Don't Get Hacked! Cybersecurity Boot Camp
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At the 2011 NARUC Winter Committee Meetings, Patrick Miller teamed up with seasoned security experts Miles Keogh from NARUC and Bill Hunteman from the Department of Energy to deliver an engaging Cybersecurity Boot Camp.
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Don't Get Hacked! Cybersecurity Boot Camp
- 1. NARUC Don’t Get Hacked! Cybersecurity Boot Camp Patrick C Miller, EnergySec / NESCO Bill Hunteman, US DOE Miles Keogh, NARUC February 13 2011 NARUC Winter Committee Meetings Marriott Renaissance, Washington DC
- 2. Our Drill Instructors! l Miles Keogh § Director of Grants and Research, NARUC NARUC l Patrick C Miller § Founder, President and CEO, EnergySec § Principal Investigator, National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization (NESCO) § Former Director, NERC CIP Practice, ICF International § Former Manager, WECC CIP Audits & Investigations § Corporate Security staff for several Pacific Northwest utilities § Deep roots in Telecom sector, IT and Industrial Control Systems § CRISC, CISA, CISSP-ISSAP, SSCP, CEH, CVI, NSA-IAM
- 3. Our Drill Instructors! l Bill Hunteman § Chief Advisor for Cybersecurity, US Department of Energy NARUC § DOE Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) and Associate CIO for Cyber Security § Cybersecurity Program Manager for the DOE National Nuclear Security Administration § Worked in the Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories § Managed cybersecurity research and development activities § Participated in the development of national and international cyber security criteria § Joint projects with Russia to improve cyber security in the Russian nuclear weapons complex § Design and development of high performance computer networks and operating systems for many of the supercomputers used by DOE (and its predecessors) § Bachelor or Science in Mathematics and Master of Science Electrical Engineering/Computer Science
- 4. What We’re Covering Today l What’s the “Cyber” in “Cyber security?” NARUC l What are we trying to protect? l What threats do we face? l What are the challenges of instituting cyber security? l Where do the vulnerabilities within the system exist? l What can Commissions do about it? l What are the policy structures you have to work with?
- 5. What Have You Seen? l How well do you understand the confluence of networked and traditional NARUC devices? l Has cybersecurity come before your commission? l What has that looked like? l What questions do you have about cybersecurity? l Is cybersecurity a concern at your commission?
- 6. Rising Cybersecurity Threats The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 5
- 7. CyberWar (InfoWar) The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 6
- 8. Aurora The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 7
- 9. Night Dragon • Recently published by McAfee • Activity designed to obtain sensitive data from targeted organizations in global oil and energy industries… The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 8
- 10. Night Dragon • Source appears to be China, but this is difficult to confirm exactly • Began Nov 2009, possibly as early as 2007 • Techniques: – Social engineering – Spear-phishing attacks – Exploitation of Microsoft Windows vulnerabilities – Microsoft Active Directory compromises – Remote administration tools (RATs) The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 9
- 11. Night Dragon • Harvesting sensitive competitive proprietary operations, and project-financing information for oil and gas field bids and operations • Controlled systems, then cracked accounts to move to more sensitive information/systems • Focus was on operational oil and gas field production systems and financial documents related to field exploration and bidding • In certain cases, the attackers collected data from SCADA systems The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 10
- 12. Stuxnet • First publicly disclosed control systems rootkit, but certainly wont be the last... • USB vector; focused on air-gapped networks • Highly sophisticated; infects everything, then rewrites PLC logic and hides • Undermines integrity of control system • Most regulations wouldn’t have stopped it • No 100% security against determined adversary The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 11
- 13. SHODAN, ERIPP, ETC The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 12
- 14. SHODAN, ERIPP, ETC Berkeley Cyclotron HMI images The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 13
- 15. There’s An App For That • “Get mobile access to your control system via an iPhone, iPad, Android and other smartphones and tablet devices. The Ignition Mobile Module gives you instant access to any HMI / SCADA project created with the Ignition Vision Module.” The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 14
