1.
「グローバルな活躍のすすめ」
～国際エネルギー機関事務局長の経験から～
2012/4/14
WASEDA
University
Nobuo
TANAKA
Former
Execu0ve
Director
of
the
IEA
Global
Associate
of
Energy
Security
and
Sustainability,
IEEJ
©
OECD/IEA
2011

2. A Time of Unprecedented Uncertainties.
Uncertainty
No.1
— Growing Asian economies, especially China, will
shape the global energy future – where will their
policy decisions lead us ?

3. China
is
already
the
largest
consumer
of
energy
and
will
be
the
largest
oil
consumer
in
2035.
Growth
in
primary
energy
demand
IEA WEO 2011
4
500
Mtoe
4
000
China
3
500
India
3
000
Other
developing
Asia
2
500
Russia
Middle
East
2
000
Rest
of
world
1
500
OECD
1
000
500
0
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
Global
energy
demand
increases
by
one-­‐third
from
2010
to
2035,
with
China,
India
and
other
Asia
accoun@ng
for
two
thirds
of
the
growth
3

4. Oil
demand
is
driven
higher
by
soaring
car
ownership
IEA WEO 2011
Vehicles
per
1000
people
in
selected
markets
800
2010
700
2035
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
United
States
European
China
India
Middle
East
Union
The
passenger
vehicle
fleet
doubles
to
1.7
billion
in
2035;
more
cars
are
built
and
sold
outside
the
OECD
by
2020,
making
non-­‐OECD
policies
key
to
global
oil
demand

5. shift concerns security
isecurity
Petroleum
about oil s
parRcularly
the
issue
for
Asia
in
the
21st
Century.
Net imports of oil
IEA WEO 2011
14
Mb/d
2000
12 2010
10 2035
8
6
4
2
0
European United Japan China India ASEAN
Union States
US
oil
imports
drop
due
to
rising
domes0c
output
&
improved
transport
efficiency:
EU
imports
US oil imports dropf
the
US
rising domestic output & improved transport around
2020 im
overtake
those
o due to around
2015;
China
becomes
the
largest
importer
efficiency: EU
overtake those of the US around 2015; China becomes the largest importer around 20

6. Uncertainty
No.2
— Does political unrest in producing regions make
oil market tighter? What will be the longer term
market structure? What will be the impact of Iran
Sanction?

7. Figure 3.21 Breakeven costs, budget breakeven and commercially
attractive prices for current oil production for selected
producers, mid-2011 IEA WEO 2011
120 Budget
Dollars per barrel
breakeven
Venezuala
100
Ecuador
Russia Commercially
Nigeria
Iran
Angola
Algeria
Saudi aƩracƟve
Iraq
Libya
80 Arabia Super Breakeven
majors
UAE
cost
60
Kuwait
Qatar
40
20
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 0 5 10
Oil producƟon (mb/d)
‘Deferred
Investment
Case’
looks
at
near-­‐term
investment
falling
short
by
one-­‐ and
Notes: Only OPEC countries, Russia and the aggregation of the five super-majors (BP, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell
Total) are included. The breakeven cost is the realised oil price at which all operating expenses (excluding taxes) and
third.
MENA
output
falls
3discount rate),y
2015
recovered.
capital costs (including a 10% capital
.4
mb/d
b are fully and
Consumers
face
a
near-­‐term
rise
in
oil
prices
to
$150/barrel.
based on industry sources: APICORP (2011), Deutsche Bank (2011), Credit Suisse
Sources: IEA databases and analysis
(2011), IMF (2011), PFC (2011) and CGES (2011).

