1. Eksamenskode
UTVB3300
(1)
2013-­‐05
KANDIDATNUMMER:
321
UTVIKLINGSSTUDIER
TEORIER
OM
UTVIKLING,
GLOBALISERING
OG
SOSIAL
ENDRING
SEMESTER-­‐/BACHELOROPPGAVE
TITTEL:
MOROCCO,
POLISARIO
AND
THE
ROLE
OF
OUTSIDE
ACTORS
IN
THE
WESTERN
SAHARA
CONFLICT
ANTALL
ORD:
10996
INNLEVERINGSDATO:
22.05.2013

2. Table of contents
List of Abbreviations.............................................................................................
Map.........................................................................................................................
1.0 INTRODUCTION: A CALL FOR STANCES.................................................1
2.0 SETTING THE SCENE......................................................................................2
2.1 Key terms and theories............................................................................2
Decolonization and the right to self-determination....................................2
Sovereignty.................................................................................................4
Grand Strategy............................................................................................5
Realpolitik and Idealpolitik........................................................................6
2.2 Methods and use of sources.....................................................................7
2.3 Background...............................................................................................7
3.0 REPRESENTING AND REACHING OUT....................................................10
3.1 Strategies.................................................................................................10
3.1.1 Morocco’s strategies.............................................................11
3.1.2 POLISARIO’s strategies......................................................13
4.0 FRIENDS WITH BENEFITS? ........................................................................16
4.1 MOROCCO’S SUPPORTERS.............................................................16
USA..........................................................................................................16
FRANCE..................................................................................................22
4.2 POLISARIO’S SUPPORTERS............................................................27
ALGERIA................................................................................................27
5.0 CONCLUSION..................................................................................................31
SOURCES..........................................................................................................33

3. LIST
OF
ABBREVIATIONS
AU African Union
ECHO European Community Humanitarian aid Office
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy
EU Europen Union
FLN National Liberation Front (Algeria)
HRW Human Rights Watch
ICJ International Court of Justice
MEP Member of Parliament
MINURSO United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MNNA Major Non-Nato Ally
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAU Organisation of African Unity
POLISARIO Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro
PUNS Sahrawi National Union Party
SADR Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic
SGPE Security-General Personal Envoy
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UN United Nations

4. MAP
Source:
Wikimedia
Commons

5. MOROCCO,
POLISARIO
AND
THE
ROLE
OF
OUTSIDE
ACTORS
IN
THE
WESTERN
SAHARA
CONFLICT
Bachelor
thesis
spring
2013
–
candidate
number
321
1
MOROCCO, POLISARIO AND THE ROLE OF OUTSIDE ACTORS IN THE
WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT
How and why do external actors support POLISARIO or Morocco? How can such
support relations affect the international community’s ability to find a solution to the
Western Sahara conflict?
1.0: INTRODUCTION: A CALL FOR STANCES
Following World War II, and especially after the 1960 UN “Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples”, the era of European
colonization steadily dissolved. While about a third of the world’s population lived in
so-called “non-self-governing territories” in 1945, about 2 million people do today
(UN 2013a). On UN’s current list of non-self-governing territories, there are 16
names. The only such territory left on the African continent, is Western Sahara (UN
2013b). When colonizer Spain left the territory in 1976, it was annexed by Morocco
(and Mauritania, but Mauritania withdrew its claims in 1979). In Morocco’s view this
act was a “restoration of [Morocco’s] territorial integrity” (Joffé 2010:375), while in
Sahrawi nationalists’ (POLISARIO’s) view, it was an illegal annexation/occupation
(Murphy 2010:258).
This thesis investigates why no solution has been brought to the dispute over Western
Sahara after almost 40 years of conflict between Morocco and POLISARIO. The
thesis’ main focus is the role of external powers; their modes of and motivations for
support, and their ability to foster or hinder movement towards a settlement between
Morocco and POLISARIO. In 1994, Antonio Pazzanita wrote that the only way out of
“the Western Sahara impasse” was for the “backers” – France and US on one side,
and Algeria on the other – to exert diplomatic and economic pressure on Morocco and
POLISARIO (1994:278). Eighteen years later, a similar stance was still embraced by
UN Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, who
emphasizes the need for the international community to get engaged in the conflict
(UN News Centre 2012). The UN seeks to facilitate direct negotiations between
Morocco and POLISARIO to reach a “mutually acceptable political solution, which
will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara” (ibid). Ross
believes this goal is hard to reach because the stances of the two parties are mutually

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exclusive, as “each party [Morocco and POLISARIO] is convinced that its position is
well grounded in history and in international law and enjoys significant domestic and
international support” (ibid). Thus, one can see the need for harder stances and
political will from external actors as key to a solution. The question remains whether
it is Morocco or POLISARIO who is to be pressured, and whether it is Morocco or
POLISARIO who is to make compromises. Can external actors put pressure on any of
the two, and still act in line with international law?
2.0: SETTING THE SCENE
Before turning to external actors, I will clarify my use of selected key terms, bring
forward some existing theories, and discuss my use of sources. A history of the
Western Sahara dispute from Spanish colonization onwards will follow, regrettably in
form of “highlights” due to space priorities.
2.1 Key terms and theories
Decolonization and the right to self-determination
The UN has termed 2011-2020 the “Third International Decade for the Eradication of
Colonialism”. The first such decade was from 1990 to 2000, and the second from
2001 to 2010 (UN 2013C). Thus, decolonization has been top priority of the UN for
30 years by the end of the current decade. Article 1 of the UN charter describes the
purposes of the United Nations. Its second paragraph (out of four) reads as follows:
“To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate
measures to strengthen universal peace“
(UN 1945 [emphasis added])
Thus, self-determination of peoples can be described as one of the core purposes of
the UN. UN adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples (resolution 1514/XV) in 1960. The vote was cast in the
General Assembly as opposed to in the Security Council, as several of the permanent
Security Council member states had “colonial legal ties or associations” (McWhinney
2008). Vote results were 89 to 0 with 9 abstentions. France, Spain and USA were
among the nine abstaining from the vote (Murphy 2010:87). I will go into some
details of this declaration, as it is actively referred to by those viewing the situation in
Western Sahara as a decolonization issue, and also because it is reflected in the 1975

7. MOROCCO,
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ROLE
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OUTSIDE
ACTORS
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SAHARA
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2013
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ICJ Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara (see background chapter) (ICJ 1975).
Resolution 1514/XV declares seven articles, of which I find the first, second, sixth
and seventh to be most relevant:
1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a
denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an
impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial
integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations.
7. All States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present Declaration on the basis
of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all States, and respect for the sovereign
rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity.
At first glance, the resolution clearly favours those who are subject to colonization. In
cases of what Edward McWhinney calls “salt-water” Colonialism – when colonial
powers are physically separated from their colonies by the oceans – the role of the
colonizer and the colonized appears obvious. As we shall see, all is not obvious in the
Western Sahara situation. As Morocco sees their annexation as a reclaiming of their
original territory, a space opens for a debate over Moroccan territorial integrity and
sovereignty – aspects that are protected by article six and seven of the resolution.
Professor Gros Espiell stresses that the UN right to self-determination applies to
peoples under colonial and alien domination, and not to peoples already organized in
the form of a state, as the UN condemns attempts aimed at the partial or total
disruption of “the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country” (Espiell, in
Hannum 2011:48). However, Espiell insists that the right of peoples to self-
determination does count also within states if colonial and alien domination takes
place underneath a “guise” of ostensible national unity (ibid). Similarly, Sondre Torp
Helmersen explains that the international right to self-determination can prove legally
valid in three cases: in the case of former colonies; in the case of oppression; and in
the case of a “definable group being denied meaningful access to government to
pursue their political, economic, social and cultural development” (Appendix 2).
A complicating issue in the case of Western Sahara and Resolution 1514/XV is the
definition of “peoples”, as in e.g. “all peoples have the right to self-determination”
(article 2). Those who oppose to perceive the Sahrawi as a defined “people” will not

