2. Ch. 3: Political Warfare
Politics is war, and lobbyists are the field
generals
Variety of tactics available
Must adapt tactics as circumstances change
3. 12 tactics
1. Win on the merits
1. Preferred. Cheapest & cleanest
2. Win procedurally
1. Effective, but may reveal weakness on merits
Example: last-minute attempt in 1999 to ban big-
box retailers from selling groceries. Hammered
by governor as “sleazy” attempt to circumvent
process
4. 12 tactics, continued
4. Win through grassroots activation
5. Win by mobilizing public opinion through
“paid media”
6. Win by mobilizing public opinion through
influencing the news media
7. Win with a silver bullet (to kill)
8. Win by burying the issue in the state budget
5. 12 tactics, continued
9. Win at the ballot box
10. Win by negotiations
11. Win by moving the issue onto the courts
12. Win by postlegislative administrative
action
13. Win the old-fashioned way by buying it
6. Example #1: Medical Malpractice
1975: lawsuits with huge awards cause
hike in malpractice insurance premiums
California Medical Association wins Medical
Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA)
$4M war chest
High regard for medical profession
Favorable media coverage
Poorly organized opposition (trial lawyers)
7. PICRA Escalation
Business coalition sought to extend MICRA
to other lawsuits (Personal Injury
Compensation Reform Act)
Deadline for compromise looming as 1987
session was ending; key players adjourned to
Frank Fat’s
Finally, deal written on a napkin and carried into
the Senate the next day
8.
9. The Deal
Drastic restriction in product liability laws
offset by fee increases for lawyers
prosecuting medical malpractice cases.
Doctors got promises that protections already in
place against lawsuits would not be touched.
Insurance companies won a reprieve from
threatened regulations gaining momentum in the
Legislature.
10. No Public Debate
The legislation was rushed into print in less
than 48 hours and brought to the Assembly
and state Senate for immediate votes on
the last night of the legislative session for
the year.
No caucusing allowed
No amendments by those not present at Fat’s
11. Business as Usual
The napkin deal came to symbolize how
narrow economic interests dominate
lawmaking in CA
But for Brown it was one of his proudest
accomplishments, and he called it the
“hallmark” of the session.
He had brought peace, if only for a time, to the
seemingly insoluble battle over liability laws.
12. Immunity from Tobacco Lawsuits
One of the most unpopular aspects of the
deal was immunity for the tobacco industry
Repealed by legislature in 1997
In 2002, the California Supreme Court eliminated
almost all protections from lawsuits for the
industry (Myers v. Phillip Morris)
Removed “immunity” from cases stemming from
pre-1998 activity
13. Example #2: Utilities Deregulation
In 1996, CA deregulated privately owned
electric utilities
Regulation of distribution lines left intact
Business of generating power separated from the
business of distributing it to the public
Utilities to spin off much if not all of their generating
capacity, then compete with other resellers for
customers, who will choose their suppliers and even
purchase "green" energy from companies selling
wind and solar.
14. What did the utilities get?
$20-$28.5 B in paybacks to the utilities for
their bad generating plants (obsolete
generators, mostly nuclear).
These charges would be levied through
"transition fees" and other surcharges, buried in
customers' bills
During the time it would take to pay back those
bad investments, retail prices would be frozen.
15. What Went Wrong?
SoCalEd and PG&E sold off too much of
their generating capacity and had too little
of their own supply at a time when rates
were still frozen. Then came a hot summer
and a cold winter.
The utilities found themselves at the mercy of
independent producers (e.g. Enron).
Customers, buying power at fixed costs, had little
incentive to conserve.
16. The End of Davis
Davis was forced to
use billions of CA
taxpayer dollars to
buy energy and save
the utilities from
bankruptcy (and CA
from blackouts)
Enron trailer
17. Ch. 4: Money
Money turns powerless into powerful – e.g.
