in Rio de Janeiro. According to the most recent Olympic Impact Study, in the one month after
the Confederations Cup protests, one in five Brazilians changed their opinion about the country’s
direction. In May 2013, 63 percent of Brazilians said that Brazil was “on the right track”
compared with 58 percent just one month later. As the report states, the protests “have resulted in
an abrupt and unparalleled change of the Brazilians’ perception of their country.” The key,
however, will be the government’s reaction to this shift – they can either institute actual solutions
15 Alex Bellos, “Sócrates: ‘Everyone Who Comes to Brazil Falls in Love with
Someone,” The Observer, June 12, 2010.
16 Olympic Games Impact (OGI) Study – RIO 2016, The OGI – SAGE/COPPE/UFRJ
Research Team (January 2014), 100
17 Juan de Onis, “Brazil’s Troubles,” World Affairs 177, no. 1 (May/June 2014), 52
18 Olympic Games Impact (OGI) Study, 2014, 103

9. 8
to the problems Brazilians are facing or they can attempt to silence critics. Unfortunately, at the
moment they appear to be choosing the latter.
The Olympic Games and similar sporting mega-events like the World Cup provide an
important opportunity for Latin American countries to redefine their image in the international
community. In Mexico’s case it was a time to correct the stereotype of what the FBI called
Mexico’s “mañana policy of procrastination.”19 Even the head of the IOC Avery Brundage
encouraged the Mexican organizers to not worry about spending too much money, but to “stage
the games in a Mexican manner.”20 This patronizing attitude from global leaders prompted the
following response from Pedro Ramírez Vázquez, head of the Mexican Olympic Committee:
“The rest of the world has taken a long time to forget an image of Mexico, that of a figure
covered by a poncho and a sombrero sleeping soundly beneath the shadow of a tree…
The new international image of Mexico is being created this Olympic Year.”21
For Brazil, the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games are considered “a sort of
giant coming-out celebration announcing Brazil’s arrival… on the global stage.”22 To the
Brazilian government it seems to be more important that foreigners see Brazil as open for
business and economically on the rise. Similar to Vázquez’s statement, President Lula explained:
19 “Legat, Mexico City (80-103),” Letter to FBI Director, February 29, 1968, “1968:
Mexican Olympics,” FBI File.
20 Eric Zolov, “Showcasing the ‘Land of Tomorrow’: Mexico and the 1968 Olympics,”
The Americas 61, no. 2 (2004), 167.
21 Pedro Ramirez Vázquez, Interview, Arquitectura/Mexico 100 (1968), 65.
22 Larry Rohter, Brazil on the Rise: The Story of a Country Transformed, (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 7.

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“Today is the day that Brazil gained its international citizenship…this is the day to
celebrate because Brazil has left behind the level of second-class countries and entered
the ranks of first-class countries. Today we earned respect. The world has finally
recognized that this is Brazil’s time.”
By all accounts, 2016 just may be Brazil’s time. The 2000s were a decade marked by the
country’s growth. As a so-called “BRIC country”, economists stamped Brazil as an “emerging
market economy” alongside powerhouses Russia, India, and China.23 From 2004-2010, its
economy grew by 4.2 percent each year, more than double its annual growth from 1999-2003 or
any other time period in the last twenty-five years.24 However, the fact that Mexico was in a
similar situation in the 1960s is noteworthy. Riding high on the wave of an economic miracle
that had lasted almost three decades, Mexico’s economy in the 1960s is comparable to Brazil’s in
the 2000s. Mexico’s annual growth of real GDP from 1921-1930 was just 0.1% compared with a
staggering 6% from 1940-1960.25 However, the 1968 Olympics did not herald Mexico’s arrival
as a major player in the global economy. In fact, overspending, corruption, and government
misuse of resources brought public dissent to the forefront. Furthermore, the patriotism and
national identity cemented by the Games only confirmed the government’s desire to pursue its
flawed strategy of import substitution industrialization. This policy eventually led Mexico to
23 Jim O’Neill, “Building Better Global Economic BRICS,” Paper no. 66, Global
Economics, (Goldman Sachs, 2001), 1.
24 Franklin Serrano and Ricardo Summa, “Macroeconomic Policy, Growth and
Income Distribution in the Brazilian Economy in the 2000s,” Center for Economic and Policy
Research (June 2011), 1.
25 Julio A. Santaella, “Economic Growth in Mexico: Searching for Clues to Its
Slowdown,” Inter-American Development Bank (December 1998), 3.

