Monroe v. Pape is an important historical legal case. There are many lessons to be learned by a careful reading of this case. Essentially, Monroe v. Pape is a case in which a black family seeks redress for a racially based violation of their Civil Rights by biased local police officers. The local Chicago police officers did not have the official right to have even been in the petitioner’s home so they were acting under the “color of law” when they burst in and took the man away and held him without access to due process. Monroe v Pape shows how a case rooted in a local violation of Civil Rights can make it to Federal Jurisdiction and change how we interpret the law. Although in some situations a petitioner may perceive a strategic advantage to proceeding through the state court system, there are other times when invoking Federal law may be advantageous. Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over "civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." Cases which present federal questions are removable to the federal district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1988 ed.), which provides that when there is a distinct claim in a complaint that presents a federal question, the defendant may remove the entire case to federal court. The Ku Klux Klan Act was passed by Congress in 1871 as a result of a 600 page report delineating the inability of state governments to cope with the Klan’s increasing racial violence. In Monroe v. Pape the petitioner, a Black man, charged that although there were laws in Illinois by which he could request redress, it was impossible for a Black man under the political pressure of Klu Klux Klan to receive justice in the District courts. The case evoked the standard of a "principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." The essence of the claim was that the police conduct offended those requirements of decency and fairness. To show the violations of Civil Rights, the petitioners invoked primarily the Fourteenth Amendment\'s Due Process Clause, claiming that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without “due process of law”. They asserted that the essence of the liberty is protected both by the common law and by the American Constitution. The claim stated that the essence of the liberty was "the right to shut the door on officials of the state unless their entry is under proper authority of law".

1. Medical Whistleblower’s
Canary Notes
Medical Whistleblower
July 2006
Monroe v. Pape is an important historical legal
case. There are many lessons to be learned by
a careful reading of this case. Essentially,
Monroe v. Pape is a case in which a black fam-
ily seeks redress for a racially based violation
of their Civil Rights by biased local police offi-
cers. The local Chicago police officers did not
have the official right to have even been in the
petitioner’s home so they were acting under
the “color of law” when they burst in and took the man away and held him without access to due
process. Monroe v Pape shows how a case rooted in a local violation of Civil Rights can make it
to Federal Jurisdiction and change how we interpret the law. Although in some situations a peti-
tioner may perceive a strategic advantage to proceeding through the state court system, there are
other times when invoking Federal law may be advantageous. Federal district courts have origi-
nal jurisdiction over "civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United
States." Cases which present federal questions are removable to the federal district courts under
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1988 ed.), which provides that when there is a distinct claim in a complaint
that presents a federal question, the defendant may remove the entire case to federal court.
The Ku Klux Klan Act was passed by Congress in 1871 as a result of a 600 page report delineating the
inability of state governments to cope with the Klan’s increasing racial violence. In Monroe v. Pape
the petitioner, a Black man, charged that although there were laws in Illinois by which he could re-
quest redress, it was impossible for a Black man under the political pressure of Klu Klux Klan to re-
ceive justice in the District courts. The case evoked the standard of a "principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." The essence of the claim
was that the police conduct offended those requirements of decency and fairness. To show the viola-
tions of Civil Rights, the petitioners invoked primarily the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, claiming that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without “due process
of law”. They asserted that the essence of the liberty is protected both by the common law and by the
American Constitution. The claim stated that the essence of the liberty was "the right to shut the door
on officials of the state unless their entry is under proper authority of law".
Lessons Learned from Monroe v. Pape
Monroe v. Pape—
Historical Case
2
Civil Rights—U. S.
Department of Justice
3
Primary Authority for
Civil Rights Action
4
Inside this issue:
Volume 1 Issue 7
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Pub. L. 88-352) (Title VII),
as amended, appears in volume 42 of
the United States Code, beginning at
section 2000e. Title VII prohibits
employment discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex and national
origin. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
(Pub. L. 102-166) (CRA) amends
several sections of Title VII. Section
102 of the CRA amends the Revised
Statutes by adding a new section
following section 1977 (42 U.S.C.
1981), to provide for the recovery of
compensatory and punitive damages in
cases of intentional violations of Title
VII, the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, and section 501 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.

2. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 365 U.S. 167
Monroe v. Pape
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 39 Argued: November 8, 1960 --- Decided: February 20, 1961
Under R.S. § 1979, derived from § 1 of the "Ku Klux Act" of April 20, 1871, petitioners (six Negro
children and their parents) brought an action in a Federal District Court against the City of Chicago
and 13 of its police officers for damages for violation of their rights under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. They alleged that, acting "under color of the statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs and
usages" of Illinois and the City of Chicago, but without any warrant for search or arrest, the police
officers broke into petitioners' home in the early morning, routed them from bed, made them stand
naked in the living room, and ransacked every room, emptying drawers and ripping mattress cov-
ers; that the father was taken to the police station and detained on "open" charges for ten hours
while he was interrogated about a two-day-old murder; that he was not taken before a magistrate,
though one was accessible; that he was not permitted to call his family or attorney, and that he was
subsequently released without criminal charges being preferred against him.
