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Jun. 30                         IJASCSE Vol 1 Issue 1 2012


                                              SQLI Prevent Parser for the prevention
                                              of SQL Injection Attacks. This Parser
  Framework of SQL Injection Attack           determines the structure of queries and
                                              compares whether the queries are
      Neha Patwari1, Parvati Bhurani 2
                                              functionally equivalent or not. This
                                              parser has been used on a sample web
Abstract                                      application and the results have come
                                              out to be positive majors to prevent SQL
With the changing demographics of             Injection Attacks.
globalization, the emergence and
prevalence of web application have            I Introduction
acquired a central and pivotal role in the
domains        of      technology     and     There has been a rapid advancement in
advancements.       It    thus   becomes      information technology as a result of the
imperative to probe deeply into the           widespread use of the internet since the
architecture, significance and different      past few years. The common man today
facets of usages. Web applications            uses the internet with a number of
enclose the functioning between a user        purposes such as to be used in the field
and the services provided by the server,      of education, for money transactions
which contains a database as its              and other countless activities. Though
backend. The user can access the              there is also an inherent risk in the
required information through sending a        frequent use of the internet as found in
request in the form of text to the web        transferring some money from one bank
server, which is interpreted by the server    account to another or in the confidential
side script to construct an SQL. The          database of the companies. The secure
query is sent to the database which           websites stores the highly sensitive
responds in order to generate an HTML         information along with non-critical data
page that is sent back to the user. Since     in their database systems in such a way
the functioning of web application is a       that the Owner of the information is able
dynamic and complicated matter, certain       to access it quickly while attackers of the
threats to the database security have         unauthorized users are blocked in their
been registered. One such alarming            attempts to have access to the
threat is the prevalence of SQL Injection     information.
Attack. Hence a dynamic algorithm is
given in this paper for preventing SQL        Hence we have to understand the
Injection Attacks which is based on           architecture of web application; a web
context free grammars and compiler            application accepts requests from users
parsing techniques. The paper attempts        in order to gather information from a
to present the notation of a                  database. It is assumed by database
Jun. 30                        IJASCSE Vol 1 Issue 1 2012


                                             application and a user in order to have a
                                             better understanding of SQL injection.
that the input is correct and thus uses it
to access the database by creating an        II Overview of SQL injection
SQL. These web applications become
virtually prone to SQL injection attacks     A web application is one through which
since these do not check the validity of     a user can access the services provided
the user queries before submitting them      by the web server while working on a
to gather the data. For example,             client machine, which contains a
attackers pretending as genuine user         database for example an online email id.
utilize maliciously created input text       The user enters a login name and
which contains SQL instructions in order     password to access the email account.
to produce SQL queries on the web            As he presses the submit button a URL
application back-end. In case web            is created and is sent to the web server.
application processes the query, the         The server side of the script interprets
accepted malicious query may breach          the user input due to which a dynamic
security net of the underscored              SQL query is created. It is submitted to
database. As a consequence of the            the database and HTML pages are
query there occurs an improper               generated in response to the query
functioning of the database parser which     which is sent back to the user. A
results in the release of the sensitive      particular section of the database query
information [1].                             code is submitted by the malicious
In order to have access to the sensitive     attackers to the server, while responding
information from the database a general      with the corresponding result some
break-in strategy is to first create a       sensitive information is disclosed by the
query which will corrupt the functioning     server. This is categorized as SQL
of the database parser, and forward the      injection attack. A SQL injection attack
application of this query to the targeted    contains injection of a SQL query to the
database. This type of approach in order     application through the input data from
to have access to the private information    the client. If successful SQL injection
is known as SQL injection. Now SQL           can read and modify the data in the
injection has become a common                database      (Insert/Update/Delete),   it
occurrence due to the easy access of         means that an SQL injection attack
the database via the internet. It is         takes place. When the intended effect of
equally necessary to have a deep             an SQL query is modified by an attacker
understanding      of    the   types    of   on inserting new SQL keywords of
communication which occurs during a          operators into the query, following are
particular session in between a web          the qualities of SQL injection attacks:
Jun. 30                         IJASCSE Vol 1 Issue 1 2012


                                              the database. i.e., if user inputs
                                              username= ’OR 1=1- -then the query will
i) Threat Modelling ii) Attack Intent iii)    be forwarded as :
Assets
                                              SELECT * FROM login WHERE name
III. Working of SQL Injection                 = ‘ ’OR 1=1–’AND password = ‘ ’;

The concept driving a SQL injection is        It will work as specified below:
simple above all attacks like these can       The input data is being used in the
be executed and mastered with ease.           WHERE clause. Since the application is
To exploit the SQL injection weakness         not actually concerned about the query
the basic requirement for the attacker is     simply tailoring a string, user has
to identify the working of the web            converted a single-component WHERE
application. A malicious SQL command          clause into a two-component clause,
can be inserted carefully into the content    and this makes it certain that the 1 = 1
of the criteria empowering the attacker       clause will be true notwithstanding the
to trick the web application so that a        fact that what the first clause is. The
malicious query can be forwarded to the       query emphasize that "Select everything
database.                                     from the table login if the name equals
e.g. the LOGIN FORM which accepts             "nothing" Or 1=1, ignores anything after
the username and password from the            the comment.
login. The input in the field (“name” and     ’ : Is used to close the user input field.
“Password”) is directly used to create        OR : The SQL query will be continued to
the SQL Query like:                           get the process as equal to what
SELECT * FROM login WHERE name                proceeds before OR what follows.
= ‘name’ AND password = ‘password’;           1=1 : A statement which is all time true.
Now, let the user input the correct name      – : Discards the rest of the lines in order
=“Administrator” and Password=“admin”.        to stop further processing.
The query will become:                        Noticing that 1 will always equal 1, the
SELECT * FROM login WHERE name                server has been virtually duped as the
= ‘Adminstrator’ AND password =               statement received is true and this
‘admin’;                                      empowers the attacker to have
                                              additional access. The code which
This will function without any problem. In    relates to the password input field is not
case the user supplied some vulnerable        run by the server and therefore does not
string of code then that will empower the     use it [2].
attacker to by-pass the authentication
and create an SQL Injection so that he         IV. Types of SQL Injection Attacks
finds out the relevant information from
Jun. 30                        IJASCSE Vol 1 Issue 1 2012