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borrow heavily from foreign banks and eventually destroyed its economy when oil prices
dropped a decade later. While Mexico’s entire economic decline is not the fault of the Olympics,
the promises of stability and modernity made in 1968 were far from realizable. Unfortunately,
Brazil seems to be following the Mexican model closely by promoting a public image that
clashes with their domestic reality.
Latin American Olympics: The Juxtaposition of Intended Public Image with Domestic
Reality
Redefining international perception is a highly politicized process. The governing bodies
of these mega-events, FIFA and the IOC, are careful to select host cities that are culturally
diverse and able to put on a good show, politically stable to guarantee the security of the Games,
and economically sound and showcasing modern infrastructure and new technology.
Understanding the IOC’s priorities, the Rio 2016 bid emphasized three values of “Celebration,
Participation, and Achievement.”26 As these values are further explained in official documents,
the Brazilian Olympic Committee wanted to convince the IOC and the world that Brazil was
open but safe, diverse but inclusive, and modern while holding on to their traditions.
Interestingly, these values align similarly with those of the Mexican Olympic Committee in
1968. With varying degrees of success, both Latin American Olympics set out to showcase their
countries as a land of peace and security and a harmonious balance between modernity and
tradition.
26 Rio 2016 Code of Ethics, PDF, Rio Organising Committee for the Olympic and
Paralympic Games (July 2013), 3.

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Peace and Security
In the weeks leading up to the Games, Mexico City was plastered with images of peace.
While the white peace dove became omnipresent around the city27, advertising agencies were
asked to replace all commercial ads in the city with slogans relating to peace.28 In case anyone
was not receiving the message, the Mexican Olympic Committee commissioned a documentary
entitled La Paz to “explore ‘peace’ in its biological, anthropological, psychological, historical,
and sociological dimensions.”29
The official motto of the 1968 Olympics was “Everything is Possible in Peace” and
served two purposes. First, it highlighted Mexico as a stable country in the midst of brutal
governments across Latin America and Cold War politics abroad. Second, the motto harkened
back to a famous statement made by national hero President Benito Juárez, “Respect for the
rights of others is peace.”30 Through its motto the organizing committee appealed to the
international community with a platform of neutrality while domestically attempting to tie the
Olympic Games with Juarez’s Reforma, one of the most celebrated periods in Mexican history.
This peaceful aspect of the campaign was hugely successful until October 2, 1968. On
this day, under orders by President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, the government gunned down students
protesting the one-party state in the Tlatelolco Square in Mexico City. With the blood of dozens,
or possibly hundreds, of students on its hands, the Mexican government touting itself as a land of
peace thus became incredibly hypocritical. To be fair, the Olympic organizing committee could
27 Zolov, 2004, 159
28 Luis Castañeda, “Beyond Tlatelolco: Design, Media, and Politics at Mexico ’68,”
Grey Room 40 (Summer 2010), 114.
29 Zolov, 2004, 171
30 Zolov, 2004, 171

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not have anticipated the government’s overly violent response to an otherwise peaceful protest,
but still, with less than two weeks until the Opening Ceremony, the committee’s carefully
planned image was torn to pieces.
Even though the students were protesting much more than just the Olympic Games, the
student movement was largely associated with the Olympics because it had been successfully
appropriating Olympic symbols throughout the year. In the political cartoons and posters
promoted by the student movement, Olympic images are prevalent.31 The peace dove became the
most frequent victim of the group, as its silhouette around the city was splattered with red
paint.32
While the government tried to downplay the massacre in the days leading up to the
Olympics, the image of Mexico as a land of peace was shattered. In an attempt to justify his
actions, President Díaz Ordaz portrayed the students as communist subversives who may have
otherwise led disturbances during the Olympic Games.33 However, this pretext was fairly
transparent from an outside perspective and memos between U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson
and other officials reveal that the American government viewed the event as “a sharp blow to
President Díaz Ordaz and his Government, both because of the excessive force used and because
it underscores the GOM [Government of Mexico] failure, after 11 weeks to eliminate
31 “Mexico 1968 Selección De Carteles,” La Grafia del ’68: Homenaje al Movimiento
Estudianti, 2nd ed. (Ediciones Zurda/Claves Latinoamericanas/El Juglar,1981).
32 Zolov, 2004, 184
33 “Information Memorandum: Student Disturbances in Mexico,” 1968, Document
362, Mexico, Vol. XXXI, South and Central America ed., Foreign Relations of the United
States: 1964-1968, U.S. State Department.

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violence.”34 Neutral commentators also picked up on a new atmosphere in Mexico City after
October 2. A Sports Illustrated reporter noted that while “the spectre of mañana has temporarily
been exorcised they are still a bit shaky over ayer – yesterday.”35 Similarly, the front page of the
New York Times after the opening ceremony shows nothing of the bright and modern Op Art
design campaign, but rather an image of Aztec Stadium surrounded by soldiers.36 As Eric Zolov
explains, “the sense of wonderment and color built up over the preceding months was
irrevocably clouded.”37 The first pillar of the Olympic campaign – Mexico as a land of peace –
had fallen just days before the Games began.
Brazil has not had a single event on the level of the Tlatelolco massacre but the treatment
of its poorest citizens during the 2014 World Cup and the buildup for the Olympics are
unfortunately comparable. Officially, the Brazilian government and planning committees
promoted the image of Rio de Janeiro as party central. One of the focal points of Rio’s Olympic
bid was “the passion to associate the power of Olympic and Paralympic sports to the festive
spirit of people from Rio de Janeiro.”38 Throughout the planning process they have maintained
this “core value” of celebrating “the passion, spontaneity, and youthful spirit by which Rio is
34 “Information Memorandum: Mexican Situation,” 1968, Document 364, Mexico,
Vol. XXXI, South and Central America ed., Foreign Relations of the United States: 1964-1968,
U.S. State Department.
35 Kahn, “Sporting Scene,” Sports Illustrated (October 1968), 221.
36 New York Times, 1968, 1.
37 Zolov, 2004, 186.
38 Candidature File – Rio de Janeiro 2016, PDF, Rio 2016, 18.

