1. 1
MEMORANDUM
FROM: Joni Schultz
TO: Ja’Net L. Davis
DATE: Wednesday, December 10, 2014
RE: State of Louisiana v. Sonny Barker
FILE NO.: 062502
A. FACTS
Officer Matthew Dillion noted that the vehicle Sonny Barker was driving did not have current
registration tags and decided to stop the vehicle during a routine traffic patrol. After stopping the vehicle,
Dillion asked to see Barker's driver's license and the vehicle registration. Since the vehicle was his mother’s,
Barker could not produce either his license or the vehicle's registration.
After checking on the license and registration, there were no warrants and the vehicle had not been
reported as stolen. Officer Dillion then asked Barker if he could search the vehicle and Barker consented to
the search. Dillion looked in the glove box and found the following: Barker's wallet, a little over one ounce
of what looked like marijuana, and a piece of paper with the following writing -- sbarker@digicom.com
("doobie"). Officer Dillion then reached under the front seat and found a large quantity of marijuana in a clear
plastic bag. At this point, Officer Dillion arrested Barker.
Later, Officer Dillion, recognizing the writing on the paper from the glove box as being an Internet e-
mail address, accessed the e-mail of Mr. Barker by utilizing his own computer.
B. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether the original stop of Mr. Barker was proper.
Whether the search of the car was proper given Mr. Barker's permission.
Whether the permission by Mr. Barker was valid.
Whether Officer Dillion's accessing Mr. Barker's e-mail was proper.
Whether the evidence obtained in the original search and the e-mail search can be used at trial.

2. 2
C. LAW AND ARGUMENT
This memo addresses whether or not Mr. Barker's Fourth Amendment rights were violated under the
Constitution regarding whether there was probable cause for the original stop, whether the search of the car
was proper, whether the permission granted by Barker to search the vehicle was valid, whether the secondary
search of Barker’s e-mail was proper, and whether the evidence obtained in both the original search and e-mail
search can be used at trial in this matter.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 5 of the Louisiana
Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.
Further, La. Const. Article I, § 5 provides that every person shall be secure in his person, property,
communications, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy.
State of Louisiana v. Chrisman, 364 S. 2d 906 (La. 1978).
The Fourth Amendment defines "the right of people to be secure in the person, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable search and seizures, shall not be violated and no warrant shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or things to be seized."1
Therefore, the court will determine whether Officer Dillion’s conduct violated Mr. Barker’s Fourth
Amendment rights when Mr. Barker consented to the search of his vehicle and obtained evidence which lead
Mr. Barker to be booked with possession for sale of marijuana for all of the reasons fully set forth in the issues
described below.
WAS THE INITIAL STOP OF MR. BARKER PROPER?
As in Terryv. Ohio, 392U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868,20 L. Ed. 2D 889 (1968), John W. Terry (the “Petitioner”),
was stopped and searched by an officer after the officer observed the Petitioner seemingly casing a store for a
1 "Fourth Amendment." West's Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2. 2008. The Gale Group 3 Nov.
2014 π1<http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Fourth+Amendment>.

3. 3
potential robbery. The officer approached the Petitioner for questioning and decided to search him first. In
Terry, the rule was whether an officer may perform a search for weapons without a warrant, even without
probable cause, when the officer reasonably believes that the person may be armed and dangerous.
Unlike Terry, Mr. Barker did not present any behavior suspicious of criminal activity to warrant an
investigative stop. The threshold issue to be determined in the instant case is whether Officer Dillion who
conducted the investigatory stop had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and conducted what amounted
to an investigatory stop. In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists to conduct an investigatory stop,
the court must take into account the totality of the circumstances in a process that allows police to draw upon
their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative
information available to them that might elude an untrained person.
In Terry, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution permits a
law enforcement officer to stop, detain, and frisk persons who are suspected of criminal activity without first
obtaining their consent, even though the officer may lack a warrant to conduct a search or probable cause to
make an arrest. 2 Id. Under the “Terry stop”, this type of police encounter is constitutionally permissible only
when an officer can articulate a particularized objective, and reasonable basis for believing that criminal activity
may be afoot or that a given suspect may be armed and dangerous. Id. In Terry, Officer McFadden possessed
neither a valid search warrantauthorizing the pat downnorprobablecause to detain the defendants in this case.
Id. Denying the defendants motion to suppress, the court scheduled the matter for trial where both defendants
were found guilty. Id. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the convictions, and the defendants appealed to
the nation's highest court. Id.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Terry divided its opinion into three parts. Id. First, the Supreme Court
ruled that the defendants enjoyed qualified protection from temporary police detention under the Fourth
Amendment. Id. Before a court will examine the propriety of police activity under the Fourth Amendment, it
2 "Terry v. Ohio." West's Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2. 2008. The Gale Group 4 Nov. 2014 π’s 1,
4,5,6,7,8,10, and 11 <http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Terry+v.+Ohio>.

