One Korea Unification Vision through Neutralization: What Should Be Done

Global Peace Convention 2013
'UNITY IN DIVERSITY' BUILDING SOCIAL COHESION FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE THROUGH
UNIVERSAL ASPIRATIONS, PRINCIPLES, AND VALUES

December 5-8, 2013, in Shangri-La Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Friday, Dec. 6, 2013, 2:00-3:30 pm.
Concurrent Session V: Korean Unification Vision and Peace-Building in
Northeast Asia

A unified Korean peninsula is directly linked to stability and security cooperation in
Northeast Asia. Without achieving a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula,
there will be no unification process on the Korean peninsula. This panel will discuss
Asian perspectives on the future vision of Korean unification and Northeast Asian
peace and security. Distinguished scholars from China, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia and
S. Korea will present five scholarly papers on panel titled "Korean Unification Vision
and Peace-Building in Northeast Asia.

Chair: Tae-Hwan KWAK Eastern Kentucky University/ Institute for Korean
Peninsula Future Strategies
Papers:
1. The One Korea Unification Vision: What Should Be Done? Tae-Hwan KWAK,
Eastern Kentucky University/ Kyungnam University
2. China's Role in Korean Unification Vision and Northeast Asian Peace-building,
Xiaohe CHENG, Renmin University of China
3. Korean Unification Vision and Northeast Asian Peace-building: A Japanese
View, KASEDA Yoshinori, University of Kitakyushu
4. ASEAN‘s Role on the Korean Peninsula: An Opportunity for the Future?
Er-Win TAN, Geetha Govindasamy, and Chang Kyoo Park (all three,
University of Malaya)
2

<GPC Concurrent Session V Panelists’ Email and Profiles>

1. Dr. Tae-Hwan KWAK
Dr. Kwak, currently Chair-Professor at Kyungnam University and Chairman, Institute
for Korean Peninsula Future Strategies (IKFS), Professor Emeritus at Eastern Kentucky
University, former President of KINU (Korea Institute for National Unification), a think
tank, former Director of the Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES), Kyungnam
University, is a specialist on Northeast Asian affairs, inter-Korean relations and Korean
peace and unification issues. He taught international relations and East Asian politics
over thirty years in 1969-1999 at Eastern Kentucky University and Korean universities.
He received his Ph.D. in International Relations from Claremont Graduate University in
1969. Dr. Kwak is a recipient of Global Peace Foundation's 2012 Innovative Scholarship
for Peace Award. He is also very active in NGO in Korea. He serves as executive
advisor of the Northeast Asian Community Studies Institute (Seoul, Korea). He is now
Chairman, Institute for Korean Peninsula Future Strategies (Seoul, Korea).
Dr. Kwak is the author of In Search for Peace and Unification on the Korean Peninsula (1986)
and The Korean Peninsula in World Politics (1999, in Korean). He is editor and co-editor of
31 books, including North Korea and Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia (Ashgate,
March, 2014),Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asian Security
Cooperation (Ashgate: Hampshire, England, June 2010); North Korea’s Foreign Policy under
Kim Jong Il: New Perspectives (Ashgate: Hampshire, England, 2009); North Korea’s Second
Nuclear Crisis and Northeast Asian Security (Ashgate: Hampshire, England, 2007), and The
United States and the Korean Peninsula in the 21st Century (Ashgate: Hampshire, England,
2006), etc. He has authored over 200 book chapters and scholarly articles in Korean,
Japanese and English. He is also active in NGO organizations in Seoul, Korea and Los
Angeles, U.S.A. Email: thkwak38@hotmail.com
Tel: +82-2-3217-2105 (Seoul, Korea);
+1-310-729-8383 (LA, USA)

2. Dr. CHENG Xiaohe
Email: chengxiaohe@ruc.edu.cn Tel: 86+1+82500769.
3

Dr. Cheng serves as an Associate Professor at the School of International Studies and
Deputy Director of Center for China’s International Strategic Studies, Renmin
University of China. His main research focuses lie in the fields of China’s foreign
relations in general and China’s Relations with the United States and some neighboring
countries in particular. Dr. Cheng once worked for China Institutes of Contemporary
International Relations for some years and served as a visiting research fellow at the
Fairbank Center of Harvard University (1997-1998). He also taught China’s Politics &
Foreign Policies in Dublin College University (2007) and China’s Foreign Relations in
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor (2009). His recently published articles mainly
cover China’s relations with the Korean Peninsula and the Indian Subcontinent.
Dr. Cheng did his undergraduate works in international politics at Fudan University,
Shanghai, and earned his Ph.D in political science from Boston University.

3. Dr. KASEDA Yoshinori
Email: ykaseda@kitakyu-u.ac.jp; ykaseda11@yahoo.co.jp Tel:+81-93-964-4072
Dr. Kaseda is Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Kitakyushu in
Kitakyushu, Japan. He has taught at Northern Illinois University (NIU) and Miyazaki
International Collage (MIC) in Japan. He received his B.A. in philosophy from the
University of Kumamoto in Japan in 1993 and his M.A. and Ph.D. in political science
from NIU in 1996 and 2005 respectively. His research areas include Japan’s relations
with the two Koreas and Japan’s security policy. He published articles in journals such
as World Affairs, Pacific Focus, International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, and
Journal of Political and Military Sociology. He contributed a chapter to such books as Korea
in the 21st Century (Nova Science, 2001), The Korean Peace Process and the Four Powers
(Ashgate, 2003), North Korea's Second Nuclear Crisis and Northeast Asian Security (Ashgate,
2007), North Korea's Foreign Policy under Kim Jong Il (Ashgate, 2009), Peace Regime
Building on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asian Security Cooperation (Ashgate, 2010),
and North Korea and Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia (Ashgate, 2013).

4. Dr Er-Win TAN (& his associates)
Email: erwintan@um.edu.my Tel:603-7967-5665
Dr Tan is a Visiting Senior Lecturer at the Department of International and Strategic
Studies at the University of Malaya. He holds a PhD in International Politics at the
4

Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University and a MA (with High
Distinction) in Strategic Studies from the Australian National University. He has
research interests in Security Dilemma Theory, Deterrence Theory, Confidence and
Security Building Measures, US-North Korean Interaction, The Korean War, The
Vietnam War, and Security and Diplomacy in the Asia Pacific Region. He is the author
of The US Versus the North Korean Nuclear Threat: Mitigating the Nuclear Security Dilemma
(Routledge, 2014). Personal website: https://sites.google.com/site/erwintanphd/

Dr. Geetha Govindasamy is Senior Lecturer at the Korean Studies program in the
Department of East Asian Studies at University of Malaya, Malaysia. She earned M.Phil.
in Oriental Studies from Queens' College, Cambridge University (UK), M.A from the
International University of Japan in Niigata, and Ph. D. from Monash University,
Australia. Her research and publications are predominantly focused on Inter-Korean
relations, foreign policy, and regionalism. Dr Govindasamy is a Research Adjunct at the
School of Politics and Inquiry, Monash University, a Korea Foundation Fellow, both an
alumna of the 2007 Women in International Security Summer (WIIS) program and the
United States’ State Department. Currently, Dr Govindasamy is the Project Director for
a Korea Foundation funded project entitled, “Impact of Globalization on Korean
Society:Korean, Malaysia and Singaporean perspectives on Multiculturalism.”

Dr. Park Chang Kyoo is Visiting Professor at the Korean Studies program in the
Department of East Asian Studies at University of Malaya, Malaysia. He is a graduate of
Moscow State University. Dr Park has authored numerous articles and books on
Korea’s relations with Central Asia and the Russian Federation. His articles have
appeared in international journals such as Peace Studies, Acta Russiana, Central Asian
Studies and Ethnic Research. In 2010, Dr Park received an award from the South Korean
Ministry of Culture for publishing an academic book on “Understanding of Central
Asia.” Currently, Dr Park is involved as a co-researcher in a Korea Foundation funded
project entitled, “Impact of Globalization on Korean Society: Korean, Malaysia and
Singaporean perspectives on Multiculturalism.”
5

One Korea Unification Vision through
Neutralization: What Should Be Done?

Tae-Hwan Kwak, Ph. D.
Professor Emeritus, Eastern Kentucky University/Chair-Professor, Kyungnam University/
Chairman, GPF Institute for Korean Peninsula Future Strategies
Email: thkwak38@hotmail.com

Paper Prepared for Presentation at the Global Peace Convention 2013
Shangri-La Hotel Kuala Lumpur, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, December 5-8, 2013

6

One Korea Unification Vision through Neutralization: What Should Be Done? ***
Tae-Hwan Kwak, Ph. D.
(Professor Emeritus, Eastern Kentucky University/ Chair Professor, Kyungnam University/
Former President, Korea Institute for National Unification)

<Contents>
I. Introduction
II. Conflicting Unification Formulae of the Two Koreas
III. One Korea Formula through Neutralization Regime Building
IV. Strategies for Implementing a Five-Stage Neutralization-Unification Formula
V. Conclusion
<APPENDIX>

Abstract
Koreans wish to achieve Korean unification as a long-term goal, but it is regrettable that
many obstacles hinder the Korean unification process. This paper attempts to evaluate
conflicting unification formulae of the two Koreas and to propose one Korea unification formula
through neutralization as an alternative to the two Koreas‟ existing formulae. The rationale for
one Korea neutralization-unification formula is provided, and a five-stage unification formula is
proposed. The Korean people as key players must work together for a neutralization-unification
formula and persuade four major powers to support a neutralized, unified Korea, which will be
in their best interests.
A unified Korea through neutralization will never be easy and smooth. It will take many
years of preparation and patience to achieve a unified, neutralized one Korean state. It is argued
that a neutralization-unification formula could be an alternative to the existing unification
formulae because of conflicting approaches to Korean unification between the two Koreas.

Keywords: DFRK unification formula, KNC unification formula, one Korea unification formula,
neutralization regime building, rationale for neutralization, five stages of neutralizationunification formula.

***This is a substantially revised version of my earlier paper, titled “The Future Vision for a Unified
Korean Peninsula: Two Koreas’ Perspectives,” originally presented at Global Peace Leadership
Conference Korea 2012, Grand Hilton Hotel, Seoul, Korea, August 17-19, 2012. The author wishes to
express his sincere thanks for his colleagues’ invaluable comments on his original paper.

