Frank Knorek Wilkes University Thesis

Theory vs. Practice 1
Introduction
A downtown plays a crucial role in defining a community’s tax base, commerce, and
overall quality of life. A city’s downtown health is also one of the criteria against which
municipal leadership is judged. Downtowns across America, as well as in Luzerne County, have
largely been overlooked as areas to live, work, and play, with people instead choosing suburbs,
industrial parks, and malls. In many ways a community’s downtown is synonymous with its
sense of place and identity. In addition, a downtown has a certain innate charm that can never be
replicated in a suburb.
In the last decade, some of the cities located in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, have
undergone a tremendous revitalization. Each municipality presents its own unique set of
strengths and weaknesses. I examine the processes and programs of downtown revitalization in
order to understand why some downtown revitalization efforts succeeded while others fail.
A comprehensive study of the downtown revitalization efforts in the four cities located in
Luzerne County has never been undertaken. This study is a panoramic analysis of downtown
revitalization efforts by the administrations in the cities of Hazleton, Pittston, Nanticoke, and
Wilkes-Barre from 1990 to 2005. A healthy downtown is the result of cooperation and a widely
shared vision among downtown stakeholders that results in a clearly articulated revitalization
strategy.
I begin with a brief history of American urban planning, which traces the evolution of the
city, some of its problems, and the role of planning in remedying those problems. The three eras
discussed, pre-industrial, post-war, and modern, reflect the challenges faced in solving urban
problems, and how the responsibility for urban problems and remedies shifted from federal to

state and local governments. The contemporary practice of urban planning is a comprehensive
process, not an endpoint, although it was not always the case.
History of Urban Planning
The study of urban planning has its antecedents in Europe during the transformation from
an agrarian to industrial society. This transformation spawned the reemergence of the market
city, where for the first time the merchant, not the noble or the land owner, became the social
leader. This period also saw the rise of the public square, something that had not been present
since the time of the Greek Polis. The result was the materialization of the market driven local
economy, and the link between commerce and governance.
The Pre-industrial Era
Immigration in the last 200 years is largely responsible for shaping the urban landscape in
America, relegating the new American city to “nothing more than a laboratory for studying the
natural experiment of social change” (Fagin 1967, 51). Up until the 1890s, no other nation had
ever seen a diverse influx of immigration on such a large scale. It is also theorized that mass
immigration is the precursor of today’s social inequity. It must be noted that during America’s
industrial revolution, no prior research was done on urban planning. The only studies that
resembled strategic planning were fragmented investigations, which were nothing more than
recorded local histories.
Prior to WWII, urban development in America was highly unorganized and sporadic, with
development only being undertaken in major metropolitan areas like Boston, New York,
Philadelphia, Detroit, and Chicago. Urban planning was unpopular in America during the 1920s
due to the “highly oppressive acts taken in the name of planning in totalitarian Russia” (Fagin
1967, 546). City plans were relegated to nothing more than public works plans during the Great

Depression. Additionally, “few, if any, means existed to carry out these narrow objectives”
(Fagin 1967, 546).
The post-war Era
With WWII over, Americans slowly returned to normalcy, and an era of prosperity began
in the 1950s. It is theorized that it was this second wave of domestic immigration that triggered
the move to the suburbs in order to escape the rigors of poverty and the constraint of living in the
urban environment, thus “supplementing the philosophies of individualism and private property”
(Fowler 1992, 116). Cities during this era did not exercise planned growth, rather they were
responding to growth out of necessity. Shortly after WWII, the constraints and paranoia of
negative public sentiment toward urban planning had largely eroded. Leadership capacities were
now being developed to carry out the new task of implementing the two “nationwide programs
of an interstate highway system and federal urban renewal projects” (Fagin, 1967 327). Up until
the 1960s, “no authentic philosophy statement on urban planning existed; instead, the philosophy
was largely based on the thoughts of planners and their plans” (Fagin 1967, 309).
The Modern Era
By the 1970s, leadership and the capacity to plan were now in place. However, it is
during this period that the federal government finally pulls the plug on the few remaining urban
planning initiatives which it controlled. Over the last forty years, the federal government
increasingly distanced itself from participating in urban renewal projects with:
President Nixon withdrawing funding for housing, urban renewal,
and local planning programs; President Carter blocked new
urban initiatives legislation; and President Reagan cutting the
Federal Innovation Program and Federal Stimulus Planning
Program that dated back to the New Deal (Peterson 2003, 327).

Over the last thirty years, discontent emerged among citizens and civic groups with the
ultimate failure of Title I of the 1949 Federal Housing Act. Criticism came when this federally
subsidized program could not achieve its goal of slum clearance and urban redevelopment.
Housing would seem to be the focus of the act, however, “the wording permitted the use of
subsidies for projects that destroyed residential areas and replaced them with commercial
development—nothing in Title I mandates the construction of low or moderate-income housing”
(Teaford 2000, 444). From this point on, federal urban renewal programs were decidedly “too
costly and destructive to personal liberty” (Teaford 2000, 454). Also during this time, planning
once again came under fire from citizen advocacy groups due to the increasing use of eminent
domain to displace citizens from their homes in the name of progress that might benefit the entire
community. Activists “sought to replace the top-down tradition of planning with a new bottomup approach, in which residents would play a major role” (Teaford 2000, 456).
One of the most important developments to take place during this era was the federal
government granting responsibility for urban development programs to state and local
governments. Federal Community Development Block Grants (CDBGs) allowed state and local
governments more flexibility in the use of federal money for locally-identified projects. Many
practitioners criticize that federal block grants are too categorical, and that they do not address
the problems in which they intend to solve (Teaford 2000, 461). During the last twenty years,
federal funding for these grants has been cut dramatically. In the last three decades, the federal
government has granted nearly full jurisdiction to “states and localities, which caused them to
rely on their own ingenuity and resources to finance revitalization programs and their
implementation” (Teaford 2000, 460). Early on in this full transition of power, many state and

local governments were not equipped with policies and programs for this task. It has only been
in the last twenty years that most localities have embraced these responsibilities.
I will now shift my focus from the history of American urban planning to the literature
review. The literature review chronicles works that seek to explain how downtown revitalization
strategies have evolved.
Literature Review
In order to understand what policies, procedures, and characteristics comprise a
successful downtown revitalization strategy, I drew a link between the situations presented in the
evolution of urban planning to recent research on downtown revitalization. For the most part,
national research appearing in books and scholarly articles on downtown revitalization have only
focused on major U.S. cities, not the more abundant smaller municipalities with populations of
less than 250,000. The focus of this study is the administrations of four Pennsylvania third-class
cities. However, there is limited literature on small-city leadership and downtown revitalization
strategies. Some may ask why research on larger cities is not applicable to small municipalities.
A major reason is that the physical size of small cities is inadequate to meet the market
requirements of development projects found in larger cities. Simply put, “larger downtowns
have the assets of larger workforces, greater market areas, and more complementary attractions”
(Robertson 2002, 54).
Much of the research on municipal leadership and public-private partnerships (Robertson,
2002; and The Academy of Political Science, 1986) suggests that healthy downtowns are
reflective of strong sustainable partnerships between the public and private sectors, and are
devoid of conflict. A downtown stakeholder is anyone who has a vested interest in improving
the downtown’s health. Downtown stakeholders consist of city and county government,

downtown development authorities and corporations, the chamber of commerce, downtown
merchants, private investors and developers, and residents. Working partnerships provide the
essential foundation to “create more stakeholders by mobilizing both human and financial
resources, broaden the support base, and aid in promoting efficiency among the different
organizations by preventing duplicate efforts” (Robertson 2002, 54). In addition, these
relationships allow downtown stakeholders to actively engage in shared projects and programs
designed to marshal maximum resources by sharing risks for the benefit of the community,
thereby confirming Alex de Tocqueville’s observation that “extra-governmental associations are
America’s legacy to democracy.”
Nevertheless, conflict between the mayor, city council, and other downtown stakeholders
exists; in order to understand why, the qualities of mayoral leadership must be examined.
Research on mayoral conflict (Wheeland , 2002; and Ihrke & Niederjohn, 2005) argues that
political institutions, at all levels, define the agenda within which politics takes place. The
institutional framework of local government places various influences on the mayoral executive
and their relationship with council and other stakeholders. Two models to evaluate mayoral
leadership and conflict include the executive mayor and facilitative mayor paradigms. Wheeland
(2002) argues that facilitative and executive mayors increase a mayor’s chances of being
successful if they (1) act in ways that are compatible to the formal institutional features defining
their roles; (2) build a consensus for a particular course of action; and (3) are supported by other
formal institutional features and benefits. Therefore, mayors in weak-facilitative mayor/council
systems have limited control and influence in setting agendas or advocating policy. When a
facilitative mayor begins to govern as a strong-executive mayor, city council members and other
downtown stakeholders may perceive conflict. On the other hand, if a strong-executive mayor,