- 16. Public Domain The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 15
- 17. Only The Disclosed The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 16
- 18. TwitBookBlogosphere The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 17
- 19. Research and Disclosure • October 24, 2010, 12:39PM, Threat Post – SCADA Vendors Still Need Security Wake Up Call • http://threatpost.com/en_us/blogs/scada-vendors-still-need-security-wake-call-102410 – Please don t waste my time • October 28, 2010: ICSJWG Seattle Meeting – Invensys, IOActive, ICS-CERT presented on case study on Wonderware vulnerability • Disclosure positions are hotly debated The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 18
- 20. From Obscurity To Novelty • Smart Meter hacking • Hacking cookbooks • Metasploit • Fuzzers • Supply chain attacks • Manuals available in all languages on Internet The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 19
- 21. Shiny Object • Shiny object for the mass media • 60 minutes • Wall Street Journal, National Journal, CNN • Too many IT trade publications to name • Blockbuster films • Prime time television shows • Social Media (blogosphere, Twitter) The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 20
- 22. Economic Drivers • Recession economy brings unique challenges • Decreased participation working groups and conferences • Static or shrinking headcount; increased workload • Insider threat increases • Decreased spending on new equipment • Older products extended beyond intended lifespan • Security is expensive for customers and vendors The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 21
- 23. People Problem • Humans are the weakest link in any security system – Passwords for candy; Social engineering • Humans are also the strongest link in any security system – The Aware Person System (APS) – ICS culture shift is very slow, but can be very powerful • Danger: unskilled/untrained operators of power tools can cause significant damage – Increasing complexity = training treadmill The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 22
- 24. People Solution • So you’ve bought all of the fancy cybersecurity gizmos… – What about the skilled staff to use them? • So you’ve put cameras in all critical sites… – What about the staff to monitor and respond? • An appropriate balance of skilled people and current technology must be used The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 23
- 25. Back In The Good Old Days • Pneumatic, electromechanical, analog • Telephone meant POTS or “bat phone” • No Internet • Less automation • Less complexity • Proprietary • Long life span The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 24
- 26. ICS Gen-X • Automation, more complexity • Internet Protocol (TCP/UDP/etc) • Data, more data and even more data • Processing power, memory, bandwidth = SPEED! • Interconnected business • Flat networks • COTS software and hardware • Increasingly shorter lifespans The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 25
- 27. Millennium Systems • Highly digital, highly complex • Highly interconnected, highly layered • Bitflocking, dynamic emergent behavior • New protocols • New interdependencies • Homogenization • Innovation treadmill; constant lifespan flux The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 26
- 28. Bigger, Better, Faster • ARRA and other green dollars are flowing • SCADA devices now come with a flash-webserver- WiMax-mesh-ZigBee-kitchensink • Mixing legacy and bleeding edge tech is difficult • Logical distance between kinetic endpoint and HMI is exponentially increasing; “hyperembeddedness” • Most (but not all) vendors put features first, security last; this will not change in the foreseeable future The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 27
- 29. Advantage: Attackers • Security approaches favor new installations, legacy environments are still vulnerable • Very difficult to replace/patch in-service devices • Stuxnet: game changer, sets the new bar - even when sophisticated attacks aren’t necessary • Organized crime will top Nation States and Non- Government Organizations (NGOs) as biggest threat • Welcome to the cyberarms race The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 28
- 30. Cybersecurity Vocabulary • Network • Virus/Trojan/Malware • Connectivity • Firmware • Packet • Denial of Service • Header • NIST • Traffic • NERC CIP • Bandwidth • SCADA • Latency • Encryption • Internet Protocol • Credential The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 29
- 31. Information Technology 101 • Connectivity: how the systems talk to each other – Hub “dumb” – Switch Device Intelligence – Managed Switch – Router – Firewall – Next Generation Firewall – Workstation/Server “smart” • What are we building for? The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 30
- 32. Three Flavors Business Systems Control Systems “Smart Grid” The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 31