7

I. INTRODUCTION
Sixty-eight years have passed since the division of the Korean peninsula in 1945. In
reality, there exist two sovereign U.N. member states: the Republic of Korea (ROK or South
Korea) and the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea). The DPRK is a
nuclear armed state, threatening peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast
Asia. The road to a peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula appears to be getting bumpier
and far from reality.
With the inauguration of Lee Myung-bak‘s presidency in February 2008, Lee took a
hardline policy toward the North, renouncing the Sunshine Policy, suspending many interKorean economic projects, and linking inter-Korean cooperation with Pyongyang‘s
denuclearization process. Lee‘s hard-line policy combined with North Korea‘s missteps and
aggressive behavior in 2010 rapidly brought deterioration to inter-Korean relations, heightening
tensions and mutual distrust between Seoul and Pyongyang. But President Park Keun-hye in
February 2013 adopted a new policy toward North Korea known as ―the Korean Peninsula trustbuilding process,‖ to improve hostile inter-Korean relations.
Because of Kim Jong-il‘s sudden death on 17 December, 2011, the DPRK was unstable
and uncertain, but it has now gradually been stabilizing under the Kim Jong-un regime. With
new leadership changes in South Korea in 2013, inter-Korean relations in the future are expected
to improve. A unified Korean peninsula may be achieved under peaceful conditions. Therefore,
conditions for the peace and unification processes on the Korean peninsula do not exist and need
to be created.
The ROK and the DPRK have different unification formulae: the ―Democratic Federal
Republic of Koryo‖ (DFRK) formula of North Korea and the ―Korean National Community‖
(KNC) unification formula of South Korea. The DFRK formula requires the abolition of the
ROK‘s National Security Law, U.S. troop withdrawal from the South, and other such points as
preconditions for implementing the North Korean unification formula. In the meantime, the KNC
unification formula has no preconditions for implementing the plan. Because of conflicting
unification formulae, an alternative to the existing unification formulae of the two Koreas is thus
desirable.
The ROK and the DPRK agreed in the second paragraph of the June 15 Joint Declaration
(2000) to work together to construct a unified Korea: Seoul‘s KNC unification formula proposal
for an inter-Korean confederation and Pyongyang‘s proposal for a low-level federation have
common elements, and the two governments can thus work together toward achieving national
unification. No discussions on this issue have been held by the two Koreas for the past 13 years.
This means that the two Koreas lack political will to unify the Korean peninsula. The two Koreas
need to agree on a common unification formula. The author has proposed that a common Korean
unification formula through neutralization be considered as an alternative to the conflicting
unification formulae of the two Korean states.
In this paper the author attempts (1) to evaluate conflicting unification formulae of the
two Koreas and (2) to propose one Korea unification vision through neutralization based on a
neutralized peace system on the Korean peninsula as an alternative to the two Koreas‘ existing
unification formulae.
II. CONFLICTING UNIFICATION FORMULAE OF THE TWO KOREAS
One of obstacles to the Korean unification process is that the ROK and the DPRK have
conflicting unification formulae, and they thus need to work together sincerely to find a mutually
8

acceptable unification formula for constructing one Korean state. Let us first take a brief look at
the DPRK‘s unification formula which the ROK cannot accept.
The DPRK’s unification formula: Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo (DFRK)
Kim Il Sung set forth the DFRK plan in his report to the Sixth Congress of the Workers‘
Party of Korea on 10 October, 1980.1 Kim claimed that the DFRK plan was ―the most realistic
and shortest way to realize Korea‘s reunification on the basis of the three principles of
independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity.‖ Kim spelled out the basic features
of the DFRK‘s formula, its composition and functions, and the ten-point policy that should be
carried out by the federal government. He further stated that ―Our party holds that the country
should be reunified by founding a Federal Republic through the establishment of a unified
national government on condition that the North and the South recognize and tolerate each
other‘s ideas and social systems, a government in which the two sides are represented on an
equal footing and under which they exercise regional autonomy respectively with equal rights
and duties‖ (Kim 1980, 60-70).
The DFRK‘s formula is a federal (originally translated as confederate in English) system
in which the two regional governments can coexist under one roof, i.e., a Supreme National
Federal Assembly (SNFA) and a Federal Standing Committee (FSC) are the unified government
of the federal state. The SNFA should be formed with an equal number of representatives from
the North and the South and an appropriate number of representatives of overseas Koreans. The
FSC, a permanent organ of the SNFA and a unified government, would guide the regional
governments in the North and the South and administer all affairs of the federal state (see Kwak
1986, 29-39). Kim Il Sung, spelling out the operation of the SNFA and the FSC in a speech on 9
September, 1983, said, ―It would be reasonable that as the unified government of the federal state,
the supreme national federal assembly and the federal standing committee elect their respective
co-chairman both from the north and south, who will run these bodies in turn‖ (Korea Today
1983, 15).2
The DFRK‘s formula appears to be persuasive, but it has several structural deficiencies.
First, North Korea claims that the DFRK is a complete form of federation, not an interim step to
the final federation form in the unification process. In fact, if the DFRK is a final form, the
problem is that the ROK cannot accept it primarily due to the preconditions for implementing it.
Second, given incompatible ideological, political, economic, and social systems, how long can
such a federal state survive? There was no mention about power distribution in a federal state
and power sharing between the two regional governments and a central government in a unified
Korea. Third, there are at least five preconditions for establishing the DFRK: (1) resignation of
the current ROK government, (2) abolition of anti-communist policy in the South, (3)
elimination of National Security Law in the South, (4) U.S. troop withdrawal from the South,
and (5) release of political prisoners, including communists in the South. The ROK must accept
these conditions for establishing a federal state under the DFRK‘s formula. Needless to say,
Seoul cannot accept these conditions and the DFRK‘s formula, because it perceives the DFRK as
a means to communize the South (Kwak 1986).

1

The Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo (DFRK), which was originally translated as the Democratic
Confederate Republic of Koryo (DCRK), was based on Kim 1980, 59-81.
2
For historical developments of the DPRK‘s unification proposals in Korean, see Kim 2001.

9

The ROK’s Korean National Community (KNC) Unification Formula
During the late 1980s, the Soviet Union and East European socialist states went through a
rapid process of disintegration, as the Cold War was rapidly dismantled. In the midst of such
changes, President Roh Tae-woo, who was inaugurated in February 1988, promoted a new North
Korea policy in the changing international security environment. Roh, in a special declaration on
7 July, 1988, acknowledged North Korea as a partner in good will. Based on this premise, he
proposed that Seoul and Pyongyang develop a joint national community in which the two Koreas
would enjoy co-prosperity. Subsequently, to achieve this common goal, the Roh government
passed an Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act on 1 August, 1990, thereby opening a
new era of exchange and cooperation between Seoul and Pyongyang (Peace and Cooperation:
White Paper on Korean Unification 1996).
In an address to the National Assembly on 11 September, 1989, Roh presented his
original Korean National Community (KNC) unification formula, which has been the official
unification formula of the ROK (Roh 1989). Thanks to such efforts, Seoul and Pyongyang
reached a set of historic agreements, including the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression
and Exchange and Cooperation (referred to as the Basic Agreement), the Joint Declaration on the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the Agreement on the Creation and Operation of
Joint Commissions, which came into effect on 19 February, 1992. Subsequently, Seoul and
Pyongyang agreed on the creation of a Joint Military Commission and an Economic Exchanges
and Cooperation Commission, as well as the establishment of a South-North liaison office. An
agreement on the creation and operation of a South-North Reconciliation Commission, along
with supplementary agreements in each area, was adopted in September 1992. Roh‘s initial
―engagement policy‖ toward North Korea was remarkably innovative and constructive for
improving inter-Korean relations.
President Kim Young Sam in his speech on the 49th anniversary of national liberation on
15 August, 1994 presented a modified version of the Roh‘s KNC unification formula, clarifying
basic philosophy, unification process, and procedures for unification as well as the future of a
unified Korea. Kim‘s modified KNC unification formula proposed a national community as a
new paradigm in unification policy. A national community provides a communal society where
all the members share common values and a common ethnic heritage. Seoul has long maintained
that the two Koreas should eventually create a single national democratic welfare community by
restoring the sense of common heritage through inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation.3
The ROK‘s unification formula, based on the three principles of independence, peace,
and democracy, is designed to establish a unified, democratic republic through the inter-Korean
confederation as an interim step under the principles of peace, non-use of military force, and
grand national unity through democratic procedures. The ROK proposed a blueprint for a unified
Korea through an inter-Korean confederation by drafting and finalizing a unified constitution,
holding general elections, and forming a unified legislature and a unified government. President
Roh Tae-woo suggested the creation and operation of a Korean National Community as an
interim stage pending the establishment of a unified Korea, proposing the establishment and

3

For details of President Kim‘s KNC unification formula, see Peace and Cooperation: White Paper on Korean
Unification, 1996, Ministry of National Unification, ROK, 45-55.

10

operation of a Council of Presidents, a Council of Ministers, a Council of Representatives, and a
Joint Secretariat as the organizations of the interim system.4
The Lee Myung-bak and Park Keun-hye governments officially supported the KNC
unification formula. In short, the ROK has supported a three-stage unification formula based on
three principles of independence, peace, and liberal democracy. The Korean unification process
is based on a three-stage gradual approach to a unified Korea: first stage, inter-Korean
reconciliation and cooperation; second stage, South-North Korean confederation; and third stage,
establishment of a unified Korea. The ROK‘s unification vision is to achieve one nation, one
state, one system, and one government through the KNC unification formula.
The ROK hoped that the DPRK would pursue reform and openness under conditions of
stability and abandon its ambitions to communize the South, and it clearly reiterated that it had
no desire to unify the Korean peninsula by absorbing the North. A unified Korean peninsula no
longer remains wishful thinking. It has now become a realistic goal. This calls for greater
preparedness on the part of the South for unification, including the buildup of its capabilities to
accomplish the task, as well as its more active efforts to improve inter-Korean relations.
Paragraph Two of the June 15 (2000) Joint Declaration
President Kim Dae-jung and Chairman Kim Jong Il had a historic summit meeting in
Pyongyang on 13-15 June, 2000 and signed the June 15 Joint Declaration, opening a new era of
reconciliation, cooperation and peace between the two Koreas. Since the first inter-Korean
summit in June 2000, inter-Korean relations substantially improved until the advent of the Lee
Myung-bak government in February 2008. The second inter-Korean summit between President
Roh Moo-hyun and Chairman Kim Jong Il contributed to changes in North Korean perceptions
of South Korea and the outside world. But North Korea‘s nuclear issue has been a key obstacle to
the Korean peace/unification processes. Inter-Korean relations under the Lee regime went back
to the hostile inter-Korean relations prior to the June 15 Joint Declaration.
(1) DPRK’s Proposal for a Low-Level Federation
Why is it so important for the two Koreas to discuss the second paragraph of the fivepoint June 15 Joint Declaration? It states, ―Acknowledging that there are common elements in
the South‘s proposal for a confederation and the North‘s proposal for a federation of lower stage
as the formulae for achieving reunification, the South and the North agreed to promote
reunification in that direction in the future‖ (Peace and Cooperation: White Paper 2001, 39).
This joint declaration is a departure from the past, symbolizing the end of ideological
arguments.5 Let us turn to discuss differences and similarities between the two proposals and
take a brief look at the key problems in the declaration.
As discussed above, Pyongyang has maintained that its DFRK‘s unification formula is a
complete form in which a federal state will exercise national defense and diplomatic rights, while
the South and the North will exercise their respective rights over regional affairs. But since 1991,
Pyongyang has maintained the basic structure of one nation, one state, two systems, and two
4

For details of the Special Address Made by President Roh Tae Woo at the 147th Regular National Assembly, see
Korean National Community Unification Formula: Basic Explanatory Materials. 1989. Seoul: National Unification
Board.
5
A North Korean version of the second paragraph in the Joint Declaration reads, ―The north and the south,
recognizing that the low-level federation proposed by the north and the commonwealth system proposed by the
south for the reunification of the country have similarity, agreed to work together for the reunification in this
direction in the future‖ (http://naenara.com.kp/en/one/nation.php?1+koryo; search: 12 March, 2012).

