Jason J. Fichtner Presentation for Mercatus Center SSDI Panel
Regulation University: Beware of Inflated Benefits and Hidden Costs
1. Regulation University:
Beware of Inflated Benefits
and Hidden Costs
March 27, 2013
Patrick A. McLaughlin
Senior Research Fellow
Mercatus Center at George Mason University
2. Review:
1. What
is
“regula4on”?
2. What
causes
regula4on?
Regula4ons
are
uniquely
opaque
as
legal
instruments
à
BCA
3. Why
BCA
for
regula4ons?
1. Avoid
unnecessary
regula4ons
2. Choose
most
efficient
alterna4ve
3. Provide
info
to
Congress,
public
4. What
can
go
wrong
in
BCA?
1. Regulate
based
on
anecdote
2. Approach
a
foregone
conclusion
3. Ignore/hide
costs
4. Inflate
benefits
5. What
can
go
wrong
in
BCA?
1. Regulate
based
on
anecdote
or
untested
theory
2. Approach
a
foregone
conclusion
3. Ignore/hide
costs
4. Inflate
benefits
7. What
can
go
wrong
in
BCA?
1. Regulate
based
on
anecdote
or
untested
theory
2. Approach
a
foregone
conclusion
3. Ignore/hide
costs
4. Inflate
benefits
8. What
can
go
wrong
in
BCA?
1. Regulate
based
on
anecdote
or
untested
theory
-‐if
there’s
no
problem,
where
do
benefits
come
from?
2. Approach
a
foregone
conclusion
3. Ignore/hide
costs
4. Inflate
benefits
9. Quote
from
EO
12866:
“Each
agency
shall
iden4fy
the
problem
that
it
intends
to
address…
as
well
as
assess
the
significance
of
that
problem.”
10. Quote
from
EO
12866:
“Each
agency
shall
iden4fy
the
problem
that
it
intends
to
address…
as
well
as
assess
the
significance
of
that
problem.”
Regulatory
Report
Card
Ques4on
6:
How
well
does
the
analysis
iden4fy
and
demonstrate
the
existence
of
a
market
failure
or
other
systemic
problem
the
regula4on
is
supposed
to
solve?
Average:
1.7
/
5
for
111
RIAs
evaluated.
11. What
can
go
wrong
in
BCA?
1. Regulate
based
on
anecdote
or
untested
theory
2. Approach
a
foregone
conclusion
3. Ignore/hide
costs
4. Inflate
benefits
12. What
can
go
wrong
in
BCA?
1. Regulate
based
on
anecdote
or
untested
theory
2. Approach
a
foregone
conclusion
3. Ignore/hide
costs
4. Inflate
benefits
13. What
can
go
wrong
in
BCA?
1. Regulate
based
on
anecdote
or
untested
theory
2. Approach
a
foregone
conclusion
3. Ignore/hide
costs
4. Inflate
benefits
14. Quote
from
OMB
Circular
A-‐4:
“Once
you
have
determined
that
Federal
regulatory
ac4on
is
appropriate,
you
will
need
to
consider
alterna4ve
regulatory
approaches.”
-‐OMB
Circular
A-‐4
(The
Instruc4on
Manual
for
RIAs)
15. Quote
from
OMB
Circular
A-‐4:
“Once
you
have
determined
that
Federal
regulatory
ac4on
is
appropriate,
you
will
need
to
consider
alterna4ve
regulatory
approaches.”
-‐
OMB
Circular
A-‐4
(The
Instruc4on
Manual
for
RIAs)
Regulatory
Report
Card
Ques4on
7:
How
well
does
the
analysis
assess
the
effec1veness
of
alterna1ve
approaches?
Average:
2.4
/
5
for
111
RIAs
evaluated.
16. What
can
go
wrong
in
BCA?
1. Regulate
based
on
anecdote
or
untested
theory
2. Approach
a
foregone
conclusion
3. Ignore/hide
costs
4. Inflate
benefits
17. What
can
go
wrong
in
BCA?
1. Regulate
based
on
anecdote
or
untested
theory
2. Approach
a
foregone
conclusion
-‐Failure
to
evaluate
alterna4ves
leads
to
inefficiency,
but
also
real
(unintended)
consequences
3. Ignore/hide
costs
4. Inflate
benefits
18. What
can
go
wrong
in
BCA?
1. Regulate
based
on
anecdote
or
untested
theory
2. Approach
a
foregone
conclusion
3. Ignore/hide
costs
4. Inflate
benefits
19. What
costs
are
le`
out
of
most
RIAs?
Usually
everything
but
direct
compliance
costs!