4. 4
must first determinewhether the interests asserted bya defendant are constitutionally protected. Id. The Fourth
amendment governs areas where individuals maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy, including a zone of
personal freedom in which every individual is secure from unnecessary and unreasonable governmental
intrusion. Id. Second, the Court ruled that the defendants' freedom was effectively impeded by their encounter
with Officer McFadden. Id. Any time a police officer accosts an individual to detain him for questioning, the
Court emphasized, the officer has "seized" that person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. It
would be nothing less than "torture of the English language," the Court added, to suggest that Officer
McFadden's pat down of the suspects' clothing was anything other than a "search" as that term is defined in
the Constitution. Id. Third, the Court ruled that Officer McFadden acted reasonably during his encounter with
the defendants acknowledging that the Constitution generally requires probable cause to effect an arrest and a
lawfully executed warrant to conduct a search. Id. The express language of the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit all warrantless searches performed without probable cause, but only those that are unreasonable.
However, if an officer has probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and there is no time to
obtain a warrant, the officer may make a warrantless arrest.
In dealing with rapidly unfolding and increasingly dangerous situations in Terry, the Court said, police
may find it impractical or impossible to obtain a search warrant before choosing to intervene. In other
situations, injury orharm may result to bystanders if law enforcement is madeto wait until it has probablecause
beforeacting. The Courtindicated that the Fourth Amendmentgives law enforcement flexibility to investigate,
detect, and prevent criminal activity. This flexibility includes the right of police officers to stop persons
suspected of criminal activity and detain them for questioning. If during questioning police are led to believe
that a suspect is armed and dangerous,an officermay friskthe suspect withoutviolating the Fourth Amendment.
The Court reached its holding in Terry by balancing the legitimate needs of law enforcement against
the privacy interests of individuals. Id. Forcible detention of individuals for questioning is far from a petty
indignity. Id. Even a limited search of outer clothing, the Court stressed, constitutes a "serious intrusion upon
the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be

5. 5
undertaken lightly." Id. At the same time, law enforcement must not be restricted from performing its job in a
proficient manner. Id.
The Fourth Amendment does not restrict police from intervening until after a crime has been
committed. Id. According to Terry, crime prevention is a bona fide goal of law enforcement, the Court said,
and the Fourth Amendment places only reasonable restrictions upon pursuit of that goal. Id. Outlining these
restrictions, the Court said that no police officer may lawfully stop and detain a person for questioning unless
the officer first observes unusual conduct that arouses a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. A stop
may be no longer than necessary to confirm or dispel an officer's suspicion and must not be unnecessary
restrictive or intrusive. Id.
Likewise, in United States v. Sokolow, 808 F. 2d. 1366, 1987 U.S. App. 3753 (9th Cir. 1987), the United
States Supreme Court obtained a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The court of appeals reversed defendant's conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine on the
ground that the Drug Enforcement Administration agents who stopped defendant did not have reasonable
suspicion for the stop. Id. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case
indicating that the stop must be brief in duration and related to the reason for the stop. Id. In Sokolow, the rule
was whether the police must legitimately pursue a reasonable means of investigation to confirm or dispel the
officer's suspicion in a short period of time. Id.
In ourcase, OfficerDillion characterized Mr.Barker as a “suspected drug dealer.” Although Mr. Barker
had never been convicted of any drug offenses which lead Officer Dillion to a Reasonable Articulable Suspicion
(RAS) under the law leading up to the traffic violation, this does not mean that Officer Dillion cannot utilize
those certain characteristics under the Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (RAS) doctrine. Thus, Officer Dillion
did not need justification under the Fourth Amendment to stop Mr. Barker on the street for questioning, and
Mr.Barker wascompletely free to refuse to answer any such questions and to go about his business. Therefore,
the Fourth Amendment does prohibit Officer Dillion from detaining Mr. Barker and without first having a
reasonable and articulable suspicion (RAS) that Mr. Barker was engaged in criminal activity.