                                             response mechanism for example E-
                                             mail.
Divergent types of advanced and
powerful      techniques    have    been     All type of attacks which is mentioned
developed by attackers over the past         below, if performed directly in text field
several years which empower attackers        and provides important information or
to exploit SQL injection vulnerabilities.    data, from the response then such type
These techniques are much advanced           of attack is called First Order Attack or
than the generic SQL injection attacks       Direct injection.
examples and derive the benefits from
sophisticated SQL designs. These             In the case of direct injection the SQL
threats must be taken into account while     query will use each argument submitted
working on the development of SQL            as such without any modification. For
injection attack problems.                   example attempt to take parameter’s
An SQL Injection Attacks proneness can       legitimate value and appending a space
be exploited by the attacker once he has     along with the word “OR” with it. In case
detected the input source, for this          if an error is generated by this, a direct
purpose the attacker can utilize various     injection is possible.
types of techniques. As per the type and
extent of the proneness the attack can       First order is basically performed by
lead to crashing the database, collecting    SELECT query which is used in
the relevant information regarding the       application for retrieving information.
tables in the database. Given below is a
synopsis of the main techniques of           Tautologies Queries
performing SQL injection attacks.
An isolated attack is not a general          Attack Intent: Bypassing authentication,
phenomenon instead a combination of          retrieving data, identifying inject able
attacks     either   simultaneously    or    parameters.
sequentially used as per the desired         Description: The normal aim of this
target of the attacker.                      type of attack is to inject code that may
                                             be in one or more conditional
First Order Attacks                          statements due to which the statements
                                             are always evaluated as to be true. The
In some attacks the desired result is        results of this type of attack take place
immediately received by the attacker.        due to the way in which the application
This may be due to the direct response       uses the outcome of the query. The
by the application with which they are       most common purpose is to skip
interacting or may be via some other         authentication route and extract data. An
                                             attacker exploits an injectable area
Jun. 30                        IJASCSE Vol 1 Issue 1 2012

                                             Query (i) given below is generated after
                                             entering           valid          name
                                             ‘adminstrator1_ad’and valid password
under this type of injection which is        ‘admin1_ad’by genuine user.
utilized in a query’s WHERE conditional.     Query       =     "select    *     from
The transformation of the conditional        login_table_llwhere
into a tautology results in returning all    name=‘adminstrator1_ad’and
the rows in the database table being         password=‘admin1_ad’";————–(i)
targeted by the query. For the attack to
be fruitful the code must either display     If an attacker writes: ’or 1=1–’in the
all of the returned records or must          name field (the input entered for the
perform some action so that at least one     other fields are impertinent) leaving the
record is returned.                          password field empty, the structure of
                                             the SQL query will be changed.
Ex: Let there be an input form with the      Query (ii) given below is generated with
fields “name” and “password”. Using this     SQL injection by the attacker.
user can login in web application. The       Query = “select * fromlogin_table_ll
given below PHP code for the                 where       name=‘’or      1=1      –’and
application server, created by a web         password=‘’——————(ii)
application developer has inherent           The complete WHERE clause is
weakness for SQL injection attack:           transformed into a tautology by the code
1. $connection=mysql_connect();              injected in the conditional(’OR 1=1–).
2. mysql_select_ db(“sample”);               The conditional is used by the database
3. $user=$HTT_GET_VARS[‘name’];              as the basis in order to evaluate each
4.                                           row and to decide which is to be
$pass=$HTTP_GET_VARS[‘password’];            returned to the application. As the
5. $query="select * from login_table_ll      conditional being a tautology, the query
where name=‘$ u_user1_name ’and              evaluation is true for each row in the
password =‘$p_pass1_name’";                  table and so all of them are returned [3].
6. $result=mysql_query($query);
7.if (mysql_num_rows($result)==1) echo       Illegal/Logically Incorrect Queries
“Authorized” else echo “authorization
failed”;                                     Attack     Intent:     Retrieving    data,
User data created in the form of a web       identifying inject able parameters,
are       assigned     to      variables     performing database finger-printing.
“u_user1’_name’ and “p_pass1_name”           Description: This category of attack
and then utilized to produce the SQL         allows to collect the relevant information
statement.                                   as per the type and structure of the
                                             back-end database of a Web application.
Jun. 30                        IJASCSE Vol 1 Issue 1 2012

