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SLAPPs: Occurrence & State Responses
Jacob Paul Walikainen
SS5300
Professor Barry Solomon
12/13/2011
Abstract:
The Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) is a counterclaim
that results from citizen reporting, monitoring, or voicing to a government body,
official, or the electorate on an issue of public interest or concern. SLAPPs
inhibit public participation in environmental assessment. This paper reviews
available literature on SLAPPs, drawing on existing case studies to investigate
how SLAPPs affect environmental monitoring and public participation in
environmental policy. Also, state responses to SLAPP are presented with three
charts on state Anti-SLAPP legislation. Most SLAPPs generate similar results- a
strategic victory for entities rather than a legal one by transforming the dispute.
The influences of SLAPPs on public participation include inhibition, intimidation,
and resource draining impacts. Findings suggest a need for every state and a
federal adoption of Anti-SLAPPs, SLAPP opposing legislation, in order to
support citizen participation in risk assessment and environmental outcomes.

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Introduction
The Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) is a counterclaim or
civil complaint filed against groups or individuals. These counterclaims are carried out
due to the defendants’ communications to a government body, official, or the electorate
on an issue of public interest or concern (Pring & Canan, 1989; Hurley & Shogren, 1997;
Osborn & Thaler, 2008). The defendants of SLAPPs are Non Government Organization
(NGO), and other citizen groups, which are often referred to as the target of a multi-
million dollar federal or state suit. Different state’s statutes define SLAPP in a variety of
ways, yet they generate similar results, a strategic victory for polluting entities rather than
a legal one by transforming the dispute. The SLAPP legal proceedings inhibit citizen
participation to assess environmental risk and to pursue public advocacy. The need for
every state and a federal adoption of Anti-SLAPPs is supported by investigations of
SLAPP case studies, state charts on Anti-SLAPP legislation, and inhibition of citizen
participation in risk dialogues.
The increasing number of SLAPPs, since the environment movement of the
1960s, uses litigation to derail political claims of pollution or proposed development
projects. These litigation methods move the public debate from the political arena to the
judicial arena, which often favors those opposed to efforts of influencing governance
(Canan, 1989). SLAPPs violate the First Amendment’s efforts safeguarding political
speech, and they restrict the public’s and citizen groups’ assessment of environmental
risks.
Citizen risk assessment is not only a public right, it is essential for pollution
monitoring within the Clean Water Act (CWA), Clean Air Act (CAA), and other

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environmental laws (Stetson, 1995). Data from the Clean Air Act shows that states with
Anti-SLAPPs have more government site inspections, impose more penalties, and locate
significantly more pollution violations (Norman, 2010). Public monitoring is vital to
support efforts of governmental pollution control agencies, especially on private lands
and areas with large regional impacts. Local pollution control agencies and
environmental policy makers rely on public reporting.
The majority of states have identified the problems of SLAPPs, and have passed
Anti-SLAPP statutes. Yet no federal Anti-SLAPP legislation has been approved, and
over 20 states lack Anti-SLAPP statutes (www.anti-slapp.org). Federal and additional
state legislation is required for dialogues of risk assessment and for democratic
environmental policy. SLAPPs dissolve trust in the democratic process. A sense of trust
is vital for building a dialogue of environment risk (Bell, 2011). Protection of public
monitoring and involvement is vital for reducing environmental damage and determining
risk to natural resources. The federal government and all states must enact Anti-SLAPP
legislation to provide environmental protection and effective environmental policy. In
this paper, SLAPP occurrences and state responses are examined.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate available literature on SLAPPs, while
using case studies and State Anti-SLAPP statutes to explain their occurrence/evolution
and impacts/consequences on environmental monitoring and public participation. This
investigation encourages Federal and State Anti-SLAPP legislation. The following
section supports this by evidence gathered from a multidisciplinary investigation of
available literature of SLAPP. This section is followed by a section on State Anti-
SLAPP legislation is compared with three developed charts, which reveal the need for