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regard Sahrawi as encompassed by the right. Who the resolution encompasses thus
depends on the eye of the beholder. However, some have discussed how the notion of
“peoples” should be understood in international law. In 1989, UNESCO published a
report in which a panel concluded that the concept of “people’s rights” is firmly
established by universally recognized international law, and that therefore one cannot
controvert its existence (UNESCO 1989:8). Even though the panel avoided setting a
strict definition, they listed a set of features that can be used to describe a people:
1. A group of individual human beings who enjoy some or all of the
following common features:
a. A common historical tradition;
b. Racial or ethnic identity;
c. Cultural homogeneity;
d. Linguistic unity;
e. Religious or ideological affinity;
f. Territorial connection;
g. Common economic life;
2. The group must be of a certain number which need not be large (e.g. the
people of micro States) but which must be more than a mere association of
individuals within a state;
3. The group as a whole must have the will to be identified as a people or
the consciousness of being a people – allowing that groups or some members
of such groups, though sharing the foregoing characteristics, may not have
the will or consciousness; and possibly;
4. The group must have institutions or other means of expressing its
common characteristics and will for identity.
(UNESCO 1989:7)
This list combines objective and subjective notions of belonging to a people; the first
and second paragraphs describe more or less “coincidental” common features of
individuals, while the third and fourth paragraphs describe the individuals’ intentional
and explicit wish to be seen as a group. One can keep in mind that both POLISARIO
and Morocco claim the traits of all four paragraphs (to various extents) in order to
strengthen their differing stances (Sahrawi as Moroccans versus Sahrawi as a distinct
people). The question remains: who seeks to describe reality and who seeks to breach
reality in order to win political ground?
Sovereignty
Ian Brownlie has termed sovereignty “the basic constitutional doctrine of the law of
nations” (in Hannum 2011:14), while Hurst Hannum describes it as a “cornerstone of
international rhetoric about state independence and freedom of action” (ibid).
Hannum debunks the idea of “absolute sovereignty” by pointing to the widely held

9. MOROCCO,
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ROLE
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OUTSIDE
ACTORS
IN
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SAHARA
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thesis
spring
2013
–
candidate
number
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5
idea of equality of states, which implies that “the sovereign rights of each state are
limited by the equally sovereign rights of others” (Hannum 2011:15). Thus, one can
say that there is a limit to sovereignty. Hannum further writes that there is universal
agreement upon the principle that sovereignty is “an attribute of statehood”, and that
only states can be sovereign (Hannum 2011:15). However, Awet Tewelde
Weldemichael, who has written on the Eritrean and East Timorese liberation
movements, writes that liberation movements can sometimes act as sovereign states,
“a condition called a state of ‘dual authority’ where a ‘state’ within a state issue[s]
orders and offer[s] its followers state-like services” (Weldemichael 2008:2).
Georg Sørensen argues that self-determination and sovereignty is highly linked,
writing that “the right of ‘peoples’ was not initially the right of individuals or groups
to self-determination, but the right of pre-existing colonial units to sovereignty”
(Sørensen 2001:104). After the decolonization of many African colonies, the OAU
committed itself to preserve existing (colonial) boundaries in Africa, and sovereignty
of these borders became internationally recognized. However, both the persistence on
and international recognition of sovereign borders has consequences for domestic
affairs in the postcolonial states. Sørensen believes that the sovereignty emphasis
constrains domestic opposition in the form of radical territorial claims to
autonomy/secession, and that it embraces non-intervention in domestic affairs to such
a degree that supreme legitimate power over domestic affairs is left with the
government (Sørensen 2001:104). Thus, the concept that was meant to serve
independence, can effectively hinder independence of sub-entities (new states) once
institutionalized.
Grand Strategy
Weldemichael writes about “Grand Strategy”, which expands the traditional notion of
strategy as military means to also encompass economic, psychological, moral,
political and technological factors (Weldemichael 2008:1). In his thesis on East
Timor/Indonesia and Eritrea/Ethiopia, Weldemichael employs a framework of “grand
strategy” to describe the strategies of both liberation movements and established
states. Thus he does not separate between the strategies employed by state and non-
state actors, partly because Eritrean and East Timorese movements “acted like
sovereign states in the organization of their followers in liberated areas [...]; in their

10. MOROCCO,
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apparatus of security and coercion; and in their robust political, diplomatic and
propaganda networks” (Weldemichael 2008:2). I argue that the situation in Western
Sahara is quite similar to the East Timorese and Eritrean cases (e.g. territories being
appropriated by neighbouring states after European colonization, movements
embracing state-like features). Thus I find it appropriate to review POLISARIO and
Morocco’s strategies in the framework of Grand Strategy.
Realpolitik and idealpolitik
Concerning support from external actors and external actors’ reasoning behind policy,
I will look further into two ideal types: Realpolitik and Idealpolitik. In rather
simplified form, realpolitik is policy promoted in self-interest, while idealpolitik is
policy with a “greater goal”. Swedish professor of political science Kjell Goldmann
lists two sets of features that characterize realpolitik and idealpolitik. He writes the
following on realpolitik: it is concerned with power and national security, it analyses
according to concrete situation and necessity, and it uses methods of pragmatic
compromise. On the contrary, he describes idealpolitik as concerned with ethics and
global change, performing analyses based on abstract theory and righteousness, using
methods of idealistic steadfastness (Goldmann 2012:2).
Goldmann further writes that states employ both models; realpolitik usually in
considerations of security and power, and idealpolitik to express identity (ibid:3). I
argue that individual states are more prone to employ realpolitik policies than what
the UN is. The UN (at least in theory) is a world community of states (thus not
competing/seeking power over other entities) bound together by the arguably
idealistic UN Charter. In the specific case of Western Sahara, Yahia Zoubir similarly
opposes realpolitik with international law, saying that there is a contradiction between
interest-motivated responses to the conflict and responses respecting international law
(in Murphy 2010:45). Without claiming the two ideal types to be neither ground-
breaking nor exhaustive, they will prove useful when analysing and labelling the
driving factors of international support by external in the Western Sahara conflict. Is
support driven by national self-interest or (international) idealism? And in the case of
the latter, can one talk of “pure” idealism or idealism used as a means for yet another
goal? I will strive to answer these questions in chapter 4.

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2.2 Methods and use of sources
This thesis is mainly built upon books, articles and official documents. However, I
will also make use of content from websites, public announcements and personal
interviews. This is due to the contemporary manner of the topic, which makes it
relevant to include up-to-date events that are not already covered by bigger published
works.
The most difficult part of writing this thesis has been the “navigation” of factuality in
my sources. As the conflict is one of a highly political manner, almost every detail of
the historical as well as contemporary events can be challenged and debated. For
example, one source may claim that people face fierce restrictions and human rights
abuses, while another one may term such claims mere propaganda. It is hard to
validate the different perceptions of reality, as sources argue they have “been there
and seen it”, while I have not. Lacking hands-on experience with the conflict, I try to
direct my analysis towards the slightly less contested field of UN resolutions and
international and national legal frameworks. However, parts of the thesis build upon
sources that can be “discredited” by other sources. My only solution to this dilemma
has been to use acknowledged sources, as well as trying to provide “both sides”
concerning matters that are especially controversial.
2.3 Background
The source of this historical review is Pablo San Martin’s book “Western Sahara: The
Refugee Nation” (2010) unless otherwise stated.
Western Sahara was claimed by colonial Spain at the 1884 Berlin Conference. For
decades, the colonial relationship played out only “on paper”. However, in the 1930s
Spain directed more of its colonial efforts towards Western Sahara. This followed
pressure from France, who claimed the Spanish protectorate served as a “free zone”
for rebels fighting France in Mauritania and Algeria. Spain established settlements,
and developed industry and infrastructure, mainly centred around the rich phosphate
resources in the area. Many Sahrawis gave up their nomadic lifestyle and settled in
the newly established cities. Many Sahrawis got access to regular employment, but
class differences between Spaniards and Sahrawis were evident.

