The Civil War in Tajikistan (Tajik: 'Ҷанги шаҳрвандии Тоҷикистон') began in May 1992 when ethnic groups from the Garm and Gorno-Badakhshan regions, which were underrepresented in the ruling elite, rose up against the national government of President Rahmon Nabiyev, in which people from the Leninabad and Kulyab regions dominated. Politically, the discontented groups were represented by liberal democratic reformists[6] and Islamists, who fought together and later organized under the banner of the United Tajik Opposition. By June 1997, from 50,000 to 100,000 people had been killed.
So is it over now !?
5. Independence and the Civil War
Tensions began in the spring of 1992 after opposition
members took to the streets in demonstrations against
the results of the 1991 presidential election.
The fight broke out in may 1992 between the
government supporter and the opposition.
The government had to resign ,and Emomali
Rahmonov became the leadership of the government.
The height of hostilities occurred between 1992 and
1993 and pitted Kulyabi militias against an array of
groups.
6. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
Tajikistan
Russia
Uzbekistan
Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan
Jamiat-e Islami
Democratic reformists
Gorno-Badakhshan
Taliban factions
Islamic State of Afghanistan
7. The end of Civil War
By the end of the war Tajikistan was in a state of complete
devastation. The estimated dead numbered from 50,000
to as many as 100,000. Around 1.2 million people were
refugees inside and outside of the country. Tajikistan's
physical infrastructure, government services, and
economy were in disarray and much of the population
was surviving on subsistence handouts from
international aid organizations. The United Nations
established a Mission of Observers in December 1994,
maintaining peace negotiations until the warring sides
signed a comprehensive peace agreement in 1997.
8. Tajikistan at present
Peaceful elections were held in 1999, though they were
criticized by opposition parties and foreign observers.
Rahmon was re-elected with 98% of the vote. Elections
were held again in 2006, with Rahmon winning a third
term in office with 79% of the vote in a field of five
candidates. Several opposition parties boycotted the
election and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe was critical of it, although
observers from the Commonwealth of Independent
States claimed the elections to be legal and
transparent.
9. In 2010, concerns of Islamic militarism in the east of
the country was on the rise following the escape of 25
militants from a Tajik prison in August, an ambush
that killed 28 Tajik soldiers in the Rasht Valley in
September and another ambush in the valley in
October that killed 30 soldiers, followed by fighting
outside Gharm that left 3 militants dead. The country's
Interior Ministry asserts to date that it maintains full
control over the country's east.
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18. Internal problems
The Tajik students go and study out side Tajikistan
More than 60 percent of the population lives in
poverty.
Corruption: the government runs largely on political
patronage.
The opposition still non-placated opposition , ex :
(Several opposition parties boycotted the elections in
2006 and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe was critical of it.)
19. Facts!
Tajikistan matters because it serves as a transit point
(and in some cases a source) of flows of drugs and
weapons into several more internationally influential
countries. It shares a porous 1200 km-long border with
Afghanistan that cannot be secured, which could help
reinforce militants fighting against US and NATO
troops. Drugs and weapons already cross the border
into Russia and China and flow across South Asia.
State collapse in Tajikistan would destabilize the
broader Fergana Valley, with impact on neighboring
Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic.
20. Conclusion
Even with the opposition threat to the stability and the
threat of the extremists within and outside the country,
and the various problems of the state, nevertheless , , the
trauma of the 1990s has generated an underlying consensus
on one issue: hardly anyone wants to return to full-scale
war and most people yearn for peaceful development. This
consensus alone may be sufficient to preserve a degree of
stability for years to come.
For the (poorest) of the post-Soviet Central Asian
republics, the prospect of armed conflict is a tremendous
expense -- both economically and politically -- that
Tajikistan truly cannot afford and would be a setback to any
nascent post-war progress that may have been achieved.