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known.”39 The idea of Brazilians as open, friendly, and constantly celebrating is evident in the
official Olympic mascots. Named after the composers of the Bossa Nova anthem “Girl from
Ipanema” Vinicius and Tom’s missions include spreading joy, celebrating friendship, inspiring
creativity, and most of all, having fun.40
While the Brazilian organizing committee would love to be able to focus on the
celebration, they do acknowledge that most visitors will need to feel safe before they can enjoy
the Games. The government has created the euphemistically-named Pacifying Police Units
(UPPs) to regulate communities where armed crime is prevalent, meaning the favelas that
currently house an estimated 22 percent of Rio’s population.41 According to the government, the
influx of police into the favelas is part of a project “aimed at upgrading the slums.”42 The UPPs
are meant to work with the community on social projects, thus eliminating the root of crime. In
theory these social projects work in conjunction with the Morar Carioca municipal program that
constructs cultural centers, lifts, health centers, and other infrastructural projects in the favelas.
While its stated goal is to improve communities from within, the program also helps relocate
people occupying areas at “high risk of landslides.”43 Along with the municipal program, the
federal government has funded Minha Casa, Minha Vida to compensate families who have been
relocated. On the surface, these programs are meant to benefit Rio’s poor by improving their
39 Sustainability Management Plan: Rio 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games, PDF,
Rio 2016 (March 2013), 5.
40 “Mascots”, Rio 2016, www.rio2016.com
41 “Rio de Janeiro: Morar Carioca”, The C40 Siemens City Climate Leadership Awards
(2014).
42 Olympic Games Impact (OGI) Study, 2014, p. 151.
43 “Rio de Janeiro: Morar Carioca”, 2014.

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living situation. Unfortunately, in reality these programs are being used to justify a much more
troubling domestic reality.
In the build-up for Rio 2016, mass evictions and militant security has characterized life in
the favelas. The official Olympic Impact Study touts the creation of new housing areas in the
Maracanã and Deodoro Olympic zones, but admits that these projects “will lead to the
demolition of homes and, consequently, the removal and resettlement of families.” This begs the
question: for who are these new housing areas meant?44 Under the guise of “urban regeneration”
in official reports, the government is clearing high-profile favelas occupying valuable real estate
to make the views from Olympic centers more appealing and eventually to make way for private
development.45 46 47 Just in preparation for the World Cup over 170,000 people were forced to
relocate.48 Apparently, the favela-dwellers are not part of the “festive spirit of people from Rio
de Janeiro” mentioned in the Olympic bid.49
The Brazilian judiciary has actually declared these forced evictions to be unconstitutional
but the organizing committee has forged ahead in the name of Olympic success.50 City officials
tell families facing eviction that they will not be compensated if they seek legal help. There are
44 Olympic Games Impact (OGI) Study, 2014, 150
45 Eva Kassens-Noor, Planning Olympic Legacies: Transport Dreams and Urban
Realities (Florence: Routledge, 2012), 92.
46 Christopher Atkins, “The Social Cost of Brazil Hosting World Cup 2014,” Bleacher
Report, June 6, 2013.
47 Zirin, 2014, 20
48 Atkins, 2013
49 Candidature File – Rio de Janeiro 2016, 18
50 Olympic Games Impact (OGI) Study, 2014, 224

17. 16
also no records kept of the evictions and no official notification or receipts are given to families
during the process. As one reporter explained, land assessors carrying cards emblazoned with the
Olympic logo are empowered to “ignore the Federal Constitution, international agreements
signed and ratified by Brazil, and the recommendations of the United Nations.”51 In addition,
aspects of the judicial system itself have been subverted for the sake of these sporting mega-
events. In 2014 the government created “World Cup courts” to fast track cases that the
government believed urgent to the safety and success of the event52. Furthermore, protesters
using the international spotlight to petition for social change have been met violently, such as
teachers who were tear-gassed and beaten by police for demanding higher wages.53
These events have produced a profound change in the minds of Rio’s citizens. While the
Olympic committee is still bragging about its open, friendly, and festive people, surveys tell a
different story. According to the Olympic Impact Study, the number of Rio’s citizens (Cariocas)
proud of their city dropped 13 percent between 2011 and 2013. The number of locals who want
to move out of Rio has increased by 21 percent.54 Ironically, the government’s attempts to
portray Brazil as safe and happy have led to instability and frustration amongst its citizens.
Modernity and Opportunity for All
The most important image that the Mexican Olympic Committee sought to promote in
1968 was also possibly the easiest to sell to the international community. That Mexico was a
51 Renato Cosentino, “Largo do Tanque: One More Summary Removal for the Rio
Olympics,” Rio on Watch, February 26, 2013, 4.
52 Zirin, 2014, 34.
53 Zirin, 2014, 18.
54 Olympic Games Impact (OGI) Study, 2014, 157.