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As many African colonies achieved independence in the 1950s and 60s, anti-colonial
movements also took hold in Western Sahara. Initially resistance was directed
towards French colonists in the Sahara, but later also against the Spanish. A
prominent figure in the Sahrawi nationalist movement was Mohamed Bassri, an
intellectual Sahrawi who built a platform of Sahrawi nationalism. He established the
political party OLVS. Three years later the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia
el-Hamra and Río de Oro – POLISARIO – was born. POLISARIO opposed the
Spanish colonizers, and soon got many adherents in the Sahrawi population.
In 1974 the Spanish conducted a comprehensive census on request by the UN,
preparing for a referendum on the future of Western Sahara. The UN visited the
territory in 1975, and recognized POLISARIO as the genuine popular resistance
movement, despite Spanish efforts to frame the opposition through a “puppet”
oppositional political party called PUNS. The UN noted in their report that
POLISARIO did not wish to integrate in neither Morocco nor Mauritania. Before
Spain got to conduct the UN requested referendum, Morocco demanded an
“advisory opinion” from The International Court of Justice (ICJ). ICJ concluded that
although there were legal ties between the Western Sahara, Morocco and Mauritania
in colonial times, “these ties were insufficient to justify decolonization of the territory
by any other means than a popular referendum” (Janis 1976:610). Morocco chose to
emphasize the “legal ties” part, and launched “the Green March” in November 1975.
“Armed with Qurans only”, about 350,000 Moroccans marched across the border into
Western Sahara. The UN discouraged the march through three UNSC resolutions. The
last one declared that the UNSC: “1. Deplores the holding of the march; 2. Calls upon
Morocco to immediately withdraw from the Territory of Western Sahara all the
participants in the march” (UNSC 1975:9). The march was still conducted.
Shortly after, Morocco, Spain and Mauritania signed the “Madrid Accords”. Spain’s
responsibilities and powers were transferred from Spain to the “temporary
administration”: Morocco, Mauritania and the Djemaa (UN 1975). Western Sahara
was then invaded by Morocco in the north and Mauritania in the south. Armed
conflict erupted, and hoards of Sahrawis fled across the Algerian border and settled in
refugee camps in Tindouf.

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Armed conflict continued, but In 1979 Mauritania withdrew, and the battle continued
between Moroccan forces and POLISARIO. Between 1982 and 1987 Morocco built
“the berm”: about 2,700 km of military wall that separates “Moroccan” from
“POLISARIO” territories. In 1983 SADR was accepted into the Organisation of
African Union (OAU), which led to Morocco’s withdrawal from OAU in 1984 (SCR
2013). In 1991 the United National Security Council (UNSC) adopted resolution 690
establishing the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
(MINURSO). It urged a ceasefire followed by a referendum in which Sahrawis were
to choose between integration with Morocco or independence. It also decided that a
Secretary-General Personal Envoy (SGPE) should be appointed. The ceasefire is
generally adhered to, but a referendum was never conducted due to persistent
disagreement over voter eligibility (MINURSO 2013).
In 1997 the SGPE James Baker led talks between the parties (Morocco and
POLISARIO as main parties, joined by Algeria and Mauritania) leading to adoption
of the Houston Accords (SCR 2013). The parties adopted a code of conduct regarding
the identification process, seeking to implement the 1991 settlement plan (UNTERM
2013). In 2001 Baker presented a framework agreement (“Baker I”). The draft was
accepted by Morocco and rejected by POLISARIO, as it included no option of
independence. The draft suggested replacing the referendum with a vote on limited
autonomy. In 2003 Baker presented the “Baker II plan”. The plan proposed a
referendum in which options were independence, autonomy or integration with
Morocco. The plan was accepted by POLISARIO and Algeria, but rejected by
Morocco. Baker also offered Moroccan settlers to be eligible voters, but Morocco still
rejected. Baker then resigned in 2004 (SCR 2013).
In 2007 Morocco submitted an ”autonomy plan” entitled “Moroccan Initiative for
Negotiating an Autonomy Statute for the Sahara Region” to the UN. Polisario
presented a counter-proposal for a ”Mutually Acceptable Political Solution that
Provides for the Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara.” Morocco and
POLISARIO met in UN-sponsored talks on several occasions during 2007 and 2008,
but did not agree on a solution, as their stances on self-determination were diverging
(SCR 2013). In 2009 Christopher Ross was appointed SGPE. In 2010 he facilitated
informal meetings between POLISARIO and Morocco, and the parties were urged to

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find a “political solution”. The parties met again in 2011, but still rejected each
other’s stances. Since 2009 the MINURSO mandate has been extended every year.
Some “language of human rights” (SCR 2013) has been added to the mandate, but it
has not been extended to pursue human right monitoring, as urged by POLISARIO
and activists (Western Sahara Campaign UK 15.05.2010). In May 2012 Morocco said
it had lost confidence in SGPE Christopher Ross, accusing him of being “unbalanced
and biased” (SCR 2013). In 2013 the MINURSO mandate was extended for another
year. A US draft before the meeting suggested extending the mandate to monitor
human rights violations, but the final draft did not contain such a suggestion (SCR
2013).
3.0: REPRESENTING AND REACHING OUT
The Moroccan state and POLISARIO are the main actors in the Western Sahara
conflict. As we have read, the Moroccans claim Western Sahara to be part of
Morocco while POLISARIO claims Sahrawis should be able to determine the future
of the territory. I will briefly emphasize a distinction here between Moroccan
authorities and Moroccans per se, as well as POLISARIO and Western Sahrawis per
se. Obviously, not all members of a society (either in the form of a state or a
movement) bear the same opinions and desires. In settings where access to channels
of communication with the outside world is unequally distributed among members of
society (e.g. as a result of network access, class, democratic channels, cultural norms
etc.), there is a chance that prominent figures (leaders) “harvest” power from the
alleged extent of popular representation. Thus, speaking on behalf of a population can
give power, and arguably the power grows in parallel with the number of people one
speaks on behalf of. One should keep this in mind when dealing with representatives,
and try not to confuse political actors with actors situated on the same land.
3.1 Strategies
This section concerns strategies employed by Morocco and POLISARIO in order to
gain international support. A key question here is whether the different status of the
two parts affects which resources they have access to. Pazzanita points out that
Morocco has always had “all the resources of an established state at its disposal”
(1994:266). Erik Hagen specifies that Morocco has “access” wherever a “non-state”

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does not have access. Embassies, diplomatic status, and access to UN and EU
processes are examples of resources that Morocco has and POLISARIO lacks.
I do not claim the following list of strategies to be exhaustive, but they may serve as
examples enhancing your understanding of why external supporters back the two
different actors. I am granting military strategies only little attention here, as these are
arguably strategies of self-interest rather than calls for international support per se. I
will evaluate the different strategies according to Weldemichael’s framework.
3.1.1 Morocco’s strategies
STABILITY CLAIMS AND “GESTURES”
Hagen says that Morocco promotes itself as a “guarantee” for stability and security in
North Africa. This image is fronted in different forums, such as in the UN, and in
bilateral meetings with neighbouring states and the US (Hagen, 08.04.2013). Morocco
also promotes itself as a nation that takes drug trafficking and terrorism seriously
(ibid). Concerning the latter, Morocco’s rhetoric post 9/11 is concerned with the
emergence of yet another “failed state” – “that a new weak Saharan state might
become a safe haven for terrorism” (2007). Mundy believes that this catches the
attention of Western capitals, and especially helps Morocco maintain and increase US
support (ibid). Pazzanita too is concerned with this “Westward” approach, and writes
that Morocco, especially during the Hassan II regime, has provided a series of
gestures to the West. The list of Moroccan gestures includes military-basing
agreements with the US, diplomatic support for Western initiatives in the Arab-Israeli
conflict, assistance during the Shaba crises in Zaïre, and collaboration on intelligence
matters. Pazzanita thinks subsequent US support to Morocco [see part 3.3] is an act of
reciprocity (1994:267). Thus, one can read the Moroccan “friendliness” towards the
West as a strategy used to gain support.
PUBLIC RELATIONS AND LOBBY
Another Moroccan strategy has been the use of PR companies, and according to
Pazzanita, Morocco spent about 1 million USD on American PR firms from 1978, in
order to “promote the country’s value to American interests” (1994:267). In a 2005
hearing of the US committee on International Relations, US senator James Inhofe