11

regional governments, while each regional government will take charge of national defense and
diplomatic rights. The DFRK plan tactically changed in the early 1990s. It appears that the
DFRK plan sees a gradual approach to unification and a federal state remains a symbol and each
regional government will be in charge of economics, culture, national defense, and diplomacy.
This plan is similar to that of the South‘s confederation proposal at the second stage of its
unification formula. Kim Il Sung wanted to keep his system intact through temporary
coexistence with the South in a hostile international environment following the end of the Cold
War.
The DPRK‘s proposal for a low-level federation symbolized peaceful coexistence
between the two Korean states. One argues that North Korea has changed its unification formula
strategically, but this argument is not persuasive. Nevertheless, it appears that the DFRK plan
still remains alive. An Kyoung-ho, Director of Secretariat of the Committee for the Peaceful
Reunification of the Fatherland, explaining the DPRK‘s proposal for a low-level federation at the
6 October, 2000 meeting to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the proposal for founding a
Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo (DFRK) as a unification formula, stressed its low-level
federation as a unification formula under which the two regional governments in Korea will
retain political, diplomatic, and military rights as they now do, without handing over sovereign
power to a federal government called a ―national reunification council.‖ Under the council, the
two regional governments will enjoy sovereign autonomy before establishing a DFRK (Rodong
Sinmun, 7 October, 2000; Pyongyang Times, 14 October, 2000; Vantage Point, November 2000,
26-27).
The DPRK argued that the shortest way to Korean unification was to establish a national
unified state with a federation formula based on ―one nation, one state, two systems and two
governments.‖ The federal formula is based on the three principles of national reunification -independence, peaceful reunification, and great national unity -- and this low-level federation
was initially proposed by President Kim Il Sung in his 1991 New Year message. The concept of
the federal republic was first introduced by Kim in August 1960, and formulated in the form of a
proposal to the South under the name of the ―Democratic Confederate (originally Confederate in
English, later changed to Federal) Republic of Koryo‖ (DC (F) RK) on 10 October, 1980. The
DC(F)RK formula was a complete form for national unification, while North Korea‘s proposal
for a low-level federation is an interim form for eventually establishing the DFRK. Kim Il Sung
in October 1980 emphasized, ―the most realistic and reasonable way to reunify the country
independently, peacefully and on the principle of great national unity is to draw the north and the
south together into a federal state, leaving the ideas and social systems existing in the north and
south as they are.‖6
Pyongyang‘s proposal for a national (re)unification council was not spelled out in detail
in term of functions and roles in a low-level federation. In my view, its low-level federation
should be understood as an interim stage to the high-level federation, i.e., a DFRK formula;
namely, the DPRK maintains a step-by-step unification plan through a low-level federation to
establish the DFRK.
(2) South Korea’s Proposal for Inter-Korean Confederation
The ROK‘s proposal for an inter-Korean confederation in the June 15 Joint Declaration is,
6

For a new English version of Kim Il Sung‘s Report to the 6th Congress of the Workers‘ Party of Korea on the work
of the central committee (excerpt),10 October, 1986, see http://naenara.com.kp /en/one/nation.php?1+koryo (search:
24 June, 2012).

12

in fact, the second phase of the ROK‘s unification formula. The first phase of inter-Korean
reconciliation and cooperation in the KNC unification formula will follow the second phase of
the national community (particularly, economic and social community), which is an interim stage
to a unitary unified Korea. Therefore, the ROK‘s proposal for inter-Korean confederation
assumes one nation, one state, two systems, and two governments, and the two Koreas will
possess their respective defense and diplomatic rights. Further, the two Koreas will have an interKorean summit meeting, an inter-Korean parliamentary meeting, and an inter-Korean cabinet
meeting.
Similarities and Differences between the Two Formulae
What are common features of the Seoul‘s confederation proposal and the Pyongyang‘s
low-level federation proposal in the June 15 Joint Declaration? First, the two proposals are based
on a principle of peaceful unification. Second, the two proposals have an interim stage in the
unification process, not a final stage of Korean unification. The loose form of federation
proposed by Kim Il Sung in his New Year address in 1991 appeared to establish a state under one
roof, recognizing the existence of two regional governments. In short, North Korea appears to
promote a loose form of the DFRK plan under the different term, ―a low-level federation‖ in the
June 15 Joint Declaration. Third, North Korea‘s proposal for a low-level federation granted
diplomatic and defense rights to two regional governments. The two regional governments
would participate in the central government on an equal basis. But the national (re)unification
council the North Korea mentioned is not yet spelled out in detail.
The differences between the two Koreas‘ unification formulae are: First, North Korea‘s
DFRK plan aims at achieving one nation, one state, two systems, and two governments, while
South Korea‘s KNC unification formula is designed to achieve one nation, one state, one system
and one government. Second, Pyongyang‘s proposal for a low-level federation was designed to
prevent unification through absorption by Seoul. Third, the DFRK unification formula has
preconditions for implementing the plan, while Seoul‘s formula does not. Fourth, the DFRK plan
has a central government, while Seoul‘s inter-Korean confederation plan is an interim stage to a
unified Korea. Hence, it does not have a central government (Namkoong 2001, 59-80).
As shown below in Table 1, the differences between Pyongyang‘s DFRK formula and
Seoul‘s KNC formula are remarkable, such that a unified Korea would have different structures
and identities. The KNC formula is to establish a unitary, democratic unified state based on
nationalism, democracy, freedom and a welfare state, while the DFRK formula is to establish a
federal state with one nation, one state, two systems, and two regional governments. Further, the
DFRK plan attached at least five preconditions for establishing a federal state, which the ROK
cannot accept. Thus, there has been no progress in moving forward to the Korean unification
process since the June 15 Joint Declaration in 2000.
<Table 1> A Comparison of the Two Koreas‘ Unification Formulae
ROK
Name
Basic

DPRK

Korean National Community Democratic Federal Republic of
(KNC) Unification Formula Koryo (DFRK) Formula
Liberal democracy

Juche (self-reliance) ideology
13

Ideology
Unification
Key Body

All people

Proletariat class

Unification
Principles

Independence, peace, and
democracy

Independence, peaceful
reunification, and great national
unity

Unification
Process

Three phases: (1)
Gradual completion of a federal
Reconciliation/cooperation(2)
state. Low-level
Inter-Korean confederation(3)
federationDFRK
A unified single state

Interim Stage
Inter-Korean confederation
Low-level federation
Procedures for General, democratic election in
a Unified
the South and the North under a A series of political negotiations
Korea
unified constitution
One nation, one state, two
Format of a
One nation, one state, one
systems, two regional
Unified Korea
system, one government
governments
Future Vision Freedom, welfare, human dignity
of a Unified guaranteed, advanced democratic
A neutral state
Korea
state
Source: Author‘s Data Collection
The ROK and the DPRK need to do joint research on a common unification formula
acceptable to both sides. For the past 13 years, the ROK and the DPRK have not even discussed
the second paragraph of the June 15 Joint Declaration. The common unification formula should
begin with joint research on the second paragraph in order to implement this agreed provision in
the future. As we have seen in our discussion of the two Koreas‘ unification formulae, the two
Koreas cannot accept the each other‘s unification formula. The two Koreas should therefore
work together in designing a common unification formula. Let us now turn to an alternative to
the existing unification formulae of the two Koreas.
III. ONE KOREA FORMULA THROUGH NEUTRALIZATION REGIME BUILDING
The ROK and the DPRK have insisted on their own unification formulae. Seoul cannot
accept Pyongyang‘s DFRK formula, while Pyongyang cannot accept Seoul‘s KNC formula either.
Hence, the author proposes a new Korean unification formula through neutralization as an
alternative.
Peace through Neutralization on the Korean Peninsula (PNKP)
The author would like to propose a unified Korea through neutralization regime building
based on the concept of peace through neutralization on the Korean peninsula (PNKP). Its
concept is relatively easy to understand. If the two Koreas make all efforts to neutralize the
extreme thinking, hard-line policy and behavior, then national reconciliation, harmony of interest,
and peace between them will ensue. In that direction, there will be a smooth road to a peaceful
unification of Korea. A unified Korea will remain a non-aligned, neutralized state, seeking a
14