- 33. Business IT Security • Typical approach: password, firewall, anti-virus, etc • Protecting four key domains 1. Confidentiality – preventing unauthorized access to information 2. Integrity – preventing the unauthorized modification or theft of information 3. Availability – preventing the denial of service and ensuring authorized access to information 4. Non-Repudiation – preventing the denial of an action that took place or the claim of an action that did not take place The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 32
- 34. What Is A Control System? Human Machine Interface L1 START L2 STOP M M O.L. M S Control Programmable M R Valve Logic Basic Motor Control Controllers Ladder Logic I/O Remote Comms Master Meters PLC Protocols SCADA Sensors IED Wired Server Field RTU Wireless HMI Devices Controller EMS DCS The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 33
- 35. IT vs ICS Security TOPIC Informa5on Technology Industrial Control Systems AnA-‐Virus/Mobile Code Common, widely used Uncommon, impossible Typical Lifespan 3-‐5 years 15-‐20 years Outsourcing Common, widely used Rare, uncommon Patch Management Regular, scheduled Slow, vendor-‐specific Change Management Regular, scheduled Uncommon Time CriAcal Content Generally delays accepted CriAcal due to safety Availability Generally delays accepted 24 x 7 x 365 x forever Security Awareness Good Poor, except physical Security TesAng/Audit Scheduled, mandated Occasional, uncommon Physical Security Secure Remote and unmanned The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 34
- 36. Typical Architecture Firewall SCADA and Internet other field devices Corporate Network Process Control Network The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 35
- 37. Smart Grid Complications The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 36
- 38. Smart Grid Complications The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 37
- 39. What Have You Seen? • Did cyber security appear in your filings and hearings? • How did this fit in your list of priorities? • What elements were most important? – Privacy? – Reliability? – Cost? – Security Effectiveness? – Upgradeability as a solution or vulnerability? The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 38
- 40. Threat Sources • Inadvertent errors • Power system equipment malfunctions • Communication equipment failure • Deliberate malicious acts The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 39
- 41. Threat Types • Replay attacks • Indiscretions (leaks) by personnel • Brute force • Bypass controls • Man-in-the-Middle • Denial of Service • Resource Exhaustion The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 40
- 42. Nothing New Under The Sun • Mature security practices; highly refined – Defense in Depth – Principle of Least Privilege – Segregation of Duties – Need to Know – Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability • No Silver Bullet, 100%, Total Security • Strong protection has never been easy, inexpensive or quick to implement • Tradeoff between functionality and security The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 41
- 43. Strategies for Defense In Depth • Governance, policy • Authentication • Authorization • Admission control • Encryption • Integrity checking • Auditing, detection The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 42
- 44. Defense In Depth: Example • NERC CIP Standards – CIP-002 – Critical Cyber Asset Identification – CIP-003 – Security Management Controls – CIP-004 – Personnel & Training – CIP-005 – Electronic Security Perimeter(s) – CIP-006 – Physical Security – CIP-007 – Systems Security Management – CIP-008 – Incident Reporting & Response Planning – CIP-009 – Recovery Plans for Critical Cyber Assets The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 43
- 45. Proven Security Solutions • Physical Protection • Network Controls: Admission, Segmentation • Strong ID, Authentication and Authorization • Aware Person System (Training and Awareness) • Intrusion Detection/Prevention • Integrity Assurance • Application Whitelisting • Response and Recovery The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 44
- 46. You Don’t Need a Perfect Defense • If defensive measures can be beaten, does the system ensure the results of the attack are : – Unprofitable – Limited in its ramifications – Hard enough to make the “juice” not worth the “squeeze” – Difficult to replicate – Quickly and easily recoverable – Traceable and easy to detect; and – Otherwise unappealing The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 45
- 47. NARUC Why Your Role Is Increasing l Increased attacks to business processes l NERC CIP compliance l The deployment of smart grid l These are increasingly drivers for cost recovery consideration and other contexts in cases that are coming your way very soon l Is that reflected in what you’re seeing / hearing?