California Indian tribes
Reforms and arrests may cause dents in
the system and superficial reforms, but
money, like water, always finds an outlet
18. The Major Players
Health care providers
California Correctional Peace Officers
Association
California Teachers Association
Indian gaming tribes
19. Bryan v. Itasca County (1976)
Ifa state statute regarding an
activity conducted in a state is
merely civil and regulatory in
nature, it is not enforceable against
Indian tribes within the state.
20. Seminole v. Butterfield (1979)
When Florida tried to shut down
Seminole Tribe bingo games, the
Seminole took the state to court.
The Supreme Court held that, given
Bryan, the Seminole Tribe high-stakes
bingo games could not be regulated by
the state.
21. California vs. Cabazon (1987)
In 1983, the Cabazon and Morongo bands sued
Riverside County for trying to shut down their
bingo and card gambling operations.
The Supreme Court upheld Bryan and the tribes’
sovereignty,
– Tribal gambling was beyond the reach of state
regulation.
22. Congress Reacts
Cabazon spurred Congress to act to
regulate Indian gambling.
– Although the Supreme Court had ruled
that the states could not do so, the
possibility remained for the federal
government to regulate tribal gambling.
23. The Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (1988)
Transferred to the states the authority to regulate Indian
gaming.
Established three classes of Indian gaming:
– CLASS I: traditional Indian social gaming with minimal prizes; no
regulation.
– CLASS II: bingo and various card games where the payout is from
a players’ pool, to be regulated by the tribes and the National
Indian Commission.
– CLASS III: all other gaming, including casinos and slot machines,
allowed only if legal in the state and agreed to in a compact
negotiated between the state and the tribe.
Allows for mediation if the state fails to negotiate Class III
compacts in good faith.
24. Neither the tribes nor the
states liked the new law
Tribes were prohibited from Class III
gaming unless the states agreed.
States were prohibited from regulating
Class II gambling, and were prevented
from sharing in any economic benefits
from tribal gaming.
25. California Indian Gaming
Until 1997, most CA Indian gaming was
Class II.
After IGRA was approved, the tribes sought
to expand into casino gambling.
– At first, Gov. Wilson refused to sign Class III
compacts; the tribes and the state sought federal
intervention.
26. The Wilson-Pala Compact
41 Indian casinos were in operation, but
they were considered illegal because they
did not operate under compacts.
In March 1998, Wilson signed an agreement
with the Pala Band of Mission Indians.
– Eventually, 11 tribal compacts were approved,
but most tribes rejected the deal.
• No slot machines, limit of 19,900 gambling devices
27. Prop 5
Supported by coalition of 40 tribes not
included in the 1998 compacts.
– Mandated governor to sign compacts
– Allowed slot machines
Opposed by Nevada gaming interests,
Wilson, and labor unions.
$100 million was spent on the initiative
campaign.
28. Hotel Employees Union
v. Davis (1999)
Prop 5 was approved overwhelmingly
by CA voters, 62.4% to 37.6%.
Declared unconstitutional by the CA
Supreme Court, August 1999
– Would have allowed Nevada- and New
Jersey-type casinos, which are prohibited
by the state constitution.
29. Davis Signs Compacts
AfterProp 5 was declared
unconstitutional, Gov. Davis began
negotiations with various state tribes.
On Sept. 9, 1999, Davis signed 60
compacts with various tribal leaders.
– Most of the provisions of Prop 5 were included,
such as the allowing of slot machines
30. Prop 1A
Validated the compacts negotiated between
Davis and 60 Indian nations
Constitutional amendment rather than statutory
Approved by 64.5% of voters, March 2000
31. Gaming Today
In 2009, the latest year for which figures are
available, tribal gaming in California
brought in $6.9 billion, down from $7.3B
in 2008 and $7.8B in 2007.
32. CA Correctional Peace Officers
Empowered in late
1970s
Granting of
collective
bargaining rights
Proposition 13
“Tough on crime”
laws
33. The Power of the CCPOA
Beneficial contracts despite ongoing budget
crisis
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/blogs/nov05election/detail?entry_id=85077
Prisons Under Pressure
34. Lobbying Today: Select & Elect?
Has the CA lobbying process come full
circle from the era of Artie Samish to
today?