balanced security and foreign policy.
The concept of PNKP should be considered at three levels: (1) the South Korean
domestic level, (2) the inter-Korean level, and (3) the international level. First, ideological
cleavages between conservatives and progressives in South Korea need to be resolved through
PNKP, and national consensus on a neutralization unification formula then needs to be achieved.
Without neutralizing ideological cleavages in South Korea, there will be no national consensus.
Second, inter-Korean reconciliation, cooperation, and peace through neutralization need to be
achieved for a neutralized, unified Korea. Third, a unified Korea will be a non-aligned,
neutralized state, making no military alliance with any of the four major powers (the U.S., China,
Japan, or Russia), maintaining a peaceful and balanced diplomacy with them. It is argued that the
neutralization of the Korean peninsula will be in the best interest of the Korean people and the
four powers, resolving intra- and inter-Korean ideological conflicts and promoting peace and
stability in Northeast Asia. The four major powers need to make firm commitments not to
interfere in the domestic affairs of a unified Korea.
A unified Korea would be a peaceful, neutralized, non-aligned state, offering a foundation
for peace, security, and co-prosperity in Northeast Asia. In short, a neutralized peace regime on
the Korean peninsula will be achieved if there is a national consensus on Korean unification
through neutralization in the South and the North. In the near future, with some improvement in
the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and some progress in peace-regime building on the
Korean peninsula, the Korean unification issue through neutralization could be discussed at the
Six-Party Talks and/or multilateral talks.
Neutralization Regime-Building as an Alternative to Two Unification Formulae
A unified Korea remains a future vision, not a reality for 75 million Koreans. The ROK
and the DPRK have lived in a hostile confrontation for the last 68 years since the division of the
Korean peninsula. Nevertheless, Seoul and Pyongyang have made little efforts to create a unified
one Korean state by peaceful means. As discussed above, the reality is that the two Koreas have
failed to agree on a common unification formula because of lack of political will to unify the
Korean peninsula. The author has opposed a Korean unification by force, absorption, and
incorporation. It appears that one Korea vision may be achieved by inter-Korean and
international agreements through neutralization.
Neutralization is designed as a means to promote national reconciliation, harmony of
interest, peace, and unification on the Korean peninsula, where the interests of the four major
powers intersect, mainly because of its geostrategic location. We cannot change geography in
Northeast Asia, but we may change history by creating a unification formula through
neutralization. A unified Korea‘s independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty would be
guaranteed by the four major powers concerned, the U.S., China, Russia and Japan, surrounding
the Korean peninsula for all times, permanently in times of war and peace under the condition
that a unified Korea would permanently agree to renounce war except for self-defense.
In the present Northeast Asian security environment, the four powers are unwilling to
support Korean unification primarily because their interests are in conflict. However, a unified
Korea through neutralization will benefit all parties concerned—the two Koreas and the four
powers. A unified, neutralized Korea will be in the best interest of the four powers, and thus they
will support a unified Korean peninsula through neutralization.
The ROK and the DPRK need to be prepared for a unified, neutralized Korean peninsula.
First and foremost they must neutralize themselves by disengaging from the bilateral arms race,
15

military provocations, ideological feuding, and military alliance systems. The two Koreas also
have to promote national reconciliation, mutual trust and confidence building. Thus, interKorean relations must be improved and peaceful so that the two Koreas can negotiate with the
four major powers on the neutralization on the Korean peninsula. When a neutralization treaty
between the two Koreas and the four powers is concluded, a divided Korea would be
transformed into a peaceful and neutralized Korean peninsula.
Neutralization on the Korean Peninsula is based on an assumption that the four powers
would prefer a unified, neutral, independent, and peaceful Korea to a divided, unstable one.
What‘s more, a unified Korean peninsula is unlikely to change the overall strategic balance of
power in Northeast Asia. Hence, the author believes that the four major powers are likely to
support a neutralized, unified Korean peninsula, which will be in their best interests (Cai 2012;
Kaseda 2012; Kim 2012; Zhebin 2012).
The Rationale for a Neutralization-Unification Formula on the Korean Peninsula
What is the rationale for neutralization on the Korean peninsula? Why is a neutralization
unification formula desirable? We will look into it from four perspectives. First, from a
geopolitical perspective, the Korean peninsula has been a victim of a balance of power politics
among major powers surrounding the peninsula for many centuries because of a geopoliticalstrategic location, and thus neutralization will liberate the Korean peninsula from a balance of
power politics.
Second, from the four major powers‘ perspectives, neutralization will be in best interests
of the four major powers (the U.S., China, Russia, and Japan). Hence, they will be supportive of
a neutralized, denuclearized, unified Korean peninsula.
Third, from the perspectives of the two Koreas, Koreans have suffered from deep
ideological cleavages between extreme conservatives and radicals, and neutralization could thus
help resolve them. Neutralization could weaken ideological feuds among South Koreans and
between the two Koreas as well. Further, neutralization will reduce arms spending of the two
Koreas, so the two would invest in economic development projects. In addition, neutralization
could also diminish Pyongyang‘s incentives for being a nuclear state, thereby accelerating the
denuclearization and peace-regime-building process on the Korean peninsula.
Fourth, from a unification formula perspective, the ROK and the DPRK have conflicting
unification formulae and cannot accept each other‘s present unification formula as discussed
above. Thus, the author proposes a neutralization-unification formula as an alternative to existing
two Koreas‘ unification formulae.
It is argued that one of the core obstacles to the Korean peace and unification processes is
the absence of a common Korean unification formula and a common ideology acceptable to the
two Koreas. Transforming various conflicting ideologies such as socialism, Juche ideology
(independence or self-reliance), Sungunjongchi (military-first politics), capitalism, democracy,
and human rights into a common unification ideology seems an impossible task. However, the
idea of neutralization serving as a catalyst can contribute to a framework of Korean unification
based on the traditional concept of a Hongik Ingan Tongil ideology (way of unification
benefiting all). Therefore, we have proposed a Hongik ideology as a common ideology of a
unified Korea.
IV. STRATEGIES FOR IMPLEMENTING A FIVE-STAGE NEUTRALIZATIONUNIFICATION FORMULA
16

As discussed above, neutralization based on a neutralized peace regime on the Korean
peninsula is absolutely necessary for one Korean state building and will be a win-win strategy
for all parties concerned.
A neutralization-unification formula is based on a five-stage neutralization plan through
inter-Korean economic-and-peace-community building to construct a unitary, unified,
neutralized state. The neutralization-unification formula will be briefly discussed below.
A neutralized Korea will enjoy a neutral status in time of war and peace in international
law. The idea of a permanent neutralization on the Korean peninsula has been supported for
many centuries by scholars, politicians, and intellectuals primarily because of geopolitical
location of the Korean peninsula (Hwang 1987; Kang 2010; Kang 2007). Since the Korean
peninsula has been a victim of balance of power politics, a neutralized Korean peninsula idea
appeals to many people as a means to insure peace, security, and prosperity on the Korean
peninsula. It is significant and encouraging that Dr. Sohn Hak-kyu, a senior advisor to the
Democratic Party, made a proposal for the Korean peninsula neutralization-unification formula
on 16 July, 2012 (Yonhap News, 16 July, 2012).
The Charter for Neutralization on the Korean peninsula (see Appendix) was declared as a
neutralization- unification formula on 21 October, 2010 in Seoul, Korea. The Charter proposes
the future vision for a unified Korea through a five-stage neutralization formula. A five-stage
neutralization-unification formula for constructing a unitary, unified, neutralized state will be
briefly discussed below.
The 1st Stage: Neutralization Preparation
It is desirable that the ROK and the DPRK be normalized by concluding a basic treaty by
confirming existing inter-Korean agreements. The ROK and the DPRK should recognize each
other as an independent, sovereign state and reaffirm inviolability of the territorial boundary
drawn by the Korean Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953 until the conclusion of a Korean
peninsula peace treaty. A permanent mission in each other‘s capital will be established with a
normalization of inter-Korean relations. They shall resolve their disputes by peaceful means,
respecting the Charter of the United Nations by refraining from threat or use of force. They shall
sincerely observe the inter-Korean agreements of the July 4 joint declaration, the 1992 interKorean basic agreement, the June 15, 2000 joint declaration and the October 4, 2007 joint
statement for promoting mutual confidence-building and a peaceful coexistence.
The author has proposed that the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement needs to be replaced
by a peace treaty signed by the four parties concerned (the U.S., China, and the two Koreas).
Four peace agreements must be included in a Korean peninsula peace treaty: a U.S.-DPRK peace
agreement, a South-North peace agreement, a U.S.-China peace agreement, and a China-ROK
peace agreement. Without concluding a peace treaty to end the Korean War, it is meaningless to
discuss a unification issue through neutralization. The peace-regime building on the Korean
peninsula, along with the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, is a top agenda item to be
discussed at the four-party talks in the near future.
The 2nd Stage: Inter-Korean Neutralization-Unification Formula Agreement
The ROK and the DPRK should agree to declare neutralization regime building on the
Korean peninsula, and then they need to adopt a South-North joint agreement for a
neutralization-unification formula. The ROK and the DPRK would appear to have many
difficulties in agreeing on a common unification formula based on the DFRK and KNC formulae.
17

The fusion of the North‘s unification formula and the South‘s plan is more difficult to be
achieved than an agreement on the neutralization-unification formula. The two Koreas need to
have political will to agree on the neutralization roadmap.
A neutralization agreement between the ROK and the DPRK, including a neutralization
declaration will be concluded with a provision setting up an interim de jure joint unification
commission titled ―The South-North Joint Supreme Unification Council (JSUC).‖ The JSUC,
consisting of equal numbers from the South and the North and appropriate numbers from
overseas Koreans, not exceeding two hundred (200) members all together, and the highest joint
organ to manage Korean unification procedures, has the following structures and roles.
The JSUC will elect its standing committee members of twenty (20) representing equal
numbers of the South and the North with a few members representing overseas Koreans, and has
its Secretariat. The JSUC will be in charge of establishing institutional arrangements for
establishing the United Republic of Corea (the URC), preparing for the URC constitution,
designing a new national flag, composing a new national anthem, and designating a new capital
for the URC.
The JSUC will establish a Joint Arms Control and Disarmament Commission to
reappraise and adjust the armed forces for the neutralized URC and a Joint Military Command
Structure to present a united front to any foreign intervention. The JSUC will be in charge of
negotiating at any time with any foreign countries concerned and international organizations for
achieving a peaceful unification through neutralization. At this stage, it is expected that an interKorean economic community will be established through interim stages of confederation and
possibly federation as specified in June 15 (2000) joint statement. There are still two states, two
systems and two governments on the Korean peninsula. An inter-Korean confederation will be
set at this stage.
The 3rd Stage: International Neutralization Treaty
Korean unification through neutralization could not be achieved without international
cooperation because the four powers‘ interests intersect on the Korean peninsula. The four
Powers (the U.S., China, Russia and Japan) will conclude a neutralization treaty with the two
Koreas and later the URC, recognizing its permanent neutrality status and its non-alignment
policy. The treaty endorsed by the United Nations will be registered at the UN Secretariat. The
four powers will guarantee a neutralized Korean peninsula. The treaty should be registered at UN
Secretariat and it should be endorsed by the United Nations. This stage may be in an interKorean federal status.
The 4th Stage: Neutralization Constitution
The two Koreas will draft and adopt a neutralization constitution which will be approved
by the Korean people, and then general elections will be prepared in the entire Korean peninsula
according to the new constitution for constructing unified one Korea: one state, one system and
one government.
The 5th Stage: General Elections/One Korea
There will be general, democratic elections in the entire Korean peninsula to establish
one Korean state. A neutralized, denuclearized, unified Korean state will be born through general
e l e c t i o n . T h e n am e o f a n e w u n i fi e d , n e u t r a l i z e d Ko r e a w i l l b e t h e Un i t e d
Republic of Corea (the URC) founded on a Korean traditional ideology of Hongik Tongil and
18