8. Iran
Crisis
and
the
Hormuz
Strait
1700 B/D
85% of Japanese2oil
import
85%
20% of Japanese
LNG 8260
LNG importLNG 3
But if no nuclear
LNG 18%
reactors are
2010
running,,,,,,?
UAE
17 mbd of petroleum
2
(20% of global demand )
2
82 million tons of LNG pa
(30% of global demand)
8

9. Uncertainty
No.
3
Shale gas in the
US brings Natural
Gas Revolution."
Is the Golden age
of Natural Gas a
solution for
security? "

10. The
Golden
Age
for
Natural
Gas
?
IEA WEO 2011
Largest
natural
gas
producers
in
2035
Russia
ConvenRonal
United
States
UnconvenRonal
China
Iran
Qatar
Canada
Algeria
Australia
India
Norway
0
200
400
600
800
1
000
bcm
Unconven@onal
natural
gas
supplies
40%
of
the
1.7
tcm
increase
in
global
supply,
but
best
prac@ces
are
essen@al
to
successfully
address
environmental
challenges
10

11. Uncertainty
No.
４
— Strategic
Role
of
Russia
as
the
key
exporter
of
fossil
fuels
especially
Natural
Gas

12. Russia’s
focus
will
move
to
the
East
IEA WEO 2011
Russian
revenue
from
fossil
fuel
exports
2010
2035
$255
billion
$420
billion
Other
Other
17%
China
21%
European
European
2%
China
Union
Other
Union
Europe
61%
20%
48%
16%
Other
Europe
15%
An
increasing
share
of
Russian
exports
go
eastwards
to
Asia,
providing
Russia
with
diversity
of
markets
and
revenues
12

13. Uncertainty
No.
5
— What is the implication of the Fukushima
Nuclear accident to the global energy
market and security?

14. the New Policies Scenario).
Low
Nbuilt from 1980 onwards are retired after a lifetime of 50 years on average
Reactors uclear
Case
(55 years in the New Policies Scenario).
IEA WEO 2011
Table 12.3 Key projections for nuclear power in the New Policies Scenario
and the Low Nuclear Case
Low Nuclear Case New Policies Scenario
OECD Non-OECD World OECD Non-OECD World
Gross installed capacity (GW)
in 2010 326 68 393 326 68 393
in 2035 171 164 335 380 252 633
Share in electricity generation
in 2010 21% 4% 13% 21% 4% 13%
in 2035 9% 5% 7% 21% 8% 13%
Gross capacity under construction (GW)* 14 54 69 14 54 69
New additions in 2011-2035 (GW)** 6 84 91 111 167 277
Retirements in 2011-2035 (GW) 176 42 218 71 36 107
*At the start of 2011. **Includes new plants and uprates, but excludes capacity currently under construction.
14

15. Less
nuclear
means
more
of
everything
else
IEA WEO 2011
Power
generation
by
fuel
in
the
New
Policies
Scenario
and
Low
Nuclear
Case
14
000
TWh
2009
12
000
2035:
10
000
New
Policies
Scenario
2035:
8
000
Low
Nuclear
Case
6
000
4
000
2
000
0
Nuclear
Coal
Gas
Renewables
The
biggest
chunk
of
the
lost
nuclear
generation
is
replaced
by
power
generation
from
gas
and
coal,
leading
to
a
6%
or
0.9
GT
increase
in
CO2
emissions
in
the
power
sector

16. Germany
may
needs
much
more
Gas
to
phase
out
Nuclear
by
2022
700
twh
600
others
500
Renewables
400
nuclear
300 Gas
200 Coal
100
0
Current Policy 2022
Germany
needs
to
import
16
BCM
of
gas
to
achieve
electricity
mix
with
10%
demand
reduc0on,
no
nuclear,
35%
renewables
and
CO2
at
the
target
level
16

17. Lessons
from
the
Fukushima
— Fukushima
accident
was
caused
by
human
error
and
should
have
been
avoided.
(Mr.
Hatamura ,
Chair
of
The
Investigation
Committee
on
the
Accident
at
the
Fukushima
Nuclear
Power
Stations)
— Think
about
the
unthinkable;
Tsunami
and
Station
Black
Out.
Change
total
mind
set
for
“Safety”.
— Prepare
for
the
severe
accidents,
common
cause
failure
&
compound
disasters.
— Recovery
from
disaster
is
at
least
as
important
as
preparing
for
it.
— Independent
Regulatory
authority
;
Reduce
risk
of
too
much
political
involvement;
Transparency
and
Trust,
“Back
Fitting”
of
regulation
— Organization
and
training
of
the
nuclear
emergency
staff
including
the
self
defense
force
;
integration
of
safety
and
security.
— International
Cooperation
:
A
nuclear
accident
anywhere
is
an
accident
everywhere.
— Further
clarification
needed
why
it
happened
only
to
Fukushima
Daiichi
and
NOT
to
Fukushima
Daini,
Onagawa
nor
Tokai
daini.

