MFleming-Training for Interoperable Communications

Running head: TRAINING FOR INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS 1
Training for Interoperable Communications with Federal Response Teams
Michael D. Fleming
University of Maryland, University College

TRAINING FOR INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS 2
Interoperable Communications
Title XVIII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 called for the development of a
National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP), a task that was undertaken by the
Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office of Emergency Communications (OEC).
OEC’s vision for the NECP was to involve stakeholders from every level of government and the
private sector and establish a roadmap that would allow emergency response personnel to
“communicate…as needed, on demand, and as authorized at all levels of government, across all
disciplines” (Department of Homeland Security, 2008). The NECP was published in 2008, and
since then there has been a large federal push for jurisdictions across the country to be able to
demonstrate their emergency communications capabilities within several hours of a “significant
incident” such as those depicted in national planning scenarios. This push has been accompanied
by several federal programs and grants to help the states achieve the national communications
goals (Department of Homeland Security, 2008).
The majority of response communications take place at the local jurisdiction level, and
the NECP and its resulting state plans address that heavily. Grants and training programs have
been developed to ensure adequate equipment is available to those responders, and that they are
proficient in its use. For large, lengthy, and/or specialized responses, there are select teams at the
federal level that can provide state and local jurisdictions with much needed resources and
support. These federal teams are typically well trained and credentialed, and superbly equipped
for their specific mission sets. Because they are federal, however, they typically have larger
response areas, and fewer opportunities to train with small jurisdictions due to scheduling and
funding constraints. It is important to understand how these federal teams train and prepare for
interoperable communications, both to ensure that they are able to integrate with the efforts of

state and local response entities, and to be certain that state and local responders understand how
they will need to communicate with those federal teams when they arrive on the scene.
In order to examine the preparedness and training for interoperable communications with
federal teams, a number of documents will be looked at. Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)
for responders at each level will be analyzed, as will the equipment sets and standards applicable
to them. SOPs will be checked for how they address interoperability with outside entities,
particularly those that are from non-adjacent jurisdictions. Next, training programs and exercises
will be examined to see that personnel have an opportunity to become proficient with the
equipment and SOPs applicable to them. Special attention will be given to exercise evaluations,
after-action reports, and lessons learned, for these are the tools used to identify capability and
procedure gaps, and come up with ways to address shortfalls and oversights in an effective
manner.
When the Homeland Security Act of 2002 called for the creation of a strategy to address
emergency communications, Congress directed the OEC to make a plan to address five key
points: 1) identify capability gaps, 2) recommend interoperability and continuity solutions, 3)
develop plans of action and milestones for deployment of those solutions, 4) establish deadlines
for baseline levels of interoperability and “benchmarks” for evaluation, and 5) continue to
manage the lifecycle of existing Federal communications programs (Department of Homeland
Security, 2008, p. 2). These points are covered by the NECP in a top level management style,
providing guidance and overall strategy, while pushing action items down to the states.
However, the states are not left completely alone, as the NECP also applies to the federal
government, and has guided several programs that work towards the NECP’s goals at all levels
of government. From the NECP, two themes emerge that will carry over into examination of

state plans and allow for examination of training effectiveness for interoperability with federal
teams. Those themes are: 1) compliance with and utilization of federal initiates like SAFECOM
and Project 25, and 2) specific measures addressing training and exercises.
SAFECOM is a program managed by DHS/EOC. It is comprised of partners from the
government, public, and private sectors, and its executive committee is a partner to the NECP
(Department of Homeland Security, 2008). SAFECOM assists federal and state response entities
through several documents and programs, including the Interoperability Continuum, the
Statement of Requirements baseline standards for equipment, and the template for Statewide
Communication Interoperability Plans (SCIP) (Department of Homeland Security, 2015).
Project 25 (P25) is a voluntary communications standard that seeks to address the need
for interoperable narrowband Land Mobile Radio (LMR) equipment used by responders (APCO
International, 2015). P25 publishes industry standards that ensure that new and emerging
technology meet the requirements of the NECP, and it offers equipment selection guides and test
data to help guide equipment selection. Project 25 is also a contributing partner to the NECP and
is recognized by DHS/OEC as a viable path towards attaining interoperability goals (http://
www.project25.org, April 13, 2015).
There are other federal programs and partners mentioned in the NECP that will be further
addressed in SCIPs. An example of these include FirstNet, the First Responder Network
Authority tasked by Congress to build, deploy, and operate a nationwide public safety broadband
network (http://www.firstnet.gov, April 13, 2015).
SCIPs
To really develop an understanding of how the federal initiatives within the NECP are
affecting communications in the nation, it is useful to examine the SCIPs developed by the