peace, liberal democracy, human rights and market economy. The URC, denouncing war,
recognizing a peaceful settlement of any international disputes and declaring a permanent
neutrality, will preserve and ensure its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity,
sincerely carrying out its obligations of neutrality. The URC, a member of the United Nations,
will be a peaceful, non-aligned, neutralized state which is defensive and armed, defending its
independence and territorial integrity against attack by any foreign country with all available
means. Neutrality is an obligation of the state, not of the individual citizen, therefore citizens
have no obligation to remain neutral; they may freely express their own opinions.
The URC and the four powers will establish three enforcement machineries: a Peace
Observer Team, an International Tribunal, and a Board of Guarantors, each consisting of five
members - one from each country to guarantee the permanent neutrality of the URC. The Peace
Observer Team will investigate and verify any violations of the neutrality law and submit its
report to the International Tribunal. The International Tribunal will render its judgments on the
findings from the Peace Observer Team and send its recommendations to the Board of
Guarantors, which will implement the recommendations from the International Tribunal with all
available means, and it may even resort to the armed forces of the member states to defend the
permanent neutrality of the URC. These machineries will be dissolved when the permanent
neutrality is firmly established.
The five-stage neutralization-unification formula in <Table 2> provides a roadmap for
building one Korean state on the Korean peninsula.
<Table 2> Specific Action Plan for a Five-Stage Neutralization-Unification Formula
1st
Normalization of Inter-Korean relations through an inter-Korean basic treaty.
Stage:
Peace and neutralization regime-building: implementation of existing inter-Korean
Neutralization
agreements/ denuclearization/ a Korean peninsula peace treaty will be signed.
Preparation

2nd
Stage:
Inter-Korean
NeutralizationUnification
Formula
Agreement

A neutralization regime declaration on the Korean peninsula.
A neutralization-unification formula agreement between the ROK and the DPRK:
Establishment of a joint unification commission, ―The South-North Joint Supreme
Unification Council (JSUC),‖ 200 members; the Standing Committee(20 members); the
Secretariat; Joint Arms Control and Disarmament Commission and Joint Military
Command Structure for joint measures against any foreign intervention. Establishment of
inter-Korean economic community through interim stages of confederation and federation
as specified in June 15 (2000) joint statement. 2 states, 2 systems and 2 governments. InterKorean confederation stage.

19

3rd
Stage:
International
Neutralization
Treaty

A conclusion of a neutralization treaty between the two Koreas and the four major powers
(the U.S., Russia, China, and Japan) and later the URC, recognizing its permanent
neutrality status and its non-alignment policy. The four powers‘ guarantees on a neutralized
Korean peninsula. This stage may be in an inter-Korean federal status.

4th
Stage:
Draft of a unified, neutralized constitution and approval by Korean people. Two Koreas‘
Neutralization
adoption of the Constitution. One Korea vision: 1 state, 1 system and 1 government.
Constitution

5th
Stage:
General
Elections/One
Korea

Holding of general, democratic elections on the entire Korean peninsula/
Establishment of a neutralized, denuclearized, unified one Korea/UN member.
The United Republic of Corea (the URC) founded on a Korean traditional ideology of Hon
gik Tongil and peace, freedom, equality, democracy, justice and human rights; The URC, a
peaceful, non-aligned, neutralized state, and defensive and armed, defending its independe
nce and territorial integrity.

The realization of the five-stage Korean unification through neutralization requires the
political will of the two Korean top leaders and many years of research and preparation. Now is
the time for the Korean people to seriously engage in research on the neutralization-unification
formula. The ROK and the DPRK must take the initiative to persuade the Korean people and the
four major powers to accept a neutralized unification formula to construct a unified one Korean
state.
Seoul and Pyongyang need to begin building mutual trust, first ceasing their arms race,
avoiding military confrontation, and gradually engaging in military-security confidence building
between the two Koreas. The two Koreas need to engage in improving inter-Korean relations by
reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula and eventually constructing an inter-Korean economic
community. It will take a long time for the two Korean states to conclude a neutralization treaty
with the four major powers, and the Korean people must be patient and vigilant with political
will to establish a neutralized, unified Korea. One must understand that there is a long, difficult
road ahead to achieve a neutralized, unified Korean peninsula.
V. CONCLUSION
We have evaluated current unification formulae of the two Koreas, which are
unacceptable by both sides, and proposed a neutralization-unification formula as an alternative to
the two Koreas‘ existing formulae. The rationale for neutralization on the Korean peninsula has
been provided and a five-stage unification formula through neutralization has been proposed for
further research.
The DPRK‘s nuclear issue has been a key obstacle to the peace process on the Korean
20

peninsula, and its denuclearization process has been long stalled since its long-range rocket
launch on 5 April, 2009. Pyongyang reactivated its nuclear facilities and conducted nuclear tests,
violating the 19 September, 2005, joint agreement. To resume the long-stalled Six-Party Talks,
the U.S. and the DPRK produced the 29 February 2012 agreement. Again, Pyongyang violated
U.N. Resolutions 1718 and 1874 and the 29 February agreement by launching a satellite using a
three-stage rocket on 13 April and 12 December, 2012. The UN Security Council unanimously
passed the Resolution 2087 on 22 January 2013. The DPRK viciously reacted in words,
declaring its intention to abandon the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. 7 The DPRK
conducted its third nuclear test on 12 February, 2013. As a result, a new crisis on the Korean
peninsula arose in the spring of 2013. But with the resumption of the long-stalled Six-Party Talks
under China‘s mediation, it is expected that the denuclearization process on the Korean peninsula
will be restarted in the near future.
The DPRK‘s amended constitution is now referred to as the ―Kim Il Sung-Kim Jong Il
Constitution.‖ The preamble credits Kim Jong Il with turning ―our motherland into an evervictorious power of political thought, a nuclear power and an invincible military power and
opened a great, brilliant path to the construction of a powerful and prosperous nation.‖8 Whether
the DPRK will resume the denuclearization process, thus abandoning a nuclear power status,
remains to be seen.
The road to a unified Korea through neutralization will be long, rough, and difficult, but
the Korean unification process has already begun. In the short-term, the denuclearization and
peace-regime-building processes on the Korean peninsula should be pursued simultaneously.
The unification process will be accelerated with the denuclearization and peace-regime-building
processes on the Korean peninsula. The Korean people as key players must work together for a
unified Korean peninsula and persuade major powers to support a neutralized, unified Korea,
which will be in their best interests. Once again, the Korean people must understand that their
firm determination will eventually build a new, neutralized and advanced welfare state through
neutralization with full support and cooperation of the four major powers.<The End>

7

For details, see DPRK Foreign Ministry 2013; DPRK National Defense Commission 2013; The Committee for the
Peaceful Reunification of Korea 2013.
8
See the full text of the amended ―Kim Il Sung- Kim Jong-il Constitution‖
(http://naenara.com.kp/en/great/constitution.php; search: 30 May 2012).

21

REFERENCES
Cai, Jian. 2012. ―The Future Vision for a Unified Korean Peninsula: A Chinese Perspective.‖
Global Peace Festival Foundation ed. Global Peace Festival Korea 2012 Conference Papers.
2012. 8. 17-19, Grand Hilton Hotel, Seoul, Korea.
Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea 2013. ―S. Korean Authorities Accused of
Fabricating UN ‗Resolution‘ with Foreign Forces.‖ KCNA. 25 January 2013.
DPRK Foreign Ministry 2013. ―DPRK FM Refutes UNSC‘s ‗Resolution‘ Pulling up DPRK over
its Satellite Launch.‖ KCNA. 23 January 2013.
DPRK National Defence Commission 2013. ―DPRK NDC Issues Statement Refuting UNSC
Resolution.‖ KCNA. 24 January 2013.
Hanbando Forum [Korean Peninsula Forum]. 2012. Nambuk Gwangye 3.0: Hanbando
Pyonghwa Hyupryuk Process [South-North Relations 3.0: Korean Peninsula Peace
Cooperation Process]. Seoul: Joongang Ilbo Institute for Unification Culture.
Hwang, In K. 1987. One Korea via Permanent Neutrality. Cambridge, Mass: Schenkman Books,
Inc.
Kang, Kwang Sik. 2010. Joongliphwa-wa Hanbando Tongil [Neutralization and Korean
Unification]. Seoul: Baeksanseodang.
Kang, Jong Il ed. 2007. Hanbando Joongliphwaro Ganeun Gil [The Road to Neutralization of
the Korean Peninsula]. Seoul: Kwangyangsa.
Kang, Young Du and Yu Mi Lee. 16 July 2012. ―Sohn Hak-kyu ‗Hanbando Joonglibhwa
Tongilbangan‘ Naenwa [Sohn Hak-kyu Proposed Korean Peninsula Neutralization
Unification Formula]‖ Yonhap News.
http://app.yonhapnews.co.kr/YNA/Basic/article/new_search/YIBW_showSearchArticle_
New.aspx?searchpart=article&searchtext=%ec%a4%91%eb%a6%bd%ed%99%94+%ed
%86%b5%ec%9d%bc%eb%b0%a9%ec%95%88&contents_id=AKR2012071614980000
1 (search: 17 July 2012).
Kaseda, Yoshinori. 2012. ―The Future Vision for a Unified Korean Peninsula: A Japanese
Perspective.‖ Global Peace Festival Foundation ed., Global Peace Festival Korea 2012
Conference Papers. 2012. 8. 17-19, Grand Hilton Hotel, Seoul, Korea.
Kim, Il Sung. 1980. Report to the Sixth Congress of the Workers‟ Party of Korea on the Work of
the Central Committee. Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House. 59-81.
Kim, Il Sung. 1980. Report (a new version) to the 6th Congress of the Workers‟ Party of Korea
on the Work of the Central Committee (excerpt), October 10, 1980. http://naenara.com.kp
/en/one/nation.php?1+koryo (search: 24 June 2012).
22