6. 6
WAS THE SEARCH OF THE BARKER VEHICLE PROPER?
A warrantless search is unreasonable unless the search can be justified by one of the narrowly drawn
exceptions to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854
(1973); State of Louisiana v. Lain, 347 So.2d 167 (La.1977). During the period of detention, no searches may be
performed unless the officer has an objective and particularized basis for believing the suspect is armed and
dangerous. Id. Any search must be limited to the suspect's outer clothing and may be performed only for the
purpose of discovering concealed weapons. Id. The state bears the burden of proving that one of these
exceptions applies. State of Louisiana v. Adams, 355 So.2d 917 (La.1978); State of Louisiana v. Franklin, 353 So.2d
1315 (La.1978).
In Barker’s case, however, Officer Dillion went beyond the reasonable search standard without a
warrant. Officer Dillion extended his search to the entire vehicle despite his investigatory stop for an expired
registration tag. Barker gave the officer no reason to suspect that he was armed and dangerous. Consequently,
one would assume that the search was an unreasonable violation of Barker’s rights under the Fourth
Amendment; however, that scenario does not take into account the fact that Barker granted permission to the
officer to search his vehicle.
Once Officer Dillion obtained consent from Mr. Barker, Officer Dillion was able to proceed with the
search of the Mercedes. This is not an exception to the warrant clause, but a waiver to Mr. Barker's right of
privacy. In essence, Mr. Barker did not have to respond to any of Officer Dillion's questions under the Fifth
Amendment with the exception of Mr. Barker only providing his name to Officer Dillion during the routine
traffic stop.
By contrast under the automobileexception, the scope ofthe warrantless search is only limited to what
area the officer has probable cause to search. This area can encompass the entire vehicle including the trunk.
If Officer Dillion reasonably believes that the vehicle holds evidence of a crime, then Officer Dillion was
allowed to search the vehicle and allowed to search any containers found inside the vehicle that could contain

7. 7
the evidence or contraband being searched for. The objects searched do not need to belong to the owner of
the vehicle.
The United States Supreme Court has determined that the automobile exception is not a violation of
the Fourth Amendment because drivers have a "reduced expectation of privacy" and because a vehicle is
inherently mobile. Conversely, a vehicle search that is conducted in the absence of reasonable suspicion would
be an infringement of guaranteed Fourth Amendment protection, and a court would strike down such an
infringement as unconstitutional. This exception was first established by the United States Supreme Court in
Carroll v. United States3.
Much like Carroll, in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 72 L.Ed.2d 572, 102 S.Ct. 2157 (1982), the court
ruled that a warrantless search of an automobile, under the rule adopted in Caroll, that a warrantless search of
an automobile based upon probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of crime in the light
of an exigency arising out of the likely disappearance of the vehicle did not contravene the Fourth Amendment
for the court to include a search of a container found inside the automobile when the search of the automobile
was supported by probable cause. The court found that the interpretation of the “Carroll doctrine” set forth
in Ross was to apply to all searches of containers found in an automobile. In other words, the police could
search without a warrantif their search wassupported by probablecause. However, the Court's holding neither
extended the “Carroll doctrine” nor broadened the scope of the permissible automobile search delineated in
Carroll. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), and Ross. Until the decision in Chambers, the Court had drawn
a curious line between the search of an automobile that coincidentally turned up a container and the search of
a container that coincidentally turned up in an automobile. The Court ruled that the protections of the Fourth
Amendment could not turn on such coincidences. It, therefore, interpreted Carroll as providing one rule to
3Hendrie, E. (August 2005). The Motor Vehicle Exception. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 74, Retrieved August 14,
2006, from π 1
< http://web.archive.org/20050825214358/www.fbi.gov/publications/leb/2005/august2005/august05leb.htm#page22
>.