20. Some
examples
Failure
to
account
for
efficiency
losses
from
taxes/subsidies
(Early
Re4ree
Reinsurance
Program)
–
up
to
44%
more
costs
21. Some
examples
Design
standards
on
trains,
automobiles
–
prevents
innova4on
domes4cally
and
importa4on
of
desired
goods
22. Speaking
of
compliance
costs…
While
it
would
be
nice
to
have
es4mates
of
the
costs
of
regula4on
that
were
right
on
average,
it
would
be
even
more
comfor4ng
to
have
es4mates
that
were
close
on
average.
-‐R.
David
Simpson,
EPA,
in
“Do
Regulators
Overes4mate
the
Costs
of
Regula4on?”
Working
Paper,
December,
2011.
23. What
can
go
wrong
in
BCA?
1. Regulate
based
on
anecdote
or
untested
theory
2. Approach
a
foregone
conclusion
3. Ignore/hide
costs
-‐affects
evalua4on
of
alterna4ves,
misinforms
Congress/public,
and
misinforms
future
regulatory
choices
4. Inflate
benefits
24. What
can
go
wrong
in
BCA?
1. Regulate
based
on
anecdote
or
untested
theory
2. Approach
a
foregone
conclusion
3. Ignore/hide
costs
4. Inflate
benefits
25. What
can
go
wrong
in
BCA?
1. Regulate
based
on
anecdote
or
untested
theory
2. Approach
a
foregone
conclusion
3. Ignore/hide
costs
4. Inflate
benefits
26. How
are
benefits
inflated?
1. Assump4ons
of
underlying
risk
not
supported
by
best
available
science
or
data
(Abdukadirov
and
Yazigi
2012;
Ellig
2013)
27.
28.
29.
30. Ques4onable
Data
(Ellig
2013)
NHTSA’s
Minimum
Sound
Requirements
for
Hybrid
and
Electric
Vehicles
(2013):
-‐Documents
how
vehicle’s
sounds
help
blind
people
-‐Concludes
that
noise
requirements
would
therefore
help
blind
people
BUT
Then
$115.1
million
of
benefits
(>50%)
come
from
avoiding
bicyclist-‐car
collisions.
Are
there
that
many
blind
bicyclists?
31. How
are
benefits
inflated?
1. Assump4ons
of
underlying
risk
not
supported
by
best
available
science
or
data
(Abdukadirov
and
Yazigi
2012;
Ellig
2013)
2. Restric4ng
consumer
choice
as
a
benefit
(Gayer
and
Viscusi
2012)
32.
33. How
are
benefits
inflated?
1. Assump4ons
of
underlying
risk
not
supported
by
best
available
science
or
data
(Abdukadirov
and
Yazigi
2012;
Ellig
2013)
2. Restric4ng
consumer
choice
as
a
benefit
(Gayer
and
Viscusi
2012)
3. Treat
transfers
as
benefit
(Ellig
and
Conover
2012)
34. Transfers
as
benefits
Rights
to
book
royal/es
Rights
to
book
royal/es
Publisher
Publisher
Author
Author
35. Transfers
as
benefits
Preexis4ng
Condi4on
Insurance
Plan
Rule
–
HHS:
Counts
reduc4ons
in
uncompensated
care
as
a
benefit
(Ellig
and
Conover
2012)
36. How
are
benefits
inflated?
1. Assump4ons
of
underlying
risk
not
supported
by
best
available
science
or
data
(Abdukadirov
and
Yazigi
2012;
Ellig
2013)
2. Restric4ng
consumer
choice
as
a
benefit
(Gayer
and
Viscusi
2012)
3. Treat
transfers
as
benefit
(Ellig
and
Conover
2012)
4. Assume
perfect
compliance
and
ignore
changes
in
consumer
behavior
38. What
can
go
wrong
in
BCA?
1. Regulate
based
on
anecdote
2. Approach
a
foregone
conclusion
3. Ignore/hide
costs
4. Inflate
benefits
-‐affects
evalua4on
of
alterna4ves,
misinforms
Congress/public,
and
misinforms
other
regulatory
choices
39. What
can
go
wrong
in
BCA?
1. Regulate
based
on
anecdote
or
untested
theory
2. Approach
a
foregone
conclusion
3. Ignore/hide
costs
4. Inflate
benefits
40. Why
would
anyone
subvert
BCA
in
RIAs?
1. Incen4ves
of
the
agency
2. Incen4ves
of
the
individual
41. Why
should
we
care?
1. Regulate
when
unnecessary
2. Fail
to
choose
most
efficient
op4on
3. Unintended
consequences
4. Misinform
Congress
and
public
5. Derail
retrospec4ve
review