who does not act in a facilitative manor (i.e., is unwilling to cooperate, communicate, and
coordinate with downtown stakeholders) on revitalization initiatives, council members and
downtown stakeholders could perceive conflict. In both models, if the mayor acts out of the
institutional boundaries, conflict could be perceived that endangers the revitalization process.
Although conflict is possible when people come together to make decisions, conflict can
be beneficial to group productivity as it prevents groupthink, and allows an open line of
communication on decision-making and policy outcomes. The factors most often cited that lead
to group conflict were gender, education, leadership credibility, and age. It was found that
“older mayors and council members perceived less conflict than younger mayors; female mayors
and council members perceived more conflict than males; tenure and higher education decreased
the perceived level of conflict; and the more credible or authentic the mayor is the less conflict
council perceived” (Ihrke & Niederjohn, 2005, 455).
Studies of urban planning (see for example Fagin, 1967; Francaviglia, 1996; Ford, 2002;
and Peterson, 2003) indicate that a lack of planning, in the form of a comprehensive plan,
significantly influences the resulting business climate and overall downtown health. Frederic
Law Olmstead was the first to propose the administrative planning agency. In 1909 no such
office existed, and he theorized that the only time planning would work was when city planning
was conceived as a continuous, non-static, process. Olmstead thought that a comprehensive plan
was not a single report, and that it was never finished. The concept of planning, as portrayed in
history, has changed over time. This study examines planning techniques utilized during the last
fifteen years, using the variables of community surveys, market studies, property inventories, and
comprehensive plans. Olmstead also argued that unplanned, quick-fix approaches and largescale catalytic development projects would fail in the long-term if a needs assessment was not

first completed. This is because in many cases communities become enamored with the concept
of large-scale projects before it is determined that there is a real need for the project. Olmstead’s
needs assessment was the forerunner of what we know today as a market analysis. Local leaders
need to market and promote their downtowns’ assets in order to attract visitors and private
investors. Without a market analysis and comprehensive plan, local leaders and citizens may
support a project, but if the market does not support demand for a project, it should not be built
because it will ultimately fail. A market study also assesses a community’s current assets, can
provide information on how to enhance its marketability, and illustrates what type of
complementary attractions should be developed. Many times, a proposed downtown convention
center or movie theater is construed as a panacea that will spark additional investment. Without
the proper planning, the probability of a project failing may result in an overall lack of
coordination and direction for future development.
Due to tight municipal budgets, private investment is crucial in providing additional
funding for downtown development. If conflict erupts, it may cause private developers and
investors to abandon a project, which would serve as a warning to other investors to avoid
business in the community.
Various studies (Robertson, 1999; and Fowler, 1992) have sought to analyze downtown
problems, and then prescribe revitalization strategies. Revitalization strategies can be placed into
two categories: functional and physical.
Functional revitalization strategies are closely associated with providing a means to foster
cooperation and mobilize resources. Examples of functional strategies include the formation of a
non-profit downtown development organization, forging public-private partnerships, and
facilitating university-community partnerships.

Physical strategies address design, architecture, and aesthetics to create a sense of place.
Physical strategies include streetscape and façade improvement programs, open space, arts and
cultural exhibits, waterfront development, zoning ordinances, and design guidelines. It was
found that for a downtown to attract people over time, it needs to be pedestrian friendly and have
a sense of place. A sense of place is difficult to describe since it is largely subjective, but a
definitive sense of place is when a location feels like home and is a place most people want to
frequent and experience. Additionally, a sense of place includes an inviting ambiance that is
created from the elements of architecture, façade and signage, street layout, open space, and the
urban forest that come together to create this perception as a venue for community gatherings.
Many practitioners state that a downtown is best experienced on foot. However, closing the
downtown to traffic was found to be detrimental. Pedestrian traffic serves as a visual stimulus to
those in their automobiles by creating curiosity. Traffic flow into the downtown is important in
making the downtown a destination, rather than having cars simply pass through it. By fostering
activity at the street level, this causes an individual to “want to shop that trendy boutique, eat at
the crowded restaurant, or stop and browse the venders at a festival” (Fowler 1992, 88).
The most successful downtown revitalization strategy frequently cited in the literature is
the Main Street Program. The Main Street program is a four-point approach (design, promotion,
economic restructuring, and organizational development) that requires the hiring of a full-time
downtown manager that oversees revitalization efforts, fosters public-private leadership
capacities, and cultivates resources in order to forge sustainable downtown development. It has
been estimated that 1,200 communities across America have participated in the Main Street
Program. The Main Street Program should not be viewed as a panacea either. In most cases the
program is only instituted after prior conflict has subsided, or in municipalities that exhibit

minute levels of conflict. This is crucial if the downtown manager is to receive full support in
harnessing all available cooperation among stakeholders. All involved must be on the same
page.
Methodology
The small number of analytical research studies that focused on small city downtowns
motivated me to initiate this research to understand why some revitalization efforts are
successful while others fail. A comprehensive study of the downtown revitalization efforts by
the administrations of the four third-class cities in Luzerne County has never been undertaken.
In order to draw a direct connection between the works presented in the literature review
to my four test cities, I specifically crafted two hypotheses. When all stakeholders in a
municipality cooperate on downtown development, then the stakeholders will be more likely to
create and adopt a strategic downtown revitalization plan; and if a municipality creates a
strategic plan for its downtown, then the municipality’s downtown is more likely to experience
sustained economic growth.
In hypothesis one, cooperation among downtown stakeholders is the independent
variable, and strategic planning is the dependent variable. In hypothesis two, strategic planning
becomes the independent variable, and economic growth is the dependent variable. Both
hypotheses are causal and are in a positive direction.
In hypothesis one, the conceptual definition of my independent variable, cooperation, is
downtown stakeholders working together toward a common goal. A stakeholder, as opposed to
its use in a business context, is anyone who has a vested interest in the health of their downtown.
Downtown stakeholders include municipal and county government leaders, downtown
development authorities and organizations, the chamber of commerce, downtown merchants,

private investors and developers, and residents. I operationally define cooperation as
measurements of local newspaper stories for reported evidence of communication between
stakeholders in the form of meetings, conferences, and community survey results.
The conceptual definition of my dependent variable, strategic planning, is a supported
approach that addresses all aspects of development with clearly identifiable and measurable
goals, and contains programs and processes for implementation. There are two variations of the
definition of strategic planning referred to throughout this study, the “supported” and
“unsupported” comprehensive plan. A supported plan is a comprehensive plan that is universally
recognized by all stakeholders as the strategy that identifies downtowns’ strengths and
weaknesses, and as the strategy that will be followed in implementing revitalization initiatives.
An unsupported plan is a strategic plan that is not universally recognized by all stakeholders. An
example of an unsupported strategy is when a downtown development organization or chamber
of commerce prepares its own downtown revitalization plan without the authorization or
recognition of city government or other stakeholders. Unsupported plans may be applicable and
contain a solid strategy, but “unless city government authorizes and initiates the drafting of a
strategic plan, the unsupported plan is artificial in its purpose” (Robertson 2002, 55). Also, no
matter how much planning is independently undertaken by one stakeholder, “if city government
does not recognize these actions, those actions do not become universally accepted and in most
cases a great plan can go unused” (Robertson 2002, 57). As this example illustrates, when city
government builds a consensus among stakeholders and initiates the planning process the
likelihood of a supported plan resulting increases. For the context of this study, strategic
planning is assumed to mean a supported plan. The operational definition of strategic planning
was measured by the presence or absence of a comprehensive plan.

In hypothesis two, strategic planning becomes the independent variable. I kept the same
conceptual and operational definitions for strategic planning that were used in hypothesis one.
The conceptual definition of my dependent variable, economic growth, is a downtown that
demonstrates evidence of new retail businesses and professional offices being built or relocating.
I operationally defined economic growth by measuring primary and secondary economic
indicators in each city. Primary indicators include the estimated number of downtown workers,
total square feet of downtown office space, the percentage of vacant downtown office space, and
the number of retail businesses in operation. Secondary economic indicators include total
population percent change and aggregate revenue in the four municipalities tested. These
indicators will illustrate how downtown health influences a community’s tax base.
Of the four cities studied, Wilkes-Barre was the only municipality to have the primary
downtown economic indicator data recorded. This data came from the 1992 Greater WilkesBarre Partnership Major Office Space Survey and the 2003 Diamond City Partnership
Downtown Wilkes-Barre Strategic Market Development Plan. In the remaining three cities, the
secondary economic indicators and newspaper reports of economic growth were substituted as
the measure for my dependent variable.
The three municipalities that did not record the primary economic indicator data raise a
serious question. If this data is not being recorded, then what criteria do city officials use to
make informed decisions in measuring revitalization goals and in prescribing strategies to
improve the economic health of their downtown? I freely admit that the secondary economic
indicators and population data is not a representative measure of downtown economic health.
However, these aggregate indicators serve as surrogate data in assessing the overall economic
health of a municipality. It is often stated by economic development and urban planning

professionals (Robertson, 1999; and Fowler, 1992) that the downtown contributes a considerable
amount to a community’s tax base. By focusing on total revenue, a measure of economic health
can be inferred. In my analysis of newspaper reports, I supplemented the secondary economic
indicator data with descriptive evidence from business leaders and residents that illustrates an
improvement in downtown economic health. This evidence includes an increase in downtown
activity and entertainment, new businesses opening, number of jobs created from development
projects, as well as a comparative assessment of the downtown to prior years.
The data for this study were collected in the fall 2005 and spring 2006 semesters by
examining local newspaper archives for articles on the topics of downtown revitalization and
downtown development from 1990 to 2005. I then contacted each municipality, chamber of
commerce, and downtown development organization in order to conduct interviews with city
officials on the status of their revitalization initiatives and to gather information on
comprehensive plans, downtown reports, and maps.
Each administration was tested separately for two reasons. First, each administration is
similar in its structure and encountered a declining downtown. Second, from the literature
review, I learned that strategic planning, precipitated by cooperation, is considered the
preeminent strategy for communities to remedy the problems facing their downtown. Data on
the structural features of Pennsylvania local governments came from the Pennsylvania Local
Government Manual. From this publication I determined all four municipalities governing
structures employed a mayor/council type arrangement. One difference encountered in
determining the governing structure, is that the cities of Hazleton and Wilkes-Barre are strongmayor/council systems, while Pittston and Nanticoke are weak-mayor/council systems.