                                             A parentheses must be added to the
                                             bad value part of the injection, and one
                                             to the WHERE clause. In few cases two
The main aim of this attack is to gather     or more parentheses may be required.
information for further                      Here’s the code:
attacks and is treated as a preliminary      mySQL= " SELECT Last_ name1_l,
step. These attacks pinpoint a weakness      First_name1_f, Title_ t1_t, Notes_n1_n
due to which the application servers         FROMEmployee_           Table1_eWHERE
returns the default error page which         City_ name1_c = (‘ “& strCity &” ’) "
often contains over description. The         When an attacker inserts " ’ " then the
vulnerable or inject able parameters can     query is built as:
be revealed to the attacker due to the       "SELECT Last_name1_l, First_name1_f,
simple fact that error messages are          Title_t1_t,      Notes_n1_n         FROM
being generated.                             Employee_Table1_eWHERE
The additional error information which       City_name1_c =(‘ ’ ’)"
was fundamentally aimed at assisting         Then the error generated is :
the programmer to repair or correct their    Error Type:
application further empowers the             Microsoft OLE DB Provider for ODBC
attacker to access information related to    Driver [Microsoft][SQL Server ]Unclosed
the schema of the back-end database.         Parentheses mark before the Character
During working on this type of attack, he    String " ’ " From the error generated, the
tries to inject statements which can         attacker knows that here parentheses is
result in syntax error, type conversion or   used.
could create logical error into the          Hence, attacker tries to inject the value ’)
database. The injectable parameters          (‘UNION SELECT another field FROM
can be detected by using the syntax          another table), thus this query will be
errors. The deduction of the data types      forwarded to the server.
of certain columns or the seperation of      SELECT Last_name1_l, First_name1_f,
the data can be done by using the type       Title_t1_t,        Note_n1_n        FROM
errors. The names of the tables and          Employee_table1_e                 WHERE
columns causing the errors can often be      City_name1_c = (‘ ’) (‘UNION SELECT
revealed by logical errors.                  another field from another Table ’) ;
Example: In case the syntax error            Through the errors generated, the
consists of a parentheses in the cited       attacker gets to know a lot of useful data
string (for example SQL Server               through various steps.
message used in the illustration given       Hence by the use of error messages
below) or a message is generated which       attacker gets information [4].
clearly     mentions      about   missing
parentheses.                                 Union Queries
Jun. 30                          IJASCSE Vol 1 Issue 1 2012


                                               Predicting that there is no login1_area
                                               equal to “ ”, a null set is returned by the
Attack Intent: Bypassing Authentication,       first original query, while the data from
extracting data.                               the “Debit_Card1_d” table is returned
Description: In such attacks the weaker        from the second query. For account
parameters are exploited by the attacker       “100” the column “cardNo1_c” would be
with a view to transform the data set          returned by the database in this case.
returned for a specific query.                 The result obtained from these queries
This technique allows the attacker to          combines and returns them to the
form the application, giving back data         application [3].
from a table not from the one which
intended by the developer but from             Second Order Attacks
another unintended table.
                                               In this type of attack when the malicious
The attacker performs it by introducing a      code is injected into the web based
statement in the way:’ UNION SELECT            application instead of being immediately
< remaining of injected query >.               executed it is stored by the web
Since the second/injected query is             application i.e. it is first stored in the
totally controlled by the attackers, this      database to be retrieved, rendered or
query can used by them in order to             executed by the victim. This category of
retrieve information from a particular         attack happens because of the notion
table. This attack results in the form of a    that when the data is contained in the
dataset from the database which is the         database, it is often supposed to be
collective result of the original query and    clean and need not be checked again.
the injected query.                            While due to the frequent use of the
Example: Referring to the running              data in the queries, it is still able harm
example, an attacker could introduce the       the web application. This type of attack
text " ’UNION SELECT card_no1_c from           happens in case where the filtration
Debit_Card1_d                        where     process is skipped during the process of
accountNo1_a=100–"             into      the   data insertion in search page. We
login1_area field, leading to the              should apply filtration for special
generation of the following query:             characters before storing data in
                                               databases, which no special characters
SELECT    bank_accounts      FROM              are allowed for inserting in databases. It
users1 WHERE login1_area = ‘’UNION             is inherently performed by INSERT
SELECT card_no1_c from                         basics which are used in application.
                                               INSERT keyword is used to add
Debit_Card1_d where accountNo1_a               information in the database. In case of
= 100 – AND pass=‘’;                           web application this keyword is used for
Jun. 30                         IJASCSE Vol 1 Issue 1 2012

                                              contrast to the other type of attacks
                                              instead of modifying the original
                                              intended query tries to insert new and
user registrations, bulletin boards           distinct query that “piggy-back” on the
inclusion, adding items to shopping carts,    original query. This results in multiple
etc. While trying to INSERT injection it      SQL queries to the database. The
could result in the flooding of the rows in   initiating query (intended query) is
the database having single quotes and         executed as normal while the remaining
SQL keywords. As per the at                   queries are injected queries, and being
tentativeness of the administrator it can     executed along with the initiating query.
be evaluated that what is to be done          The attack of this category is highly fatal.
with the information. For example the         In case an attacker succeeds in this
user is on a site on which user               attack he can virtually insert any sort of
registration of some kind is allowed.         SQL command in the additional queries
A format is provided in which the user        and is able to execute them along with
has to enter name, address, phone             the initiating query. This kind of attack
number, etc. As the information is            vulnerability is often due to the
submitted in the format a page is             possession of a database configuration
generated where this information is           via which multiple statements can be
displayed along with an option to edit        inserted in a single string.
the information. This is what is required
by the user. Thus after the process of        Example: If the attacker inputs “ ’; drop
insertion the required data can be            table login ;” into the password field, the
modified and updated. Thus in case            application generates the query:
some malicious data is inserted in the        SELECT * FROM login WHERE
database by the attacker, the data can        name=‘admin’ AND password= ‘ ’;
be updated as per the desire of the           drop table login ;
attacker.                                     As the first query having query delimiter
                                              (“;”) is completed the second query is
Piggybacked Query attack is example of        executed by the database. The effect of
Second Order Attack [5].                      the execution of the second query would
                                              be to drop table login which may lead to
Piggybacked Queries                           the destruction of the valuable data [6].