8. 8
govern all automobile searches -- The police could search an automobile and the containers within it where
they had probable cause to believe contraband or evidence was contained.
With permission being granted by Barker, based upon the above cases, it appears the original search
of the vehicle was obtained properly.
WAS THE PERMISSION OF BARKER VALID?
As in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed. 2d 854 (1973), the issue is whether
the respondent voluntarily consented to the search of the vehicle.
In Bustamonte, the police stopped the vehicle containing the respondent and five other passengers after
they noticed a broken headlight and license plate light. When the driver could not produce a license, the police
asked for someone who could produce identification. Another passenger responded, and when the police
asked him if they could search the vehicle he consented. Three stolen checks were found, and they were used
as evidence to convict the respondent. In Bustamonte, the rule was whether a search was voluntary does not
require that a person knew of his rights, but whether the totality of circumstances indicated that the person was
voluntarily allowing the search.
In Bustamonte,4 the U.S. Supreme Court found that officers were not required to warn people of their
right to withhold consent in order for consent to be valid.
In a similar case, the Court of Appeals of Louisiana decided the issue of whether Mr. Valrie’s Fourth
Amendment rights were violated based upon coercion and circumstances surrounding whether consent was
freely and voluntarily given. State of Louisiana v. Valrie, 597 So. 2d 1218 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 605 So. 2d
[Pg 14] 1113 (La.1992). In Valrie, the Defendant refused to sign the consent form and argues that the State has
failed to demonstrate that he voluntarily and freely gave permission to Officers to search the vehicle. Id.
Additionally, defendant argues that he was coerced in that the officers made promises of aid to induce him to
4 Moenssens, A.A. (2005). Forensic-Evidence.com: Police Procedures/The Validity of Consent Searches. Retrieved
August 14, 2006, π 2 <http://www.forensic-evidence.com/site/police/nonverbalconsent.html>.

9. 9
consent to search of a vehicle that did not even belong to him. Id. The court held that (1) the warrantless search
did not violate defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment or La. Const. art. I, § 5 because he did not
limit, condition, or withdraw his consent; and (2) the search was not unreasonable or too intrusive. Id.
Therefore, Barker did not withdraw consent to the search of the vehicle at any time during Officer
Dillion's investigation. Officer Dillion did not have to inform Mr. Barker of his right to refuse to conduct the
search of the vehicle. Once Mr. Barker consented to the search, Officer Dillion had to comply with the scope
of the consent. Since no scope was specified, Officer Dillion proceeded with objectively searching the vehicle
and looked into the glove box.
WAS THE ASSESSING OF THE BARKER E-MAIL PROPER?
As in State of Louisiana v. William A. Hargiss, 288 So. 2d. 633 (1974), the issue is whether the officers
had probable cause to conduct a secondary search of the items in Mr. Hargiss’s vehicle without his consent
when the officers observed them in plain view.
In Hargiss, Hargiss sought review of his conviction from the Seventh Judicial District Court, Parish of
Catahoula in Louisiana of possession of marijuana in violation of La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:966(C). After being
formally charged with the possession of marijuana, Mr. Hargiss moved to suppress the evidence, alleging that
it was the product of an unconstitutional search and seizure. Id. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge
overruled the motion to suppress on the ground that the marijuana and pipe were not products of a search but
were lawfully taken when the officers observed them in plain view. Id. Mr. Hargiss sought a supervisory writ
to determine the constitutionality of asearch ofhis automobile,following his incarceration fora traffic violation.
Id. In reversing the conviction and sentence, the court held that the officers did not have probable cause to
search the automobile at the time the marijuana was seized. Id. The contraband was seized during the night
time, after one of the officers had previously driven the car during daylight hours from the place of arrest to
the local police station. Id. Further, the officer who drove the car testified that he saw nothing to attract his
attention. Id. In addition, one of the officers testified that they planned to search the automobile. Id. Mr.
Hargiss corroborated that the testimony he overheard by the officers was during the officers’ discussion of the