By testing each administration separately, this method presents the history and individual
attitudes toward planning. Also, if each administration is not evaluated separately, it does not
allow for a comprehensive assessment of revitalization activities. All administrations took a
different approach to revitalizing their downtown. It is not reasonable to contribute the activities
of one administration for the conditions that are present because of actions taken by prior
administrations. The time period used for my observation allowed me to apply my hypotheses to
multiple administrations that were in office during the same election cycle.
Population data for the years 1990, 2000, and 2004 came from the United States Census
Bureau. Aggregate municipal tax data was retrieved from the Governor’s Center for Local
Government Services database. At the time of retrieval 2004 and 2005 data were not available.
All amounts were then adjusted for inflation by using the United States Federal Reserve inflation
index.
My purpose for testing the two hypotheses was to determine if the key factors leading to
successful downtown revitalization were present, and whether they influenced the downtown’s
economic health.
Results
Applying my hypotheses to the four test cities yielded the following results:
Hypothesis One
When all stakeholders in a municipality cooperate on downtown development, then the
stakeholders will be more likely to create and adopt a strategic downtown revitalization plan.

Hazleton
The Quigley Administration (1988-1995)
John Quigley was first elected as mayor of the city of Hazleton in 1987, and was
reelected in 1991. There were reports that demonstrated evidence of cooperation among
stakeholders, when the city was awarded a $978,000 low interest loan that aided in the
revitalization of downtown Hazleton. It was cited by Mayor Quigley that “cooperation among
all who had a vested interest in revitalizing this great city were the reason the grants were
awarded.”1 Hazleton was also presented with a two million dollar state grant for downtown
development. The money was used for downtown development, and to update the city’s
comprehensive plan. Downtown revitalization was one of the top priorities reported in the
Mayor’s 1993 State of the City Address.2
There was additional evidence of cooperation reported when the mayor and city council
approved a study for a downtown parking garage. Mayor Quigley said “building a parking
garage is a key project to revitalizing the city by dealing with the problem of a lack of parking in
the downtown district, council and I am actively listening to merchants concerns.”3 The mayor
and city council agreed to apply for a $750,000 state grant that was used for blight removal, as
well as a $150,000 loan for historic preservation.
There were also reports of conflict between Mayor Quigley and one city council member
over a downtown business center project. Mayor-elect and current city councilman, Mike
Marsicano, felt Mayor Quigley was financially benefiting from the development projects taking
place in the city.”4 There were reports of merchants and residents who felt Mayor Quigley’s
actions to revitalize the downtown were working.5 From the reports gathered, it is apparent
throughout the Quigley administration that downtown revitalization and historic preservation

were among his top priorities. However, criticism and conflict seemed to result from a single
councilman, Mike Marsicano. At times, Marsicano’s comments seemed to tarnish the mayor’s
revitalization initiatives. In 1994, city council voted to update the city’s comprehensive plan for
the downtown, and administer a community survey to residents and downtown merchants for
input on the plan. The decision to update to the city’s largely outdated 1980 comprehensive
plan, was found to be reflective of the cooperation among the mayor, city council, residents, and
downtown merchants.6 Based on this evidence, it appears that cooperation and strategic planning
were present. Thus, my hypothesis was confirmed.
The Marsicano Administration (1996-2000)
Mike Marsicano, a former councilman, was elected mayor in 1995. There were reports
that illustrated downtown merchants objected to the new mayor’s comments on the future of
downtown revitalization. It was reported that the mayor wanted to concentrate on developing the
Hazleton Municipal Airport, instead of the downtown.7 There was also evidence that downtown
merchants felt the new mayor was not following the strategies outlined in the updated
comprehensive plan. Instead, the mayor wanted to purchase all blighted buildings and tear them
down. Merchants argued that the mayor’s haphazard plan to tear down buildings was not
discussed with them.8 There was also evidence that the conflict between Mayor Marsicano and
city council over the plan to raze vacant main street buildings, moved U.S. Representative Paul
Kanjorski, to urge the mayor and council “to come together to make something work that is
important to the city’s future.”9
It would appear from reports that the mayor was not cooperating with city council or
downtown merchants on the initiatives established in the comprehensive plan. However, ground
was broken for the downtown parking garage project. My hypothesis was not confirmed.

Conflict was present, but downtown development and historic preservation projects outlined in
the comprehensive plan were conducted.
The Barletta Administration (2000 - present)
Louis Barletta, a former councilman, was elected mayor in 1999, and was reelected in
2003. Newspaper reports revealed examples of cooperation when the newly elected mayor
administered a survey to the chamber of commerce and downtown merchants that sought their
input on future downtown development.10 The results of the survey revealed the need to fix
traffic signals, recruit new businesses, and to construct additional parking spaces. A story on
Mayor Barletta’s first 100 days in office reported that merchants felt the mayor and his
administration were listening to their requests by cooperating with them, as well as the municipal
authority and city council in building a consensus by focusing on revitalizing the downtown with
an update to the 1995 comprehensive plan.11 Merchants felt confident in the job the new mayor
had done so far, and sensed they were close to a downtown renaissance.12
Another example of cooperation among the mayor and downtown merchants occurred
when mayor Barletta visited downtown merchants to check on the progress of the façade
improvement program, and to gather input on future downtown development projects.13 Based
on the evidence I observed, cooperation and strategic planning were present during the Barletta
administration. My hypothesis was confirmed.
Pittston
The Walsh Administration (1981-1997).
Thomas Walsh was the city of Pittston’s four term mayor. During his last two terms,
(1991-1997) newspaper reports about downtown development were sporadic. I relied on
interviews with city officials to understand the political and business climate in the downtown.

From personal interviews, I learned that city leaders recognized the need to plan for the
future in the mid 1980s. With the assistance of generous federal funding, the city drafted a
comprehensive plan in 1987 that not only focused on the downtown, but also addressed a variety
of residential needs including parking, paving, and recreational activities. When asked to
describe the relationship among stakeholders, interviewee said, the “Walsh administration and
the update to the comprehensive plan was the byproduct of cooperation among the mayor,
chamber of commerce, city council, and various city departments.”14
Based on the information uncovered during the interview with a city official, I observed
evidence of cooperation that lead to drafting a comprehensive plan. Thus, my hypothesis was
confirmed.
The Lombardo Administration (1998-2005)
Michael Lombardo was elected in mayor in 1997, and was reelected in 2002.
Newspaper reports revealed the condition of downtown Pittston, which told of blighted buildings
and vacant storefronts.15 During the election campaign, mayoral and city council candidates
presented a twelve-point plan to revitalize the city. 16 The plan consisted of an update to the 1987
comprehensive plan and zoning ordinances, the implementation of façade and streetscape
improvement programs, an update to the property inventory database software, and a survey of
residents and downtown business owners. A survey of residents and merchants during Mayor
Lombardo’s first six months in office revealed evidence of cooperation, with those who lived
and worked in Pittston demonstrating a high approval rating for the strategies the mayor and
council had implemented to revitalize the city.17 Furthermore, I observed evidence of
cooperation when the mayor and city council agreed to apply for the Pennsylvania Main Street
Program.18 From news stories and interviews with city officials, I discovered the Lombardo