18. 17
land of opportunity seemed to be a given to economists who had spent the better part of the last
three decades studying the so-called “Mexican Miracle.” The key for the Olympic committee
was simply to perpetuate this image. There were only two groups that could possibly disturb
Mexico’s economic “poster-child” status: women and the poor.
Historically, the ideology of machismo has dominated Latin America’s international
reputation. While the national economy was obviously succeeding, the Olympic committee
decided that it was of the utmost importance to convince the world that those benefiting from
economic growth were not just men, and that growing opportunities for women were another
sign of Mexico’s debut into modernity. For most tourists visiting Mexico City during the
Olympics, the edecanes, or event hostesses, were the first faces they would see. The government
hired 1,170 of these guides, the majority of which were young women, to represent the face of
the new, independent Mexican woman.55 Uniforms that included brightly printed miniskirts fit
into the colorful, Op Art design aesthetic and provided a stark contrast to many foreigners’
previous notions of Mexican women in simple white peasant dresses. For first-time visitors to
Mexico City, these young women “present[ed] an image of a modern Mexico…as a land
‘young,’ ‘beautiful,’ and ‘inviting.’”56 The icing on the feminist cake was 20-year-old Mexican
hurdler Norma Enriqueta Basilio, who became the first woman to ever light the Olympic flame
in an opening ceremony. Basilio’s selection was an obvious nod to the Olympic committee’s
desire to present Mexico as a land where women could thrive and were benefiting just as much
from economic development and modernity as men.
55 Ruben Salazar, “Wonderland of Color Welcomes Olympics,” Los Angeles Times,
October 13, 1968.
56 Zolov, 2004, 178.

19. 18
Of all of the representations of Mexico in the 1968 Olympics the image of a gender
equitable society might be the most accurate. The student movement of 1968, along with other
protest movements in vogue with the times, provided many women with an opportunity to get
involved in public society for the first time. In fact, while many leaders of the student movement
were arrested, authorities often ignored women because of their perceived lack of influence in
the movement and so they were able to take up the mantle. In 1968 the Olympics gave the
feminist movement a more legitimate outlet as it paired up with other urban protests.
Economically, women also benefited from the “Mexican Miracle” early on. Post-revolutionary
Mexico included a distinct professionalization of women who were encouraged to earn degrees
in education, nursing, and social work.57 While Mexico was the penultimate country in Latin
America to grant women suffrage (Paraguay was the last in 1961, eight years after Mexico),
clearly the global women’s movement and the growth of opportunities for women in the
workplace stretched to Mexico, as well.
Unfortunately, it was not quite as easy to convince the world that the poor were also
receiving economic opportunity. The fact that there was still a large amount of poverty in
Mexico, despite its economic growth, was difficult to get around.58 The Olympic committee
seemed to know that it would be impossible to completely cover up the urban poor, but they did
their best by painting the walls of the city slums to “temporarily [hide] the misery.”59 Time
magazine reported in 1968 that, “Even the shantytowns look good. Inhabitants were given
57 Nichole Sanders, Gender and Welfare in Mexico: The Consolidation of a
Postrevolutionary State (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011).
58 “Poverty in Mexico, Economic Crisis and 21st Century Welfare,” Poverties.org:
Research for Social and Economic Development, June 2012.
59 Salazar, 1968

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buckets of free paint, and they responded with a typically Mexican gusto. Some shacks were
bright stripes, others have blazing coats of lavender, green, or orange.”60
While some foreigners may have been fooled by this half-hearted attempt to almost
literally whitewash a dark stain on Mexico’s economic reputation, those who looked closer
would have seen that while the economy had grown from 1940 to 1968, income distribution had
worsened.61 Economic programs benefiting the urban centers often occurred at the expense of the
countryside, forcing peasants to move to the cities in search of work. While this migration led to
problems such as overcrowding and housing shortages, unemployment in Mexico rose by 487
percent in the decade leading up to the Olympic Games.62
For most tourists visiting the country, Mexico would have indeed seemed like a land of
opportunity. However, that opportunity typically was reserved for the country’s elite at the
expense of the “people” – the campesinos and urban workers. But Mexico always knew that it
would be judged on the terms of its “underdevelopment.”63 The difficulty of living up to
European standards was the cost of being the first Third World country to host the Games. For
many in Mexico and around the world, the simple fact that the country was able to pull off such
an enormous feat of centralized planning and expenditure was proof in and of itself that what had
happened in Mexico over the past thirty years was, indeed, miraculous.
60 “Sport: The Scene a/la Mexicono,” Time, October 18, 1968.
61 Tanalís Padilla, Rural Resistance in the Land of Zapata: The Jaramillista Movement
and the Myth of the Pax Priísta, 1940-1962 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 9.
62 Peter Watt and Roberto Martínez Zepeda, Drug War Mexico: Politics, Neoliberalism
and Violence in the New Narcoeconomy (London: Zed Books, 2012), 46.
63 Zolov, 2004, 162.