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voiced his concern that in the Western Sahara conflict “virtually all of the high-priced
lobbyists [in the US] are on behalf of Morocco” (Committee on International
Relations 2005). He mentioned the Livingston Group, Tew Cardenas, Edelman Public
Relations, Miller and Chevalier, Gabriel and Company, Robert Holley – all
representing “millions and millions of dollars that are spent to lobby on behalf of
Morocco” (ibid). Robert Holley and others are associated with the Moroccan
American Center for Policy (MACP) – “a registered foreign agent for the Moroccan
government” (Zunes 02.08.2012).
CENSORSHIP
According to Mundy, Morocco makes sure to control the flow of information into and
out of Western Sahara. During the 2005 “Intifada”, activists and journalists were
hindered from reaching the territories (Mundy 2006:16). The same year, Moroccan
journalist Ali Lmrabet was sentenced to a ten-year ban on working as a journalist due
to his remarks about Sahrawi refugees in Tindouf. Lmrabet wrote in the Moroccan
newspaper “al Moustakil” that the Sahrawis “were not being ‘held’ as Moroccan
officials claim, but were ‘refugees’ as defined by the UN” (Reporters Without
Borders 12.04.2005). In 2010 Morocco closed down Al Jazeera’s Moroccan news
bureau because they were not happy with the channel’s coverage of the Western
Sahara conflict (HRW 2011). Moroccan press law forbids speech that undermines
“Islam, the institution of the monarchy, or territorial integrity” (ibid), thus coverage of
pro-independence voices will be silenced. Such restrictions make Morocco in control
of the stories are made available to the public, and it allows Morocco to frame its own
image of the conflict both nationally and internationally.
ALGERIA FRAMING
Murphy believes that “the dynamic nature of a conflict situation and the changing
relationships amongst its players can at times cause confusion or can be used by the
players themselves to obstruct an accurate conflict assessment” (Murphy 2010: 276,
emphasis added). Building on this, Murphy claims that Morocco deliberately
confused POLISARIO and Algeria during the open confrontations in the 70s by
accusing Algeria of POLISARIO led and executed attacks (Murphy 2010:256). In a
Cold War political climate this shifted focus from the “Frente Polisario’s
independence movement and turned all eyes on Algeria, a socialist and communist

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friendly country, France’s nemesis and the United States’ concern” (ibid). By framing
Algeria as the “real” enemy, Morocco could mobilize big anti-communist allies in the
dispute over Western Sahara. Similarly, Mundy writes that Morocco’s framing of
POLISARIO as “a creation of the Algerian state, an arm of the Algerian army […]
remains a firm cornerstone of the Moroccan nationalist imaginaire” (Mundy 2007).
One can argue that such “strategic confusion” of key antagonists allows Morocco to
push outside actors’ realpolitikal rather than idealpolitikal buttons.
STRATEGY REVIEW
I will sum up Morocco’s use of Grand Strategy factors by posing the following
question: “How can one characterize the strategic means that Morocco employs in its
quest for international support?”
I argue that Morocco employs the whole arsenal of Grand Strategy factors in their
quest. The extensive use of PR companies is an economic strategy. The stability
claims and the Algeria framing is a psychological strategy aimed at the west, as it
plays the strings Western fear of insecurity, and as it projects the west’s (negative)
feelings for Algeria upon POLISARIO. Punishing journalists is also a psychological
strategy, scaring others from doing the same. Support for Israel and emphasis on
national unity can be termed moral strategies, for use in international and national
contexts respectively. Publicly supporting western initiatives is part of a political
strategy. Finally, online presence and manipulation resembles a technological
strategy.
3.1.2 POLISARIO’s strategies
FROM ARMED TO POLITICAL STRUGGLE
As we have read, POLISARIO initially waged armed struggle against (Spain,
Mauritania and) Morocco, under the slogan “with the rifle we will seize our freedom”
(San Martin 2010:85). Erik Hagen says that the shift from armed struggle to political
struggle post the 1991 ceasefire was a controversial move, as many Sahrawis felt like
they made too many compromises (Hagen 08.04.2013). However, POLISARIO
conducted a parallel non-armed struggle long before 1991 – since the creation of
SADR in 1976. One can call the very creation of SADR a strategy in itself. Murphy

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claims that statehood can confer “legitimacy on the objectives and actions of
liberation movements” (Murphy 2010:236). A state, as opposed to a liberation
movement, is something that has the potential of recognition by other states. One can
also argue that POLISARIO “released” more and different resources in its search for
recognition through the state creation. In their national action programme of 1974,
POLISARIO aimed to “politicize, organize and affiliate” the masses and to
“reinforce” links with Arab, African and other countries (San Martin 2010:116),
actions that could more easily be conducted when “national” institutions were in
place.
Today, due to the enduring stalemate, some warn that POLISARIO may once again
return to armed resistance (e.g. Lehbib 14.03.2013). Thus one can ask whether the
current non-armed stage is a strategy, or whether it is a result of necessity and
resource access.
INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND MAKESHIFT DIPLOMACY
From the middle 70s to the middle 80s, POLISARIO’s efforts were aimed at gaining
support from African, Asian and Latin American regimes, culminating in the SADR’s
membership in the OAU in 1984. By 1982 SADR was recognized by 52 governments,
in 1990 by 74 countries (Pazzanita 1994:271). In total, 83 countries have recognized
SADR, but due to some cancellations and freezes of diplomatic relations, 45 countries
recognize it today (WSHRW 2013).
Hagen says that POLISARIO principally employ diplomatic strategies similar to
those of any recognized country when it comes to seeking international support. The
difference, however, is the access to resources. POLISARIO has representatives in
many different countries, but as these usually do not enjoy formal diplomatic status,
the logistics of wage, accommodation and various permissions takes much of their
time. They try to be present in the diplomatic arenas they can access, albeit with few
material resources (Hagen, 08.04.2013). In 2009, 32 Sahrawi political representatives
were present in Europe, of which the majority was located in Spain. In Africa they
had 22, in North America four, and South America 10 (Rossetti 2012:343).

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INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMING
POLISARIO mobilizes around the UN principles and human rights. POLISARIO
cites “UN resolutions and the International Court of Justice’s 1975 decision […] [and]
calls for a democratic referendum that allows the Saharawis themselves to decide
their political future. This is the pivot upon which all Polisario arguments revolve”
(OSF 2013). Whether one finds the claims legitimate is another debate. The
Washington-based NGO “Leadership Council for Human Rights” founded by Nobel
peace prize nominee Kathryn Porter blames POLISARIO for “exploiting human
rights for a political agenda” (LCHR 2013).
VISIBILITY
Although not explicit POLISARIO initiatives, popular uprisings against human rights
abuses in the “Moroccan” territories have been joined by POLISARIO adherents.
Mundy writes that what started as a small Sahrawi demonstration in May 2005
developed into a “Sahrawi Intifada”, in which POLISARIO flags and symbols were
clearly present (Mundy 2006:14). This was also the case when Hambdi Lembarki –
“the Intifada’s first Martyr” – was buried, and when Sahrawi human rights activist
Aminatou Haidar was released from prison, both in January 2006. Mundy finds the
use of POLISARIO flags interesting, and refers to Toby Shelley who claims that
POLISARIO flags have been ubiquitous in Sahrawi demonstrations since 2006
(Mundy 2006:16 [in notes]). One can argue that linking the POLISARIO to broader
movements can work as a strategy to attract more international attention.
STRATEGY REVIEW
I will sum up POLISARIO’s use of Grand Strategy factors by posing the following
question: “How can one characterize the strategic means that POLISARIO employs in
its quest for international support?”
Political and moral factors dominate POLISARIO’s strategies. The state construction,
the diplomatic efforts and the UN principles mobilization are strategies of a political
manner. However, propagating international law can also be termed a moral strategy;
confronting external actors by claiming a right to “universal” values. The non-
violence stance, if deliberate, is also a strategy claiming moral ground. I read the use
of symbols (flags etc.) as a psychological strategy, as it can build cohesiveness