Kim Il Sung. 1983. ―Speech Made at the Banquet to Celebrate the 35th Birthday of the DPRK,
September 9, 1983,‖ Korea Today: Monthly Journal. 326, No. 11, 15.
―Kim Il Sung-Kim Jong Il Constitution.‖ http://naenara.com.kp/en/great/constitution.php (search:
30 May 2012).
Kim, Tae Young. 2001. Aeguk Aejok-eui Tongil Bangan [North Korea‟s Unification Formula].
Pyongyang: Pyongyang Publishing Co.
Kim, Tong. 2012. ―The Future Vision for a Unified Korean Peninsula: A U.S. Perspective.‖
Global Peace Festival Foundation ed., Global Peace Festival Korea 2012 Conference
Papers. 2012. 8. 17-19, Grand Hilton Hotel, Seoul, Korea.
Kwak, Tae-Hwan. 2012. ―The Future of the Six-Party Talks in the Post-Kim Jong Il Era,‖ Korea
Review. Vol. II, No. 1. 12-32.
Kwak, Tae-Hwan. 2010a. ―A Creative Formula for Building a Korean Peninsula Peace Regime.‖
Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo, eds., Peace Regime Building on the Korean
Peninsula and Northeast Asian Security Cooperation(Hampshire: Ashgate). 21-44.
Kwak, Tae-Hwan. 2010b. ―The Six-Party Talks and North Korea‘s Denuclearization: Evaluation
and Prospects.‖ Pacific Focus. Vol. XXV, No. 2. 211-236.
Kwak, Tae-Hwan and Seung-Ho Joo, eds. 2010. Peace Regime Building on the Korean
Peninsula and Northeast Asian Security Cooperation (Hampshire: Ashgate).
Kwak, Tae-Hwan. 2009. ―The Korean Peninsula Peace Regime: How to Build it.‖ Pacific Focus.
Vol. XXIV, No. 1.
Kwak, Tae-Hwan. 2004. ―The Six-Party Nuclear Talks: An Evaluation and Policy
Recommendations.‖ Pacific Focus. Vol. XIX, No. 2. 7-55.
Kwak, Tae-Hwan. 2003 ―The Korean Peninsula Peace Regime Building through the Four-Party
Peace Talks: Re-evaluation and Policy Recommendations.‖ Journal of East Asian Affairs,
Vol. 17, No. 1. 1-32.
Kwak, Tae-Hwan and Seung-Ho Joo eds. 2003. The Korean Peace Process and the Four Powers
(Hampshire: Ashgate).
Kwak, Tae-Hwan. 1997. ―The Four-Party Peace Treaty: A Creative Formula for Building a Peace
Regime on the Korean Peninsula.‖ Korea Journal for Defense Analyses. Vol. IX, No. 2.
117-135.
Kwak, Tae-Hwan. 1989. In Search of a Step-by-Step Policy for the Realization of the Korean
National Community (A Specially Commissioned Research Report to the Ministry of
23

Unification, ROK, 10 August 1989).
Kwak, Tae-Hwan. 1986. In Search of Peace and Unification on the Korean Peninsula. Seoul:
Seoul Computer Press.
Namkoong, Young. 2001. ―Similarities and Dissimilarities: The Inter-Korean Summit and
Unification Formulae.‖ East Asian Review. Vol. 13, No. 3. 59-80.
North Korean version of the 15 June Joint Declaration.
http://naenara.com.kp/en/one/nation.php?1+koryo (search: 12 March 2012).
―North Korea‘s Unification Formula,‖ Vantage Point (November 2000). 26-27.
Peace and Cooperation: White Paper on Korean Unification, 1996. Seoul: Ministry of Nation
Unification, ROK.
Peace and Cooperation: White Paper on Korean Unification, 2001. Seoul: Ministry of
Unification, ROK.
Ri Yong Jo. 14 October, 2000. ―20 Years of Bi-System (DFRK) Formula,‖ The Pyongyang Times.
Rodong Sinmun. 7 October 2000. ―A Meeting of Pyongyangites on 6 October 2000, to
Commemorate the 20th Anniversary of the Proposal for Founding of Democratic Federal
Republic of Koryo (DFRK) Proposed by Great Leader Chairman Kim Il Sung [Widaehan
Suryung Kim Il Sung Dongji Gyessoe Koryo Minju Yeonbang Konghwaguk
Changrypbangan-eul Jessihasin 20dol Kinyum Pyongyang-si Bogohoe Jinhaeng].‖
Roh, Tae Woo. 1989. Speech at the 147th Regular National Assembly, Korean National
Community Unification Formula: Basic Explanatory Materials. Seoul: National
Unification Board.
Zhebin, Alexander. 2012. ―The Future Vision for a Unified Korean Peninsula: A Russian
Perspective.‖ Global Peace Festival Foundation ed., Global Peace Festival Korea 2012
Conference Papers. 2012. 8. 17-19, Grand Hilton Hotel, Seoul, Korea.

24

<APPENDIX>
The following Charter for Neutralization on the Korean Peninsula was declared on October 21, 2010 in
Seoul, Korea.
The Charter for Neutralization on the Korean Peninsula
Preamble
Ever since the division of the Korean peninsula more than sixty-five years ago, there have been numerous
attempts to achieve unification of the divided Korea. The Republic of Korea (ROK or the South) and the
Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea (DPRK or the North) have thus far failed to agree on a common
unification formula. Therefore, we propose a neutralized unification formula as an alternative, which is to
create a single, permanently neutral, unified Korean state through gradual integration of the South and the
North through neutralization.
While simple neutrality known as "ordinary" or "occasional" neutrality exists only in time of war, the
permanent neutrality exists in times of war and peace permanently. Permanent neutrality aims at bringing
peace and security to the Korean peninsula, which has been constantly subject to great power politics for
centuries primarily because of its geo-strategic location. In this context, it would be instructive to recall
an old Korean adage, ―When whales fight, the shrimp in the middle gets crushed.‖ We cannot change our
geography, but by adopting the neutralization paradigm, we can change our history. Our independence,
territorial integrity and sovereignty would be guaranteed by the four major powers concerned, i.e., the
U.S., China, Russia, Japan, surrounding the Korean peninsula for all times, permanently in times of both
war and peace under the condition that a unified Korea would agree to renounce a war permanently
except for self-defense.
The most fundamental merit of permanent neutrality is that it benefits both parties – the neutralized Korea
and the four major powers as it provides guaranteed security for Korea and peaceful relations among the
guarantor powers as they can disengage themselves from their rivalries on the Korean peninsula. This
shall generate a win-win situation for both sides.
This charter provides a conceptual framework for building a neutralization regime on the Korean
peninsula in which the future vision of the five-stage unification formula for neutralization is proposed in
brief as follows: (1) the first stage is a normalization of South-North Korean relations through a peace
regime building; (2) the second stage is a joint agreement on the Korean peninsula neutralization between
the South and the North ; (3) the third stage is to conclude an international treaty on the Korean peninsula
neutralization between the South and the North and the four major powers concerned; (4) the fourth stage
is an adoption of unified constitution and general election; and (5) the fifth stage is the birth of a unified
Korean republic. The detailed procedures and processes for achieving Korean peninsula neutralization
shall be discussed below.
The South and the North must be fully prepared for a unified, neutralized Korean peninsula. First and
foremost they must ―neutralize‖ themselves, by disengaging from their own arms race, military
confrontation, ideological and legitimacy struggle, and military alliances with foreign countries. At the
same time, they have to cultivate and promote genuine reconciliation, mutual trust and support, and
confidence building. Thus having established a stable, secure and peaceful society, the South and the
North can negotiate with the four major powers on the neutralization of the Korean peninsula. When a
neutrality treaty is concluded between a unified Korea and the four powers, the tragedy of the Korean

25

division would be transformed into a peaceful, neutralized unification, creating a new United Republic of
Corea (URC).
The Article 9 of this charter is based on our assumption that the four powers would prefer a united, neutral,
independent, and peaceful Korea to a divided, vulnerable, and unstable one. Furthermore, the URC is
unlikely to change overall strategic balance of power in Northeast Asia. Thus, we strongly believe that the
four powers are likely to support the permanent neutrality of Korea.
It has been argued that one of the key obstacles to the Korean unification process is the absence of a
common Korean unification ―ideology‖ acceptable to the South and the North. Transforming various
conflicting ideologies such as communism, totalitarianism, Juche idea (independence or self-reliance),
Sungun jongchi (military first politics), capitalism, democracy, individual freedom and social justice, into
a common unification ideology seems to be an almost impossible task. However, the idea of neutrality,
serving as a catalyst, can contribute to constructing an over-arching framework of unification based on the
concept of Hongik Tongil Ideology (way of unification benefiting all). Therefore, we have proposed Hong
Ik Tongil as a common ideology of the South and the North really wanting a peaceful unification.
Chapter I
General Principles
Article 1
The name of a new unified Korea shall be the United Republic of Corea (URC) founded on a Korean
traditional ideology of Hongik Tongil and peace, freedom, equality, democracy, justice and human rights.
Article 2
The framework of Korean unification shall be based on the basic principles of permanent neutrality
(neutralization) learned from the Swiss or Austrian model with our own unique creative device grounded
on history and cultural traditions of the Korean nation.
Article 3
The South and the North shall faithfully and sincerely observe the following.
a. The South and the North should recognize each other‘s government and reaffirm inviolability of the
territorial boundary drawn by the Korean Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953 until the conclusion of a
Korean peninsula peace treaty.
b. The South and the North shall resolve their disputes by peaceful means, respecting the Charter of the
United Nations by refraining from threat or use of force. They shall sincerely observe the inter-Korean
agreements of the July 4 joint declaration, the 1992 inter-Korean basic agreement, the June 15, 2000 joint
declaration and the October 4, 2007 joint statement for promoting mutual confidence-building and a
peaceful coexistence.
Chapter II
The Procedures and Processes of Korean Peninsula Neutralization
Article 4