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additional Anti-SLAPPs. In the next section, SLAPP case studies of environmental
disputes, divided into sub-sections by publication year of the only book published
entirely about SLAPPs (Pring & Canan, 1996). Finally, the paper concludes by
reaffirming the necessity and urgency of public participation and risk dialogues.
Literature Review
An interdisciplinary investigation into SLAPPs and their environmental and social
consequences reveal a lack of attention and concern by academic scholars. The majority
of literature is written in law review journals. For example, Shannon Hartzler (2007) in
the Valparaiso University Law Review discusses one of most publicized SLAPPs, when
Oprah Winfrey won a SLAPP from Texas cattlemen for discussing beef and mad cow
disease on her show. Malena Barilai (2004) writes in QUILL Magazine that land
developers, business groups, and others with deep pockets and government connections
file the majority of SLAPPs. In the 2005 American Bar Association Journal, Margaret
Graham Tebo indicates Ohio has no Anti-SLAPP law. Marnie Stetson (1995) in the New
York University Law Review describes New York’s Anti-SLAPP, whereas London
Wright-Pegs (2009) analyzes California’s Anti-SLAPP statute. Also discussing
California’s Anti-SLAPP statute, Jerome Braun (2003) in the McGeorge Law Review
mentions that while it can be improved, was effective after 11 years.
Impacts of SLAPPs are discussed across multiple disciplines, yet direct
implications and comprehensive investigations are mostly unpublished. The exception is
a few websites and the co-principal investigators of the Political Litigation Project (PLP),
sponsored by the National Science Foundation. These co-directors of the PLP at the

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University of Denver are Dr. Penelope Canan and Dr. George W. Pring, who authored the
book on SLAPPs in 1996, SLAPPs: Getting Sued For Speaking Out. An addition, Dr.
Pring (1989) has published extensive SLAPP articles as a Professor of Law, and Dr.
Canan (1989) has published numerous articles in periodicals including Law & Society
Review (Canan & Pring, 1985), Sociological Perspective, Social Problems (Canan &
Pring, 1988), and Sociological Inquiry. These academic scholars coined the term SLAPP
and convey unique sociological and law perspectives. Their individual and collaborate
contributions for nearly three decades define the subject.
Important current information on SLAPPs and Anti-SLAPPs is provided by the
website of the Public Participation Project (PPP), www.anti-slapp.org. This PPP website
discusses state Anti-SLAPP statutes, and state judicial decisions setting Anti-SLAPP
precedent. The PPP director and Harvard Law graduate, Mark Goldowitz, founded the
California Anti-SLAPP Project, in reaction to SLAPPs against him and his clients
(Brown & Goldowitz, 2010). Another valuable website, http://law.wustl.edu/, provides
the stalled federal Anti-SLAPP legislation, The Citizen Participation in Government and
Society Act of 2009, along with John Glassman’s 2002 chart containing in-depth
information on state Anti-SLAPPs. The www.anti-slapp.org website describes anti-
SLAPP efforts in all the states with a color coded map. Goldowitz also presents general
SLAPP information filed against individuals and groups protecting the environment, non-
profit organizational targets, and academic targets, among others.
Mark Goldowitz co-authored with Samantha Brown in the same issue of the
Review of European Community & International Environmental Law as Catherine
Norman. In this issue, Catherine Norman discusses direct and indirect effects of SLAPPs

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and Anti-SLAPPs, along with data of impacts on the CWA and CAA (2010). Catherine
Norman is an economic professor and shares this discipline with Terrence Hurley and
Jason Shogren. Hurley and Shogren (1997) wrote “Environmental Conflicts and the
SLAPP” in the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, and showed with
environmental conflict models that SLAPP restrictions do not increase dispute efficiency.
Policy decisions and social organization does not depend on efficiency alone,
rather they usually determine the best course of action with all parties’ viewpoints. A
few sociologists have published on SLAPP in law review journals, indicating the need to
maximize opinions and information. Penelope Canan (1989) writes an article in the Pace
Environmental Law Review discussing the SLAPP’s inhibition of informed political
change without all citizens’ viewpoints. Also published in a law review are University of
Florida sociology professors, who investigated the community Bucket Brigade’s
effectiveness in monitoring and reducing local industrial polluters (Overdevest & Mayer,
2008). Bucket Brigades are citizen and community groups monitoring and reporting
industrial pollution with air quality measuring devices within buckets. Overdevest and
Mayer (2008) indicate these low tech civil-society regulators need encouragement
strategies for gathering pollution risk information.
In addition to efforts at holding existing polluters accountable, social scientists
have investigated proposed industrial sites. Not In My Back Yard (NIMBY) incinerator
site proposal disputes in Pennsylvania show that citizens were unwilling to express
opinions as individuals, because they feared personal retribution by SLAPPs (Walsh,
et.al, 1993). Even though citizen groups and Non-Government Organizations (NGO) are
targets of SLAPPs, individuals targeted may experience larger consequences including