Attack Intent: Inserting or updating data,    V. Prevention Methodology
performing denial of service.
Description: In this category of attack,      The methodology which has been used
attacker tries to inject queries in the       to prevent the SQL injection attacks is
original query. These kinds of attacks in     the merging of SQLIPreventParser with
                                              the application therefore protecting
Jun. 30                       IJASCSE Vol 1 Issue 1 2012

                                            WHERE clause into a tautology of code
                                            injected in the conditional statement(’

against any attacks. Firstly SQLI           OR 1=1 –). The conditional used by
Prevent Parser has been built which is      database to evaluate each row and
used to determines the structure of the     decide the rows to return to the
query. Then limitations of the method       application. Since conditional is a
are identified. Finally, the solution to    tautology, query evaluates each row in
overcome the problems has been              the table as true and returns all of them
proposed making the system fully            to application. The problem is reckoned
efficient.                                  by taking into consideration its cause:

Approach                                    The detailed information of the program
                                            is that the substrings are taken from
The developer built a data structure for    user input and the substrings are
the parsed representation of the            restrained syntactically. The concept is
statement, which is called a parser. For    to restrict queries in which the input
parsing, we require the grammar             substring    modifies     the   syntactic
language of statement. In this method,      structure of the remaining query. Such
by parsing two statements and               queries are called SQL injection attacks
comparing their parser functionality, it    in the perspective of database back-
leads to conclusion that the two queries    ends.
are equal. When sql is injected
successfully in database query, the         The user’s intake is visualized by using
parser of the intended SQL query and        meta-character displayed as ‘(|’ and ‘|)’.
the resulting SQL query is generated        It allegorizes the commencement and
after mismatch of attacker’s input.         ending of each input string. This meta
                                            character follow the string through
The SQL Query is:                           assignments, concatenations, etc., thus
SELECT * FROM login WHERE login             as a query is ready to be transferred to
name=‘ ’ AND password=‘ ’;                  database, it contains matching pair of
Web applications have SQL injection         markers identifying the substrings from
vulnerabilities because inputs are not      input. We should refuse to introduce
sanitized which they use to construct       input substrings from modification of the
structured output.                          syntactic structure of the remaining of
                                            the query. For this grammar for queries
If an attacker passes name = ’ OR 1=1–      as per the standard grammar for SQL
as the login name, all login name in the    queries is build up. In the grammar, the
database will be returned and displayed,    only productions in which ‘(|’ and ‘|)’
reason being transformation of entire       occur have the following form:
Jun. 30                             IJASCSE Vol 1 Issue 1 2012


                                                      1. If the attacker is somehow able to
                                                         detect the delimiter used, it would
Non terminal ::= ‘(|’ symbol ‘|)’
                                                         require only a slight modification of
Where symbol is either a terminal or                     the query to break this protection.
non-terminal                                          2. The attacker may simply use a
                                                         brute force attack to simply try out
For query to be in the language of this                  all possible combinations (to
grammar, the substrings surrounded by                    guess     the    correct    delimiter
‘(|’ and ‘|)’ must be syntactic. A parser                combination).
generator is used to build a parser for
grammar and each query is attempted to            VII. Solution
be parsed. In case the query is parsed
successfully, it meets the syntactic              Original solution where we use static
constraints and is legitimate. Conversely,        delimiter upgraded to circumvent
it fails the syntactic constraints and may        potential     security    leaks.     Hence
be a SQL injection attack.                        implementation by dynamically changing
                                                  the delimiter combination for every
After SQL Prevent Parser is built using           variable field and not using the same
the grammar of the output language and            delimiter blend for two consecutive
plan of action is specified that permitted        variable fields or in same field in
syntactic forms, it remains on the web            application. As a result of this
server and intercepts generated queries.          modification to the original algorithm, the
Each input needs to be propagated in              attacker will have to correctly guess the
form of some query, notwithstanding the           exact sequence of delimiters used to
input’s source, gets amplified with the           bypass the parser’s security system.
meta-characters ‘(|’ and ’|)’ Then query          Since the delimiter blend will be cycled
is generated by the application, which            randomly this will not be easily possible.
SQLIPreventParser attempts to parse. If           By this proposed method static delimiter
a query parses successfully, SQLI                 has been made dynamic. This solution
Prevent Parser sends it to the database           makes the parser more secure than
without the meta-character. Otherwise,            before.
the query is block out.                           Figure 3.3 shows the basic structure of
                                                  work where the user input is interpreted
 VI. Limitation                                   by the web application. In the web
                                                  application it has been used the concept
This solution can be overcome in either           of dynamic delimiter so that the attacker
of two ways:                                      is unable to guess the sequence of the
Jun. 30                           IJASCSE Vol 1 Issue 1 2012

                                                query at the Parser) are functionally
                                                equivalent or not. Incase both the
                                                queries are functionally equivalent then
delimiter; here even the user has no            it reaches the database then response is
idea about the sequence of the delimiter.       taken from the database, which is
                                                generated as an HTML Page and is
Hence in the given application the              send to the user [1].
limitation of the static delimiter has been
eliminated.                                     VII. Result

Figure 3.3: Work Architecture.                  This paper presents the first overview of
                                                SQL injection attacks in web application.
                                                According to the presented paper an
                                                effective technique has been developed
                                                for preventing SQL injection attacks.
                                                The implementation on web application
                                                and parser on java CC [7] proved
                                                effective under testing. Here have been
                                                diligent efforts in applying parser on web
                                                application and produces output.
                                                The result of evaluation and test proves
                                                that the proposed method is an effective
                                                technique to prevent SQL Injection
                                                Attacks.

