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IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop –
An enterprise application of the IBM ZTIC

Dr. Michael Baentsch, Dr. Paolo Scotton, IBM Research – Zurich




IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop                                    © 2012 IBM Corporation
Secure Enterprise Desktop: Core problem addressed


           All Internet connected devices are (and will remain) under attack …
                   – Attack vectors (selection)
                          •     Spam (mail): “Click-and-be-doomed”
                          •     Some “free helper tools”
                          •     “popular” websites (porn, warez, etc.): “Drive-by infection”
                          •     Google-found websites

                   – Sample attack method (beyond traditional vulnerability + standard API exploits)
                          • APEG (Automatic Patch-based exploit generation)

                   – Attack goals (selection)
                          • Get at company secrets (SpearPhishing, Advanced Persistent Threats and beyond)
                          • Log company communication in real-time
                          • Find out about customer’s customers

                   – Attack professionalism
                          • Very high and rising (task “outsourcing”, physical “enforcement” the norm)
                          • To some accounts, e-crime is already more profitable than drug trafficking




IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop
Authentication: Main Attack classes


                                              Spoofed email (phishing)    Fake server

                                       Link
                                                    Credentials
                                  login:
                                                                                             Im
                                                                                                  pe
                                                                                                     rs   on
                                                                                                            a ti
                                                                                                                   on
                                                                                                                      a   ta
                                                                                                                               ny
                                                                           Fake    Fake                                             tim
                                                                                                                                          e   Server
                                                                          server   client

                                                                                             Impersonation while
                                                                                            genuine client connects

                                                                                                                      e/
                                                                         Man-in-the-middle (MITM)
                                                                                                                 y tim on
                                                                                                              an      ti
                                                                                                            at nsac
                                                                                                           n tra
                                                                                                      t io
                                                                                                    na uine
                                                                                                 rso n
                                                Trojan horse virus                            pe g ge
                                                                                            Im r in
                                                                                             Du
                                                        Credentials
                                   Malicious
                                software (MSW)
                                                                      Man-in-the-browser (MITB)



IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop
Secure Enterprise Desktop: So what?




    You cannot trust the PC (tablet, smart phone, etc.) display – nor any SW.


              You need separate protection – crypto & I/O HW outside the PC.


                           Based on some “trust anchor” – ideally a mobile one.




IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop
classicZTIC concept: How it works (high-level)



                                          2: ZTIC initiates connection to server
                                       (automatically via auto-run or after user clicks on ZTIC icon)




                                                                      3: ZTIC establishes TLS connection to server
                                                                    (incl. automatic certificate check and possibly, using client authentication)
                           TLS Proxy


     1: User approaches any appliance
       with USB port and inserts ZTIC
                                                                     TLS Server Connection




                                                                           4: Server validates authenticity
                                                      (using existing authentication protocols like EMV CAP or via PKI/SSL client authentication)



IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop
Approaches to Desktop Security

    Corporate-issue PCs: Machines are custom-installed and centrally managed.

       Challenges: limited choice of machines; cost for dedicated hardware; zero-day exploits; mobility

    Trusted Platform Modules, Smart Cards, etc: Security hardware protecting system software

       Challenges: Without I/O, user cannot ascertain what’s happening; mobility

    Secure Execution Environments: Software controlling applications executing

       Challenges: Size & origin of software; can software be protected by software?

    Secure boot stick: user carries a secure OS to boot from on a USB stick

       Challenges: maintenance of OS; no central control; no user credential control

    Virtualization: adding an access & security control layer for all resources

       Challenges: host-OS security; installation; performance/scalability




IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop
IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop: Design Goals

               Protect against “State of the Art” Attacks (esp. Malware & Man-in-the-Middle)
                – Do not rely on PC or smart phone for input or output of critical data
               Do not require the installation of additional software
                – No device drivers (no new user/support center hassles)
                – Work on as many platforms as possible
               Do not interfere with existing protection technologies
                – VPNs, Firewalls, Virus scanners, etc.
               Be easy-to-use
                – Do not create performance penalties
                – Use “familiar” device/interaction pattern    mobility
               Be easy-to-administrate & integrate
                – Require minimal server changes
                    • Re-use existing authentication protocols, e.g., CAP, PKI/SSL client-
                      authentication
                – Allow for “fool-proof” device maintenance




IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop
Secure Enterprise Desktop: Goal




IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop
Secure Enterprise Desktop: Basic Concept ‘Bring-Your-Own’




IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop
Secure Enterprise Desktop: Core technologies

                                          Image                            ZTIC
                                        Management


                                • Image backup                                 • Security
                                • Image composition                            • Authentication
                                • Image maintenance                            • Key storage


                                                        Secure
                                                       Enterprise
                                                        Desktop




                                                 • Streaming technology
                                                 • Significant OS experience


                                                        Provisioning




IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop
Secure Enterprise Desktop: Architecture




  Hypervisor allows SED…
           …to be hardware agnostic: hardware support delegated to the hypervisor
           …to implement specialized drivers without changing the user image
           …run multiple images on the same client

IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop
Secure Enterprise Desktop: Usage view




IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop
Secure Enterprise Desktop: Key Differentiators


             VM + OS provisioning is server-controlled via trusted channel
                – ZTIC establishes basic trust level and pulls disk-keys & software via SSL
                – Future extension: Build VPN support into low-level drivers + ZTIC


             No need for or reliance on pre-installed software
                – ZTIC possession is sufficient to get started     boot off empty/’bare metal’ machines
                – All OS & user data is streamed as needed        Fast start-up time on empty machines
                – Local machine used as ‘cache’      scalability from overall system perspective


             Constant ‘backup’ when online
                – Offline operation also possible (e.g., when traveling)
                – All local data encrypted via ZTIC and mirrored back when online again


             User credentials handled outside of PC
                – Protection even against hacked BIOS’
                – Smart card support without need for drivers




IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop
Secure Enterprise Desktop: Next steps for 2012


             IBM internal pilot operation
             Introduction of standard/’out-of-the-box’ usage scenarios
             Pilot deployment at lead customers
             Integration with IBM standard offerings




IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop
Questions?


    http://www.zurich.ibm.com/secure-ed
    eztic@zurich.ibm.com
    YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mPZrkeHMDJ8


    Michael Baentsch (mib@zurich.ibm.com; +41 44 724 8620)
    Paolo Scotton (psc@zurich.ibm.com; +41 44 724 8948)




IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop

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CeBIT 2012: IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop

  • 1. IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop – An enterprise application of the IBM ZTIC Dr. Michael Baentsch, Dr. Paolo Scotton, IBM Research – Zurich IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop © 2012 IBM Corporation
  • 2. Secure Enterprise Desktop: Core problem addressed All Internet connected devices are (and will remain) under attack … – Attack vectors (selection) • Spam (mail): “Click-and-be-doomed” • Some “free helper tools” • “popular” websites (porn, warez, etc.): “Drive-by infection” • Google-found websites – Sample attack method (beyond traditional vulnerability + standard API exploits) • APEG (Automatic Patch-based exploit generation) – Attack goals (selection) • Get at company secrets (SpearPhishing, Advanced Persistent Threats and beyond) • Log company communication in real-time • Find out about customer’s customers – Attack professionalism • Very high and rising (task “outsourcing”, physical “enforcement” the norm) • To some accounts, e-crime is already more profitable than drug trafficking IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop
  • 3. Authentication: Main Attack classes Spoofed email (phishing) Fake server Link Credentials login: Im pe rs on a ti on a ta ny Fake Fake tim e Server server client Impersonation while genuine client connects e/ Man-in-the-middle (MITM) y tim on an ti at nsac n tra t io na uine rso n Trojan horse virus pe g ge Im r in Du Credentials Malicious software (MSW) Man-in-the-browser (MITB) IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop
  • 4. Secure Enterprise Desktop: So what? You cannot trust the PC (tablet, smart phone, etc.) display – nor any SW. You need separate protection – crypto & I/O HW outside the PC. Based on some “trust anchor” – ideally a mobile one. IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop
  • 5. classicZTIC concept: How it works (high-level) 2: ZTIC initiates connection to server (automatically via auto-run or after user clicks on ZTIC icon) 3: ZTIC establishes TLS connection to server (incl. automatic certificate check and possibly, using client authentication) TLS Proxy 1: User approaches any appliance with USB port and inserts ZTIC TLS Server Connection 4: Server validates authenticity (using existing authentication protocols like EMV CAP or via PKI/SSL client authentication) IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop
  • 6. Approaches to Desktop Security Corporate-issue PCs: Machines are custom-installed and centrally managed. Challenges: limited choice of machines; cost for dedicated hardware; zero-day exploits; mobility Trusted Platform Modules, Smart Cards, etc: Security hardware protecting system software Challenges: Without I/O, user cannot ascertain what’s happening; mobility Secure Execution Environments: Software controlling applications executing Challenges: Size & origin of software; can software be protected by software? Secure boot stick: user carries a secure OS to boot from on a USB stick Challenges: maintenance of OS; no central control; no user credential control Virtualization: adding an access & security control layer for all resources Challenges: host-OS security; installation; performance/scalability IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop
  • 7. IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop: Design Goals Protect against “State of the Art” Attacks (esp. Malware & Man-in-the-Middle) – Do not rely on PC or smart phone for input or output of critical data Do not require the installation of additional software – No device drivers (no new user/support center hassles) – Work on as many platforms as possible Do not interfere with existing protection technologies – VPNs, Firewalls, Virus scanners, etc. Be easy-to-use – Do not create performance penalties – Use “familiar” device/interaction pattern mobility Be easy-to-administrate & integrate – Require minimal server changes • Re-use existing authentication protocols, e.g., CAP, PKI/SSL client- authentication – Allow for “fool-proof” device maintenance IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop
  • 8. Secure Enterprise Desktop: Goal IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop
  • 9. Secure Enterprise Desktop: Basic Concept ‘Bring-Your-Own’ IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop
  • 10. Secure Enterprise Desktop: Core technologies Image ZTIC Management • Image backup • Security • Image composition • Authentication • Image maintenance • Key storage Secure Enterprise Desktop • Streaming technology • Significant OS experience Provisioning IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop
  • 11. Secure Enterprise Desktop: Architecture Hypervisor allows SED… …to be hardware agnostic: hardware support delegated to the hypervisor …to implement specialized drivers without changing the user image …run multiple images on the same client IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop
  • 12. Secure Enterprise Desktop: Usage view IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop
  • 13. Secure Enterprise Desktop: Key Differentiators VM + OS provisioning is server-controlled via trusted channel – ZTIC establishes basic trust level and pulls disk-keys & software via SSL – Future extension: Build VPN support into low-level drivers + ZTIC No need for or reliance on pre-installed software – ZTIC possession is sufficient to get started boot off empty/’bare metal’ machines – All OS & user data is streamed as needed Fast start-up time on empty machines – Local machine used as ‘cache’ scalability from overall system perspective Constant ‘backup’ when online – Offline operation also possible (e.g., when traveling) – All local data encrypted via ZTIC and mirrored back when online again User credentials handled outside of PC – Protection even against hacked BIOS’ – Smart card support without need for drivers IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop
  • 14. Secure Enterprise Desktop: Next steps for 2012 IBM internal pilot operation Introduction of standard/’out-of-the-box’ usage scenarios Pilot deployment at lead customers Integration with IBM standard offerings IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop
  • 15. Questions? http://www.zurich.ibm.com/secure-ed eztic@zurich.ibm.com YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mPZrkeHMDJ8 Michael Baentsch (mib@zurich.ibm.com; +41 44 724 8620) Paolo Scotton (psc@zurich.ibm.com; +41 44 724 8948) IBM Secure Enterprise Desktop