10. 10
search announced on the police radio. Id. The second entry into the automobile was without Mr. Hargiss's
knowledge or consent because Mr. Hargiss had requested that his automobile be locked and left where he had
been arrested. Id. The court, therefore, maintained Mr. Hargiss's motion to suppress the evidence, reversed his
conviction and sentence, and remanded the case. Id.
Unlike Hargiss, Mr. Barker's disclosure of his e-mail account is constituted as an unreasonable search
and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Mr. Barker's rights were violated during the secondary search
conducted by Officer Dillion because the items obtained for evidence in the e-mails were not in plain view.
According to the private search doctrine, Officer Dillion violated this application to email information when
he exceeded the scope of the private actors search under the exclusionary rule.
Thus, based upon the above cases, it appears Officer Dillion’s access to Mr. Barker’s email was not
proper.
WILL THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN THE ORIGINAL SEARCH AND THE E-MAIL
SEARCH BE ALLOWED AT TRIAL?
Under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement, the appropriateness of every warrantless
search is decided on a case-by-case basis, weighing on the defendant's privacy interests against the reasonable
needs of law enforcement under the circumstances. Evidence seized by law enforcement from a warrantless
or otherwise unreasonable search is admissible at trial if the judge found it reliable.
Evidence obtained during searches that comport with the Terry restrictions (mentioned above), is
admissible under the Fourth Amendment. Evidence obtained in violation of the limitations set forth in Terry
may be suppressed under the Exclusionary Rule.
Whenever an individual may harbor a reasonable 'expectation of privacy' he is entitled to be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion. Katz v. United States, 364 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511, 19 L.Ed.2d 576
(1967). In Katz, the police wiretapped a phone booth (on the outside) to catch illegal conversations, which
resulted in no physical intrusion into the phone booth that caught Katz's conversation with the door closed. In

11. 11
determining whether or not a search occurred, the Supreme Court articulates the new rule of whether or not a
search occurs turns on the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine. Id.
As with Barker, in State of Louisiana v. Jacob Gordon, Jr. , 646 So.2d 995 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/10/94), Mr.
Gordon sought review of his conviction from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, in and for the Parish of
East Baton Rouge in Louisiana of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of La.Rev.Stat.Ann
§ 40:967A. Id. Two police officers pulled over a car driven by Mr. Gordon that did not have a license plate. Id.
At Officer Johnson’s request, Mr. Gordon exited the car and stepped to its rear. Id. One officer detected the
odor of marijuana on Mr. Gordon and the other officer observed a baggie with a white powder on the lap of
Mr. Gordon’s wife, who was sitting in the front seat. Id. A search of the car revealed one gram of cocaine, five
gramsofmarijuana, various drug paraphernalia, and business cards and a notebookwithincriminating notations.
Id. The trial court denied Mr. Gordon’s motion to suppress. Id. However, the only argument advanced by Mr.
Gordon was that the cocaine found in Shirley Gordon’s purse was neither in plain view of Officer Cowart nor
was it inadvertently discovered by him. Id. Mr. Gordon also argues that it would be unreasonable to find him
to have been in constructive possession on the basis that his wife was in possession of a small quantity of
cocaine and that to find him in constructive possession “would make possession crimes a form of community
property, i.e., one spouse could be held criminally liable for the possession of the other spouse.” Id.
In Gordon, the court held that the warrantless search of the car was justified based on the officer’s
observations. Id. The court rejected Mr. Gordon’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the
conviction. Id. The court found that Mr.Gordonwasin constructive possession ofthe drugsfound in his wife’s
purse given his proximity to them and the fact that they were in plain view. Id. The court further found that
there was sufficient evidence of intent to distribute, despite the small amount of drugs recovered, and based on
the paraphernalia and the incriminating notations. Id. Thus, the court affirmed Mr. Gordon’s conviction of
possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Id.
Additionally, in State of Louisiana v. Thomas Wells, 593 So. 2d. 465 (1992), the trial court upheld Mr.
Wells's motion to suppress methamphetamine seized from a parked van. The court reversed, holding that

12. 12
exigent circumstances existed to allow the warrantless search. Id. In Wells, the court found that the informant
proved to have been reliable, because Mr. Wells and the van were found by the officers when and where the
informant said they would be. Id. Under the circumstances, the court concluded there was a fair probability
that methamphetamine would be found in the van. Id. Exigent circumstances were found to exist where
evidence of a crime was located in an unlocked and unattended vehicle parked on a public road, accessible to
anyone who might have had reason to moveit or removethe evidence. Id. Therefore, there wasprobablecause
and exigent circumstances to uphold the warrantless search. Id. The right of the officers to search the van for
methamphetamine was not enervated because they kept the van directly, and Mr. Wells, indirectly, under
surveillance for almost two hours before staging an "accident" to further "connect" Mr. Wells with the van and
its contents. Id. Although the court did not condone the fabrication of the officers, the warrantless search was
proper. Id.
In Wells, on Application for Writs from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo in
Louisiana, the State sought review of a judgment of the district court, which upheld Mr. Wells’ motion to
suppress methamphetamine seized from aparked van that resulted from a warrantless search. Id. The judgment
upholding the motion to suppress was reversed, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. Id. While applauding the court's conclusion that the officers created the exigent circumstances in
bad faith, Wells contends further that the officers did not have probable cause to search the van. Id. The state
agrees that the officers had probable cause to search and urges, in effect, that exigent circumstances may be
found when the thing to be searched is a motor vehicle. Id.
Indeed, Mr. Barker consented to have the vehicle searched by Officer Dillion. The evidence located
during the original search can be deemed “in plain view” since the original search revealed their contents based
upon the arguments mentioned above. However, the same cannot be said for the e-mail search.
In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914), a federal agent conducted a
warrantless search for evidence of gambling at the home of Fremont Weeks. The evidence seized in the search
wasused at trial, and Weeks wasconvicted. Id. On appeal,the Supreme Courtheld that the Fourth Amendment