                                                In this work it has been managed to
                                                prevent SQL injection attacks through:
If the user puts any input by using the
delimiter for example x|)’ OR ’(| 1 = 1 ,       • Tautologies Queries
then it will be checked at the application      • Union Queries
itself and the error is reported here itself.   • Illegal/Logically Incorrect Queries
Now from application query is sent to           • Piggybacked Queries
the parser.                                     •SQLIPreventParser has been built for
                                                SQL constraints

The Parser determines the structure of          Following are the two goals for future
SQL query and input variable. Parser            works:
compares that both queries ( means                 1. The parser is to be more
query at the application and the                      generalized for maximum number
                                                      of SQL commands.
Jun. 30                         IJASCSE Vol 1 Issue 1 2012




    2. The technique can be applied to
       prevent cross-site scripting.

VIII. References

[1] Zhendong Su. The essence of
command injection attacks in web
applications. pages 372–382. ACM
Press, 2006.
[2] Chris Anley. Advanced sql injection
in sql server applications. In An
NGSSoftware Insight Security Research
(NISR) Publication, 2002.
 [3] J.ViegasWilliam G.J.Holfond. A
classification of sql injection attacks and
countermeasures. In IEEE, 2009.
[4] SQL Injection, Are Your Web
Applications                    Vulnerable?
http://www.securitydocs.com/library/265
6/.
[5] SQL Injection Attack and Defense.
http://www.securitydocs.com/library/358
7/.
[6] D.K. Bhattacharyya Debasish Das,
Utpal Sharma. An appraoch to
detectionof sql injection attack based on
dynamic query matching. In International
Journal of Computer Application(0975-
8887) volume 1-No.25,2010., 2010.
 [7]JAVACFAQ.
http://www.engr.mun.ca/~theo/ JavaCC-
FAQ/javacc-faq-moz.htm.