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internally and generate nostalgia and compassion externally. Even though economic
and technological strategies may exist, I think the non-prominence of such is linked to
the lack of resources the POLISARIO experiences compared to Morocco.
4.0: FRIENDS WITH BENEFITS?
In this section I will investigate how and why different actors back the two sides,
Morocco and POLISARIO. Murphy writes that “the conflict between Morocco and
the Frente Polisario (Western Sahara) is an open-case decolonization conflict
complicated by third-party intervention and geopolitical, economic, political and
militaristic interests” (2010:44). The aim of this chapter is thus to reveal a bigger
picture that can better explain why it is hard to agree on a solution. Emphasis will be
given to the US, France and Algeria, as they are identified as main backers by
Pazzanita. Other substantial supporters are Spain, the EU and the OAU/AU. These are
left out in order to investigate the main actors’ support more in detail.
I will label the different supporters as either “pro Morocco” or “pro POLISARIO”
based on the weight of support to one side, even though ambivalence sometimes
occurs. Also, I am using the term “support” in a wide manner. I will talk of explicit
support for the actors (Morocco and POLISARIO), but also general support for the
claims that they put forward, e.g. support for the right to self-determination (being a
goal for POLISARIO). I will provide chronological histories of support from the days
of the Green March in 1975 and up until today.
4.1: MOROCCO’S SUPPORTERS
USA
Means of US support
USA has provided rather steadfast support to Morocco, although the extent has
changed somewhat under the different administrations. US-Moroccan diplomatic
relations date back to 1777, and in 1787 relations were formalized in the “Treaty of
Peace and Friendship” – the longest unbroken treaty relationship in the history of the
US (Murphy 2010:105). Even though the US formally supports the UN process in
Western Sahara, “the United States has offered considerable political and material
support to Morocco to sustain the war effort and prevent the nationalist movement

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[POLISARIO] from accomplishing its goal (Zoubir & Volman, 1998; Zunes, 1998)”
(Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier 2005:185).
Many have written on US support to Morocco during Spanish decolonization and the
subsequent Green March, which took place during the days of the Ford
administration (1974-1977). Murphy writes that USA secretly aided Morocco during
the build-up to direct conflict between Morocco and POLISARIO, and that foreign
minister Henry Kissinger knew about the Green March plan, which was a violation of
article 49 in the Geneva Convention concerning use of civilians in occupation
(Murphy 2010:279). Murphy writes that Kissinger “purposefully steered President
Ford towards a transfer of power from Spain to Morocco by providing a distorted, or
even falsified, picture of the actual situation” (Murphy 2010:237). Brahim Saidy
writes that it was the US who pressured Spain into accepting the Madrid Accords of
1975 (Saidy 2011:87).
Concerning the following armed conflict, Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier write that
“the US played a major role in reversing the war over Western Sahara in Morocco’s
favour through large-scale economic and military aid, military advisers and logistical
assistance” (Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier 2005:188). The US supported Morocco
with F5E aircrafts weeks after the Green March, and Kissinger approved shipment of
tanks, armoured personnel carriers and howitzers (Murphy 2010:298).
According to Murphy, Henry Kissinger and Vernon Walters organized illegal transfer
of guns from Jordan, Iran, South Korea and South Africa to Morocco in the end of the
1970s. At the same time the UN tried to broker a ceasefire and referendum (Murphy
2010:300). US Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s wrote in his memoires that
the US intentionally blocked the UN referendum and self-determination process both
in East Timor and in Western Sahara, and that “the United States wished things to
turn out as they did, and worked to bring this about. The Department of State desired
that the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook”
(Moynihan 1980:279).
In 1978, during the Carter Administration (1977-1981), the US froze arms sales to
Morocco. According to a military agreement signed by US and Morocco in 1960,

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Morocco was not allowed to use US weapons “outside internationally recognized
borders” (Slimi 17.06.2009). Due to pressure from congress members and the CIA,
the weapon trade was resumed in 1979 (ibid, Saidy 2011:87). In 1979 the State
Department allowed US company Northrop Page Communications to build an
electronic detection system (“ICDS” – Integrated Intrusion Detection and
Communications System) worth 200 US Dollars for use by Morocco in Western
Sahara (Murphy 2010:301).
Economic and military aid to Morocco increased during the Reagan administration
(1981-1989), which “condemned the POLISARIO Front as a Sovjet ally” (Saidy
2011:87). Reagan lifted all restrictions of weapon use in the war against POLISARIO
(Murphy 2010:302), and from 1982 onwards the US supplied Morocco with Cluster
Bomb Units and cluster shells for use in Western Sahara (ibid). Slimi argues that the
US support in these days was military, and not political, i.e. USA “did not defend
Morocco’s case in international arenas” (Slimi 17.06.2009).
Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier write that after the Cold War, the US began to
“quietly urge” Morocco to seek a compromise on Western Sahara (2005:188). During
the post-Cold War Bush administration (1989-1993) the official US stance was that
the Western Sahara conflict was to be addressed by the UN (Slimi 17.06.2009). The
administration supported the 1991 ceasefire as well as the UN Settlement Plan (Saidy
2011:88).
The Clinton Administration (1993-2001) again strengthened the position in favour of
Morocco (Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier, 2005:186), and officials at the
Department of State and Department of Defense argued that “integrating the former
colonial territory into Morocco might prove the best solution” (ibid). Saidy terms the
Clinton approach “pragmatic” – “it opted for promoting a solution based on territorial
autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty and leaving the details to be negotiated
between the parties” (Saidy 2011:88), and it saw negotiations between Morocco and
Algeria as key to a solution (ibid). It was also during the Clinton administration that
the Eizenstat Initiative (today: US North Africa Economic Program) was entered.
This program encourages US investment in the Maghreb region, and seeks reduction

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of internal barriers among and between the countries of North Africa (Eizenstat 1999,
in Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier 2005:182).
In 2003 the Bush administration (2001-2009) voiced its support for the “Baker plan”.
However, Bush stated that a solution would not be imposed on Morocco (Slimi
17.06.2009). In 2004 the US designated Morocco as a “Major Non-NATO Ally”
(MNNA) (BBC News 04.06.2004) – a title granted to “exceptionally close allies who
have strong strategic working relationships with American forces but [who] are not
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]” (Global Security 2013).
MNNAs can receive certain kinds of military assistance, and the MNNA designation
“represents an affirmation of the importance the US places on the relationship” (ibid).
In 2005 Morocco and the US joined a “deep-cutting free trade agreement [...] which
would eliminate most tariffs on most products” (Korany and Dessouki 2010:340).
Later on, the Bush administration gave its full support to Morocco’s “Autonomy
Plan” of 2007, while discarding the Sahrawi counter-proposal (Darbouche and Zoubir
2008:100). American ambassadors William Burns and Jackie Wolcott Sanders termed
the 2007 Moroccan autonomy initiative a “serious and credible proposal to provide
real autonomy” and a “promising realistic way forward” (Murphy 2010:141).
According to Murphy, this became the official stance of the US, and it was supported
by both republicans and democrats alike (ibid:142).
The current Obama administration (2009- ) has emphasized negotiations under UN
auspices, among others in Obama’s letter to the Moroccan king Mohammad IV in
2009. In his letter Obama did not mention the Moroccan autonomy plan which was so
praised by the previous administration. Solà Martin thinks this symbols a reversal of
the US policy of endorsing Morocco’s autonomy proposal, and he believes that the
Obama administration will work on a solution more similar to the Baker Plan (Solà-
Martin 2009:132). However, continued support for the Moroccan autonomy plan has
been voiced in other settings. At the 2009 “Forum for the Future” in Marrakech,
Hillary Clinton spoke of the 2007 Moroccan autonomy plan and said that “I don’t
want anyone in the region or elsewhere to have any doubt about our policy, which
remains the same” (Saydi 2011:89).