Administration exhibited multiple instances of cooperation and an updated comprehensive plan.19
My hypothesis was confirmed.
Nanticoke
The Sokolowski Administration (1987-1993)
Walter Sokolowski was elected mayor in 1987. I found evidence of cooperation during
the Sokolowski Administration when the mayor and city council authorized the Nanticoke
General Municipal Authority to apply for a grant for downtown development.20 Nanticoke
received federal and state grants to build the Kanjorski Center, a 40,000 ft2 multi-tenant office
building in the downtown.21
During the period of the Sokolowski Administration, I observed no evidence of strategic
planning. However, the mayor, council, and municipal authority did exhibit cooperation in
securing funding for the Kanjorski Center. Based on this evidence, my hypothesis was not
confirmed, because we have evidence of cooperation, but an absence of a strategic plan.
The Kobela Administration (1994-1997)
Wasil Kobela, a former Nanticoke police chief, was elected mayor in 1993. I observed
evidence of discontent among those who lived and worked in Nanticoke. Six Months after the
Kanjorski center was completed, it was reported many residents and merchants had a pessimistic
view of the downtown and the new Kanjorski Center because it had not spurred additional
downtown development that was promised by city officials.22 Another story reported that
downtown merchants felt they would not see a downtown renaissance due to a lack of parking,
and that their requests had not been taken into consideration by the new mayor.23 Merchants
cited a 1980 ornamental brick paving project that reduced the number of available off-street

parking spaces by half on Main Street.24 In response, the city created a temporary parking lot
when they razed the vacant State Theater.25
During the Kobela administration, I found no evidence of strategic planning. Conversely,
the mayor, council, and municipal authority did exhibit cooperation by creating a short-term
solution for the downtown parking situation. There was further evidence of downtown
development after the construction of the Kanjorski Center, when the Nanticoke Municipal
Authority purchased six properties for its revitalization project.26 No reference was made to a
downtown plan. I learned during a recent interview with city officials that the city of Nanticoke
never had a downtown revitalization plan.27 During the Kobela administration, there were few
reports of conflict between city council, the mayor, and municipal authority. I observed conflict
among the city officials and downtown merchants over the need for additional parking. In
response, the city created a commission to study the feasibility of a downtown parking garage
and created a temporary parking lot. Based on this evidence, I observed cooperation in shortterm problem solving, but a lack of strategic planning. My hypothesis was not confirmed.
The Toole Administration (1997-2005)
John Toole was elected mayor in 1997 and was reelected in 2001. During the Toole
administration, cooperation was observed among the mayor, city council, and the Nanticoke
Municipal Authority over the need for a comprehensive plan, but a plan never resulted.28 There
was also conflict present among the mayor, city council, and the municipal authority over a plan
to recruit businesses to the downtown.29 Further evidence of conflict emerged when two
members of the Nanticoke Municipal Authority resigned because of a lack of communication
between the mayor and authority. They also claimed that the reason the downtown was in poor
health was due to a lack of planning downtown development projects.30

Evidence of a lack of cooperation between the city and the Kanjorski Center’s tenant,
Health Now, was observed during the later portion of the Toole administration when the
Medicare claims processing company wanted to expand operations.31 A spokesperson for Health
Now cited that both the city and the municipal authority had not replied to its requests for more
parking. The company said it would leave if its requests were not taken seriously. 32
Multiple examples of conflict and a lack of communication among the mayor, city
council, municipal authority, a State Representative, and a U.S. Congressman were observed in
the later years of Mayor Toole’s term.33 It was reported that State Representative John Yudichak
and U.S. Representative Paul Kanjorski, both from Nanticoke, were at odds concerning
downtown development due to a past feud.34 Evidence of a lack of communication and
cooperation was observed when city officials accused the municipal authority of holding
repeated closed-door meetings..35 City officials said “they do not know what downtown
development programs the city has access to, the financial status of grants, or the status of any of
its projects.”36
I did not observe evidence of strategic planning, but an attempt was made by
representatives of the South Valley Partnership to join with the Nanticoke Municipal Authority
to hire an urban planner and draft a regional comprehensive plan, but the municipal authority
dismissed the idea.37 During the Toole administration, I observed multiple instances of conflict
among the mayor, city council, the South Valley Partnership, state and federal representatives,
and municipal authority. Based on evidence of conflict found during the Toole administration,
and the absence of a strategic plan, my hypothesis was confirmed: conflict resulted in a lack of
strategic planning.

Wilkes-Barre
The Namey Administration (1987-1995)
Lee Namey, a high school art teacher, was elected to two terms as mayor of the city of
Wilkes-Barre. I found evidence of conflict during the Namey administration with reports of
internal conflict among city council and the city administrator over a proposed plan to renovate
the downtown.38 Further evidence of conflict was observed during when the mayor wanted to
bring a museum to the downtown, but the proposal did not receive support from city council to
pursue funding for a feasibility study.39 I also observed evidence of internal conflict between the
mayor and city council in a report that summed up the mayor’s two terms, and how conflict with
city council hindered the attraction of businesses to the downtown.40
I did not observe evidence of strategic planning during the Namey administration, but
there was evidence of planning undertaken by the Wilkes-Barre Chamber of Commerce with
their Downtown Wilkes-Barre Redevelopment Plan in 1992. However, the plan was not adopted
by the city. Based on evidence collected during the Namey administration, I found multiple
examples of conflict, and an absence of strategic planning. My hypothesis was confirmed
because conflict between the mayor and council inhibited strategic planning.
The McGroarty Administration (1996-2003)
Thomas McGroarty was elected to two terms as mayor of the city of Wilkes-Barre.
There was evidence of cooperation among city officials and the chamber of commerce reported
when Mayor McGroarty and Steve Barrouk traveled to Burlington, Vermont to study a model for
the revitalization of downtown Wilkes-Barre.41 Later in his term, there was evidence of conflict
reported among city officials and downtown business owners. Merchants felt the McGroarty
administration was not responsive to their needs for a better downtown, which included better

lighting, more parking, and more frequent police patrols.42 Additional evidence of conflict was
reported among the mayor, city council, and the chamber of commerce when the mayor was
criticized for his confrontational, go-it-alone approach by merchants and residents.43
Little evidence of cooperation during the McGroarty administration was discovered.44
I read numerous articles that illustrated an increased awareness for the need to revitalize the
downtown.45 However, these reports were accompanied by an increase in conflict between the
mayor and the chamber of commerce; these included the mayor not answering chamber or city
council’s questions about proposed downtown development projects, and the status of the stalled
downtown movie theater project.46 Lack of communication between the mayor and the chamber
was apparent when the chamber of commerce took out a full-page advertisement in a local
newspaper explaining its position on downtown revitalization initiatives to the mayor.47
Strategic planning during the McGroarty administration appears to have been absent.48
However, 2001 saw the formation of the Diamond City Partnership, a non-profit downtown
revitalization organization.49 Soon after its formation, the Diamond City Partnership held a
series of four visioning sessions that were designed to bring residents, merchants, city officials,
the chamber of commerce, and downtown development professionals together to formulate a
revitalization strategy.50 It appeared the participation of Mayor McGroarty was uncertain.51
Evidence of conflict was apparent at the conclusion of the last session when four groups emerged
with differing strategies to revitalize the downtown.52 In 2003, the Downtown Wilkes-Barre
Strategic Market Development Study was released, which was a comprehensive analysis of the
downtown market and its governance.53 Evidence of a comprehensive plan was not present.
Based on evidence collected during the McGroarty administration, I found multiple
examples of conflict among the mayor, city council, downtown merchants, residents, and the

chamber of commerce. Strategic planning was also absent.54 My hypothesis was confirmed,
because conflict produced no plans.
The Leighton Administration (2004 - Present)
Thomas Leighton, the owner of a real estate and insurance company, was elected mayor
in 2003. There were reports that indicated evidence of cooperation among the newly elected
mayor and city council. City officials agreed that the 1974 comprehensive plan and other
planning documents were outdated. In response, city officials voted to update the
comprehensive plan, amend zoning regulations, and authorized the Diamond City Partnership to
draft a downtown revitalization plan. Evidence of cooperation appeared in a report that
illustrated residents, the chamber, and downtown merchants supported Mayor Leighton’s vision
for the future of the city.55 In the summer of 2005, Mayor Leighton delivered his “I Believe”
speech to stakeholders. There appeared to be conflicting evidence as to whether the citizens
supported the mayor’s revitalization visions.56
I found evidence of support for strategic planning, when city officials voted to update the
1974 comprehensive plan and draft a downtown revitalization plan. It should be noted that the
city never had a downtown revitalization plan. In addition, during the initial years of the
Leighton administration, I found multiple instances of cooperation among the mayor, city
council, and chamber of commerce on downtown development issues and solutions. My
hypothesis was confirmed.
Hypothesis Two
If a municipality engages in strategic planning, then the municipality’s downtown is more
likely to experience economic growth. The primary indicators of downtown economic growth
were not recorded by the chamber of commerce or the governments of Hazleton, Pittston, and

Nanticoke. Therefore, I collected newspaper reports, aggregate revenue data, and population
data to use as surrogate indicators of economic activity. Kent Robertson (1999, 2002) has stated
in numerous articles that the downtown contributes a considerable amount to a community’s tax
base. The links among these indicators present an overall view of the economic exchanges and
health of each municipality.
Population statistics are also an important economic indicator. If a significant population
loss occurs, it may be credited to the death of the elderly population or a loss of young educated
workers. Population losses due to a lack of employment opportunities serve as an indicator of
economic health. The Brookings Institution’s 2004 study, A Competitive Agenda for Renewing
Northeastern Pennsylvania cited Northeastern Pennsylvania as having the largest population loss
of those 18 to 34 years of age during the last decade. I supplemented the population and
aggregate revenue data with information of economic conditions and job creation reported in
local newspapers.
Hazleton
The Quigley Administration (1988-1995)
The Quigley administration exhibited evidence of strategic planning when an update was
made to the comprehensive plan in 1995. I observed evidence of economic development in the
downtown district when a total of four million dollars in grants from the state and county were
awarded for downtown revitalization projects. Newspapers reported that theses initiatives were
the first downtown development in Hazleton in 30 years.57 This news story also illustrated a plan
to construct a seven story office and retail building, as well as an intermodal transportation
center, plus historic preservation of the Markle Building, which is the tallest building in
Hazleton.58 It was estimated that the projects would create 500 additional jobs in the