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Sql

  • 1. Jun. 30 IJASCSE Vol 1 Issue 1 2012 SQLI Prevent Parser for the prevention of SQL Injection Attacks. This Parser Framework of SQL Injection Attack determines the structure of queries and compares whether the queries are Neha Patwari1, Parvati Bhurani 2 functionally equivalent or not. This parser has been used on a sample web Abstract application and the results have come out to be positive majors to prevent SQL With the changing demographics of Injection Attacks. globalization, the emergence and prevalence of web application have I Introduction acquired a central and pivotal role in the domains of technology and There has been a rapid advancement in advancements. It thus becomes information technology as a result of the imperative to probe deeply into the widespread use of the internet since the architecture, significance and different past few years. The common man today facets of usages. Web applications uses the internet with a number of enclose the functioning between a user purposes such as to be used in the field and the services provided by the server, of education, for money transactions which contains a database as its and other countless activities. Though backend. The user can access the there is also an inherent risk in the required information through sending a frequent use of the internet as found in request in the form of text to the web transferring some money from one bank server, which is interpreted by the server account to another or in the confidential side script to construct an SQL. The database of the companies. The secure query is sent to the database which websites stores the highly sensitive responds in order to generate an HTML information along with non-critical data page that is sent back to the user. Since in their database systems in such a way the functioning of web application is a that the Owner of the information is able dynamic and complicated matter, certain to access it quickly while attackers of the threats to the database security have unauthorized users are blocked in their been registered. One such alarming attempts to have access to the threat is the prevalence of SQL Injection information. Attack. Hence a dynamic algorithm is given in this paper for preventing SQL Hence we have to understand the Injection Attacks which is based on architecture of web application; a web context free grammars and compiler application accepts requests from users parsing techniques. The paper attempts in order to gather information from a to present the notation of a database. It is assumed by database
  • 2. Jun. 30 IJASCSE Vol 1 Issue 1 2012 application and a user in order to have a better understanding of SQL injection. that the input is correct and thus uses it to access the database by creating an II Overview of SQL injection SQL. These web applications become virtually prone to SQL injection attacks A web application is one through which since these do not check the validity of a user can access the services provided the user queries before submitting them by the web server while working on a to gather the data. For example, client machine, which contains a attackers pretending as genuine user database for example an online email id. utilize maliciously created input text The user enters a login name and which contains SQL instructions in order password to access the email account. to produce SQL queries on the web As he presses the submit button a URL application back-end. In case web is created and is sent to the web server. application processes the query, the The server side of the script interprets accepted malicious query may breach the user input due to which a dynamic security net of the underscored SQL query is created. It is submitted to database. As a consequence of the the database and HTML pages are query there occurs an improper generated in response to the query functioning of the database parser which which is sent back to the user. A results in the release of the sensitive particular section of the database query information [1]. code is submitted by the malicious In order to have access to the sensitive attackers to the server, while responding information from the database a general with the corresponding result some break-in strategy is to first create a sensitive information is disclosed by the query which will corrupt the functioning server. This is categorized as SQL of the database parser, and forward the injection attack. A SQL injection attack application of this query to the targeted contains injection of a SQL query to the database. This type of approach in order application through the input data from to have access to the private information the client. If successful SQL injection is known as SQL injection. Now SQL can read and modify the data in the injection has become a common database (Insert/Update/Delete), it occurrence due to the easy access of means that an SQL injection attack the database via the internet. It is takes place. When the intended effect of equally necessary to have a deep an SQL query is modified by an attacker understanding of the types of on inserting new SQL keywords of communication which occurs during a operators into the query, following are particular session in between a web the qualities of SQL injection attacks:
  • 3. Jun. 30 IJASCSE Vol 1 Issue 1 2012 the database. i.e., if user inputs username= ’OR 1=1- -then the query will i) Threat Modelling ii) Attack Intent iii) be forwarded as : Assets SELECT * FROM login WHERE name III. Working of SQL Injection = ‘ ’OR 1=1–’AND password = ‘ ’; The concept driving a SQL injection is It will work as specified below: simple above all attacks like these can The input data is being used in the be executed and mastered with ease. WHERE clause. Since the application is To exploit the SQL injection weakness not actually concerned about the query the basic requirement for the attacker is simply tailoring a string, user has to identify the working of the web converted a single-component WHERE application. A malicious SQL command clause into a two-component clause, can be inserted carefully into the content and this makes it certain that the 1 = 1 of the criteria empowering the attacker clause will be true notwithstanding the to trick the web application so that a fact that what the first clause is. The malicious query can be forwarded to the query emphasize that "Select everything database. from the table login if the name equals e.g. the LOGIN FORM which accepts "nothing" Or 1=1, ignores anything after the username and password from the the comment. login. The input in the field (“name” and ’ : Is used to close the user input field. “Password”) is directly used to create OR : The SQL query will be continued to the SQL Query like: get the process as equal to what SELECT * FROM login WHERE name proceeds before OR what follows. = ‘name’ AND password = ‘password’; 1=1 : A statement which is all time true. Now, let the user input the correct name – : Discards the rest of the lines in order =“Administrator” and Password=“admin”. to stop further processing. The query will become: Noticing that 1 will always equal 1, the SELECT * FROM login WHERE name server has been virtually duped as the = ‘Adminstrator’ AND password = statement received is true and this ‘admin’; empowers the attacker to have additional access. The code which This will function without any problem. In relates to the password input field is not case the user supplied some vulnerable run by the server and therefore does not string of code then that will empower the use it [2]. attacker to by-pass the authentication and create an SQL Injection so that he IV. Types of SQL Injection Attacks finds out the relevant information from
  • 4. Jun. 30 IJASCSE Vol 1 Issue 1 2012 response mechanism for example E- mail. Divergent types of advanced and powerful techniques have been All type of attacks which is mentioned developed by attackers over the past below, if performed directly in text field several years which empower attackers and provides important information or to exploit SQL injection vulnerabilities. data, from the response then such type These techniques are much advanced of attack is called First Order Attack or than the generic SQL injection attacks Direct injection. examples and derive the benefits from sophisticated SQL designs. These In the case of direct injection the SQL threats must be taken into account while query will use each argument submitted working on the development of SQL as such without any modification. For injection attack problems. example attempt to take parameter’s An SQL Injection Attacks proneness can legitimate value and appending a space be exploited by the attacker once he has along with the word “OR” with it. In case detected the input source, for this if an error is generated by this, a direct purpose the attacker can utilize various injection is possible. types of techniques. As per the type and extent of the proneness the attack can First order is basically performed by lead to crashing the database, collecting SELECT query which is used in the relevant information regarding the application for retrieving information. tables in the database. Given below is a synopsis of the main techniques of Tautologies Queries performing SQL injection attacks. An isolated attack is not a general Attack Intent: Bypassing authentication, phenomenon instead a combination of retrieving data, identifying inject able attacks either simultaneously or parameters. sequentially used as per the desired Description: The normal aim of this target of the attacker. type of attack is to inject code that may be in one or more conditional First Order Attacks statements due to which the statements are always evaluated as to be true. The In some attacks the desired result is results of this type of attack take place immediately received by the attacker. due to the way in which the application This may be due to the direct response uses the outcome of the query. The by the application with which they are most common purpose is to skip interacting or may be via some other authentication route and extract data. An attacker exploits an injectable area