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alienation, expensive legal fees, reporting inhibition. Michael Bell (2011) discusses
SLAPPs inhibition of individual’s assessment of environmental risk and creating a
dialogue of risk rationality.
The environmental sociologist, Michael Carolan (2007), describes rethinking
assessment and mitigation of environmental threats with increased public involvement
and a precautionary approach. Citizens develop trust in government with involvement.
A sense of trust is essential to build a dialogic rationality of risk (Carolan & Bell, 2003).
For environmental policy to succeed, a dialogue must develop without inhibited opinion
or science to assess environmental risks. Michael Bell (2011) discusses SLAPPs
inhibition of individual’s determination of environmental risk and creating a dialogue of
risk rationality. Developing dialogues of risk is essential to protect a society and the
environment.
Dialogues of risk are diverted and distracted by SLAPPs’ transformation of a
dispute. William Freudenburg (2005) describes a second diversion form of privilege as
the diversion of attention or distraction that is rarely questioned. This second diversion
represents SLAPP results. He also discusses the need for closer attention to the
relationships between powers over discourses. Once a dispute makes it to court, those
privileged with the means for the best lawyers, often win the lawsuit and dispute.
Freudenberg’s diversion resembles Penelope Canan’s transformation of the
dispute by SLAPPs. Through a ten year period, Canan & Pring (1996) investigated
sociological perspectives of SLAPP case studies. This studying and reporting of SLAPP
case studies indicated drastic consequences to social organization, which is represented
by this list of actions initiating SLAPPs: writing, testifying, complaining, recommending,

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reporting, demonstrating, filing, lobbying, campaigning, rating, and collecting.
Besides sociologists, environmental scientists have investigated the Bucket
Brigades. A new strategy of public participation in environmental regulation, Bucket
Brigades create public policy dialogues and effective community environmental policing
(O’Rourke & Macey, 2003). SLAPPs’ target can be either citizens monitoring air
pollution with buckets, or those monitoring with the most expense equipment. Scientist
and academic scholars can suffer a heavy toll from SLAPPs. Defamation lawsuits
against scientist rarely have merit, yet they may result in a loss of research time, money,
job, emotional stability, and livelihood (Kuehn, 2004). Besides intimidation and
inhibition of citizen participation in social organization and environmental policy, results
of SLAPPs are drastic to communities and individuals’ quality of life.
Discussion of SLAPP Occurrence
The environmental movement developed in the 1960s, and flowered in the 1970s
with citizen concern, involvement, and empowerment. Public concern arose from Rachel
Carson’s Silent Spring and environmental disasters like the Santa Barbara oil spill, which
opened the governmental door for risk dialogues. At the time, the government expanded
the role of citizen involvement for self-serving recognition, that government enforcement
resources were insufficient and needed aid (Sax, 1971). Besides opening dialogues for
environmental policy, the passage of major environmental laws, such as the CWA, and
CAA, improved citizen rights to monitor environments and enhance government
regulatory enforcement (Stetson, 1995). The complexity of environmental regulation and
policy require public participation and involvement.

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The legislative foundations of the environmental movement were also fueled by
the courts opening to citizen environmental protection actions. Individuals were
empowered by ‘private Attorney-General’ status to sue for the environment (Norman,
2010). Judicial barriers soon developed to citizen actions with the onslaught of SLAPPs,
which increased in numbers since the 1970s. Ecological Strategic Lawsuit Against
Public Participation (Eco-SLAPP) counteracted the environmental movement by
restricting risk dialogues of wilderness, pollution, animal rights, and sustainable
development (Pring & Canan, 1996). There was a slow process of restricting Eco-
SLAPPs burden on courts and their inhibition on citizen participation in environmental
policy.
Some Anti-SLAPP statutes allow SLAPP defendants to file lawsuits for damages,
known as SLAPPbacks. Anti-SLAPP legislation first appeared in Washington state
during 1989 (Osborn & Thaler, 2008). Opposition to SLAPPs by citizens and NGOs first
developed in the 1980s through the courts, yet Anti-SLAPP statutes did not become a
majority in states until after 2005 (PPP, 2011). Unfortunately SLAPPs’ drastic
consequences of NGO/individual bankruptcy, lack of political power/creditability, and
other negative changes to social organization, have impacted the environmental
movement and reduced risk dialogues and assessment.
Anti-SLAPP Legislation
Many states have drawn from model legislation created by law professors and
other academic scholars, especially George Pring and Penelope Canan (1996). Federal
proposed legislation is based on their proposals, model legislation developed by the