18. ネルギー、 、エネルギ には EU の
スペインは エネルギー
技術のテー
ー供給のセ エネルギー
特に地中海 キュリティ
入れている 太陽計画( マを議論し 、再生可能
Mediterra 、２日目の エネルギ
Uncertainty
No.
6
。
IEA のプレ nean Sola 大臣会合に
ゼンテーシ r Plan)と 報告した。
ョン： 電気自動車
http://www の推進に力
.iea.org/sp を
eech/2010
/Tanaka/Se
ville.pdf
Electric Power Grid and Renewable Energy. " 26
Will Renewables be a solution ? Challenge to the
Grid for stable supply of the electricity."

19. Power
grid
in
Europe
ノ orwayー ルウェ
N
Max
Capacity
3.6
GW
最大発電容量
オランダ
Netherlands
29.8GW
Max
Capacity
最大発電容量
イギリス
UK
2.4
GW
19.8GW
3GW 3.9
GW
Max
Capacity
最大発電容量
75.5GW 2.4
GW
3.6
GW スウェ
ーデン
Sweden
2
GW Belgium
ベルギー 0.6
GW Max
Capacity
最大発電容量
Max
Capacity
2 GW
最大発電容量 32.6GW
15.8GW
0.6
GW
France
2.7
GW
フランス Germany
ドイツ
Max
Capacity
最大発電容量 Max
Capacity
最大発電容量
110.9GW 3.2
GW
0.5
GW 3.2
GW 129.1GW
3.5GW
：GeneraRon
capacity
Spain
スペイン 1.3
GW
Swiss
スイス
1.5
GW
1.1
GW 2.2
GW ：maximum
powerflow
Max
Capacity
最大発電容量 Max
Capacity
最大発電容量 1.2
GW
93.5GW 1
GW 17.9GW 2
GW
1.8
GW
2.6
GW
0.5
GW
Italy
イタリア 4.2
GW
0.3
GW Austria
リ
オースト ア
Max
Capacity
最大発電容量 Max
Capacity
最大発電容量
93.1GW 18.9GW
0.2
GW
Source:
IEA 「Electricity
InformaRon
2010」
IndicaRve
value
for
Net
Transfer
CapaciRes
(NTC)
in
ConRnental
Europe
19

20. Power
grid
in
Japan
Hydro Gas
Coal
GeneraRng
company
Hokkaido
Nuclear
Oil
Other
In-­‐house
Power
uRlity
company
generaRon
Tohoku
60 hz <-------
Chugoku
Kansai
Hokuriku
Tokyo
Kyushu
29GW
Shikoku
12GW
Okinawa
Chubu
---à 50 hz
2GW
40GW
Source: Agency
for
Natural
Resources
and
Energy,
The
Federation
of
Electric
Power
Companies
of
Japan, Electric
Power
System
Council
of
Japan,
The
International
Energy
Agency
20

21. Not
only
Feed-­‐in-­‐tariffs
but
Grid
integraRon
!
Snapshot
of
present
penetraRon
potenRals

22. Uncertainty
No.
7
第 15 回締約国会議（COP15）（12 月 7-18 日、コペンハーゲン）
12/14）、IEA デー
、450ppm シナリオ、省エ
— Climate Change
術ロードマップ、再生可能
Mitigation: Where
々な分析成果を発信した。
are we going"
— and what does this
ゼンテーション
mean to energy
eech/2009/tanaka/cop15.pdf
security?
ームページ
rk/workshopdetail.asp?WS_ID