21. 20
Brazil’s current situation is similar to Mexico in that few in the international community
are confident about Brazil’s ability to pull off two mega-events back to back. To counter this
skepticism the organizing committee has emphasized “Accomplishment” as one of its core
values. Official documents continually highlight the “organization, innovation, and optimism” of
its people. A major strand of the marketing campaign for Rio 2016 is Brazil’s diversity,
highlighting a multicultural people that can unite to accomplish its goals. A short film produced
during the bid process is appropriately titled, “Passion Unites Us.”64 Similarly, the official slogan
of the 2016 Olympics is “All in one rhythm.” Brazil has been attempting to toe a tricky line
between emphasizing the diverse backgrounds and traditions of its people while still showcasing
its modernity and technological prowess. A perfect example of the attempt to harmonize
modernity with tradition is the official match ball of the World Cup. Named the Brazuca, its
colors and design symbolize traditional bracelets worn in the country, but it also had a new
“structural innovation” that made it arguably the most advanced soccer ball in the world.65 With
an audience of billions, 2016 will be Brazil’s moment to announce its arrival as an innovative
and viable international market and new technology will be front and center. Approximately 10%
of the overall budget is dedicated to Information and Communications Technology and the
government has invested billions of dollars into new technology, especially in the realm of
transportation.66 However, this investment comes at a high social cost as not everyone in Brazil
will benefit equally from its debut as a united and modern nation.
64 “Rio 2016 Olympic Bid Film ‘Passion Unites Us,’” Vimeo (2013).
65 “Adidas Brings Brazuca into the World,” FIFA.com, December 2, 2013.
66 “World Cup, Olympics Give Brazil a Chance for Stunning Technology Display,”
Sourcing Brazil, February 26, 2015.

22. 21
The billion-dollar question is how much Brazil is actually spending on these sporting
mega-events. The 2014 World Cup was the most expensive in history and the Olympics appears
to be on the same path.67 Officially, the Olympic budget increased by 1.4 billion reais (430
million USD) between 2008 and 2014.68 Unofficially, most assume that number is much larger.
Stadia built for the World Cup ended up costing four times the original number proposed to
FIFA and tax dollars are being spent for Olympic stadium upgrades even though originally
Brazilian officials said no public money would be used on stadium construction.69 70 While some
stadium upgrades are required to comply with IOC standards, other Olympic projects seem
wholly unnecessary. 2016 will be the first time golf is played at the Olympics in over one
hundred years, and the Brazilian government appears to be using that as justification for gross
overspending. The City of Rio committed $26.8 million USD to build a brand new golf course,
even though the median cost for a professional 18-hole golf course is only $4.5 million. Even
worse, Rio already has two courses that are ranked in the top 100 best golf courses outside the
United States. One of the two was only a 20-minute drive from the Olympic Village and would
have met IOC regulations without alterations.71 The final nail in the moral coffin is the new golf
course’s location, which rests on 11 million square feet of ecologically fragile marshland. The
67 Guilherme Cruz, “Brazil Running Out of Time to Get Things Done for World Cup
2014,” SBNation.com, December 4, 2013.
68 Olympic Games Impact (OGI) Study, 2014, 192
69 Tariq Panja, “Corruption to Blame for Some Brazil World Cup Cost Rises,”
Bloomberg Business, May 23, 2014.
70 Sam Borden, “Romário, a World Cup Champion, Is Now a World Cup Dissenter,”
New York Times, October 15, 2013.
71 Elena Hodges, “Rio’s Olympic Golf Course Will Trample a Protected Ecological
Gem, “Next City, August 18, 2014.

23. 22
land slated to become a golf course currently contains “the highest biodiversity index of any
biome on earth, harboring eight percent of the world’s species, many of which are only found in
Brazil.”72
To understand why the government is spending so much and so recklessly, one only has
to look at a list of the top political donors in the country: construction companies are number
one. The government appears to be employing what Jules Boykoff calls “Celebration
Capitalism.” According to this theory, mega-events like the World Cup and Olympics are “states
of exception” that allow politicians and corporate influence to enact policies that would never be
accepted during normal times.73 Accordingly, Rio is experiencing a construction boom.
Currently there are 1,242 sports facilities under construction for the Olympics.74 Another
staggering figure: Forbes estimated that the amount of corruption in Brazil in 2013 alone could
be as high as $53 billion USD.75
The justification given for the enormous budget is that it will bring infrastructural
improvements that will last long after the Olympics is over. Admittedly a large portion of the
budget is being spent on transportation improvements that, in theory, will benefit all Cariocas.
One of the reasons, however, that the government needs to improve its transportation is because
the working class has been evicted from the city center where it works. Thus, the need for new
projects like the Bus Rapid Transit is a direct result of bad government policy. Furthermore,
72 Hodges, 2014
73 Jules Boykoff, “What is the Real Price of the London Olympics?” The Guardian,
April 4, 2012.
74 Olympic Games Impact (OGI) Study, 2014, 144
75 Panja, 2014