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Society for Professional Journalists (SPJ), and the best components of existing state Anti-
SLAPPs (Brown & Goldowitz, 2010). The proposed federal Anti-SLAPP Legislation,
“The Citizen Participation in Government and Society Act of 2009“, is currently stalled
in U. S. House Subcommittee (www.anti-slapp.org).
The following section of Anti-SLAPP legislation is divided into four subsections:
three charts of states with Anti-SLAPP statutes organized by year, and a section on states
without Anti-SLAPP statutes. These statutes or lack thereof are based from www.anti-
slapp.org and cross referenced with a chart provided by John Glassman (2002) and other
sources. This updated website, anti-slapp.org, defines statements made by target as:
 Made as part of an initiative
 Referendum or recall effort
 Before or submitted to a government body
 Concerning an issue under review by that body
 To influence government action or result are protected
The following three charts of Anti-SLAPP statutes are divided by statute adoption prior
to 1996, from 1996 through 2002, and since 2002. On all of these charts the seven
columns/topics are the same. These state Anti-SLAPP charts enhance understanding and
initiate additional investigations.

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Table 1: State Anti-SLAPP Legislation Adopted Prior To 1996
State Anti-
SLAPP
Statute
(Year)
Proposals/
Amendments
Allows
SLAPPbacks
Statement/
Free
Speech
Protection
Communication/
Petitioning
Protection
Reference
Environmental
Advocacy/ Law
California CA. Senate
Bill 264
(1992)
CIV. PROC.
CODE §
425.16-
425.18
(2009)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Delaware DEL.
CODE
ANN. tit.
10, §§ 8136
– 8138
(1992)
No Yes Yes Yes No
Maine ME. REV.
STAT.
ANN. tit. 14
§ 556
(1995)
No No Yes Yes No
Massachusetts MASS.
GEN.
LAWS
ANN. ch.
231 § 59H
(1994)
Proposed
SB1618
(2009)
No Yes Yes No
Minnesota MINN.
STAT. §§
554.01 –
554.05
(1994)
No Yes Yes Yes No
Nebraska NEB. REV.
STAT.
§§25-21,241
– 25-21,246
(1994)
No Yes Yes Yes No
Nevada NEV. REV.
STAT. §§
41.635 –
41.670
(1993)
No Yes Yes Yes No
Oklahoma OKLA.
STAT. TIT.
12, § 1443.1
(1994)
No No No Yes No
Rhode Island R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§
9-33-1 – 9-
33-4 (1995)
No Yes Yes Yes No
Washington WASH.
REV.
CODE §§
RCW
4.24.500-
520 (1989)
WASH.
REV. CODE
§§ RCW
4.24.500-525
(2010)
Yes Yes Yes No

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Table 2: State Anti-SLAPP Legislation From 1996 Through 2002
State Anti-SLAPP
Statute (Year)
Proposals/
Amendmen
ts
Allows
SLAPPbacks
Statement/
Free
Speech
Protection
Communication/
Petitioning
Protection
Reference
Environmental
Advocacy/
Law
Florida FLA. STAT.
§§ 768.295 &
720.304
(2000)
No No Yes Yes No
Georgia GA. CODE
ANN. § 9-11-
11.1 (1996)
GA. CODE
ANN. § 9-
11-11.1
(2006)
Yes Yes Yes No
Hawaii HAW. REV.
STAT. §
634F-1 –
634F-4 (2002)
No Yes Yes Yes No
Indiana IND. CODE §
34-7-7-1 et
seq.(1998)
No Yes Yes Yes No
Louisiana LA. CODE
CIV. PROC.
ANN. art. 971
(1999)
No No Yes Yes No
New Mexico N.M. STAT.
§§ 38-2-9.1 –
38-2-9.2
(2001)
N.M.
STAT. §§
38-2-9.1 –
38-2-9.2
(2006)
Yes Yes No No
New York N.Y. C.P.L.R.
70-a & 76-a
N.Y.C.P.L.R.
3211 (2002)
N.Y.
C.P.L.R.
70-a & 76-
a
N.Y.C.P.L.
R. 3211
(2008)
Yes Yes Yes No
Oregon OR. REV.
STAT. §§
31.150 et seq.
(2001)
No Yes Yes Yes No
Pennsylvania 27 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 7707
& §§ 8301 –
8303. (2000)
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tennessee TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 4-21-
1001 -21-1004
(1997)
No No Yes Yes No
Utah UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 78B-
6-1401 – 1405
(2001)
No Yes No No No