  • 5. Jun. 30 IJASCSE Vol 1 Issue 1 2012 Query (i) given below is generated after entering valid name ‘adminstrator1_ad’and valid password under this type of injection which is ‘admin1_ad’by genuine user. utilized in a query’s WHERE conditional. Query = "select * from The transformation of the conditional login_table_llwhere into a tautology results in returning all name=‘adminstrator1_ad’and the rows in the database table being password=‘admin1_ad’";————–(i) targeted by the query. For the attack to be fruitful the code must either display If an attacker writes: ’or 1=1–’in the all of the returned records or must name field (the input entered for the perform some action so that at least one other fields are impertinent) leaving the record is returned. password field empty, the structure of the SQL query will be changed. Ex: Let there be an input form with the Query (ii) given below is generated with fields “name” and “password”. Using this SQL injection by the attacker. user can login in web application. The Query = “select * fromlogin_table_ll given below PHP code for the where name=‘’or 1=1 –’and application server, created by a web password=‘’——————(ii) application developer has inherent The complete WHERE clause is weakness for SQL injection attack: transformed into a tautology by the code 1. $connection=mysql_connect(); injected in the conditional(’OR 1=1–). 2. mysql_select_ db(“sample”); The conditional is used by the database 3. $user=$HTT_GET_VARS[‘name’]; as the basis in order to evaluate each 4. row and to decide which is to be $pass=$HTTP_GET_VARS[‘password’]; returned to the application. As the 5. $query="select * from login_table_ll conditional being a tautology, the query where name=‘$ u_user1_name ’and evaluation is true for each row in the password =‘$p_pass1_name’"; table and so all of them are returned [3]. 6. $result=mysql_query($query); 7.if (mysql_num_rows($result)==1) echo Illegal/Logically Incorrect Queries “Authorized” else echo “authorization failed”; Attack Intent: Retrieving data, User data created in the form of a web identifying inject able parameters, are assigned to variables performing database finger-printing. “u_user1’_name’ and “p_pass1_name” Description: This category of attack and then utilized to produce the SQL allows to collect the relevant information statement. as per the type and structure of the back-end database of a Web application.
  • 6. Jun. 30 IJASCSE Vol 1 Issue 1 2012 A parentheses must be added to the bad value part of the injection, and one to the WHERE clause. In few cases two The main aim of this attack is to gather or more parentheses may be required. information for further Here’s the code: attacks and is treated as a preliminary mySQL= " SELECT Last_ name1_l, step. These attacks pinpoint a weakness First_name1_f, Title_ t1_t, Notes_n1_n due to which the application servers FROMEmployee_ Table1_eWHERE returns the default error page which City_ name1_c = (‘ “& strCity &” ’) " often contains over description. The When an attacker inserts " ’ " then the vulnerable or inject able parameters can query is built as: be revealed to the attacker due to the "SELECT Last_name1_l, First_name1_f, simple fact that error messages are Title_t1_t, Notes_n1_n FROM being generated. Employee_Table1_eWHERE The additional error information which City_name1_c =(‘ ’ ’)" was fundamentally aimed at assisting Then the error generated is : the programmer to repair or correct their Error Type: application further empowers the Microsoft OLE DB Provider for ODBC attacker to access information related to Driver [Microsoft][SQL Server ]Unclosed the schema of the back-end database. Parentheses mark before the Character During working on this type of attack, he String " ’ " From the error generated, the tries to inject statements which can attacker knows that here parentheses is result in syntax error, type conversion or used. could create logical error into the Hence, attacker tries to inject the value ’) database. The injectable parameters (‘UNION SELECT another field FROM can be detected by using the syntax another table), thus this query will be errors. The deduction of the data types forwarded to the server. of certain columns or the seperation of SELECT Last_name1_l, First_name1_f, the data can be done by using the type Title_t1_t, Note_n1_n FROM errors. The names of the tables and Employee_table1_e WHERE columns causing the errors can often be City_name1_c = (‘ ’) (‘UNION SELECT revealed by logical errors. another field from another Table ’) ; Example: In case the syntax error Through the errors generated, the consists of a parentheses in the cited attacker gets to know a lot of useful data string (for example SQL Server through various steps. message used in the illustration given Hence by the use of error messages below) or a message is generated which attacker gets information [4]. clearly mentions about missing parentheses. Union Queries
  • 7. Jun. 30 IJASCSE Vol 1 Issue 1 2012 Predicting that there is no login1_area equal to “ ”, a null set is returned by the Attack Intent: Bypassing Authentication, first original query, while the data from extracting data. the “Debit_Card1_d” table is returned Description: In such attacks the weaker from the second query. For account parameters are exploited by the attacker “100” the column “cardNo1_c” would be with a view to transform the data set returned by the database in this case. returned for a specific query. The result obtained from these queries This technique allows the attacker to combines and returns them to the form the application, giving back data application [3]. from a table not from the one which intended by the developer but from Second Order Attacks another unintended table. In this type of attack when the malicious The attacker performs it by introducing a code is injected into the web based statement in the way:’ UNION SELECT application instead of being immediately < remaining of injected query >. executed it is stored by the web Since the second/injected query is application i.e. it is first stored in the totally controlled by the attackers, this database to be retrieved, rendered or query can used by them in order to executed by the victim. This category of retrieve information from a particular attack happens because of the notion table. This attack results in the form of a that when the data is contained in the dataset from the database which is the database, it is often supposed to be collective result of the original query and clean and need not be checked again. the injected query. While due to the frequent use of the Example: Referring to the running data in the queries, it is still able harm example, an attacker could introduce the the web application. This type of attack text " ’UNION SELECT card_no1_c from happens in case where the filtration Debit_Card1_d where process is skipped during the process of accountNo1_a=100–" into the data insertion in search page. We login1_area field, leading to the should apply filtration for special generation of the following query: characters before storing data in databases, which no special characters SELECT bank_accounts FROM are allowed for inserting in databases. It users1 WHERE login1_area = ‘’UNION is inherently performed by INSERT SELECT card_no1_c from basics which are used in application. INSERT keyword is used to add Debit_Card1_d where accountNo1_a information in the database. In case of = 100 – AND pass=‘’; web application this keyword is used for