26

The South-North Joint Supreme Unification Council (JSUC) has structures and roles as follows:
a. The South and the North shall establish a permanent mission in each other‘s capital with a
normalization of inter-Korean relations. They shall conclude an inter-Korean neutralization agreement
including a neutralization declaration with a provision setting up an interim de jure joint unification
commission titled ―The South-North Joint Supreme Unification Council (JSUC)‖.
b. Mandated by the South and the North, the JSUC shall be the highest permanent organ to manage
Korean unification processes, consisting of equal numbers from the South and the North Korea and
appropriate numbers from overseas Koreans, not exceeding two hundred (200) members all
together. Each member of the JSUC shall have one vote.
c. The JSUC shall adopt its own rules of organization and operational procedures. The expenses of the
organization shall be borne equally by the South and the North. It shall enjoy in each other‘s territory such
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the performance of their duties.
d. The JSUC shall elect its standing committee members of twenty (20) representing
equal numbers of the South and the North with a few members representing overseas
Koreans.
e. The JSUC Secretariat shall be located in the vicinity of Panmunjom or any place else mutually agreed.
The Secretariat shall keep a journal of its proceedings and from time
to time publish the same, deleting such part as may in its judgment require secrecy.
f. The JSUC shall be in charge of establishing institutional arrangements for creating the URC.
Article 5
The JSUC shall perform the following functions.
a. The JSUC shall prepare for the constitution of the URC. It shall design a new national flag, compose a
new national anthem, and designate a new capital for the URC.
b. The JSUC shall set up a Joint Arms Control and Disarmament Commission to reappraise and adjust
the armed forces of the South and the North to be appropriate for the new status of the neutralized URC.
c. The JSUC shall institute a Joint Military Command Structure to present a united front to any foreign
intervention.
d. The JSUC shall be in charge of making preparation for armed forces of the URC.
e. The JSUC shall be empowered to negotiate at any time with any foreign countries concerned and
international organizations for achieving a peaceful unification through neutralization.
f. All the decisions made by the JSUC shall go into effect once the highest authorities of the South and
the North approve them.
Chapter III
Responsibilities and Obligations of the United Republic of Corea

27

Article 6
The URC shall denounce war, recognizing that any international disputes in which it may be involved
must be settled by peaceful means, and declares permanent neutrality in its international relations. In
order to preserve and ensure its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the URC shall carry
out its obligations of neutrality.
Article 7
The United Republic of Corea shall have the following obligations.
a. The URC shall not resort to the use or threat of force, and shall not interfere in the internal affairs of
other countries.
b. It shall not enter into any military alliance or into any agreement, whether military or otherwise, which
is inconsistent with the neutrality of the URC.
c. It shall not allow the establishment of any foreign military base on its territory, nor allow any country to
use its territory for military purposes of interference in the internal affairs of other countries
d. It shall neither permit any foreign interference in its internal affairs in any form whatsoever nor
recognize the protection of any alliance or military coalition.
e. It shall not allow the introduction into its territory of offensive weapons and war materials except for
its own internal security and defensive purposes.
f. It shall defend its independence and territorial integrity against any interference or attack by any
foreign country with all available means - its neutrality is defensive but armed.
Article 8
Neutrality is an obligation of the state, not of the individual citizen, therefore it restricts in no way the
citizen‘s basic rights to freedom of speech, press, assembly, opinion, conscience, and religion. Citizens
have no obligation to remain neutral; they may freely express their own opinions in the fields of morality,
ethics, ideology, culture and all other social activities.
Chapter IV
Responsibilities and Obligations of the Four Powers (the U.S., China, Russia, Japan)
Article 9
The four powers shall have the following responsibilities and obligations for guaranteeing the permanent
neutrality of the URC.
a. The four powers shall conclude a neutralization treaty with the URC, recognizing its permanent
neutrality status and its non-alignment policy for the defense of its own independence and territorial
integrity. The treaty shall be endorsed by the United Nations and shall be registered at the Secretariat of
the United Nations.
b. They shall respect and observe in every way the independence, territorial integrity, and permanent

28

c. They shall defend and guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the URC and reserve the
right to come to its defense separately in the event that joint action cannot be agreed upon.
d. They shall not commit or participate in any act which might directly or indirectly impair the permanent
neutrality of the URC, or resort to the use or threat of force or any other measure which might impair the
peace of the URC.
e. They shall respect the wish of the URC not to recognize the protection of any alliance or military
coalition. They shall neither introduce into the URC foreign troops or military personnel in any form
whatsoever, nor shall they in any way facilitate or condone the introduction of any foreign troops or
military personnel. They shall not establish in the URC any foreign base or other foreign military
installation of any kind.
f. They shall not use the territory of the URC for interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
They shall not use territory of any country, including their own, for interference in the internal affairs of
the URC.
Chapter V
International Cooperation between the URC and the Four Powers
Article 10
The four powers shall have positive international cooperation and close consultations with the URC.
a. To guarantee the permanent neutrality of the URC, the URC and the four powers shall establish three
enforcement machineries: a Peace Observer Team, an International Tribunal, and a Board of Guarantors,
each consisting of five members - one from each country.
b. The Peace Observer Team shall investigate and verify any violations of the law of neutrality set forth
in Articles 7 and 9 in this charter and submit its reports to the International Tribunal.
c. The International Tribunal shall render its judgments on the findings from the Peace Observer Team
and send its recommendations to the Board of Guarantors.
d. The Board of Guarantors shall implement the recommendations from the International Tribunal with all
available means, and it may even resort to the armed forces of the member states to defend the permanent
e. All these three organs shall get together and devise the rules of their organization and their operational
procedures with a mechanism of effective coordination and cooperation.
f. These machineries shall be dissolved or shall become obsolete when the permanent neutrality is firmly
established.
Supplementary Provisions
Article 1

29

The detailed regulations necessary for carrying out the provisions of this charter, unless otherwise
provided, shall be made by the JSUC with the support of the South and the North governments during the
interim period until the birth of the URC.
Article 2
The present charter and other relevant agreements shall remain in effect as long as they do not conflict
with the constitutions and by-laws of the South and the North.
Article 3
The present charter shall be amended only by a mutual agreement between the South and the North.
*This Charter is a final version of “A Draft Model Charter of Korean Reunification via Permanent Neutrality,” originally
drafted by Professor In-Kwan Hwang. This Charter was approved by the Center for Korean Peninsula Neutralization in
Seoul, Institute for Korean Peninsula Neutralization in Seoul, Tongil-Mirae Institute in Seoul, Korea, Forum for Peaceful
Reunification of Korea (FPRK) in Los Angeles and Korean Unification Strategies Research Council in Los Angeles,
California, USA.

30

China's Role in Korean Unification Vision and
Northeast Asian Peace-building

CHENG Xiaohe, Ph. D
(Associate Professor, School of International Studies, Deputy Director, Center for China‘s
International Strategic Studies, Renmin University of China)

Paper Prepared for Presentation at the Global Peace Convention 2013
Shangri-La Hotel Kuala Lumpur, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, December 5-8, 2013

31

China's Role in Korean Unification Vision and Northeast Asian Peace-building
CHENG Xiaohe, Ph. D
<Contents>
I. Introduction
II. The Roles China Had Played in Ancient History
III. China‘s Roles in the Cold War Era
IV. China‘s Roles in the Post-Cold War Era
V. The Role China Can Play in the Future
VI. Conclusion

Abstract
As Korea‟s next-door neighbor, China has keen interest in Korean affairs, in which Korean unification
issue occupies a central position. Although China is not the creator of the Korean division, but its military
intervention in the Korean War helped to harden the division.
As the two Koreas bogged down in a drawn-out military confrontation and political competition on
the divided Korean Peninsula, the Peninsula became one of major sources of conflicts and instability in
Northeast Asia. The divided situation on the Peninsula remains basically unchanged even though the Cold War
was left behind in early 1990s.
Nonetheless, as the Peninsula remains divided, the relations among major players have undertaken
dramatic changes. China and the United States, once pitted against each other in a dead confrontation, shook
hands and became strategic partners; China and South Korea, another set of antagonists, exchanged
diplomatic recognition and also formed a strategic partnership; the Sino-North Korea relationship, which has
been characterized as “lips and teeth” has had hard time and still faces daunting challenge regarding North
Korea‟s nuclear issues; the inter-Korean relations also have changed from hostile to reconciliatory and to
hostile. As the wealth gap between the North and the South is widening, coupled with leadership changes in
Pyongyang, the expectation of imminent national unification in South Korea runs high.
For China, it realizes that the division of the Korean Peninsula is a historical product and the master
of the ultimate unification on the Peninsula are the Korean people, outside powers‟ interference, no matter
what the motive will be, cannot stop the unification trend. For China, which also faces its own national
division, it is immoral to stand in the way of eventual Korean unification and at the same time, it is
strategically unwise for China to take a hands-off policy toward Korean affairs. A number of non-intervention
and non-obstruction principles should be observed: (1) China should avoid taking specific position on how the
unification process should go; in other words, China should refrain from publically endorsing any specific
unification programs before they become acceptable to both Koreas; (2) China should continue to maintain
friendly relations with both Koreas, no matter who absorbs whom; (3) China should prepare to influence the
process that best serve its national interests through bilateral or multilateral venues; (4) China only conduct
selective interventions as they deems necessary, China should do so with caution; (5) China should not fight
alone, international cooperation is a necessary tool that helps to transform the unification process into a plussum game for major powers.
Guarding against two extreme situations, namely, massive chaos and military conflict or smooth
accomplishment of the national unification, China should prepare to intervene to restore and keep peace on the
Peninsula and to participate post-unification reconstruction in the united Korea.
Key Words: Korea, Korean unification, Korea Peninsula, China, Chinese foreign policy

32

Introduction
The Korean division is a legacy of the Cold War and makes the Korean Peninsula a most
dangerous place in the world. As a major source of conflict, the perennial inter-Korean rivalry
from time to time threatens peace in Northeast Asia, provoking major powers ‗competition,
dividing the region into competing blocs, and fueling regional arms race. As an immediate
neighbor of the Korean Peninsula and major stakeholder in Northeast Asia, China has a keen
interest in the Korean affairs. As the two Koreas, Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea (DPRK,
also called North Korea) and Republic of Korea (ROK, also called South Korea), work to their
final unification, what kind of role China have played and what role it will play in the future
matter. Since what happen on the Korean Peninsula is closely associated with the general
security situation in Northeast Asia, what peace building role China can do in the region also
deserves a special attention in this paper.
The Roles China Had Played in Ancient History
In order to understand what kind of role China may play in the future in Korean
Unification process, it is necessary to know what roles China had played in its long ancient
history. A brief historical assessment is in order.
A Unification facilitator
China dominated East Asia for more than two thousand years. It had carefully cultivated
a complex tribute system to deal with external relations, in which China occupied a central and
superior position vs. other states on its periphery. The system made its debut in Han Dynasty. In
its early years, the system was not firmly established. The tributary states were not always
submissive to the Middle Kingdom. Sometimes, they rose up and fought with China for a variety
reasons. In the Sui Dynasty, border military conflicts flared up and China tried to conquer the
Korean Peninsula, but to no avail. Sui‘s military expeditions led its quick fall. New Dynasty,
Tang, followed Sui‘s suit. In order to eliminate a threat from the Koguryo, which was the most
strongest states on the Korean Peninsula, the Tang government adopted two-pronged strategy,
namely, ―using barbarians against barbarians‖ (YiyiZhiyi) and ―befriending distance states while
attacking those nearby‖ (YuanjiaoJingong), and formed an alliance with Silla to attack Koguryo,
which posed direct threat to China. China‘s intervention in the inter-Korean rivalry decidedly
tilted the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula and helped Silla conquered and united the
whole peninsula. Even though Chinese intervention derived from its self-interest, including
destroying long-time strong competitor and imposing a direct control of the peninsula, one of its
unintended results was that the divided Korean for the first time accomplished their first
unification in ancient times that laid down groundwork for their reunification in the future.
A Security Protector
The tribute system was a device for interest tradeoff. Small and poor states on China‘s
periphery paid tributes to Chinese emperors to demonstrate their submission and allegiance, the
emperors reciprocated in kind with much generous largesse, regime recognition and security
protection. Among all the tributary states, Korea and Vietnam occupied a special position in that
they served as a buffer zone separating China from outside hostile powers. In Ming Dynasty,
33