- 48. Proposal: Roles for Public Utility Commissions 1. Ask the right questions when considering cost recovery of prudent utility expenditures for cyber NARUC security. 2. Assuring that cyber security requirements that utilities are subject to are being met. § PUC Staff need to be up-to-date on cyber security requirements and potential threats. 3. Assuring that the PUC’s computer systems and operations are subject to on-going cyber security reviews and remediation, and that disaster recovery plans are in place and tested. § This also included cyber security awareness for agency employees. 4. Understand and participate in regional and national efforts for protecting critical infrastructure
- 49. Cybersecurity Investments: What To Ask l Worth saying twice: someone at the PUC staff needs to be up-to- date on cyber security requirements and potential threats. NARUC l Ask how security is addressed (conceptually) for each component l Don’t accept assurances that all products used were built to be secure, or that IT solutions will work for SCADA systems. Insist that vendors document & independently verify their security controls l Use compliance as a floor, not a ceiling: Ask to see risk assessment documentation l Ensure security is budgeted for and individuals are assigned responsibility l Ensure service providers (for example, telcos, meter data processors) are included in risk assessment and provide sufficient information l Ensure integrated security between business systems and control systems for existing grid and for smart grid 48
- 50. NARUC Three examples of State action l Pennsylvania l Missouri l New York l PUCs don’t need to become cyber experts or enforces, but if you ask a utility a question they will return with an answer
- 51. Cybersecurity Requirements and Resources • For the Bulk Power System: – The North American Electric Reliability Corporation -- Standards CIP-002 through CIP-009 (the Critical Cyber Asset Identification portion of the Critical Infrastructure Protection standards) – http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=2|20 • For the Smart Grid: – The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) smart grid interoperability standards and specifications for inclusion in the Smart Grid Interoperability Standards Framework, Release 1.0. These include three volumes on cyber security – http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsNISTIRs.html#NIST-IR-7628 • What’s Missing? – Distribution systems, serial control systems, and other gaps The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 50
- 52. Smart Grid Investment Grant Program • Requires a description of how cyber security concerns will be addressed with respect to the use of best available equipment and the application of procedures and practices involving system design, testing, deployment, operations and decommissioning, including at a minimum: i. A description of the cyber security risks at each stage of the system deployment lifecycle, ii. Cyber security criteria used for vendor and device selection, iii. Cyber security control strategies, iv. Descriptions of residual cyber security risks, v. Relevant cyber security standards and best practices, and vi. Descriptions of how the project will support/adopt/implement emerging smart grid security standards Source: Notice of Intent to Issue a Funding Opportunity Announcement For the Smart Grid Investment Grant Program, April 16, 2009 The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 51
- 53. Is Smart Grid More Vulnerable? Source: “San Diego Smart Grid Study”, October 2006 Power outages cost between $80 billion and $150 billion every year The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 52
- 54. Energy Independence and Security Act o In the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007, Congress established the development of a Smart Grid as a national policy goal. o Under EISA, NIST is directed to “coordinate the development of a framework that includes protocols and model standards for information management to achieve interoperability of smart grid devices and systems” as well as maintain the reliability and security of the electricity infrastructure. 53
- 55. Conceptual Reference Diagram for Smart Grid Information Networks 54
- 56. Interoperability Framework Testing and Certification Standards Security Architecture and Requirements Conceptual Reference Model Business and Public Policy Requirements 55
- 57. NIST Three Phase Plan PHASE 1 PHASE 2 Identify an initial set of Establish public/private existing consensus Standards Panel to provide standards and develop ongoing recommendations for a roadmap to fill gaps new/revised standards PHASE 3 Testing and Certification Framework 2009 2010 56 56