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Table 3: State Anti-SLAPP Legislation Since 2002
State Anti-SLAPP
Statute (Year)
Proposals/
Amendments
Allows
SLAPPbacks
Statement/
Free
Speech
Protection
Communication/
Petitioning
Protection
Reference
Environmental
Advocacy/
Law
Arkansas ARK. CODE
ANN. §§16-
63-501 – 16-
63-508 (2005)
No Yes Yes Yes No
Illinois 735 ILL.
COMP.
STAT. 110/1
– 110/99
(2007)
No Yes Yes Yes No
Maryland MD. CODE
ANN. CTS. &
JUD. PROC.
§ 5-807
(2004)
No Yes No No No
Missouri MO. REV.
STAT. §
537.528(2004)
No No Yes Yes No
Texas The Citizens
Participation
Act (HB
2973)
(2011)
No Yes Yes Yes No
Vermont 12 V.S.A. §
1041 (2002)
No Yes Yes Yes No
States without Anti-SLAPP law
Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi,
Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, & Wyoming.

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Additional investigation into individual state Anti-SLAPPs may yield additional
proposals, court decisions, and Eco-SLAPP cases. Court decisions have set SLAPP
precedence in multiple states for over three decades. In 1984, Colorado’s Protect Our
Mountain Environment v. District Court (POME) resulted in a District Court decision
setting effective precedence. POME is still used as precedence in Colorado and this
precedence has been reinforced by additional court rulings. Other states with court
rulings setting SLAPP precedence include Connecticut’s Anti-SLAPP court ruling
establishing precedence and West Virginia’s Supreme Court ruling to protect petitioning
and speech on issues of public interest.
State proposals, amendments, and discussions on SLAPP exist across the country.
Michigan Anti-SLAPP bill (HB 5036) is in subcommittee and resembles the federal bill
introduced by Steve Cohen, “The Citizen Participation in Government and Society Act of
2009.” South Carolina also has proposed Anti-SLAPP legislation (HR 3587). Other
states have legislation that overlaps public participation protection, such as Wisconsin’s
“Whistleblower Protection Act” which shields reporters from revealing their source’s
identity unless it is highly relevant to public interest.
Protection of public participation and advocacy are an essential part of Anti-
SLAPP legislation. Many states have evaluated and amended Anti-SLAPP legislation,
following investigations into their essential components. Pring and Canan (1996)
developed three tests/criteria necessary for Anti-SLAPP law to effectively protect public
participation in government. The first criterion is protection of oral and written
communication, covering all public advocacy and reporting to government. Pring and
Canan’s second test involves protections of forums, including all governmental and

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citizen participation in public meetings and other public discourse. Their third criteria for
Anti-SLAPP legislation are increasing SLAPP cures and prevention. This refers to early
review of SLAPPs by courts and shifting the burden of proof to filer, which discourages
further SLAPP filing.
Aspects of effective Anti-SLAPP legislation are shown by state implementation
of Pring and Canan’s model Anti-SLAPP bill. This four page proposal is located on page
201 in SLAPPs: Getting Sued For Speaking Out (1996). Overlap and additional criteria
of Anti-SLAPP legislation is presented in the developed charts of this paper. A strong
element of effective Anti-SLAPPs is specific reference of environmental law or
environmental advocacy. An important method for Anti-SLAPP to defeat Eco-SLAPPs
is specific connection to earlier precedence of right allocation in environmental laws,
such as CWA and CAA. Reaffirming rights in previous environmental legislation
secures public protection of environmental risk assessment and dialogue.
Ecological/Environmental SLAPP Case Studies
Community social organization is transformed negatively by SLAPPs, and their
results extend across the nation. Determining SLAPPs comprehensive direct and indirect
impacts to society is next to impossible, since the resulting fear and intimidation restricts
responses to surveys and studies. Pring and Canan (1996) have studied hundreds of
SLAPP case studies, and set an important timeline for information by their book
publication. They also find intangible and immeasurable impacts that inhibit
understanding of SLAPPs consequences, since citizen responses and participation are
lacking and inhibited by fear. Yet, apparent lengthy and expensive legal defenses, along