Korea‘s security value came to be appreciated by Chinese ruling class. After Suffering from
frequent harassment and invasion from Japanese pirates, China begun to see Japan as a direct
threat to its security. To China, Korea was a ―protective screen" (pingzhang). 9 As General
Toyotomi Hideyoshin brought an end to the Sengoku period and united a divided Japan, he
embarked on a risky overseas military adventure by invading Korea in 1592. Recognizing the
loss of Korea to Japan would invite further invasion of China itself, the Ming Court decided to
fulfill its obligation to offer its security protection to Korea. With China strong intervention, the
Korean finally drove Japan out of the Korean peninsula. The place then remained in peace for
nearly three hundred years. But in the next round of head-on competition for sphere of influence
on the Korean Peninsula in late 19th century, China, which haunted by internal turmoil and extern
wars, could not repeat what it did in Ming Dynasty. Even though China once again tried to honor
its security commitment to Korea by sending its military forces to Pyongyang in a vain attempt
to shore up Korean King‘s rule, the rising Japan defeated China and drove it out of the peninsula.
China not only lost its last buffer zone, but also lost capacity to compete with Japan in the years
to come. The vulnerability of China‘s homeland security was completely exposed to Japan
aggression.
China’s Roles in the Cold War Era
In ancient time, living beside giant neighbors had been a tragedy for Korea, Korea fell
victim to Sino-Japanese rivalry. In modern time, Korea still could not escape this misfortune. The
end of the WWII finished Japan‘s occupation but did not return a unitary Korean Peninsula to the
hands of the Korean People. As the Soviet Union and the United States carved up their spheres of
influence in Northeast Asia, they artificially divided the peninsula into two parts along the 38th
parallel with two nations‘ military presence in each side. The unfolding of the Cold War gave a
birth to two competing states on the Peninsula, the ROK and the DPRK, and the two Koreas‘
competition for Korean unification on their own terms became a perennial drama that has been
significantly impacting on the geopolitical landscape in Northeast Asia. As an immediate
neighbor, China inevitably entangled in the Korean affairs. In contrast with its roles in ancient
times, mainly defined by a single factor, namely, geopolitical security consideration, its role in
Korean unification process in the Cold War had determined by more factors, including its
relations with the two Koreas, the Soviet Union and the United States.
An Adamant Supporter
The People‘s Republic of China (called China in the following text), which shared with
North Korea with similar ideology and mutual ally, the Soviet Union, and was indebted to North
Korea for its critical assistance in Chinese civil war, became Pyongyang‘s adamant supporter, as
evidenced in Kim Il Sung‘s military unification drive in June 1950.
Although China‘s tribute system had totally collapsed a long time ago, China also faced a

9Zhang

Peiheng, Yu Suisheng, ErshiSishiQuanyi•MingshiDishice (Complete Translation of Twenty Four

Dynastic Histories. Ming Dyansty, Vol. X), Shanghai: Grand Chinese Dictionary Publishing House, 2004,
p.6681.

34

similar situation when the Korean War broke out. As US forces crossed the 38th parallel and
approached China‘s border, China needed to make a strategic choice: to stay put simply China
was still weak and ill-prepared for a war with the most powerful nation, the United States and its
support; or to militarily intervene for the sake of keeping hostile powers from its buffer zone.
China chose the second option for two basic reasons: 1) the United States, which had sided with
the Nationalist government and had recently been driven out of the Chinese mainland, was the
head of the Western camp and the number one enemy with the capability and political will to
topple the regime; so it could not tolerate the presence of such hostile forces in its vital buffer
zone; and 2) viewing history as a mirror, China saw the United States through the lens of what
Japan had done on the Korean Peninsula, fearing a repeat performance. Even though, China‘s
participation of the Korean War was mainly motivated by its own self-interest, it offered security
protection to North Korea, with which it shared an ideology and membership in the communist
camp. In 1961, China‘s security commitment was formalized by a legally-binding alliance
agreement, also called the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the
PRC and the DPRK.10
China‘s support to North Korea has also been demonstrated in political and diplomatic
fields. Since the 1954 Geneva Conference, China has offered its consistent endorsement to
Pyongyang‘s unification proposals. After joining the United Nations, China made a good use of
this international organization to help North Korea to promote its own diplomatic agenda. In 28th
UN General Assembly, held from September to October 1973, Qiao Guanhua, the head of the
Chinese delegation, wasted no time in presenting China‘s position on the Korean issue: (1) The
foreign troops, mainly the American forces, are the obstacle to Korea‘s independent and peaceful
unification, the UN Command should be allowed to disband and the foreign military forces
should be allowed to withdraw; (2) The two Koreas‘ July 4th Statement to large extent makes the
Korean Armistice Agreement dysfunctional; (3) the continuing presence of the United Nations
Command and foreign military forces on the Korean Peninsula encourages South Korea to refuse
a series of rational proposals made by the DPRK and stalls the dialogue between the North and
the South; (4) two Korea‘s simultaneous admission to UN will legalize and perpetuate the
division of the Korean Peninsula, the two Koreas should not enter the United Nations as separate
nations, and if they want to join the UN before national unification, they should form the northsouth confederation under the single name of the Confederal Republic of Koryo, and enter the
UN under that name; (5) Kim Il Sung‘s five point proposal 11 is completely rational and

10

For

full

text

of

the

treaty,

see

http://www.google.com.hk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=the+Treaty+of+Friendship%2C+Cooperation+and+Mutual+A
ssistance+between+the+PRC+and+the+DPRK&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCoQFjAA&url=%68%74%74
%70%3a%2f%2f%77%77%77%2e%6d%61%72%78%69%73%74%73%2e%6f%72%67%2f%73%75%6
2%6a%65%63%74%2f%63%68%69%6e%61%2f%64%6f%63%75%6d%65%6e%74%73%2f%63%68%
69%6e%61%5f%64%70%72%6b%2e%68%74%6d&ei=X8uMUqXgCoHniAf714D4CA&usg=AFQjCNHFS
QHPQoomstTjo83UxTbmLkkWFA.
11

The five point proposal includes: to remove military confrontation and ease tension between the north

and south, bring about multilateral collaboration and interchange between the two parts, convene the

35

reasonable and should gain support and sympathy from all the nations that pursue justice.12 With
China‘s active support, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a consensus statement,
confirming Kim Il Sung‘s three principles and decided to dismantle U.N. Commission for the
Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.
In the 1974 UN General Assembly, China made new efforts to promote its own draft
resolution with regard to the question of Korea, cosponsored by other thirty seven nations. With
China‘s intensive lobby, the UN General Assembly adopted the Resolution 3333, which
promised to consider the dissolution of the UN Command. Upon China‘s insistence, the UN for
the first time formally invited North Korea to participate in the discussion of Korean issue in the
UN General Assembly. In August 1975, Qiao Guanhua, then China‘s Foreign Minister, once
again made a high-pitched speech, which the question of Korea ranked second in five major
issues Qi addressed.13 Qiao reiterated that the UN Command be dissolved, all the foreign troops
under the flag of the United Nations in South Korea withdraw, and parties directly concerned to14
the Korean Armistice Agreement instead of its signatories as the US delegates insisted should
sign a peace treaty. For Qiao, signing a peace treaty and withdrawing all the US troops are the
keys to the peaceful solution to the question of Korea. 15 With China and 42 other nations‘
intensive lobby, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution, calling for the withdrawal of all
foreign forces from South Korea and dissolution of the UN Command.
As discussed above, from the end of the Korean War to early 1980s, China had been North
Korea‘s adamant supporter. With China‘s diplomatic support, North Korea made some headway
in its unification pursuit, including the dissolution of the UN Commission on Unification and
Reconstruction; a consensus-building for turning the armistice agreement into a peace treaty
among the two Koreas, China and the United States. As China experienced leadership changes
and normalized its relations with the United States, its enthusiastic interest in the Korean issue
abated.
An Intermediary

Great National Congress composed of representatives of people of all levels and political parties and
social organizations in the north and south, institute the north-south confederation under the single name
of the Confederal Republic of Koryo, and enter the UN under that name.
12

Xinhua News, ―Zai Lianheguo Di Ershiba Jie Huiyi Quanti Huiyi Shang Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo

Daibiaotuan Tuanzhang Qiao Guanhua de Fanyan‖ (Qiao Guanhua‘s Speech at the 28th Assembly
Conference of the United Nations ), the People‟s Daily, October 3, 1973.
13

In Qiao Guanhua‘s 1973 Speech, he discussed ten major issues, the question of Korea ranked number

five.
14

In Chinese, it means实际当事者.

15

Xinhua News, ―Zai Lianheguo Dahui Di Sanshi Jie Huiyi Quanti Huiyishang Zhongguo Daibiaotuan

Tuanzhang Qiao Guanhua de Fayan‖ (Qiao Guanhua‘s Speech in the 30th UN General Assembly), the

People‟s Daily, Sept. 27, 1975.

36

One Korea Unification Vision through Neutralization: What Should Be Done

One Korea Unification Vision through Neutralization: What Should Be Done

Recomendados

Recomendados

Más contenido relacionado

Similar a One Korea Unification Vision through Neutralization: What Should Be Done

Similar a One Korea Unification Vision through Neutralization: What Should Be Done (20)

Más de GlobalPeaceFoundation

Más de GlobalPeaceFoundation (20)

Último

Último (8)

One Korea Unification Vision through Neutralization: What Should Be Done