downtown.59 Strategic planning and funding for of economic development projects was present.
Therefore, my hypothesis was confirmed.
The Marsicano Administration (1996-2000)
A comprehensive plan was in place during the Marsicano administration. When Mayor
Marsicano took office many revitalization projects started by mayor Quigley were in the process
of construction. There were reports of the mayor focusing on developing the Hazleton
Municipal Airport and development of the Humboldt Industrial Park, instead of following the
plan meant for the downtown.60 Based on this evidence, strategic planning and the construction
of development projects were present, my hypothesis was confirmed.
The Barletta Administration (2000- present)
During the Barletta administration, an update to the 1995 comprehensive plan was made
in 2000. Evidence of economic development was observed in reports that compared the
declining downtown of the early 1990s to the renaissance that took place during Mayor
Barletta’s first term.61 A news story told of an increase in the downtown business occupancy
rate from 60% in 1998 to 90% in 2004.62
Over the past two decades, Hazleton’s population of Hispanic-Americans has increased
dramatically. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, Hispanic-Americans composed five percent
of Hazleton’s total population in 2000. Hazleton’s Hispanic-American population has played a
key role in revitalizing the downtown. It was reported in 2004 that there were 250 Hispanicowned businesses in the downtown.63 Based on this evidence, strategic planning and the
description of a revitalized downtown confirmed my hypothesis.
From 1990 to 2004 Hazleton’s population decreased by ten percent. (see Table 1) In
addition, Hazleton’s revenue increased three percent from 1990 to 2000, and 71% from 2000 to

2004. (see Table 2) This data would appear to confirm the reports of economic growth from
1990 to 2005.
Pittston
The Walsh Administration (1981-1997)
As mentioned earlier, reports during the Walsh administration were sporadic. Based on
information gathered from an interview with a city official, Pittston drafted a comprehensive
plan in 1987 with the full cooperation of stakeholders.64 I learned the city had completed most of
the city-wide initiatives outlined in the plan by the mid 1990s. I then asked city officials to
describe some examples of economic growth that took place during the Walsh administration.
Examples included a dress factory converted into a professional center on main street, an Insalco
Supermarket that was converted into office and retail space, and construction of a downtown
building that housed a Dollar General and a gym. Evidence of businesses that relocated to
downtown Pittston included a dance studio, and the headquarters of Landmark Bank and Joyce
Insurance. It was estimated by one city official that the development activities during the Walsh
administration created 160 jobs in the downtown.65
Based on my interview with a city official, the Walsh Administration adopted a strategic
plan that led to development projects and an increase of economic growth in the downtown.
This evidence confirmed my hypothesis.
The Lombardo Administration (1998-2005)
During the Lombardo administration, the city of Pittston updated its comprehensive plan
in 1998. Primary economic indicator data was not available. Evidence of economic
development was observed in reports that illustrated a stagnant downtown business district lined
with vacant buildings.66 There were reports that illustrated how the revitalization programs

outlined in the 1998 comprehensive plan have attracted new businesses to the downtown.67 I
found that strategic planning was present, which resulted in businesses relocating to the
downtown. My hypothesis was confirmed.
From 1990 to 2004 Pittston’s population declined 18%. (see Table 1) From 1990 to
2000, Pittston’s total revenue increased 117%, but decreased to 14% from 2000 to 2003. (see
Table 3) This data would appear to confirm the reports of economic growth during the period
from 1990 to 2005.
Nanticoke
The Sokolowski Administration (1987-1993)
Strategic planning was not observed during the Sokolowski administration. Primary
economic indicator data for the city of Nanticoke was not available. There were reports of
economic development during this period with the construction of Kanjorski Center.68 The
project created 300 jobs in the downtown.69 Based on this evidence, strategic planning was not
present, while economic development was present. My hypothesis was not confirmed.
The Kobela Administration (1994-1996)
Strategic planning was not observed during the Kobela administration. There were
reports of economic development activity that resulted in an increase of eight Pennsylvania
Department of Labor jobs in the Kanjorski Center.70 There were also reports of the city
purchasing downtown properties due to a natural gas explosion that severely damaged four
buildings during the summer of 1993. It was reported the damaged downtown properties were to
be developed into retail space, “yet no plan for the properties had been solidified as of yet”, said
Municipal Authority, Chair Charles Margelewicz.71

Based on this evidence, strategic planning was not present, but there was evidence of
eight jobs created in the downtown. My hypothesis was confirmed, because there was no
strategic planning and a lack of job creation after the construction of the Kanjorski Center.
The Toole Administration (1997-2005)
Strategic planning was not observed during the Toole administration, as the city has
never had a market study conducted or a comprehensive plan drafted. However, there was an
attempt made by members of the South Valley Partnership to join the Nanticoke Municipal
Authority to draft a regional economic development and comprehensive plan, but the proposal
was rejected. There were reports that the city was advised by the state to hire a downtown
planner. In addition, Nanticoke Councilwoman, Yvonne Bozinski said, “that the seemingly
haphazard selection of developers and development sites in the economically flagging downtown
without a general overall plan is cause for concern.”73 Furthermore, Governor Ed Rendell said
“that the state will not invest anymore money in Nanticoke until it gets its financials in order and
a comprehensive plan in place.”74 It was reported that the city needed to have a comprehensive
plan in place by May 2005, or it would lose a $1.5 million dollar federal grant.”75
There was evidence of economic growth with the construction of two new pharmacies
and a new grocery store in the downtown. I estimate that an additional 150 jobs were created.
Conversely, it was reported that additional attempts were made for economic development with
the proposed construction of a multi-story parking garage and retail space that could have created
an additional 120 jobs to the downtown.76 Reports illustrated the city lost an estimated 300 jobs,
when the Kanjorski Center’s main tenant, Health Now, terminated its lease. Representatives
from Health Now claimed the city was unresponsive to its needs. The building is currently 89%
vacant, and is costing the Nanticoke Municipal Authority $33,000 a month to operate.

Based on the evidence observed, strategic planning was not present. Nanticoke also
encountered a net loss of 150 jobs during the Toole administration. My hypothesis was
confirmed, because the absence of strategic planning caused economic decline and job loss.
From 1990 to 2004 the population of Nanticoke decreased by 15%. (see Table 1)
Nanticoke’s total revenue increased 40% from 1990 to 2003. (see Table 4 ) Data for the year
2000 was not available. Due to a projected three million dollar deficit, city officials were
reviewing a decision to declare Nanticoke a financially distressed city under Act 47. Tax rates in
the city were raised to their highest amounts. Although this data would appear to confirm the
reports of economic growth during the period of 1990 to 2005, the true economic impact of the
vacant Kanjorski Center will not be known until the end of the 2006 fiscal year.
Wilkes-Barre
The Namey Administration (1987-1995)
Strategic planning was not observed during the Namey administration. There was little
reported evidence of economic development in the downtown. One report told of PNC Bank
relocating to Scranton. Downtown merchants commented that residents have little reason to go
downtown, and criticized the mayor for worrying about downtown aesthetics rather than
attracting businesses.77 Council president Thomas Leighton said, “the downtown is a
deteriorating relic of the past, something needs to be done to save it before it is too late.”78 Lack
of a strategic planning and reports of a downtown littered with vacant storefronts, confirmed my
hypothesis.

The McGroarty Administration (1996-2003)
Strategic planning was not observed during the McGroarty administration. Yet, there
was a visioning session held in 2001, and a downtown market study completed in 2003.
Economic growth was evident in the relocation of Alltel and Commonwealth Telephone to the
downtown. The relocation brought 350 jobs to the downtown.79
In testing my first hypothesis, the McGroarty Administration exhibited multiple instances
of conflict among the mayor, chamber of commerce, residents, downtown merchants, and city
council. However, economic development projects and jobs were created in the downtown. By
looking at the downtown economic health indicator data from 1992 to 2003, I found an increase
of 20% in the estimated number of downtown workers, a 97% increase in total office space, but a
three percent decrease in the number of downtown retail businesses. From 1992 to 2003 vacant
office space increased 18%. (see Table 5) From 1990 to 2004, the population of Wilkes-Barre
declined by 13%. From 1990 to 2000, Wilkes-Barre’s total revenue increased 48%. From 2000
to 2003 total revenue decreased 19%. (see Table 6) It appears that the downtown is
experiencing economic and workforce growth, while the overall population of the city is
declining. Based on both qualitative and quantitative evidence, my hypothesis was not
confirmed, because there was an absence of planning, but economic growth occurred.
The Leighton Administration (2004-Present)
Strategic planning was observed during the Leighton administration when city council
and the mayor voted to update the comprehensive plan, and commissioned the Diamond City
Partnership to draft a downtown revitalization plan. The city of Wilkes-Barre had not updated its
comprehensive plan since 1974. Strategic planning in 1974 was in response to the devastation
caused by Hurricane Agnes. This thirty-year gap in strategic planning is “believed to be caused

by the political realignment in Wilkes-Barre that took place following the devastating flood
caused by Hurricane Agnes” (Baldino, Hepp & Wolenski, 2004). As stated in hypothesis one,
Wilkes-Barre’s political history was rife with conflict, “being one of the few American cities to
experience the commission, city manager, and strong mayor forms of governance” (Baldino,
Hepp & Wolenski, 2004). During an interview with a city official I posed the question of why
there was an absence of planning. The elected official cited the conflict-oriented past
administrations, and a political culture was resistant to change.80 Furthermore, the chamber of
commerce drafted a downtown revitalization plan in 1992, but prior city administrations never
adopted it. All downtown development prior to the Leighton administration was unplanned.81
There were reports of economic growth when Mayor Leighton outlined the advancements
of downtown businesses with the opening of the chamber-owned Innovation Center in 2004, the
expanding of Guard Insurance Group, and the opening of the Pennsylvania Department of Labor
office.82 Mayor Leighton also stated that “he had solid funding and a committed tenant for the
construction of the downtown movie theater, which also includes housing and retail space.” 83
These activities were expected to result in the creation of 650 jobs in the downtown. I observed
evidence of strategic planning and affirmation of economic growth, which confirmed my
hypothesis.
Discussion of Findings
By clustering the results of my hypotheses, a clear pattern to compare the outcomes
emerges. (see Tables 7 & 8) In hypothesis one, I found that administrations that exhibited
evidence of cooperation, facilitated the updating and adoption of a strategic plan. In hypothesis
two, I found that the same administrations that confirmed hypothesis one, also encountered an
increase in economic growth. As expected, I observed confirmation of both hypotheses in the