- 58. Smart Grid – an Opportunity o Modernization provides an opportunity to improve security of the Grid o Integration of new IT and networking technologies n Brings new risks as well as an array of security standards, processes, and tools o Architecture is key n Security must be designed in – it cannot be added on later 57
- 59. CSWG o To address the cross-cutting issue of cyber security, NIST established the Cyber Security Coordination Task Group (CSCTG) in March 2009 o Moved under the NIST Smart Grid Interoperability Panel (SGIP) as a standing working group and was renamed the Cyber Security Working Group (SGIP–CSWG) o The CSWG now has more than 475 participants from the private sector (including vendors and service providers), academia, regulatory organizations, national research laboratories, and federal agencies 58
- 60. Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security o NIST Interagency Report 7628 - Augut 2010 n Development of the document lead by NIST n Represents significant coordination among o Federal agencies o Private sector o Regulators o Academics n Document includes material that will be used in selecting and modifying security requirements 59
- 61. NISTIR 7628 – What it IS and IS NOT What it IS o A tool for organizations that are researching, designing, developing, and implementing Smart Grid technologies o May be used as a guideline to evaluate the overall cyber risks to a Smart Grid system during the design phase and during system implementation and maintenance o Guidance for organizations n Each organization must develop its own cyber security strategy (including a risk assessment methodology) for the Smart Grid. What it IS NOT o It does not prescribe particular solutions o It is not mandatory 60
- 62. Smart Grid Cyber Security Strategy - Tasks 64(7$2(.*$2( 8&*9:$#$ B<?C+<D&(*&*9:$#$ -#&%2,C3<=?<&2&%E( +<=*#&5 P4(N#$Q(8$$2$$=2&% ! /+2&%#J:(*$$2%$ ! R>9&2,*A#9#%#2$ ! BH,2*%$ ! /=?*3%$ ;<%%<=(>?(*&*9:$#$ -@>9&2,*A#9#%:( 0,#@*3:( 39*$$2$5 8$$2$$=2&% K4(L#'H(M2@29( )23>,#%:( N2O>#,2=2&%$ !"#$%#&'( FA4()=*,%(G,#+( F*4()23>,#%:( )%*&+*,+$ )%*&+*,+$( 8,3H#%23%>,2 -./01(/!!!1( 8$$2$$=2&% /!.1(2%345 I4(.<&J<,=#%: 8$$2$$=2&% 61
- 63. NISTIR 7628 Content The NISTIR includes the following o Executive Summary o Chapter 1 - Overall cyber security strategy for the Smart Grid o Chapter 2 – High level and logical security architecture o Chapter 3 – High level security requirements o Chapter 4 – Cryptography and key management 62
- 64. NISTIR 7628 Content (2) o Chapter 5 - Privacy and the Smart Grid o Chapter 6 – Vulnerability Classes o Chapter 7 – Bottom-up security analysis of the Smart Grid o Chapter 8 - R&D themes for cyber security in the Smart Grid o Chapter 9 – Overview of the standards review 63
- 65. NISTIR 7628 Content (3) o Chapter 10 – Key power system use cases for security requirements o Appendices A - J 64
- 66. How to Participate in CSWG o NIST Smart Grid portal http://nist.gov/ smartgrid o Cyber Security Working Group n Lead: Marianne Swanson (marianne.swanson@nist.gov) n NIST Support: Tanya Brewer (tanya.brewer@nist.gov) o Cyber Security Twiki site o http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-sggrid/bin/view/ SmartGrid/CyberSecurityCTG 65
- 67. Security of PUC’s computer systems This may be the responsibility of another state agency or NARUC office, but the implication of a failure will impact the business operation of the Commission l Assuring that the computer systems that the PUC relies have on-going cyber security reviews and remediation of identified vulnerabilities. l Disaster recovery plans are in place and tested and Continuity of Operation Plans have been developed. l Cyber security awareness for agency employees including social engineering and insider threats.
- 68. Continuity of Operation Plans (COOP) l Internal contingency plans of government and business to assure the rapid resumption of essential NARUC functions as soon as possible if they are disrupted for any reason: e.g., fire, tornado, hurricanes, wildfires, earthquakes, terrorism, pandemics, etc. – Build Self- reliance and Resiliency l Helps assure that critical/essential functions can quickly resume operations l Addresses key or essential employees, required facilities, computer system records and back-up data systems, etc. l Minimize damage & losses l Management succession & emergency powers
- 69. On what cyber systems do you rely? l What IT systems support critical PUC NARUC functions? l What are the backed up systems? l What systems are needed to support restoration? l What systems are needed operationally? l In what sequence should systems be restored? l What are the telecommunication needs and requirements? Hourly Loss from Downtime in the Information Technology Sector: $1.3 million/hr
- 70. NARUC What if this happened?