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Recent events too point to some ambivalence in the steadfast US support to Morocco.
In April 2013 the US proposed to expand the MINURSO mandate in Western Sahara
to encompass human rights monitoring. Morocco answered by cancelling a planned
US-Morocco military exercise, and the Moroccan king sent a letter to Obama warning
of the “risks that may result from any shift in the MINURSO prerogatives” (Lebbar
13.05.2013). The US then withdrew their suggestion, and the mandate remained
unchanged (ibid).
Reasons for US support
Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier trace US’ support to Morocco back to the Cold
War, and quote James Baker who said that during the Cold War “the POLISARIO
Front was aligned with Cuba and Libya and some other enemies of the United States”
(Baker, 2004, in Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier 2005:185). Zoubir thinks that the
US feared the emergence of a pro-Sovjet state in Western Sahara (Zoubir 1987, in
Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier 2005:185). But why did Moroccan support seem to
decline in importance under the Bush Senior administration? Zoubir and Benabdallah-
Gambier suggest that “the dramatic decline of Marxism-Leninism in Africa lessened
the need for Morocco as a surrogate or proxy state” (2005:188).
Murphy believes that the “war on terror” serves the same purpose for the Morocco-
USA relation today as the Cold War did (Murphy 2010:296). Related to this, Zoubir
and Benabdallah-Gambier think that the US shows interest in the Maghreb region
because some members of the Al-Qaeda network are of North African origin
(2005:181). Slimi thinks Bush’s supportive but non-imposing attitude towards the
Baker Plan “was a stand that revealed the centrality of the war on terror in the Bush
administration’s strategies, as it viewed the conflict in the Sahara as intertwined with
Morocco’s cooperation in Washington’s antiterrorism campaign”
(Slimi17.06.2009).On the question of the MNNA designation, the US said that it
designated Morocco a MNNA because of the US’ “appreciation for Morocco's
steadfast support in the global war on terror, and for King Mohamed's role as a
visionary leader in the Arab world" (BBC News 04.06.2004).
Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier thinks that US’ main motivation for stability in the
region is economic interest, referring to the US North Africa Economic Program and

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the 2004 free trade agreement (2005:182). They suggest that US support is partly
linked to US interest in seeing the emergence of a “regional, marked based Maghreb
entity” (2005:181). Such a regionalization process is dependent on Algeria and
Morocco, thus it is necessary to resolve the tension between the two, which according
to Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier stems from the Western Sahara conflict (ibid).
Murphy thinks US support relates to Morocco’s geographic location, “in terms of
access to the Mediterranean and in terms of strategic positioning for U.S. bases”
(2010:287). Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier think Morocco is important to the US
due to the presence of US Sixth Fleet [the US Navy’s operational fleet in Europe] in
the Mediterranean (2005:188). Also, in Morocco CIA and the National Security
Agency (NSA) can operate effectively (Saidy 2010:99).
The US supports Morocco in order to keep a key ally in the Arab world; the
Moroccan king (2008:100). Some also suggest that USA supports Morocco in order to
preserve its presence in the Middle East. Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier point to
Morocco’s role in the Middle East “peace process”, and suggest that that the US
congress supports Morocco because it is less antagonistic towards Israel. They write
that American administrations have appreciated “Morocco’s position towards Israel
and its pro-western orientation” (2005:188).
Concerning whether US support is of an idealistic manner, Murphy believes that “the
principles of self-determination and decolonization fall to the way side when up
against anything that gets in the way of U.S. practices of imperial conquest and global
hegemony” (2010:95). Murphy: “In essence, no clear line can be drawn between U.S.
foreign policy and U.S. declared principles on the subject of self-determination: “The
right to self-determination as a general principle may have been as often
compromised as observed in US policy” (Hunt, 2000: 211). In essence, the U.S.
position on self-determination is conflicted, ranging from open support, as in the
recent case of Kosovo, to its despotic denial” (Murphy 2010:96).
Slimi believes that the occasional “neutrality” stance, e.g. under Bush senior, is
embraced because the US tries to improve its image and prove its respect for

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international legitimacy, and in the 1990s to avoid harming economic interests in
Algeria (Slimi 17.06.2009).
To sum up, motivation behind a majority of the US support to Morocco seems to be
of a realpolitik manner. USA is willing to compromise international law in order to
see an end to the conflict; and they are concerned with preserving key allies and
economic presence. However, I find it hard to frame war on terror/communism as
motivated by mere realpolitik. Although it can ultimately be seen as a national
security issue for the US, it can also be understood as motivated by idealpolitikal
desires for global change, demonstrating US’ self-proclaimed but firm belief in
liberalism and democracy. Although the position may gain the US in other for a, the
anti-terror stance is undoubtedly one of idealistic steadfastness. Thus, even though
they might not adhere to internationally agreed upon laws, they do set their own ideals
and adhere to these.
FRANCE
Means of French support
France and Morocco’s interaction dates long back, and is necessarily coloured by
their colonial bond lasting from 1912 to 1956. Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier write
that “France has consistently backed the Moroccan view in the conflict” (Zoubir and
Benabdallah-Gambier 2005:183), and Zoubir writes that “neither conservatives nor
socialists in France have ever been favorable to the establishment of a Sahrawi
independent state” (Zoubir 2001). Murphy writes that despite claimed neutrality,
France has supported Morocco and Mauritania from the very beginning (Murphy
2010:308), and that France “provides Morocco with generous political support in the
UN Security Council” (ibid), as well as constant economic and military assistance.
The Green March took place during the Giscard presidency (1974-1981). Murphy
writes that “the French used their powerful status in the United Nations to undermine
the Security Council’s response mechanisms for handling the illegal Green March
invasion” (Murphy 2010:307). Apparently, the French delegate to the UN Security
Council employed “delay tactics” – preventing debates and drafts of resolution texts –
which hindered the UNSC in addressing the severity of the Green March in
resolutions 377, 379 and 380 (ibid). Also, Kamil writes that France secretly equipped

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Morocco with advisors and weaponry (in Murphy 2010:309). Although executed in
Mauritania and not Morocco, France’s 1977 and 1978 air attacks “Opération
Lamantin” can be seen as acts supporting Morocco’s position in the Western Sahara
conflict, as it sought to harm POLISARIO forces (Murphy 2010:309).
During the Mitterrand presidency (1981-1995), the French actually tended to favour
relations with Algeria over Morocco (Behr 2009:112). According to a 1981 report by
the conservative think tank “The Heritage Foundation” Mitterand supported
POLISARIO, and was pro self-determination for Western Sahara (The Heritage
Foundation 1981:15). A POLISARIO office was opened in Paris in 1982 (Naylor
2000:148). In his early career Mitterand attacked Morocco’s aggression towards
Sahrawis, and he referred to Western Sahara emphasizing that all peoples have a right
to self-determination (Naylor 2000:142). However, in 1982 France honoured military
contracts with Morocco and later abstained from UN votes on self-determination
resolutions for Western Sahara. SADR representative Mohamed Ould Sidati termed
the French behaviour “deceptive” (ibid).
Under the Chirac presidency (1995-2007), close relations with Morocco were re-
established, and Morocco became central to Chirac’s Maghreb policy. According to
Behr, the Chirac government gave its full diplomatic support to Morocco on the
Western Sahara conflict (Behr 2009:154). However, Chirac was keen to settle the
Western Sahara conflict (Lefebvre 15.03.2003), and pursued settlement through
“choosing” Morocco. Murphy writes that the Chirac government sought to pressure
Algeria into reducing support for POLISARIO (Murphy 2010:310) – according to
Algerian officials by offering them economic aid (Darbouche and Zoubir 2008:99).
France also used financial conditionality to offset diplomatic gains made by SADR:
Darbouche and Zoubir write that African states such as Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad,
Comoros Islands, Congo-Brazzaville and Togo broke diplomatic ties with SADR in
1996-97 as a result of such French policies (2008:100).
France supported Morocco in international forums during the Chirac presidency.
Darbouche and Zoubir write that the UNSC were unable to enforce Resolution 1495,
which sought to extend the MINURSO mandate and implement James Baker’s “Peace
plan” (UNSC 2003), due to obstruction by France (Darbouche and Zoubir 2008:94).