Quigley, Barletta, Walsh, Lombardo, and Leighton administrations. Also as anticipated, my
hypotheses were negatively confirmed. I found that if conflict was present and a strategic plan
was not drafted, the downtown experienced economic decline and job loss. This finding was
observed in the Namey and Toole administrations.
Research on public-private partnerships (Robertson, 2002) indicated that healthy
downtowns are the result of sustainable partnerships. By mobilizing both human and financial
capital, the probability of drafting and adopting a comprehensive plan increases. Literature on
urban planning (Fagin, 1967; Francaviglia, 1996; Ford, 2002; and Peterson, 2003) explains that
communities that conduct market studies, inventory land use, seek public input, and update their
comprehensive plans, increase the probability of revitalizing their downtown and generating
sustained economic growth. I found these two theories to validate my observations of the
administrations that confirmed both hypotheses.
My observation of the Marsicano and McGroarty administrations were found to be
anomalies. It appears that the conflict-oriented Marsicano administration inherited the prosperity
produced by the planning activities of the prior administration. In contrast, the McGroarty
administration did exhibit evidence conflict and an absence of strategic planning, but the
downtown still experienced economic growth. From my observations, it appears that city
council and the chamber of commerce facilitated workforce development and recruitment of
businesses, in defiance of Mayor McGroarty’s criticisms. In both the Marsicano and McGroarty
administrations, conflict was present, but economic growth occurred because of prior or external
planning activities.
The findings for the Sokolowski and Kobela administrations were also unique. The
Sokolowski administration demonstrated that cooperation, not strategic planning led to short-

term economic growth occurring in the downtown. Strategic planning, land use inventories,
market analyses, and public input were absent during the Sokolowski and Kobela
administrations. From my observations, it appears the construction of the Kanjorski Center was
anticipated by city officials to generate additional downtown development. Eleven years after its
construction, the Kanjorski Center now sits vacant, and is costing the Nanticoke Municipal
Authority $32,000 per month to operate.
Research on urban planning indicated that unplanned, quick-fix approaches and largescale catalytic development projects will ultimately fail if a market analysis and strategic plan are
not first completed. Additional research also indicated that private investment, not public
ownership of development projects, is crucial if projects are to be financially sustainable in the
long-term. My findings support this theory.
Conclusions
To conclude, the contemporary problems facing the downtowns located in Luzerne
County are not insurmountable. In my analysis I sought to answer the question why some
downtown revitalization efforts were more successful than others. From my findings I found
that administrations that exhibited cooperation and embarked on strategic planning activities,
experienced sustained economic growth; administrations that exhibited cooperation in spite of
strategically plan, experienced short-term economic growth; and administrations that
experienced conflict and had strategic planning activities occur externally, saw an increase in
economic growth.
I also learned from earlier research conducted that strategic planning cannot occur in
absence of a written plan. In the literature review, I did not find reference to an unwritten
strategic plan. Municipalities can, however, plan in the short-term. The majority of practitioners

agree that most short-term problems have long-term consequences if not properly planned.84 The
Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development (2001) states in its
planning guidelines, that a statement of community development goals and objectives must be
provided in a written document.
My main audience for this study was the Political Science Department at WilkesUniversity. That is not to say that city and county officials, and economic development
practitioners could learn valuable lessons from this study. My research and analysis provided
valuable insight into past and present situations facing the cities of Luzerne County in their quest
to revitalize their downtowns. Therefore, cooperation and strategic planning significantly impact
a community’s downtown economic health. From the theories presented and confirmation of my
findings, it becomes apparent that the adage holds true—there are those who fail to plan and
those who plan to fail.

Tables and Figures
Table 1: Municipal Population Data Percent Change 1990-2004.

City
Hazleton
Nanticoke
Pittston
W-B

1990-2000
-6%
-11%
-14%
-9%

2000-2004
-4%
-4%
-4%
-4%

Source: Data taken from United States Census Bureau
American Fact Finder. Summary File 1.
<http://factfinder.census.gov/>.

1990-2004
-10%
-15%
-18%
-13%

Table 2: City of Hazleton Aggregate Tax Information.

Year Of Data

Total Revenue*

Percent Change

2003
2000
1990

$21,186,465
$12,382,988
$12,075,694

71%
3%

Source: Data taken from Local Government Financial
Statistics. Governors Center for Local Government
Services. 2005.
<http://cax.agsci.win.psu.edu/CAXDRLOCGov.asp.>.
*Amounts adjusted for inflation.

Table 3: City of Pittston Aggregate Tax Information.

Year Of Data

TOTAL
REVENUE*

2003
2000
1990

$6,579,727
$7,679,406
$3,549,395

Percent Change

-14%
117%

Source: Data taken from Local Government Financial
Statistics. Governors Center for Local Government
Services. 2005.

Table 4: City of Nanticoke Aggregate Tax Information.

Year Of Data

TOTAL REVENUE*

Percent Change

2003
2000
1990

$4,762,329

40%
NA

NA
$3,406,984

Source: Data taken from Local Government Financial Statistics.
Governors Center for Local Government Services. 2005.

Table 5: City of Wilkes-Barre Downtown Health Indicators 1992-2003.

Indicator
Estimated Number of Downtown Workers
Total Multi-Tenant Office Space sq. ft.
Office Vacancy %
Retail Businesses in Operation

1992
10,000
864,855
9.00%
200

2003
12,000
1.7Million
27.00%
195

Source: Data taken from "Major Office Space Survey." 1992. Greater
Wilkes-Barre Partnership (February): 1-6; "Strategic Market Development
Plan for Downtown Wilkes-Barre." 2003. Diamond City Partnership (May).

%
Change
20%
97%
18%
-3%

Table 6: City of Wilkes-Barre Aggregate Tax Information.

Year Of Data

TOTAL REVENUE*

Percent Change

2003
2000
1990

$41,961,931
$51,601,019
$34,778,412

-19%
48%

Source: Data taken from Local Government Financial Statistics.
Governors Center for Local Government Services. 2005.


Table 7. Comparative Results for Hypothesis One.
IV

Yes

DV

No

Yes
Quigley (H)
Barletta (H)
Walsh (P)
Lombardo (P)
Leighton (W-B)

No
Marsicano (H)

Sokolowski (N)
Kobela (N)

Namey (W-B)
McGroarty (W-B)
Toole (N)

H = Hazleton, P = Pittston, N = Nanticoke, W-B = Wilkes-Barre


Table 8. Comparative Results for Hypothesis Two.
IV

Yes

DV

No

Yes
Quigley (H)
Marsicano (H)
Barletta(H)
Walsh (P)
Lombardo (P)
Leighton (W-B)

No
Sokolowski (N)
McGroarty(W-B)

Kobela (N)
Toole(N)
Namey (W-B)

H = Hazleton, P = Pittston, N = Nanticoke, W-B = Wilkes-Barre


Notes
1.

The Times Leader. 1993. “Hazleton Restoration.” 19 June. p. 3A.

2.

The Times Leader. 1993. “The State of Hazleton.” 24 January. p. 14A.

3.

The Times Leader. 1994. “Hazleton Sets Study of Parking.” 26 November. p. 3A.

4.

The Times Leader. 1995. “Downtown Nearing Crossroads Out-of-Town Development.”
17 September. p. 3A.

5.

The Times Leader. 1995. “Witness to Hazleton’s History Recalls Downtown’s heyday.”

6.

Barletta, Louis. 2006. Personal interview by author. Hazleton City Hall, PA. 31 March.

7.

The Times Leader .1996. “Merchants Object to Mayor’s Comments About Downtown.”
31 March. p. 3A.

8.

The Times Leader. 1997. “Hazleton Mayor’s Demolition Idea Baffles Owners, Officials
Say the Plan was Not Discussed with Them.” 5 July. p. 3A.

9.

The Times Leader. 1997. “Kanjorski Urges Cooperation for Development.” 13 July.
p.1A.

10.

TheTimes Leader. 2000. “Merchants' Input Sought on Boosting Downtown Hazleton.” 1
April. p. 2B.

11.

The Times Leader. 2000. “Downtown Hazleton’s Rebirth Near.” 30 January. P. 3A.