23. highlight briefly why the scenario is needed. It is because (as illustrated in Figure 6.2) neither
the New Policies Scenario, our central scenario, nor the Current Policies Scenario puts us on
450
ppm
Scenmario
:
what
we
need
and
where
.
a future trajectory for greenhouse-gas emissions that is consistent with limiting the increase
in global temperature to no more than 2°C, the level climate scientists say is likely to avoid
catastrophic climate change. The 450 Scenario illustrates one plausible path to that objective.
Energy efficiency measures account for half the cumulative CO2 abatement achieved in the
Figure 6.2 World energy-related CO2 emissions by scenario2
450 Scenario, relative to the New Policies Scenario, over the Outlook period (Figure 6.4).
45 The scale of this reduction underlines the importance of strong policy action to ensure
IEA WEO 2011
Gt
OECD
that potential efficiency gains are realised, in such forms as building standards, vehicle fuel
28%
40
Non-OECD Current Policies economy mandatesGtand insistence on widespread use in industry of the best-available
71% 7
Scenario technologies (Box 6.3). After the cheaper energy efficiency measures are exploited early in
35
the Outlook period, more expensive abatement options take a larger share, and the annual
New Policies 33%
Scenario
30
share in abatement of efficiency measures falls to 44% in 2035. The increased adoption of
15 Gt
450 Scenario
renewable energy (including biofuels) is the second-most important source of CO2 abatement,
65%
25 relative to the New Policies Scenario, growing from a combined 19% in 2020 to 25% in 2035, or
a cumulative 24% over the period as a whole. Nuclear power grows rapidly in importance and
20 accounts for a cumulative 9%, while CCS also accounts for an increasing share, growing from
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2035
only 3% of total abatement in 2020 to 22% in 2035, or a cumulative 18%.
Note: There is also some abatement of inter-regional (bunker) emissions which, at less than 2% of the difference between
scenarios, is not visible in the 2035 shares.
Figure 6.4 World
In line with practice in previous World Energy Outlooks, we have estimated greenhouse-gasenergy-related CO2 emissions abatement in the
emissionsfromallsourcesandforallscenarios(Table6.1).Wehavethenassessedtheconsequences 450 Scenario relative to the New Policies Scenario
for long-term concentrations and temperature increases of such emissions trajectories.
38
Gt
The New Policies Scenario, which takes account of both existing government policies and New Policies Scenario Abatement
36
declared policy intentions (including cautious implementation of the Copenhagen Accord and 2020 2035
34
Cancun Agreements), would result in a level of emissions that is consistent with a long-term Efficiency 72% 44%
average temperature increase of more than 3.5°C (see Chapter 2 for energy trends in the New
32 Renewables 17% 21%
Policies Scenario). The outlook in the Current Policies Scenario, which assumes no change in
30 Biofuels 2% 4%
government policies and measures beyond those that were enacted or adopted by mid-2011,
is considerably worse, and is consistent with a long term temperature28
increase of 6°C or more. Nuclear 5% 9%
26 CCS 3% 22%
The trends and implications of the 450 Scenario, a scenario based on achieving an emissions
24
trajectory consistent with an average temperature increase of 2°C, are sometimes presented Total (Gt CO2) 2.5 14.8
here against the baseline of the New Policies Scenario to help demonstrate what more 450 Scenario
22
needs to be done, particularly in terms of carbon abatement. The main changes to the
20
450 Scenario in WEO-2011 relate to the policy assumptions, which reflect changes in 2020
2010 2015 2025 2030 2035
domestic and international energy and climate policies (Box 6.2). Non-policy assumptions
relating to energy and CO2 prices, GDP and population are presented in Chapter 1.
Box 6.3 Reaping abatement through efficiency in the 450 Scenario 23
2. In 2009, energy-related CO emissions contributed 61% to total greenhouse-gas emissions.