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According to an ICG report, France were the ones who insisted that the UNSC did not
“endorse” but rather “strongly support” the Baker’s Peace plan (ICG 2007:3). France
also threatened with veto in the UNSC in case of solutions unacceptable to Morocco
(Darbouche and Zoubir 2008:98), and on his first visit to Morocco as president,
Chirac offered himself as “Morocco’s spokesperson in the EU” (Behr 2009:152).
Furthermore, Chirac voiced his support for the 2007 Moroccan autonomy plan, and
termed it “constructive” (Al Jazeera 06.02.2007).
Economic support was significant, and in 2006 French bilateral aid to Morocco was
220 million Euros (HRW 2008:34).
The Sarkozy presidency (2007-2012) continued the pro-Moroccan policy of Chirac
(Mundy 2009:119). Like G. W. Bush, Sarkozy termed Morocco’s 2007 autonomy
proposal “serious and credible”, and he assured the Moroccan parliament that “France
will stand shoulder to shoulder with you [in negotiations over Western Sahara]” (in
Mundy 2009:119). In 2007 Sarkozy promised Mohammed VI to pave way for
negotiations on granting Morocco “advanced status” in the EU (Touahri 24.10.2007),
and in 2010 he was very clear about French support for Moroccan and Maghribian
counter-terrorism efforts, stating that “their fight against terrorism is ours” (Serrai
27.08.2010).
French-Moroccan Economic cooperation prospered. In 2007 Sarkozy signed civilian
and military contracts worth 2.8 billion US Dollars with Morocco. The contracts
included construction of a TGV railway line, frigates, a power plant, Puma
helicopters, armoured vehicles and border surveillance equipment (The Financial
Express 24.10.2007). France agreed to provide Morocco with civil nuclear technology
(AFP 25.10.2007), and a mining cooperation contract was signed between French
company Areva and Moroccan company OCP (Areva 23.10.2007). OCP carries out
mining operations both in Morocco and in the disputed Western Saharan territories
(OCP 2013). One can call such an agreement a de facto recognition of Moroccan
sovereignty over the Western Sahara territory.
A small gap in the consistent French support occurred in 2009, when Sarkozy urged
Morocco to return the confiscated passport of hunger striking Sahrawi activist

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Aminatou Haidar. Haidar was detained by Moroccan authorities because she refused
to state her homeland as “Moroccan Sahara” (Passanante, 09.03.2011). This
“intervention” may prove that there are certain limits to France’s support.
It is still quite early to thoroughly assess the extent of French support to Morocco
under the Hollande presidency(2012-). However, all points to a further consolidation
of France’s support to Morocco. On a visit in April 2013, Hollande signed thirty
contracts and agreements with Morocco, apparently aiming to surpass Spain as
Morocco’s main trading partner. Hollande praised Morocco for taking “decisive steps
towards democracy” (El Azzouzi 10.04.2013), and also stressed the urgency of
finding a solution to the Western Sahara conflict (AFP 04.04.2013). AFP reported that
Hollande renewed French backing for “Morocco's insistence on its sovereignty over
the territory and its refusal to negotiate more autonomy for the native Sahrawis”
(ibid). Thus it seems there is no change of status quo for the time being.
Reasons for French support
Murphy traces the reasons for French support to Morocco back to the time of
Moroccan decolonization. Even though Morocco was officially declared independent
from France in 1956, Murphy holds that “bilateral agreements and promises of
interdependence guaranteed a continuity of French interests” (Murphy 2010:102).
France and Morocco remain important trading partners, as France accounts for about
70 per cent of direct investments in Morocco (Darbouche and Zoubir 2008:99). Such
economic interests were also at the core of Chirac’s wish to settle the conflict
(through supporting Morocco), as he wanted to build an all-North Africa economic
union, and saw the resolution of the Western Sahara conflict as key to Moroccan-
Algerian cooperation (Lefebvre 15.03.2003).
Some link France’s motivation for Moroccan support to its fear of losing French
hegemony to other states. Murphy thinks France fears for the hegemonic position of
the French language and the French-Moroccan interdependence, which may be
threatened if a Spanish-speaking country emerges in the Maghreb (ibid:103).
Darbouche and Zoubir think France wants to curtail both US and Spanish influence in
the region (2008:99), and Behr points to the pro-Moroccan stance under Chircas as

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due to “rivalry” with the US, who had already chosen Morocco as its preferred partner
in the Maghreb (Behr 2009:154).
Like for USA, Stability also seems to be a key motivation for France. Zoubir and
Benabdallah-Gambier write that the (USA and) France came to see Morocco as a
“fortress of stability and bulwark against radical Islamism” (2005:186) during the
1990s. More recently – in relation to the nuclear deal signed under Sarkozy – France’s
reasoning was that “if Morocco develops, it can fight against extremism” (AFP
25.10.2007). Whether stability is desired out of specific (French) or general interest,
however remains an unanswered question.
Considering the occasional breaches in French support to Morocco, Behr believes that
Mitterrand’s initial favouring of Algeria over Morocco was due to moral guilt for
colonization, sympathy with FLN, and dislike of aggression in Western Sahara (Behr
2009:112). Naylor writes that Mitterrand must have later come to realize the
“manifold strategic value of Morocco” (2010:148), and especially after the Cold War
ended it was more legitimate for France to support both Algeria and Morocco (Behr
2009:131). Considering the Aminatou Haidar case, writer and journalist Ian Williams
thinks that Sarkozy’s manoeuvre deserves little admiration. He suggests that it was
merely fuelled by the wish to minimize attention drawn to the “Moroccan occupation
and consequent human rights violations which France has protected from
international action” (Williams 20.12.2009).
To sum up, France’s support seem, maybe more than US’, to be motivated by
preserving power and hegemonic position in Morocco. Also, France’s participation in
the war on terror is arguably more explicitly motivated by national interest than the
US’, as France and Morocco are more closely tied, both physically and presence-wise.
Also France is willing to seek pragmatic compromise of international law. All of
these are realpolitik concerns. Whether there exists idealpolitikal motivations for
support to Morocco, one may imagine that France supports Morocco by
paternalistically giving “payback” for colonialism.

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4.2: POLISARIO’S SUPPORTERS
ALGERIA
Means of Algerian support
Although termed POLISARIO’s “creator” by some sources (e.g. El Ouali 2008, Louh
18.04.2013), Algeria and POLISARIO play separate roles. Murphy labels Algeria a
“secondary actor” to the conflict with the occasional “primary actor overlap” (Murphy
2010:286). Algeria itself consistently rejects any attempt to ‘bilateralise’ the conflict
(Mundy 2007:260). Nevertheless, Algeria can be termed the main supporter of the
POLISARIO, and more specifically, a supporter of the right to self-determination
stance. Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier write that “Algeria […] has maintained a
rather constant position in support of a referendum in Western Sahara, though
ambiguities in its stance have emerged occasionally” (2005:187). Also, POLISARIO
has received most of its equipment, training and financial resources from Algeria
(Volman, 1993: 157).
Algeria recognized SADR in 1976, in the days of the Boumediene presidency
(1965/76-1978). Zoubir writes that Algeria’s early Western Sahara policy centred
around counteracting Moroccan de facto annexation attempts (Zoubir 2000:49).
Algeria was hesitant about aiding POLISARIO in the first stages of the open war, but
when tens of thousands of Sahrawi refugees fled from cities such as El Aaiún, Algeria
“began to give the revolutionary group the economic, technical and military aid that
was essential to the Frente Polisario’s counter attack and survival” (Murphy
2010:256). According to Mundy, POLISARIO received both military and diplomatic
backing from Algeria (Mundy 2007:256). Examples of such military backing was
tanks, heavy artillery and “Surface-to-Air Missiles” (SAMs) (Mundy 2007:256, Air
Scene UK 2013). Diplomatic backing is exemplified through e.g. a meeting between
Bouteflika and Kissinger in 1975, in which Bouteflika criticized Kissinger for not
stopping the Green March, and said that the US should have withheld military and
economic aid to Morocco (The White House 17.12.1975).
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, in the days of the Bendjedid presidency (1979-
1992), Algeria’s support of the Sahrawis remained strong. However, after 1988
Bendjedid adopted a policy of rapprochement with (Zoubir 2000:50). Zoubir believes