13. 13
barred the use of evidence secured through a warrantless search and seizure. Id. Week's conviction was reversed
and thus wasborn the exclusionary rule. Id.This rule providessome substantive protection against illegal search
and seizure. Id.
The exclusionary rule was constitutionally required only in federal court until Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). In Mapp, the Court held that the exclusionary rule applied to state
criminal proceedings through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be used to prove
the guilt ofa defendantat astate criminal trial. Beforethe Mapp ruling, not all states excluded evidence obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. After Mapp, a defendant's claim of unreasonable search and seizure
became commonplace in criminal prosecutions.
The application of the exclusionary rule has been significantly limited by a Good Faith exception
created by the Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984).
Under the good faith exception, evidence obtained in violation of a person's Fourth Amendment rights will
not be excluded from trial if the law enforcement officer, though mistaken, acts reasonably. The Supreme
Court has carved out this exception to the exclusionary rule because, according to the majority of the court, the
rule wasdesigned to deter police misconduct, and excluding evidence when the police did not misbehave would
not deter police misconduct.
In comparison to the exclusionary rule is the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree doctrine, established by the
SupremeCourtin Nardone v. United States, 308U.S. 338, 60 S. Ct. 266, 84L. Ed. 307 (1939). Under this doctrine,
a court may exclude from trial any evidence derived from the results of an illegal search and excludes the
evidence initially used to obtain the search warrant.
Particularly in Barker, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply in this case due
to Officer Dillion's warrantless search of the e-mail and the evidence obtained therefrom. In our case, the
parties will argue that the evidence obtained from Mr. Barker's e-mail under the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
doctrine that the search of the vehicle became an illegal search when Officer Dillion failed to obtain the
necessary warrants required to obtain a secondary search without permission from Barker.

14. 14
Therefore, according to Louisiana law, whatever is seized in plain view or grabable space may be used
against the Defendant. In our case, the items seized in the glove box and other areas of the Mercedes were in
plain view and the warrantrequirement waswaived when Barker consented to the search; however, the evidence
obtained through the secondary search of the e-mail were not in plain view and constituted misconduct on the
part of the officer as he did not obtain a search warrant.
D. LOUISIANA CASES AND JURISDICTION
I now turn to Louisiana law, which will support the facts and are adverse to the facts asserted in
Barker’s case. Louisiana has several cases involving illegal search and seizures, warrantless searches, and
suppression of evidence relative to vehicle searches. I cite only a few of them here. In State of Louisiana v.
Augustus Jackson, 25 So. 3d 814, 2010 La. LEXIS 177 (La. 2010), the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal
reversed the trial court’s denial of Mr. Jackson’s motion to suppress marijuana evidence found concealed in a
can of bug spray lying on the floorboard of a rental vehicle from Enterprise after a routine traffic stop. In
Jackson, any dispute that exists overthe legality ofthe Officer’s warrantless entry into the vehicle and subsequent
search of its interior, including closed bug spray container, reflects a distinctive aspect of Louisiana law with
respect to an individual’s standing to challenge unreasonable intrusions on the right to privacy guaranteed by
La. Const. art. I, § 5. Id.
On the other hand, in Louisiana, any person “adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in
violation of La. Const. art. I, § 5 shall have standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate Court.” Id. Thus,
“[t]here is no equivalent under Louisiana constitutional law to the federal rule that one may not raise the
violation of a third person’s constitutional rights.” State of Louisiana v. Owen, 453 So. 2d 1202, 1205 (La. 1984).
Generally speaking, in Louisiana, whether a defendant is the driver or a passenger of a vehicle stopped by the
police has no bearing on whether he may challenge the lawfulness of a subsequent search of the car. See, e.g.,
State of Louisiana v. Scull, 93-2360, pp. 4-7 (La. App. 4th Cir. 6/30/94), 639 So.2d 1239, 1242-44 (affirming grant
of motion to suppress currency retrieved from glove compartment of vehicle in which defendant was riding as
a passenger after police lawfullystopped the car on reasonable suspicion ofcriminal activity). The officerclearly