- 71. NARUC Employee Education http://www.michigan.gov/cybersecurity
- 72. Resilience Factors • Robustness – The ability to operate or stay standing in the face of disaster • Resourcefulness – skillfully managing a disaster once it unfolds • Rapid Recovery – The capacity to get things back to normal as quickly as possible after a disaster • Learning lessons – Having the means to absorb the new lessons that can be drawn from a catastrophe The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 71
- 73. Resilience Considerations • Resilience depends on humans – Human networks are key – Ability to work together and individually – Potential for panic or confusion – Build necessary connections (relationships) in advance • In the event of an electric power sector cyberattack, do you know: – Your role? If not, whose role it is to act? – Who to call? What they can /should do? The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 72
- 74. Protecting The Right Stuff • Very little security actuarial data vs. engineering actuarial data • Most organizations don t communicate details of security breaches • Most estimates are based on FUD (Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt) • Need better/current data on: – What is being attacked? (most preferred targets) – Which attacks were successful? The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 73
- 75. Product/Service Problem(s) • Utilities are married to their products [and vendors] for many years • Most products are very expensive to replace or upgrade and challenging to coordinate • Product vendors are trying to balance security and profit; guess which one wins… • Some vendors are responsive, most are not • SCADA Procurement Language can help, but only for new purchases The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 74
- 76. What Can State Regulators Do? • Get educated (even more than today) • Strategic communication, in all directions • Build new relationships and reshape old • Support measures to get actuarial data • Support secure procurement measures • Support security training/education • Support appropriate staffing levels • Rethink the rate case approach The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 75
- 77. What Can State Regulators Do? • Ask questions… – Are you using the SCADA Procurement Language? – Are you participating in local, state, regional, national security/disaster exercises? – What security training/education/awareness are you providing to your staff and how often? – Where do you get your situational awareness data? – What cybersecurity technologies do you use? – Have you performed a full [exhaustive] inventory of all control systems and all associated communication links? The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 76
- 78. Education and Training • What is happening in Operations, Federal, States? • OpSec, Red-Blue, Security Body of Knowledge, security concepts • Security practices change rapidly – Need for training on new tactics and new technology is perpetual • Lack of education leads to a false sense of security – Otherwise known as knowing just enough to be dangerous The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 77
- 79. Communication • Ratepayers want a secure grid, until they see the bill – Expect rate shock – Rates could triple or more, for some infrastructures • Common Practice vs. Best Practice • Early and regular, fact-based communication can minimize negative public reaction • Remind ratepayers that smart, informed decisions are being made The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 78
- 80. Communication • Keep the story fresh; lather, rinse, repeat • Leverage existing Safety communication vehicles/ mechanisms – Newsletters – Mailers, billing notices – Public service announcments – Sponsored events • Partner with utilities, Federal agencies and even Media to convey a unified message The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 79
- 81. Relationships • Get out and talk to your operators • Get to know the industry thought leaders • What are your peers doing? • Situational Awareness – NESCO, VirtualUSA, Einstein, Fusion centers, Infragard… • Take a partnership approach to the rate case (vs. adversarial) as much as possible The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 80
- 82. Closing Thoughts • Cybersecurity is worth taking seriously, but will have to fit into a long list of concerns and priorities • There are few response networks for utility sector cybersecurity among State Governments • Few of those evaluating cybersecurity investments understand cybersecurity • An unskilled operator of any power tool will hurt themselves and those around them – Training and staffing are imperative • A culture shift is the first ingredient for success • Soft-skills may matter more than technical skills The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program 81
- 83. Questions? Patrick C Miller, NARUC President and CEO, EnergySec Principal Investigator, NESCO patrick@energysec.org 503-446-1212 Miles Keogh, NARUC Director of Grants & Research mkeogh@naruc.org 202-898-2217 Bill Hunteman, Chief Cyber Security Advisor US Department of Energy Office of Electricity Deliver & Energy Reliability William.hunteman@doe.gov