12.

The Times Leader. 2000. “Confidence Still Reigns High on Hazleton Hiring A
Downtown Manager to Direct Revitalization.” 23 January. p. 3A.

13.

The Times Leader. 2005. “Hazleton Gets Some New Life: Redevelopment Programs
Help to Turn the City Around.” 24 April. p. 3A.

14.

Mullarkey, Jerry. 2006. Personal interview by author. Pittston City Hall, PA. 20
January.

15.

The Times Leader. 1997. “Pittston Mayoral Candidate Envisions New Downtown.”
30 April. p. 3A.

16.

The Times Leader. 1997. “Pittston Mayoral Candidate wants to Rid Decay,
Deterioration.” 12 October. p.3A.

17.
18.

The Times Leader. 1998. “Pittston’s New Mayor Draws Praise.” 12 July. p. 3A.
The Times Leader. 2003. “Pittston to Revitalize Downtown.” 18 December. p.12A.

19.

Lombardo, Michael. 2006. Personal interview by author. Wilkes-Barre Chamber of
Commerce, PA. 31 March.

20.

The Times Leader. 1993. “Loan Pushes Nanticoke Plan Forward.” 20 April. p. 3A.

21.

The Times Leader. 1993. “Travelers Data Office Could Bring 300 Jobs.” 14 January.
p. 3A.

22.

The Times Leader. 1994. “Wanted: A Bustling Nanticoke Now.” 4 November. p. 1D.

23.

The Times Leader. 1995. “Nanticoke Parking Elicits Complaints.” 1 April 1. p. 3A.

24.

The Times Leader. 1994. “A Quiet boom.” 2 January. p. 2F.

25.

The Times Leader. 1996. “Nanticoke Officials Plan for More Parking.”
12 April. p. 3A.

26.

The Times Leader. 1996. “Authority to Buy Six City-Owned Properties for
Revitalzation Plan.” 23 January. p. 3A.

27.

Bushko, John. 2006. Personal interview by author. Nanticoke City Hall, PA.
13 February.

28.

The Times Leader. 2005. “Councilwoman: Downtown Needs a Plan, Nanticoke:
Sporadic Redevelopment Efforts are Cause for Concern, Planner is
Advised.”
3 March. p. 3A.
29.

The Times Leader. 1999. “Nanticoke Factions at Odds Over Possible Jobs.” 28 July.
p. 3A.

30.

The Times Leader. 2001. “Chairman, Member of Nanticoke General Municipal
Authority Quit.” 17 July. p. 15A.

31.

The Times Leader. 2000. “Decision Could Cost Nanticoke 300 Jobs.” 12 February.
p. 1A.

32.

The Times Leader. 2004. “Resignations Disable Nanticoke Municipal Authority.”

33.

Skrapits, Elizabeth. 2006. “Nanticoke Officials Bicker.” The Citizens’ Voice,
5 February.

34.

The Times Leader. 2005. “Yudichak Rebukes Kanjorski.” 20 February. p. 1A.

35.

Skrapits, Elizabeth. 2005. “Nanticoke Wants Answers from Authority.” The Citizens’
Voice. 24 February.

36.

The Times Leader. 2005. “Controversy Pits Toole vs. Authority.” 9 January. p. 3A.

37.

Advised.”
3 March. p. 3A.
38.

The Times Leader. 1993. “Business District Pleads for Repair.” 23 April. p. 3A.

39.

The Times Leader. 1995. “Museum Plan No Hit with Council.” 26 April. p. 11A.

40.

The Times Leader. 1995. “Publicity Pros Urge Wilkes-Barre to do its Homework A
Little Mental Elbow Grease Regenerates Life in A City if the Focus is
Long-term
Selling Points -- Not Quick Fixes, Experts Say.” 16 December. p.
1A.
41.

The Times Leader. 1996. “Mayor to Tour Growth in Burlington, VT.” 16 April. p. 3A.

42.

The Times Leader. 1999. “W-B Chamber Rips McGroarty.” 22 December. p.1A.

43.

The Times Leader. 2001. “McGroarty not Delivering, Chamber Complains.” 18 March.
p. 3A.

44.

The Times Leader. 2002. “No Arguing McGroarty Means Well.” 15 August. p. 3A.

45.

The Times Leader. 2000. “Remaking the Downtown McGroarty: Savior or Saboteur?
Mayor’s Go-it-Alone Approach Draws Fire as well as Respect.” 23
January.
p. 1A.


46.

The Times Leader. 2001. “Developer Criticizes McGroarty: Mayor Won’t Give
Answers about Theater.” 31 January. p. 1A.

47.

The Times Leader. 2001. “Chamber’s Ad Takes Issue with McGroarty.” 17 April.
p. 1A.

48.

The Times Leader. 2001. “Public Input Sought on Downtown Wilkes-Barre.”
19 January. p. 1B

49.

The Times Leader. 2001. “Future of W-B’s Downtown in All Our Hands.” 4 February.
p. 3A.

50.

The Times Leader. 2001. “Four Meetings That Could Save Wilkes-Barre.”
28 January. p. 3A.

51.

The Times Leader. 2001. “Planners Wonder: Is McGroarty In or Out.” 30 January.
p. 1A.

52.

The Times Leader. 2001. “Adjourning into a Limbo of Indecision.” 29 March. p. 9A.

53.

The Times Leader. 2003. “An Attitude Adjustment Can Only Help Downtown.”
29 May. p. 7A.

54.

The Times Leader. 2003. “Lame-Duck Mayor Takes His Ball, Goes Home.”
30 December. p. 3A.

55.

The Times Leader. 2004. “Revitalization won’t Come Through City Hall Alone, Expert
Says, Private and Public Sectors Implored to Strike Balance That will
Redefine
what a Downtown is all About.” 2 March. p. 3A.
56.

The Times Leader. 2005. “More Than Just Belief: Leighton Criticized for His "I
BELIEVE" Campaign, Wilkes-Barre’s Mayor Gets Specific.” 29 June. p.

1A.
57.

The Times Leader. 1993. “The State of Hazleton.” 24 January. p. 14A.

58.

The Times Leader. 1993. “Hazleton Restoration.” 19 June. p. 3A.

59.

The Times Leader. 1995. “Downtown Nearing Crossroads Out-of-Town Development.”

60.

The Times Leader. 1997. “Hazleton Mayor’s Demolition Idea Baffles Owners, Officials
Say the Plan was Not Discussed with Them.” 5 July. p. 3A.

61.

The Times Leader. 2000. “Downtown Hazleton’s Rebirth Near.” 30 January. p. 3A.


62.

The Times Leader. 2005. “Hazleton Gets Some New Life: Redevelopment Programs
Help to Turn the City Around.” 24 April. p. 3A.

63.

The Times Leader. 2004. “Hispanics Cashing In on Hazleton.” 19 December. p. 2D.

64.

Mullarkey, Jerry. 2006. Personal interview by author. Pittston City Hall, PA.
20 January.

65.

Mullarkey, Jerry. 2006. Personal interview by author. Pittston City Hall, PA.
20 January.

66.

The Times Leader. 1997. “Pittston Mayoral Candidate Envisions New Downtown.”
30 April. p. 3A.

67.
68.

The Times Leader. 2003. “Pittston on the Rise, Mayor and Businesspeople Attempt to
Breathe Life Back Into the City.” 21 December. p. 1D.
The Times Leader. 1994. “Wanted: A Bustling Nanticoke Now.” 4 November. p. 1D.

69.

The Times Leader. 1994. “A Quiet boom.” 2 January. p. 2F.

70.

The Times Leader. 1995. “Job Center Makes Smooth Transaction Into New Building.”
1 February. p. 1A.

71.

The Times Leader. 1996. “Authority to Buy Six City-Owned Properties for
Revitalzation Plan.” 23 January. p. 3A.

72.

Bushko, John. 2006. Personal interview by author. Nanticoke City Hall, PA.
13 February.

73.

Advised.”
3 March. p. 3A.
74.

Skrapits, Elizabeth. 2004. “Nanticoke Ready for Fresh Start.” The Citizens’ Voice,
8 August .

75.

Fox, Jon. 2005. “Turf War Dividing Nanticoke.” The Times Leader, 19 March.

76.

Skrapits, Elizabeth. 2005. “Nanticoke Authority Outlines Building Project, Legal
Action.” The Citizens’ Voice, 15 September.

77.

The Times Leader. 1995. “W-B Needs Identity, Observers Say.” 14 December. p. 28A.

78.

The Times Leader. 1993. “Core City Renewal Proposed.” 29 November. p. 18A.

79.

The Times Leader. 2000. “Mystery Tenant Revealed Commonwealth Telephone
Enterprises will Bring 350 Jobs to a Downtown Wilkes-Barre Building in
Boost for the City’s Economy.” 17 May. p. 1A.

a
80.

Leighton, Thomas. 2006. Personal Interview by author. Wilkes-Barre City Hall, PA.
12 April.

81.

The Times Leader. 1996. “Shelved W-B Plan Revived Key to Wilkes-Barre’s Future
Might Have Lain Unused for Years.” 27 March. p.1A.

82.

Allabaugh, Denise. 2005. “Leighton: Things Looking Up for Wilkes-Barre.”
The Citizens’ Voice, 16 April.