Held: The complaint stated a cause of action against the police officers under § 1979; but the City of
Chicago was not liable under that section. Pp. 168-192.
1. Allegation of facts constituting a deprivation under color of state authority of the guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizures, contained in the Fourth Amendment and made appli-
cable to the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, satisfies to that ex-
tent the requirement of § 1979. Pp. 170-171.
2. In enacting § 1979, Congress intended to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional
rights, privileges and immunities by an official's abuse of his position. Pp. 171-187.
(a) The statutory words "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory" do not exclude acts of an official or policeman who can show no authority under
state law, custom or usage to do what he did, or even who violated the state constitution and laws.
Pp. 172-187. [p168]
(b) One of the purposes of this legislation was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by
reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance, or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced
and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by state agencies. Pp. 174-180.
(c) The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the state remedy need not be
sought and refused before the federal remedy is invoked. P. 183.
(d) Misuse of power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrong-
doer is clothed with the authority of state law is action taken "under color of" state law within the
meaning of § 1979. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299; Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91. Pp.
183-187.
3. Since § 1979 does not contain the word "willfully," as does 18 U.S.C. § 242 and § 1979 imposes
civil liability, rather than criminal sanctions, actions under § 1979 can dispense with the require-
ment of showing a "specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right." P. 187.
4. The City of Chicago is not liable under § 1979, because Congress did not intend to bring munici-
pal corporations within the ambit of that section. Pp. 187-192.
Monroe v. Pape — Historical Case
Page 2 Medical Whistleblower’s Canary Notes Volume 1 Issue 7
18 U.S.C. § 242 --
Deprivation of
Rights Under
Color of Law
The defendant acted under
color of law.
The defendant deprived the
victim of a right secured by
the Constitution or laws of
the United States.
The defendant acted willfully.
[If excessive force violation
charged:] The defendant's
actions resulted in bodily in-
jury to the victim.
[Incidents prior to September
1994]: The victim was an in-
habitant of a state or territory
of the United States.

3. Office of the Assistant Attorney General The Office of the Assistant Attorney General establishes policy
and provides executive direction and control over legislative enforcement and administrative manage-
ment activities in the Division.
Administrative Management Section In support of the enforcement responsibilities of the Division, the
Administrative Management Section provides a diverse array of management and technical services.
These services include, but are not limited to, personnel administration, budget formulation and execu-
tion, facility services, mail and file operations, and automated systems.
Appellate Section (Apelaciones) The Appellate Section has primary responsibility for handling civil rights
cases in the courts of appeals and, in cooperation with the Solicitor General, in the Supreme Court.
Complaint Adjudication Office The Complaint Adjudication Office reviews cases provided to it by depart-
mental components or the EEOC alleging employment discrimination by employees of the Department of
Justice and renders a final decision for the Department.
Coordination and Review Section The Coordination and Review Section exercises both programmatic
and non-litigation enforcement responsibilities. Under Executive Order 12250, the Section coordinates
the enforcement by Federal agencies of various statutes that prohibit discrimination in programs that
receive Federal financial assistance. The Section also has authority to investigate certain complaints of
discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, and religion against certain recipients of
assistance from the Department of Justice.
Criminal Section The federal criminal civil rights statutes provide for prosecutions of conspiracies to
interfere with federally protected rights, deprivation of rights under color of law, the use or threat of force
to injure or intimidate someone in their enjoyment of specific rights (such as voting, employment, educa-
tion, public facilities and accommodations) and criminal housing interference.
Disability Rights Section (Derechos en Razón a Discapacidad) The Disability Rights Section implements
the Department of Justice's responsibilities under titles I, II, and III of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). The ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in employment (Title I), in all activities
of state and local governments (Title II), in places of public accommodation and in commercial facilities
(Title III). The Section's responsibilities include enforcement, technical assistance activities and certifica-
tion of building codes. Enforcement responsibilities cover a broad spectrum of potential actions includ-
ing investigations, informal or formal settlement agreements, consent decrees (approved by a court), and
litigation. To promote voluntary compliance with the ADA and to enhance enforcement efforts, the Tech-
nical Assistance Program provides free information and technical assistance to businesses, state and
local governments, people with disabilities, and the general public. The Section also develops regulations
to implement Titles II and III of the ADA, including standards for accessible design, and coordinates Fed-
eral enforcement of Title II and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and other Federal statutes that pro-
hibit discrimination on the basis of disability in programs that receive Federal financial assistance.
Educational Opportunities Section (Oportunidades Educativas) The Educational Opportunities Section
enforces federal statutes which prohibit public school officials from engaging in discriminatory practices
involving both elementary and secondary schools and institutions of higher education.
Employment Litigation Section The Employment Litigation Section enforces against state and local gov-
ernment employers the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, and other federal laws
prohibiting employment practices that discriminate on grounds of race, sex, religion, and national origin.