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with other negative consequences, are revealed in SLAPP case studies.
Eco-SLAPP Case Study Results Before 1996
Objections to environmental damaging activities have been repressed throughout
human existence. Just after the United States’ independence from England, citizens were
fined and prosecuted for speaking out against corrupt government officials. Not until 150
years later did SLAPPs reappear from disputes over the Wilderness Act of 1964. The
Sierra Club’s battles over natural resource extraction since the 19th century was the target
of the first officially reported Eco-SLAPP, Sierra Club v. Butz (Pring & Canan, 1996).
This Humboldt Fir counterclaim in 1972 was filed immediately after the Sierra Club’s
federal court challenge to logging a virgin forest of Northwestern California in what
would become the Salmon-Trinity Alps Wilderness. This Humboldt Fir Eco-SLAPP of
$1,750,000 was defeated and set judicial precedence, yet not without extensive expense
and a resulting chill echoed throughout the environmental movement.
The Sierra Club and other environmental activist groups are common targets of
Eco-SLAPPs, with an ultimate goal of establishing fear and to suppress activism
objection. Not all Eco-SLAPPs target environmental activist groups; land trusts and
preservation groups have also been SLAPPed. The Nature Conservancy (TNC), an ultra-
business like group, was the target of a $2,790,000 lawsuit in 1974 by seaweed-farm
developers in the San Juan Islands north of Seattle (Pring & Canan, 1996). This TNC
ecological strategic lawsuit arrived from inventorying potential natural areas and
recommending preservation to the county government. Pring and Canan (1996) mention
the court dismissed the case, then the appeals court affirmed it, yet the Eco-SLAPP of

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this simple study dragged on for over fours years resulting in extensive expense, and
created a shock wave of intimidation throughout land trusts.
Land use and development soon became a major dispute involving SLAPPs.
With the national housing and development boom in the 1980s, an onslaught of SLAPPs
emerged against citizens concerned over sprawl and sustainable development. In
Jefferson County, CO after two years of dispute over a 500 acre development site,
developers Gayno, Inc. filed suit during 1980 for $40,000,000, Protect Our Mountain
Environment v. District Court (POME) (O’Neil, 2011). POME is one of the most well
known case studies, which exemplified SLAPPs’ resource-draining effects and citizen
participation inhibition. This NGO eventually won the SLAPP after four years in court
and the 500 acre site was preserved as open space. Yet POME and environmental
activism became a loser. This costly six year battle with Gayno bankrupted POME, its
leaders dropped out of politics, and local citizens think twice about speaking out as the
saying “Remember POME” has the opposite force of “Remember the Alamo” (Pring &
Canan, 1996).
Eco-SLAPP Case Study Results After 1996
Suppression of public involvement in environmental policy since 1996 has
continued and even increased in some states that lack Anti-SLAPP statutes. SLAPP
disputes in both Michigan and Nebraska settled in 2008 show the different results of
having Anti-SLAPP or not. In 2006, the Ecology Center and two members of the
Michigan Chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics were SLAPPed for $9,300,000
by Morton Grove Pharmaceuticals over a campaign to restrict use of pharmaceutical

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lindane, Morton Grove Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. The National Pediculosis Association
(www.anti-slapp.org, 2011). Morton Grove settled the case with no money changing
hands, yet won the political dispute by forcing the Ecology Center to edit their website.
This is a clear example of dispute transformation, which shifts the dispute away from the
environmental damage (Pring, 1989). Without a Michigan Anti-SLAPP statute and
confronted with the power of the pharmaceutical industry, the Ecology Center had little
choice then to suppress its concerns over toxic chemicals (www.anti-slapp.org, 2011).
Many people speaking out and monitoring polluters in Michigan are inhibited by the fear
of SLAPPs, since no Michigan or federal Anti-SLAPP exists.
Another SLAPP settled in 2008 shows the importance of having Anti-SLAPP
legislation. In 2000 two Nebraska farmers were SLAPPed by Furnas County Farms for
written comments filed with state regulators about Furnas’ environmental record, Sand
Livestock Sys. V. Svoboda (www.anti-slapp.org). The two local farmers filed a
counterclaim under the Nebraska Anti-SLAPP. This action leveled the dispute and
stopped a conviction and the defamation fines. Their Anti-SLAPP was won in 2005, with
an award of $900,000 plus legal fees, yet was overturned by the appeals court three years
later. This Anti-SLAPP prevented a SLAPP award, but did cost the local farmers eight
years of legal fees and inhibited dialogues on environmental risk.
In another case study, dialogues and monitoring of environmental risk in Rodeo,
CA initiated unique community activism methods (Bucket Brigades), and eventually
proved the importance of Anti-SLAPP legislation. The California petrochemical
facilities of Tosco-Unocal and Chevron experienced repeated fires, explosions, and
chemical releases throughout the 1990s (O’Rourke & Macey, 2003). Citizens in Rodeo,