24. 23
most of the new transportation will be in air travel, which is inaccessible to the lower classes
who do not participate in or cannot afford long-distance travel. Much of the transportation
budget is going into improving air transportation in and out of the city and the government even
sold off two of its main airports to private business.76 After studying the geography of the
Olympic sites most of the money is being poured into areas of Rio that need it the least. The four
Olympic zones of Barra, Copacabana, Deodoro, and Maracanã are situated in the parts of the city
with the highest literacy rates and the highest salaries.77 78 And, as previously mentioned, the
lower classes living in those zones that might have benefitted from the influx of capital have
been forced to move. During the World Cup, local merchants and vendors were not even allowed
within two kilometers of each stadium because they might compete with official FIFA
merchandise and affiliated sponsors.79 Finally, the influx of tourists over the past few years has
led to increasing inflation, which disproportionately harms the poor.80
The organizing committee has long forgotten most of the social benefits promised during
the bidding process.81 Thirteen of the original fifty urban mobility projects have been scrapped
and many infrastructural improvements are not being attempted simply because they wouldn’t be
ready in time for the Games.82 83 According to Christopher Gaffney, Rio has not delivered any of
76 Zirin, 2014, 17
77 Figure 1, Appendix
78 Figure 2, Appendix
79 Atkins, 2013
80 Olympic Games Impact (OGI) Study, 2014, 179
81 Atkins, 2013
82 Atkins, 2013

25. 24
the promised improvements for the poor, the athletes, or the environment, all of which were
neglected in the “production of Olympic constellations in Rio.”84
In response, some Brazilians are pressuring the government to follow through on these
forgotten promises. In May 2014 protests and strikes erupted across several World Cup host
cities protesting overspending and the government’s “forgetting health and education.”85 Visitors
to the World Cup observed graffiti near venues pushing for “’FIFA standard’ hospitals and
schools.”86 The official Olympic Impact Study mentioned four pressure groups criticizing
everything from the government’s lack of transparency and the creation of Rio as a “city of
exception” to environmental degradation and corruption within the national sports system.87 The
most famous protest so far came during the 2013 Confederations Cup and led to June 2013 being
labeled “the month of popular discontent.”88 The protests were initiated by Movimento Passe
Libre, which advocated for free public transportation but eventually encompassed a multitude of
frustrations with the government. The protests were so visible that the FIFA secretary general
83 Cruz, 2013
84 Christopher Thomas Gaffney, Temples of the Earthbound Gods: Stadiums in the
Cultural Landscapes of Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires (Austin: University of Texas Press,
2008), 18
85 Dom Phillips, “Fury at World Cup’s Cost Erupts in Brazil,” The Washington Post,
May 16, 2014.
86 Rob Walker, “Brazil World Cup Host City Natal Seethes at Cost,” The Guardian,
November 28, 2013
87 Olympic Games Impact (OGI) Study, 2014, 101
88 Olympic Games Impact (OGI) Study, 2014, 100

26. 25
considered moving the World Cup to another country less than one year before the event.89 In
general, however, complaints have fallen on deaf ears as the government continues its march
toward “modernity”.
Mexico’s Legacy: The Olympics as a Platform for Promoting National Culture
When comparing the official public image with the reality of life in each country, Brazil
mirrors Mexico quite closely. Interestingly, however, Brazil has not imitated what was arguably
the most successful aspect of the 1968 Games – the Cultural Olympiad. The Cultural Olympiad
consisted of over 1,500 events that occurred in the year leading up to the sporting events and was
promoted as an “opportunity to join art and sports, the body and the intellect.”90 The events were
spread out across the country, allowing all Mexicans to feel connected to the Games even if they
lived far from Mexico City. The Olympiad included film festivals, art exhibits, live
performances, children’s festivals, and meetings of sculptors and poets. Contributions were not
limited to Mexican culture and so collections included an incredibly wide range; the “Imaginary
Museum,” for example, displayed ancient Egyptian sculptures alongside Jackson Pollock
paintings.91 All nations were invited to participate and send contributions to the events, ideally
art that would reflect both their country’s historic traditions and its contemporary culture.
Through the Cultural Olympiad the Mexican Olympic Committee was able to showcase the
diversity of Mexico’s people and facilitate an international exhibition of culture that celebrated
all contributions equally. Recently independent African nations were able to promote their new
89 Cruz, 2013
90 1968 Official Report - The Cultural Olympiad (part 1), 1968, 8
91 1968 Official Report - The Cultural Olympiad (part 1), 1968, 52