24. Russia n.a. 136 166 168 173 203 150 96
World 2 560 4 705 5 833 5 859 6 308 7 742 5 309 3 309
Share of non-OECD 46% 69% 74% 80% 74% 79% 74% 81%
Coal
is
abundant
but
CO2
intensive.
Share of China
Share of India
17%
3%
46%
8%
49%
11%
48%
15%
49%
11%
48%
15%
49%
10%
46%
16%
IEA WEO 2011
Figure 10.3 Incremental world primary coal demand by region and scenario
China
1990-2009 India
Other
Current Policies non-OECD
Scenario OECD
2009-2035
New Policies
Scenario
450 Scenario
-1 800 -1 200 -600 0 600 1 200 1 800 2 400 3 000 3 600
Mtce
The power sector remains the main driver of global coal demand over the projection period
24

25. The
door
to
2°C
is
closing,
but
will
we
be
“locked-­‐in”
?
IEA WEO 2011
CO2
emissions
(giggatonnes)
45
6°C
trajectory
40
35
30
2°C
trajectory
25
20 Delay
unRl
2017
Delay
unRl
2015
15
10 Emissions
from
exisRng
5 infrastructure
0
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Without
further
ac0on,
by
2017
all
CO2
emissions
permi]ed
in
the
450
Scenario
will
be
“locked-­‐in”
by
exis0ng
power
plants,
factories,
buildings,
etc

26. Energy
poverty
is
widespread
Source International Energy Agency
— 1.3
billion
people
in
the
world
live
without
electricity
— and
2.7
billion
live
without
clean
cooking
faciliRes

27. What
is
Energy
Security
in
the
21st
Century?

28. Diversity : Energy mix as Energy
Security Mix
ASEAN
96%
30%
0%
IEA
51%
8%
11%
EU
27
26%
10%
14%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
140%
Self sufficiency
=inland production / tpes
(2010 estimates)
Nuclear
is
an
important
op0on
for
countries
with
limited
indigenous
energy
resources
(low
energy
sustainability).
28

29. Strategic
Petroleum
Reserve:
Does
the
current
IEA
system
conRnue
to
work?
IEA
stockholding
cover
of
global
oil
demand
60% 40
35
Growing
share
of
50%
non-­‐OECD
oil
days
of
world
oil
demand
cover
30
%
share
of
world
oil
demand
40% demand
results
in
25
declining
global
30% 20
demand
cover
20%
15
from
IEA
oil
stocks
10
10%
5
0% -­‐
IEA
90
days
of
stockholding,
share
of
world
demand
with
China
with
India
with
A SEAN
Share
of
non-­‐OECD
in
global
oil
demand
29

30. Overseas Investments by Chinese National Oil Companies: Assessing the Drivers and Impacts
30

31. ConnecRng
MENA
and
Europe:
"
Desertec"
as
“Energy
for
Peace"
Source:
DESRETEC
FoundaRon
31

32. Existing and proposed ASEAN Power Grid
Interconnections
32

33. Energy for Peace in Asia ? A New Vision
Demand Leveling (Time Zone & Climate Difference)
Stable Supply (through regional interdependence)
Fair Electricity Price
Vladivostok
Vladivostok
Gobi Desert
Gobi Desert
Beijing
Beijing Seoul
Seoul Phase 3
Chengdu
Chengdu Tokyo
Asia
Tokyo
Delhi
Delhi Bhutan
Bhutan Shanghai
Shanghai
Hong Kong
Super Grid
Dacca
Dacca Hong Kong Taipei
Taipei
Bangkok
Bangkok Manila
Mumbai
Mumbai Manila
Kuala Lumpur
Kuala Lumpur
Singapore
Total 36,000km
Singapore
Presentation by Mr. Masayoshi SON
33

34. One cannot enhance energy security by
risking someone else‘s: Role of International
Organizations in Energy Sector
-IEA vs IAEA: energy vs nuclear security and safety
-IEA vs IRENA: energy vs Renewables in developing
countries
-IEA vs OPEC: oil consumer vs producer
-IEA vs EU, ASEAN, APEC: global vs regional
-IEA vs UNFCCC: energy vs Climate change
-IEA vs OECD: energy security vs economy
-IEA vs WB: security vs development
-IEA vs WTO: security vs trade
-IEA vs G8, G20: energy security vs global governance
-IEA vs UN: energy security vs energy access

35. Thank
You,
AIESEC.