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CA took action by developing bucket brigades, and hired a lawyer after a significant
industrial accident. Over a period of two weeks, Unocal exposed the Rodeo, CA
community to an estimated 200 tons of the toxic refinery catalyst Catacarb (Overdevest
& Mayer, 2008). While a civil case was pending, community members were empowered
by monitoring Unocal’s and other polluters’ fence lines with low cost air-quality plastic
buckets devices. The civil case was won with monetary awards for the community.
Their effective citizen involvement holding polluters accountable with buckets was
adopted across the U.S. and eventually around the world.
The strong prospects of Bucket Brigades as a community activism tool
empowered the San Francisco community to engage in risk dialogues. Denny Larson, a
environmental justice activist working with Communities for a Better Environment
(CBE), formalized the Bucket Brigade as an organizing model and developed the Global
Community Monitor (Overdevest & Mayer, 2008). With Bucket Brigades spreading
around the world, industrial polluters became concerned over citizens monitoring and
implementing risk dialogues. Violations of the Clean Air Act caused lawsuits to emerge
from Bucket Brigades’ monitoring and action. In 1999, the CBE was SLAPPed in
federal court by Tosco to deter pollution lawsuits, Tosco v. Communities for Better
Environments (www.anti-slapp.org). This suit was filed in federal court to avoid
California’s Anti-SLAPP law, and was dismissed for lack of subject jurisdiction. This
dismissal indicates the importance of Anti-SLAPP legislation, which fueled citizen
participation in environmental monitoring and risk dialogues.

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Conclusion
An investigation of SLAPPs reveals a need for Anti-SLAPPs to allow citizen
participation and development of risk dialogues. Individual citizens and NGOs are the
targets of an onslaught of SLAPPs, as thousands of SLAPPs are filed each year (Tebo,
2005). Citizen participation in environmental policy, like the Bucket Brigades, is
essential for holding polluters accountable, enhancing community trust, and developing
effective risk dialogues and assessment (Carolan & Bell, 2003). Tosco and other
polluters have reduced emissions because of Bucket Brigades’ increased monitoring and
risk dialogues (O’Rourke & Macey, 2003). Anti-SLAPP legislation discourages the
polluter’s approach of intimidation, and their attempts at transforming the dispute
dialogue.
Social organization relies on citizen trust in the process of policy decisions. For
effective environmental policy, public participation is an essential component of risk
dialogues. A sense of trust in the policy process is the foundation for dialogues of risk
rationality (Bell, 2011). Without public participation holding polluters accountable,
regulation agencies struggle to monitor pollution and enforce environmental laws.
Citizens and NGOs can’t let SLAPPs inhibit voicing concerns to legislatures.
Many legislatures have recognized the value and necessity of citizen enforcement
of environmental laws. Legislatures’ recognition is demonstrated by including citizen-
suit provisions in the Clean Water Act, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund), the Solid Waste Disposal Act, and the
Clean Air Act (Stetson, 1995). With large regions to regulate, government agencies rely
on citizen monitoring. SLAPPs deter public involvement that is required in major

21. 21
environmental statutes.
SLAPP case studies involving development, pollution, and preservation disputes
show consequences to social organization and environmental policy. SLAPPs countered
the environmental movement and have increased since the 1970. SLAPPs result in
expensive litigation, refocused resources, and intimidation. Additional negative
consequences also include fear and inaction, but are difficult to determine. For dialogues
of risk to influence environmental policy, the federal government and all states should
adopt Anti-SLAPP laws. These Anti-SLAPPs are essential for social and environmental
protection.

22. 22
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