27. 26
national identity just as successfully as that of their European colonizers. The decision to focus
as much attention on the Cultural Olympiad as on the traditional sporting events was very smart
on the part of the Mexican Olympic Committee. They were able to shift attention away from
their low budget and lack of high-tech infrastructure and reinterpret the narrative as a nostalgic
effort to honor the “purity, beauty and simplicity of the ancient Olympic Games.”92
The Cultural Olympiad was a major emphasis in the Games, so much so that at one point
IOC officials expressed concern that it might take too much focus away from the sporting
event.93 The Cultural Olympiad encouraged tourism throughout the year and drew visitors that
might otherwise not have been interested in the athletic competitions. Culture in general was an
enormous focus of the 1968 Games. The organizing committee emphasized Mexico’s diverse
history at every possible opportunity. Teotihuacan, the pre-Hispanic ceremonial center, was the
last stop on the torch relay before the Opening Ceremony, which occurred on October 11, 1968,
known both as Columbus Day and el Dia de la Raza (Day of the Race). At this ceremony
organizers even revived the ancient Aztec ceremony of the “New Fire” and modeled the entire
event after an old Nahuatl poem.94
While the positive impact of the other aspects of the Olympic promotional campaign is
murky at best, in terms of the Cultural Olympiad the consensus is clear: it was a success.
Newspaper commentary “applauded the opportunity to showcase Mexico’s folkloric traditions”
92 1968 Official Report - The Cultural Olympiad (part 1), 1968, 8.
93 Claire Brewster and Keith Brewster, Representing the Nation: Sport and Spectacle
in Post-revolutionary Mexico, In the International Journal for the History of Sport, 6th ed., Vol.
26 (London: Routledge, 2010), 133.
94 1968 Official Report - The Cultural Olympiad (part 2), PDF, Mexico City: Organizing
Committee of the Games of the XIX Olympiad, 1969, 272.

28. 27
and felt that the organization and successful implementation of such a massive event successfully
refuted the “mañana’label” that plagued Mexicans throughout their history.95 96 An American
writing for the New Yorker lauded the effort, explaining that ‘In every possible way, [the
Mexicans] are using their great talent for display… to prove that Mexico is no longer the land of
mañana.”97 Domestically, Eric Zolov claims that the Cultural Olympiad allowed the people of
Mexico to establish a “matured modernity” that was internally driven rather than out of
“exigency of convincing [the United States] of Mexican capabilities.”98 When approached from a
domestically-driven perspective, then, the foreign perception of the Cultural Olympiad does not
even matter. For Mexicans, 1968, and more specifically the Cultural Olympiad, was an
opportunity to assert their own value and national identity outside the sphere of competition with
the West.
The Cultural Olympiad was not without its problems. For one, a cynical interpretation of
the event is that Mexico focused so heavily on the cultural side of the Olympics because they
knew that they and other “impoverished nations” would not be very successful in the sporting
events.99 Furthermore, not all Mexicans were willing to participate. Notably, famed Mexican
poet Octavio Paz withdrew from the international reunion of poets in response to the massacre at
Tlatelolco. He instead submitted a poem voicing his anger and disgust with the Mexican
95 Zolov, 2004, 176
96 Zolov, 2004, 182
97 Christopher Rand, “Letter from Mexico,” New Yorker, June 29, 1968, 68.
98 Zolov, 2004, 161
99 Brewster, 2010, 135

29. 28
government.100 However, Paz’s poem is not a reflection of the effectiveness of the Cultural
Olympiad, but rather a confirmation of the aforementioned frustration with the government’s
hypocritical marketing campaign of peace.
On paper, culture seems to be an important aspect of the 2016 Games in Rio. A common
theme in official documents is that of Brazil as a harmonious multicultural nation that celebrates
its full history and native culture. For example, in the official Rio 2016 Code of Ethics, there is a
paragraph-long “Diversity Manifesto.”101 Similarly, a short video on the official website entitled
“Sport in the City” tells “tales of a vibrant, multicultural city that is bursting with colourful
characters.”102 Unfortunately, many problems exist with Brazil’s current attempts to promote a
national culture in the lead-up to the Games: first, promotion of any cultural events is almost
nonexistent and second, the national culture they are endorsing is a whitewashed version of the
true Brazilian identity. Furthermore, the IOC saw multiculturalism as a “paramount concern”
during the bidding process and so Brazil’s nod toward its diverse population may have just been
a short-sighted strategy to win the Games.103
No evidence has been found of a Cultural Olympiad similar to Mexico City’s except for
one brief reference to it on the official website. In a 2014 story praising Rio’s progress the
Cultural Olympiad is mentioned in a list of “upcoming events” but no details are given and no
other searches, whether on the official Olympic website or any other news outlet following the
100 Brewster, 2010, 136.
101 Rio 2016 Code of Ethics, 2013, 12.
102 “Sport in the City,” Rio 2016, www.rio2016.com.
103 Gold, 2007, 395.

30. 29
Olympics, yielded further information.104 If, in fact, a Cultural Olympiad is being planned, its
lack of even the most basic promotion seems to assure that it will not be nearly as successful or
popular as that of the 1968 Cultural Olympiad.
One official project aimed at incorporating the indigenous population is the Native-
Archer Project. The Brazilian national sports ministry has been scouring the rainforest for native
tribes who excel in the Olympic sport of archery, as well as kayaking and canoeing. The program
would be an interesting way to reflect Brazil’s cultural diversity but it is also admittedly a
program to “strengthen the Brazilian Olympic Archery Team.”105 While the program could be a
win-win situation in which the native people feel included and Brazil is able to come out on top
in the competition, the fact that the main effort to incorporate the indigenous community would
mostly benefit the Brazilian government and sports world is interesting, at the very least.
Other cultural programs center on modern cosmopolitanism, such as the new Rio de
Janeiro Art Museum, or explicitly futuristic endeavors like the Museum of Tomorrow. The latter
museum is part of a $5 billion effort to revitalize Rio’s urban waterfront district. However,
problems arose for developers when a construction crew discovered the remains of a 19th-century
slave-trading wharf on the site. While the museum still plans to focus on “the sustainable and
ecological future of 2061,” the City of Rio did put up a plaque in honor of the archaeological
findings and the countless enslaved people who began their experience with Brazilian slavery at
104 “IOC declares itself ‘satisfied with progress,’” Rio 2016, www.rio2016.com, 2014
105 Janet Tappin Coelho, “Hunt for the Amazonian Olympian Archer: Brazil Talent
Scouts Search Jungle Tribes for the Archers and Kayakers Who Could Win Gold at Rio
2016,” Daily Mail, October 5, 2013.