Special Litigation Section The Special Litigation Section is responsible for protecting the constitutional
and federal statutory rights of persons confined in certain institutions owned or operated by state or local
governments. These institutions include facilities for individuals who are mentally ill and developmentally
disabled, elderly persons in nursing homes, inmates in prisons and jails and juveniles confined in deten-
tion halls. The Section also investigates state and local law enforcement agencies alleged to engage in a
pattern or practice of violating citizens' federal rights and may bring civil lawsuits to remedy such
abuses. The Section has also been charged with the civil enforcement of the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act which prohibits the use of force, threats or physical obstruction to interfere with access to
Page 3Medical Whistleblower’s Canary Notes Volume 1 Issue 7
18 U.S.C. § 245 -Interference
with Federally Protected
Activities
The Elements of the Crime are:
The defendant used force or threats
of force.
The defendant injured, intimidated or
interfered with or attempted to injure,
intimidate or interfere with the victim.
The defendant acted because of the
victim's race /color /religion
/national origin and because the
victim was enjoying one of the pro-
tected activities set forth in the stat-
ute.
The defendant acted willfully.
For felony: The defendant's ac-
tions resulted in bodily injury to
the victims/used force/firearm.
CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION—U.S. DOJ
There also are divisions on
Housing and Civil
Enforcement Section
(Vivienda y Coacción Civil)
& Office of Special Counsel
for Immigration-Related
Unfair Employment
Practices & Voting Section.

4. Dr. Janet Parker
P.O. Box C
Lawrence, KS 66044
We are on the Web!
MedicalWhistleblower.googlepages.com
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV , U.S. Const. Amend. XIII, 18 U.S.C.A. § 241 (conspiracies to deprive citizens
of rights), 18 U.S.C.A. § 242 (deprivation of rights under color of law), 18 U.S.C.A. § 245 (interference
with federally protected activities),20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1651, 1652, 1654–1656 (prohibition against busing to
overcome racial imbalance in public schools), 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1681–1686 (prohibition against sexual
discrimination in education), 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701–1710, 1712–1718, 1720, 1721, 1751–1758 (equal edu-
cation opportunities and transportation of public school students), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (federal ques-
tion jurisdiction of federal courts), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (Tax Injunction Act), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1342
(Johnson Act), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (federal jurisdiction over civil rights actions), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367
(supplemental jurisdiction of federal courts), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1443 (removal to federal court of civil rights
actions or criminal proceedings), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 (preclusive effect in federal courts of state court
judgments), 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283 (Anti–Injunction Act), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (equal rights under law),
42 U.S.C.A. § 1982 (equal property rights of citizens), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (actions for deprivation of
rights under color of state law), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985 (conspiracies to interfere with civil rights),
42 U.S.C.A. § 1986 (neglect to prevent conspiracy to interfere with civil rights), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988
(proceedings in vindication of civil rights), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(f)
(1) (conduct of pretrial proceedings in prisoner's action under
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 or other statute by telephone, video confer-
ence, or other telecommunications technology), 42 U.S.C.A. §§
2000a et seq. (civil rights in public accommodations), 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000b et seq. (civil rights in public facilities), 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000c et seq. (civil rights in public education), 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000d et seq. (civil rights in federally assisted pro-
grams), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000h-2 (intervention by Attorney General;
denial of equal protection on account of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601 et seq. (Fair Housing
Act)
Primary Authority for Civil Rights Action
Phone: 360-809-3058
Fax: None
E-mail: MedicalWhistleblower@gmail.com
Supporting the Emotional Health of All Whistleblowers
and their Friends, Supporters and Families.
Medical Whistleblower
18 U.S.C. § 245
Interference in
Federally Protected
Activity
Participating in any pro-
gram or activity provided
or administered by a state -
- § 245(b)(2)(B); United
State v. McDermott, 822 F.
Supp. 582 (N.D. Iowa
1993) (public park); United
States v. White, 846 F.2d
678 (11th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 488 U.S. 984 (1988)
(public parade).
The information contained through the Medical Whistle-
blower Canary Notes Newsletter is provided for general
information only. The information provided by the Medial
Whistleblower Canary Notes does not constitute legal or
professional advice nor is it conveyed or intended to be con-
veyed in the course of any adviser-client discourse, but is
intended to be general information with respect to common
issues. It is not offered as and does not constitute legal or
medical advice or opinion. It should not serve as a substitute
for advice from an attorney, qualified medical professional,
social worker, therapist or counselor familiar with the facts
of your specific situation. We encourage you in due diligence
to seek additional information and resources before making
any decision. We make no warranty, express or implied,
concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content of this
newsletter due to the constantly changing nature of the legal
and medical aspects of these issues .
18 U.S. C. § 245 Case
Applying for or enjoying
employment -- § 245(b)(2)
(C); United States v. Lane,
883 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1059 (1990).