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that this allowed Morocco to start building the berm. Two political positions emerged
within the Algerian political system. Bendjedid was of the “moderate” block
sympathetic to Hassan’s view, while important segments of the Algerian military and
diplomatic corps remained in support of POLISARIO, and did not allow the pro-
Moroccan forces to gain “the upper hand” (Zoubir 2000:51).
Algerian aid to POLISARIO decreased in the late 1980s, but increased in the early
1990s. Algerian relations with Morocco began to deteriorate in 1992, and Algeria
returned to support for the Sahrawis and a negotiated settlement (Zoubir 2000:51).
Algerians preferred the holding of a referendum because of “mistrust in Moroccan
good faith” (Zoubir 2000:51). According to Zoubir, Algeria used “its best diplomats
and “considerable resources” to establish their position on Western Sahara in the
international arena (ibid:51).
President Liamine Zéroual was a former commander of the Tindouf region, and a
backer of POLISARIO. Algerian support for POLISARIO grew under the Zéroual
presidency (1994-1999) (Chopra 1997:57), and from 1994 one saw an increase in
economic aid from Algeria to POLISARIO. Algeria was eager to see an “honest”
referendum, but at the same time they warned Sahrawis that total independence might
prove unrealistic (Zoubir 1999:200). In March 1999 Algerian officials insisted that
Western Sahara is an issue of international legality (Zoubir 2000:56).
When Bouteflika (1999-present) came to office, he again aimed to better Algeria-
Morocco relations, and thus put the Western Sahara issue somewhat in the
background (easing the “global approach”) (Zoubir 2000:57). However, in 1999
Bouteflika stated that Algeria’s constant position “is based on the recognition of the
right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination” (ibid:61). He later emphasized that
the question of Western Sahara is a UN issue. Bouteflika termed peoples’ right to
self-determination a “sacred principle” and “central” foreign policy issue for Algeria
(ibid:64).
When France and the US firmly positioned themselves behind the “third way” in
2000, promoting “large autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty”, they could not
convince Algeria to do the same (Zoubir 2000:63). Algeria rejected the 2000 draft

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Framework Agreement (“Baker I plan”) (Zoubir and Benabdalleh-Gambier 2003).
During the 2000s Algeria has on several occasions pressured Spain’s socialist
government (Zapatero) to “correct its aim” concerning Western Sahara, as Spain
moved closer to Morocco post 2004 Madrid terrorist attacks (Mundy 2007:260).
There are many examples of Algeria suggesting to resolve the conflict in favour of
self-determination. In 2001 Algeria proposed to “place Western Sahara under UN
administration in order to conduct the referendum, following the example of East
Timor” (Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier 2003). In 2002 Algeria suggested dividing
the territory (Mundy 2007:257). Today, the Algerian stance remains in firm parallel to
international legality. In April 2013 the Algerian foreign minister stated that Algeria
is not a party to the Western Sahara conflict, which “should be resolved through UN
mediation” (Middle East Online 21.04.2013).
Reasons for Algerian support
Darbouche and Zoubir claim Algeria to have clear geostrategic interests in the
conflict (2008:94). Murphy quotes Damis, writing that in terms of geopolitical
strategy, “Algeria would benefit from the Frente Polisario’s ideological orientation,
which is more allied with its own, socialist and nonaligned movement” (Murphy
2010:286). She believes that SADR would most likely be pro-Algerian in the case of
independence, and that the “somewhat indebted” relationship between Algeria and
SADR would strengthen Algeria’s influence in the region (ibid). Murphy thinks
Algeria fears further Moroccan expansionist claims in the case of a Moroccan Westen
Sahara (ibid). John Damis elaborates on this, claiming that ‘Algerians fear that the
absorption of the Sahara by their neighbors would only encourage Moroccan
expansionist tendencies and whet the Moroccans’ appetite for pursuing their
unfulfilled and frequently articulated irredentist claim to territory in western Algeria”
(in Zoubir 2000:47). On a more direct note, Morocco sees Algeria’s support to SADR
as “a means to establish regional hegemony and to have access to the Atlantic Ocean”
(Zoubir 2000:70). Morocco claims that the support has nothing to do with defending
the right to self-determination (ibid).
Murphy writes that Algeria supports POLISARIO because they support independence
movements in general, and she traces the reason for such support back to Algeria’s

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“bloody independence revolution with France” (Murphy 2010:286). Zoubir claims
that Algerian belief in the right to self-determination of peoples is genuine and
“anchored in their [Algerians’] psychology” (Zoubir 2000:70). Although this may
seem a little far-fetched, such an attitude is reflected in Algeria’s diplomatic
interaction with other states. In a confidential meeting with US ambassador Robert
Ford in 2008, Bouteflika clearly stated that Algeria would not compromise its position
on the Sahrawis’ right to choose independence because Algerians considered this “a
matter of principle” (Algerian Embassy 25.06.2008). He further argued that “powerful
states should not be allowed to crush the weak” (ibid).
Algerian support also has an “image” aspect. Zoubir argues that the legitimacy of
Algeria’s foreign policy rests on the belief in self-determination (2000:70).
Apparently, Algeria shaped its “early diplomatic priorities around the precepts of self-
determination and decolonisation” (Darbouche and Zoubir 2008:94). One can imagine
that non-involvement in this self-determination conflict would lead to a loss of
international recognition. Hagen points to a related, but arguably less deliberate
motivation; namely the fact that Algeria has to support the refugees in Tindouf
according to international law, as it is the refugee state.
To sum up, Algeria’s support to POLISARIO seem to be motivated by idealpolitikal
concerns such as adherence to righteousness, ethics and idealistic steadfastness in the
form of a constant return to international law, which I have previously termed
idealistic. However, idealist measures can be pursued both out of empathy and out of
“image building” self-interest. In Algeria’s case both seem to matter. Algeria is the
only country out the three external actors who recognizes SADR. This is arguably an
idealistic “statement” that goes beyond mere support for self-determination, as it
ultimately supports one out of several possible outcomes of a referendum
(independence) before a referendum has been held. In terms of realpolitikal
motivations for support to POLISARIO, Algeria seems to genuinely fear for its own
national security if the territory is formally granted to Morocco.

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5.0: CONCLUSION
In the introduction of this thesis, I asked whether it is Morocco or POLISARIO who
is being pressured by the international community, and whether such pressure is
legitimate according to international law.
Inherent in the call for pressure is the wish for a solution. As Morocco and
POLISARIO’s positions remain mutually exclusive, one of them must eventually give
in to the other’s claims if solution is to be made in a peaceful way. This means that
Morocco must either allow independence to be an option of a referendum
(“sacrificing” their sovereignty), or that POLISARIO must give up on this option and
accept an autonomy framework (“sacrificing” their right to free self-determination).
We have seen that the three external actors have remained rather constant in their
material support to either side of the conflict. Generally, political positions have also
been clear – the US and France supports an autonomy option while Algeria toggles
between explicit support for POLISARIO’s independence claims and general support
for whatever the UN decides. Under the US Obama administration there seems to be a
slight change in rhetoric, but as exemplified by the withdrawal of human rights claims
in the last MINURSO meeting, the US does not go beyond its strong historical
alliance with Morocco in practice.
The power dimension is essential to the conflict. This thesis argues that Morocco has
access to more resources than the POLISARIO. This must not be underestimated in a
conflict where winning the “moral high ground” becomes core. I argue that what is
“right” is not an attribute of objective “righteousness”, but rather a result of certain
forces being prominent at certain times in certain places. The more lobbying,
interaction and visibility one can “afford”, the more one is able to influence public
discourse.
Ultimately, both Morocco and POLISARIO’s are legitimate from an international law
stance. Thus, debates turn political instead, and realpolitik in disguise plays out as a
confusing quest for political and moral legitimacy. The bottom line is that tens of
thousands of Sahrawis are living whole lives in refugee camps. Even though
compromise might equal a loss of integrity for actors that have spent over thirty years

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defending their position, external actors do not have as much to “lose”. If external
actors take firm stances and exert pressure in ways that are justified not by realpolitik
but by the international law framework, genuine ideal antagonisms may take
precedence. Like this one may be able to resolve the conflict without a return to
armed hostilities, and with legitimacy intact.

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