31. 30
that spot. However, some local experts feel that a plaque is not enough compared with the multi-
billion dollar development projects nearby that are bound to dwarf the historic site.106
Brazil is not utilizing their culture to the fullest extent in the way Mexico did. However,
the Brazilian people have been picking up the slack. The best example, so far, of activists
utilizing the Olympic spotlight in a way similar to Tlatelolco in 1968 centers on what the official
Olympic Impact Study calls “an old building.”107 While it is, in fact, an old building, what the
official records gloss over is the building’s history. Originally a colonial mansion, it was donated
in the early twentieth century “to serve the indigenous cause for the construction of a research
centre of indigenous culture, in order to reunite and represent the ancestral knowledge of
Brazil.”108 Up until 1978 it served as the Museum of the Indian People in Brazil, making it the
first indigenous peoples’ museum in the entire Western hemisphere. The building also housed
Brazil’s Indian Protection Service until it was abandoned during the dictatorship. In recent years
the indigenous community has moved back in, counting on Brazil’s historically strong squatters’
rights laws. Their recommitment to the historic building created “a beacon of hope in the
struggle of Brazilian Indians.”109 Unfortunately for the more than fifty ethnicities that inhabited
the Indigenous Cultural Center, only a few years later Rio de Janeiro won its bid for the 2016
Olympics. The ICC was slated to be demolished to make way for a 10,000-car parking lot
106 Romero, 2014
107 Olympic Games Impact (OGI) Study, 2014, 253
108 Sophie Pinchetti, “Aldeia Maracanã: A Symbol of Brazil’s Indigenous Struggle,”
The Other, May 2014.
109 Pinchetti, 2014

32. 31
adjacent to the Maracanã Stadium. According to the governor of Rio de Janeiro, “Long live
democracy, but the building has no historical value. We’re going to tear it down.”110
In one of the most unintentionally symbolic moments of Rio’s Olympic progress so far,
part of the ICC’s land was also rumored to become a new Olympic Museum.111 Indigenous
groups and supporters protesting their eviction met with police firing tear gas and pepper spray
into the crowds. Poignant images of Brazilian police facing off against natives adorned with
traditional feathered headdresses made headlines in Brazil and the United States. After the media
began reporting on the clashes the Rio Governor had a change of heart regarding the historic
value of the ICC. In an attempt to avoid too much bad press so close to the World Cup, the
governor promised to turn the space into a new Indian cultural center with housing. The new
plans include “an indigenous museum managed and built by the Indians… vast archives and a
library… [and] Brazil’s first Indigenous University.”112 Of course, the new plan for the ICC is
still in its infant stages and there is no guarantee that the government will follow through after
the spotlight fades in 2016. However, the successful protests around the ICC are the first real
glimmer of hope for many who believe Brazil should be showing its true culture – including its
native peoples and slave past – rather than one whitewashed for foreign audiences.
110 Jenny Barchfield, “Riot by the Maracanã! Brazilian Police Spark Angry Protests
with Clear Out of Indian Museum as Part of World Cup Preparations,” Daily Mail, March 22,
2013.
111 Romero, 2013
112 Pinchetti, 2014

33. 32
Conclusion
Mexico and Brazil are the only Latin American countries to have the opportunity to put
on the most watched event on earth, the Olympic Games. Both countries have used the
international attention to highlight what they want their countries to be, or, more accurately, what
the developed world wants their countries to be. However, neither country has been able to
successfully marry its vision for the future with its domestic reality. In both countries hosting the
Olympics has led to increased frustration with the government, wealth for the wealthiest, and an
overall sense that the lower classes have little place in the new Olympic world. Nevertheless,
groups like the Mexico City students and the Brazilian indigenous groups have fought back
against the tide of corruption and corporatism disguised as modernity. In Mexico, the
government left at least one lasting positive legacy in the Cultural Olympiad, incorporating and
highlighting the traditions of the peoples who had otherwise felt disconnected. The Brazilian
organizers have yet to do the same. Many of these negative trends are unlikely to change in the
next year before the Olympics, but Rio 2016 can be remembered for more than evictions, police
confrontations, and environmental destruction. However, this positive legacy will not come from
official Olympic groups, so the Brazilian people will have to initiate it themselves.

34. 33
Appendix
Fig. 1. Olympic venues compared with literacy rates in Rio de Janeiro.
Fig. 2. Olympic venues compared with household salaries in Rio de Janeiro.

35. 34
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