83.

The Times Leader. 2004. “Wilkes-Barre Government, Leighton: Give me 10 Years.”
14 November. p. 3A.

84.

Land Use Workshop. 2006. Regional Economic Indicators Forum. Pittston, PA.
25 April.


Bibliography
Baldino, Thomas J., Hepp, John, and Wolenski, Robert. 2004. Natural Disaster and
Municipal Reform: The Case of Wilkes-Barre in the Aftermath of the 1972 Agnes Flood.
Wilkes University: Work in progress.
This paper discuses the evolution of city government in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, and
the changes that took place in the post-Agnes era. Most relevant is the dialogue about the
conflict-oriented political culture in not only Wilkes-Barre, but also in Luzerne County, and the
political realignment that took place following the Agnes disaster.
Ford, Larry R. 2003. America’s New Downtowns: Revitalization or Reinvention?
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
This book discusses what factors compose a successful downtown. This book rates
America’s major cities based on the authors criteria, and his subjective assessment. Most
relevant is the author’s critical description of the downtown as a constantly evolving entity that
may have never experienced a golden age. He also posits that a downtown does not have a
consensus definition, nor how or if it can ever be revitalized.
Fowler, Edmund P. 1992. Building Cities That Work. Quebec City: McGill-Queen’s
University Press.
This book vehemently discusses the political and cultural philosophy of why the city can
never be revitalized. The two main reasons for this are decentralization and deconcentration of

society in the urban setting. Two key arguments in this book are most relevant: First, the
argument made by architect and urban planner Christopher Alexander, who exclaims that we all
have the ability to design spaces that work for us, but we are restricted due to zoning regulations.
Second, Charles Darwin states that the better adapted a species is to its environment, the more
likely it is to survive.
Francaviglia, Richard V. 1996. Main Street Revisited. Iowa City: University of Iowa

Press.

This book considers the various types of urban architecture and landscape. He posits that
a main street must evolve, but at the same time retain its unique character, for it is ultimately the
people who contribute to this character. Architecture and landscape dramatically impact
citizen’s mobility and pedestrian traffic flow. Most relevant is the five images of the city in
discerning the types of downtown architecture and landscape.

Ihrke, Douglas M & Niederjohn, M. Scott. 2002. “Conflict On City Councils In Wisconsin.”
Journal of Urban Affairs 27(October): 453-462.
This article focuses on determining what demographic and community characteristics
lead to conflict between the mayor and city council. The study takes place in small Wisconsin
communities with populations greater than 10,000. Most relevant is the discussion of group
dynamics in decision making, and the demographic, social, government, and community
characteristics in predicting conflict during the governing process.
Peterson, Jon A. 2003. The Birth of City Planning In the United States 1840-1917.
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
This book discusses the American history of urban planning, reform and development.
The author chronicles the significant eras of reform and their intended and unintended
consequences. Most relevant is Frederic Law Olmstead’s vision of the administrative planning
agency. In 1909 no such office existed, and it was his theory he posited, that the only time
planning would work, was when city planning is conceived as a continuous, non static, process.
Robertson, Kent A. 1999. “Can Small-City Downtowns Remain Viable?” Journal of the
American Planning Association 65 (Summer): 270-283.
This journal article discusses the critical role downtowns play in the health of not only
larger cities, but also those that are designated as third-class. A healthy down town is an
essential element of the prosperity of most non suburban small cities with a population ranging
from 25,000 to 50,000. In this article Robertson conducts a survey and observable case-study of 57

small-cities in North America. Robertson identified several downtown problems that led to
decline. He accomplished this by having leaders and citizens complete a survey that assessed the
municipalities’ strengths and weaknesses. From the survey findings, Robertson prescribes a
multitude of downtown revitalization strategies to counter the decline. Most relevant is the
examination and exposure of significant differences between downtown development in small
vs. large cities.
Robertson, Kent. 2002. “Main Street Partnering.” Economic Development Journal 1 (Fall):
53-59.
This journal article chronicles the advantages of cooperative relationships among
multiple public, private, and civic entities, of which all have the mutual goal of downtown
economic development. A wide variety of sustainable partnerships are instrumental in
promoting a viable city. It is important to note the absence of local politics in this article. Most
relevant, is what is possible when the CED actors work in concert coordinating their activities.

Schnore, Fagin. 1967. Urban Research and Policy Planning. Beverly Hills: Sage
Publications. 2-547.
This classic book outlines the history and evolution of urban planning in the United
States from the industrial revolution up to the mid 1960s. Also discussed is the importance of
social augmentation and civic participation in the development process. Most relevant is the
discussion of the history of urban planning and policy as a vehicle to explain the modern
planning process and the subsequent theories of the era.
The Academy of Political Science. 1986. Public-Private Partnerships: Improving Urban Life.
Montpelier: Capital City Press.
This book is a compilation of essays and case-studies that discusses the history and
evolution of public-Private sector partnerships. The business sector is just as important as the
governing entity when it comes to establishing a successful community. Most relevant is the
example of how these partnerships can unanimously define common community goals and
values. This source is also valuable in defining and measuring what is a successful chamber of
commerce.
Wheeland, Craig M. 2002. “An Institutional Perspective on Mayoral Leadership: Linking
Leadership Style to Formal Structure.” National Civic Review 91 (Spring): 25-39.
This fascinating journal article analyzes the institution of the municipal executive, and
the various influences on the two mayoral leadership models-the executive mayor and facilitative
mayor. Most relevant is the findings of this article in predicting mayoral behavior and the
willingness to cooperate with the other actors in the development process.


Primary Sources
Downtown Wilkes-Barre Retail Study. (1990). Wilkes-Barre, PA: Wilkes-Barre Downtown
Committee. Draft.
This study presents the results of research conducted on area residents to gather data on
downtown and mall shopping patterns; socio-economic and demographic characteristics. From
the data gathered, a downtown improvement and market development plan was then drafted.
The data gathered is essential to comparing both short-term and long-term retail trends in
Luzerne County.

Governor’s Center for Local Government Services. (2001). The Comprehensive Plan in
Pennsylvania. Planning Series #3. Harrisburg, PA: Pennsylvania Department of
Community and Economic Development.
This publication discusses land use planning procedures, legislation, and resources.
Furthermore, it outlines nearly every aspect of the comprehensive plan from drafting to
implementing. The conclusion provides information to Pennsylvania municipalities for the many
planning resources available from the Commonwealth.
Major Office Space Summary. (1992). Wilkes-Barre, PA: Greater Wilkes-Barre Partnership.
This study presents the findings of research conducted on both downtown and nondowntown office buildings in the City of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. In addition, the study
analyzed total ft2; cost per ft2, and vacant ft2. The information distilled in this study aids in
understanding current and long-term trends in office space use for the city.
Pennsylvania Department of Municipal Government. The Pennsylvania Local Government
Manual. Pennsylvania State and Local Government Overview.
Harrisburg: Department of Municipal Government. 6-3 – 6-6.
This Pennsylvania local government document gives an intimate overview of the
institution of state, local, and county government. Also discussed, are state and constitutional
provisions that govern municipal classifications, legislative jurisdiction, the authority to levy
taxes, and the Home Rule Charter. Most relevant to my proposed paper is the discussion of
third-class cities mayoral institution and its relationship with city council.

Strategic Market Development Plan for Downtown Wilkes-Barre. (2003). Wilkes-Barre, PA:
Diamond City Partnership.
This market study conducts a comprehensive analysis of the functional and physical
components of downtown Wilkes-Barre. The data compiled examines both past and future
trends of the downtown’s assets. The conclusion of this study provides the foundation for a
formal comprehensive downtown revitalization plan by recommending six revitalization
strategies.

Teaford, Jon C. 2000. “Urban Renewal and Its Aftermath.” The Fannie Mae Foundation (11):
443-465.
This journal article discusses the failure of the Title I Federal Urban Housing Act to
revitalize urban neighborhoods from the post WWII era until the mid 1970’s. This was in
response to the prewar Progressive and New Deal era. This in-depth analysis explains the
evolution of federal urban planning programs all the way up to the federal CDBG cuts of the
Reagan Administration. Most relevant is the explanation of how those failures ultimately made
federal government intervention in the planning process unwanted by city officials, which
created a reciprocal relationship, whereby state and municipal governments were left to fend for
themselves.


Acknowledgements
Writing this study was a significant challenge. The author would like to thank the following
people and organizations that helped make this project a reality:
Dr. Thomas Baldino
Dr. Kent Robertson
Mr. John Jablowski
Wilkes University Cooperative Education Office
Greater Wilkes-Barre Area Chamber of Business and Industry
Wilkes-Barre Diamond City Partnership
Joint Urban Studies Center
Osterhout Free Library
Mayor Thomas Leighton
Mayor Louis Barletta
Mayor John Bushko
Mr. Michael Lombardo

Mr. Jerry Mullarkey

Frank Knorek Wilkes University Thesis

Recomendados

Recomendados

Más contenido relacionado

La actualidad más candente

La actualidad más candente (20)

Destacado

Destacado (7)

Similar a Frank Knorek Wilkes University Thesis

Similar a Frank Knorek Wilkes University Thesis (20)

Último

Último (20)

Frank Knorek Wilkes University Thesis