15. 15
had probablecause to search the passenger compartmentof the vehicle without a warrant,based on the burning
marijuana the officersmelled as he approached the car. See Stateof Louisiana v. Johnlouis, 09-0235, p.20 (La. App.
3rd Cir. 11/4/09), 22 So.3d 1150, 1163. The court thereby accords due deference to the officer’s training and
expertise, State of Louisiana v. Johnson, 01-2081, p.3 (La. 4/26/02), 815 So.2d 809, 811, police may “draw on their
own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative
information available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person’”)(quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534
U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 750-51, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002).
As with Barker, in State of Louisiana v. Cary Anderson, 377 So. 2d 837 (La. 1979), Mr. Anderson was
driving while intoxicated and had driven his car into a chain link fence striking a tree and a house. Nevertheless,
one of the officers proceeded to make an inventory search of the vehicle’s contents. No effort was made to
secure the consent of Mr. Anderson to this inventory. The searching officer went immediately to the glove
compartment, first looked inside a toilet article kit and found nothing illegal. Underneath the kit, the officer
saw a plastic bag containing three smaller sandwich bagscontaining heroin. The Louisiana Supreme Courtheld
that an unconstitutional warrantless search may not be constitutionalized by a police policy requiring an
“inventory” search, where impoundment of a vehicle or inventory is unnecessary. Accordingly, the Louisiana
Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s ruling denying Anderson’s motion to suppress the evidence as
unconstitutionally seized, setting aside the conviction and sentence appealed from, and remanded Anderson’s
case for a new trial in accordance with the law.
E. CONCLUSION
I conclude that the original stop of Barker was proper in that the vehicle he was driving has an expired
registration. The search of the vehicle was proper only to the extent that Barker gave unrestricted permission
to the officer to do so. The evidence obtained as a result of the initial search was obtained validly in plain view
and/or in an area where it would be expected for the officer to search given the reason for the stop. Despite
arguments of undue duress in granting permission to the officer to search the vehicle, the evidence of the initial
search will likely be allowed at trial.

16. 16
The same cannot be said for the evidence obtained from an unreasonable search of the e-mail. Barker
will argue from the perspective of a "reasonable officer" regarding the facts showing a reasonable expectation
of privacy. Barker will also argue that Officer Dillion's action of the e-mail search constituted "police
misconduct" in that the necessary and required search warrants wasnot obtained priorto the search. Mr. Barker
will argue that seizure of the items contained in the emails were a direct violation of his Fourth amendment
rights.
Concerning Officer Dillion's seizure of the contents in the glove box, Mr. Barker can argue that this
was a warrantless search and seizure without probable cause given the reason for the stop was expired
registration and that he granted permission to search under undue duress.
With regard to the consent of search by Mr. Barker, the Plaintiff must prove Mr. Barker actually gave
consent and mere acquiescence to the police does not count. The court will determine whether Mr. Barker was
coerced or under duress to submit his consent during the traffic stop and whether Mr. Barker knew he had the
right to refuse the search of his vehicle during the stop.
The court will also take into consideration Mr. Barker's age, whether or not a language barrier existed
during the time of the stop, race, capacity, education and sophistication, and experience with the police.
The Plaintiff will bearthe burdenofproving that the search wasreasonable during a warrantless search.
However, before evidence is seized during a warrantless search to be excluded from trial, Mr. Barker must
prove that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place that was searched.
On the factor concerning whether or not the e-mail evidence will be suppressed obtained from the
glove box by Officer Dillion, the court will likely find Mr. Barker’s mother will face charges relative to
conspiracy with intent to distribute or possession with intent to distribute a Schedule I narcotic drug.
Thus, viewing all the evidence both direct and circumstantial in the light most favorable to the state,
any rational trier offact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubtand to the exclusion ofany reasonable

17. 17
hypothesis of innocence that Mr. Barker possessed marijuana but since the evidence of the e-mail with the
intent to distribute should be suppressed, the court is not likely to find possession with the intent to distribute.