  • 8. Jun. 30 IJASCSE Vol 1 Issue 1 2012 contrast to the other type of attacks instead of modifying the original intended query tries to insert new and user registrations, bulletin boards distinct query that “piggy-back” on the inclusion, adding items to shopping carts, original query. This results in multiple etc. While trying to INSERT injection it SQL queries to the database. The could result in the flooding of the rows in initiating query (intended query) is the database having single quotes and executed as normal while the remaining SQL keywords. As per the at queries are injected queries, and being tentativeness of the administrator it can executed along with the initiating query. be evaluated that what is to be done The attack of this category is highly fatal. with the information. For example the In case an attacker succeeds in this user is on a site on which user attack he can virtually insert any sort of registration of some kind is allowed. SQL command in the additional queries A format is provided in which the user and is able to execute them along with has to enter name, address, phone the initiating query. This kind of attack number, etc. As the information is vulnerability is often due to the submitted in the format a page is possession of a database configuration generated where this information is via which multiple statements can be displayed along with an option to edit inserted in a single string. the information. This is what is required by the user. Thus after the process of Example: If the attacker inputs “ ’; drop insertion the required data can be table login ;” into the password field, the modified and updated. Thus in case application generates the query: some malicious data is inserted in the SELECT * FROM login WHERE database by the attacker, the data can name=‘admin’ AND password= ‘ ’; be updated as per the desire of the drop table login ; attacker. As the first query having query delimiter (“;”) is completed the second query is Piggybacked Query attack is example of executed by the database. The effect of Second Order Attack [5]. the execution of the second query would be to drop table login which may lead to Piggybacked Queries the destruction of the valuable data [6]. Attack Intent: Inserting or updating data, V. Prevention Methodology performing denial of service. Description: In this category of attack, The methodology which has been used attacker tries to inject queries in the to prevent the SQL injection attacks is original query. These kinds of attacks in the merging of SQLIPreventParser with the application therefore protecting
  • 9. Jun. 30 IJASCSE Vol 1 Issue 1 2012 WHERE clause into a tautology of code injected in the conditional statement(’ against any attacks. Firstly SQLI OR 1=1 –). The conditional used by Prevent Parser has been built which is database to evaluate each row and used to determines the structure of the decide the rows to return to the query. Then limitations of the method application. Since conditional is a are identified. Finally, the solution to tautology, query evaluates each row in overcome the problems has been the table as true and returns all of them proposed making the system fully to application. The problem is reckoned efficient. by taking into consideration its cause: Approach The detailed information of the program is that the substrings are taken from The developer built a data structure for user input and the substrings are the parsed representation of the restrained syntactically. The concept is statement, which is called a parser. For to restrict queries in which the input parsing, we require the grammar substring modifies the syntactic language of statement. In this method, structure of the remaining query. Such by parsing two statements and queries are called SQL injection attacks comparing their parser functionality, it in the perspective of database back- leads to conclusion that the two queries ends. are equal. When sql is injected successfully in database query, the The user’s intake is visualized by using parser of the intended SQL query and meta-character displayed as ‘(|’ and ‘|)’. the resulting SQL query is generated It allegorizes the commencement and after mismatch of attacker’s input. ending of each input string. This meta character follow the string through The SQL Query is: assignments, concatenations, etc., thus SELECT * FROM login WHERE login as a query is ready to be transferred to name=‘ ’ AND password=‘ ’; database, it contains matching pair of Web applications have SQL injection markers identifying the substrings from vulnerabilities because inputs are not input. We should refuse to introduce sanitized which they use to construct input substrings from modification of the structured output. syntactic structure of the remaining of the query. For this grammar for queries If an attacker passes name = ’ OR 1=1– as per the standard grammar for SQL as the login name, all login name in the queries is build up. In the grammar, the database will be returned and displayed, only productions in which ‘(|’ and ‘|)’ reason being transformation of entire occur have the following form:
  • 10. Jun. 30 IJASCSE Vol 1 Issue 1 2012 1. If the attacker is somehow able to detect the delimiter used, it would Non terminal ::= ‘(|’ symbol ‘|)’ require only a slight modification of Where symbol is either a terminal or the query to break this protection. non-terminal 2. The attacker may simply use a brute force attack to simply try out For query to be in the language of this all possible combinations (to grammar, the substrings surrounded by guess the correct delimiter ‘(|’ and ‘|)’ must be syntactic. A parser combination). generator is used to build a parser for grammar and each query is attempted to VII. Solution be parsed. In case the query is parsed successfully, it meets the syntactic Original solution where we use static constraints and is legitimate. Conversely, delimiter upgraded to circumvent it fails the syntactic constraints and may potential security leaks. Hence be a SQL injection attack. implementation by dynamically changing the delimiter combination for every After SQL Prevent Parser is built using variable field and not using the same the grammar of the output language and delimiter blend for two consecutive plan of action is specified that permitted variable fields or in same field in syntactic forms, it remains on the web application. As a result of this server and intercepts generated queries. modification to the original algorithm, the Each input needs to be propagated in attacker will have to correctly guess the form of some query, notwithstanding the exact sequence of delimiters used to input’s source, gets amplified with the bypass the parser’s security system. meta-characters ‘(|’ and ’|)’ Then query Since the delimiter blend will be cycled is generated by the application, which randomly this will not be easily possible. SQLIPreventParser attempts to parse. If By this proposed method static delimiter a query parses successfully, SQLI has been made dynamic. This solution Prevent Parser sends it to the database makes the parser more secure than without the meta-character. Otherwise, before. the query is block out. Figure 3.3 shows the basic structure of work where the user input is interpreted VI. Limitation by the web application. In the web application it has been used the concept This solution can be overcome in either of dynamic delimiter so that the attacker of two ways: is unable to guess the sequence of the
  • 11. Jun. 30 IJASCSE Vol 1 Issue 1 2012 query at the Parser) are functionally equivalent or not. Incase both the queries are functionally equivalent then delimiter; here even the user has no it reaches the database then response is idea about the sequence of the delimiter. taken from the database, which is generated as an HTML Page and is Hence in the given application the send to the user [1]. limitation of the static delimiter has been eliminated. VII. Result Figure 3.3: Work Architecture. This paper presents the first overview of SQL injection attacks in web application. According to the presented paper an effective technique has been developed for preventing SQL injection attacks. The implementation on web application and parser on java CC [7] proved effective under testing. Here have been diligent efforts in applying parser on web application and produces output. The result of evaluation and test proves that the proposed method is an effective technique to prevent SQL Injection Attacks. In this work it has been managed to prevent SQL injection attacks through: If the user puts any input by using the delimiter for example x|)’ OR ’(| 1 = 1 , • Tautologies Queries then it will be checked at the application • Union Queries itself and the error is reported here itself. • Illegal/Logically Incorrect Queries Now from application query is sent to • Piggybacked Queries the parser. •SQLIPreventParser has been built for SQL constraints The Parser determines the structure of Following are the two goals for future SQL query and input variable. Parser works: compares that both queries ( means 1. The parser is to be more query at the application and the generalized for maximum number of SQL commands.
  • 12. Jun. 30 IJASCSE Vol 1 Issue 1 2012 2. The technique can be applied to prevent cross-site scripting. VIII. References [1] Zhendong Su. The essence of command injection attacks in web applications. pages 372–382. ACM Press, 2006. [2] Chris Anley. Advanced sql injection in sql server applications. In An NGSSoftware Insight Security Research (NISR) Publication, 2002. [3] J.ViegasWilliam G.J.Holfond. A classification of sql injection attacks and countermeasures. In IEEE, 2009. [4] SQL Injection, Are Your Web Applications Vulnerable? http://www.securitydocs.com/library/265 6/. [5] SQL Injection Attack and Defense. http://www.securitydocs.com/library/358 7/. [6] D.K. Bhattacharyya Debasish Das, Utpal Sharma. An appraoch to detectionof sql injection attack based on dynamic query matching. In International Journal of Computer Application(0975- 8887) volume 1-No.25,2010., 2010. [7]JAVACFAQ. http://www.engr.mun.ca/~theo/ JavaCC- FAQ/javacc-faq-moz.htm.