states. For the purpose of this study, state plans for Alabama, Maryland, New York, and Utah
were examined. Of the four plans examined, Maryland’s stands out initially on sheer volume; at
just over 200 pages, Maryland’s SCIP is nearly eight times the length of the other three plans
(State of Maryland, 2008). Alabama’s, New York’s, and Utah’s plans are each roughly 30
pages, and share an identical table of contents (State of Alabama, 2013) (State of New York,
2014) (State of Utah, 2013).
Alabama
Several initiatives contained within Alabama’s SCIP point towards compliance with and
utilization of federal initiatives. It discusses future changes that will need to be addressed under
the FirstNet initiative, and how FirstNet may change but not replace the State’s LMR network
for first responders (State of Alabama, 2013, p. 6). It also relates how the State is using the
SAFECOM Interoperability Continuum to guide planning for the deployment of FirstNet (State
of Alabama, 2013, p. 7). Alabama’s SCIP defines its communication architecture as a “system
of systems” (State of Alabama, 2013, p. 14), and it instructs county governments to develop
Tactical Communication Interoperability Plans (TCIP) that detail how they utilize “interoperable
communication gateways” between jurisdictions (State of Alabama, 2013, p. 12). Finally,
Alabama’s SCIP identifies key stakeholders and establishes goals for maintaining and upgrading
technology, including goals for creating a statewide P25-compliant system (State of Alabama,
2013, p. 14).
The training and exercises section of Alabama’s plan discusses both current status and
goals. For training, Alabama currently has two formal communications courses, one for unit
leaders and the other for technicians, and graduates of those courses are in place at both the State
and local response levels (State of Alabama, 2013, p. 15). Alabama’s training goal is to add

interoperable communications “awareness” training to the curriculum at their law enforcement
and fire service academies (State of Alabama, 2013, p. 15). Alabama’s exercise regime consists
of typical programs under the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Homeland
Security Exercise Evaluation Program (HSEEP), conducted by the State Emergency
Management Agency and involving all levels of government, private companies, and non-
government organizations (State of Alabama, 2013, p. 15). The State’s goals for exercises are
simply to include interoperable communications as a targeted capability assessment, and conduct
training on new and updated equipment (State of Alabama, 2013, Table 4).
New York
The State of New York’s SCIP mirrors Alabama’s closely. It also makes reference to the
deployment of FirstNet and use of the SAFECOM Interoperability Continuum to guide planning,
but provides additional details on specific actions being taken, such as a preliminary conference
call that was to be held in the summer of 2014 (State of New York, 2014, p. 7). New York’s
plan also calls for the creation of TCIPs, but calls for creation of a regional consortium that will
roll local and county TCIPs into a regional one, and eventually populate a Statewide TCIP (State
of New York, 2014, p. 15). It also calls for creation of county, regional, and a State level Field
Operations Guide, an element absent from the Alabama plan (State of New York, 2014, p. 15).
New York’s plan also embraces the P25 standard and encourages adoption of P25 technology
within the state, but the established goals, such as developing SOPs for interoperability channel
naming and usage conventions, reveal that New York is further along with implementing P25
compliance statewide (State of New York, 2014, p. 16). Of special note, considering the training
and evaluation of interoperable systems is a focus of this study, is New York’s technology goal
number 7.3 and 7.4, which call for a statewide plan for usage and testing of interoperability

channels, and identification of coverage gaps and mitigation plans (State of New York, 2014, p.
17).
New York’s training section, like Alabama’s, makes reference to a formal
communications course, and sets goals around building a communications unit as a response
asset under the Incident Command System (ICS) structure (State of New York, 2014, pp. 2, 19-
20). The plan admits that interoperable communications are not typically an exercise objective,
so several specific goals are set to test and evaluate communications during future exercises, and
develop plans for communications-specific exercises (State of New York, 2014, pp. 19-20). One
exercise goal that stands out is 13.4: “[g]ain familiarity with other systems” (State of New York,
2014, Table 4), meaning systems used by other responders, to include federal teams.
Utah
Like the plans for Alabama and New York, Utah’s SCIP covers the same topics. Like
New York, Utah identifies some additional steps being taken to prepare for the deployment of
FirstNet, most notably the forming of a subcommittee for implementation (State of Utah, 2013,
p. 7). The plan includes the same references to using SAFECOM’s Interoperability Continuum
as a framework to address new technology implementation as well (State of Utah, 2013, p. 8).
Unlike the Alabama and New York plans, Utah’s does not push for development of TCIPs at the
county or regional level; instead, Utah’s SCIP planning subcommittee and its partners are
developing statewide SOPs (State of Utah, 2013, p. 12).
On the subject of P25 implementation, Utah’s plan provides detail on their current LMR,
which consists of a trunked analog network along the Wasatch Front that was installed prior to
the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City (State of Utah, 2013, p. 10). Although there are
goals within the plan that are aimed at rolling out a P25-compliant system, they are vague, most

likely because the State is awaiting a December 2014 report from a Task Force that was formed
by the Utah Legislature in March 2013 for making recommendations on upgrades and increases
in efficiency (State of Utah, 2013, p. 13). For the time being, the plan focuses on the two
prevailing systems in the State and is content that most responders in the State can access the
trunked network directly, or via a patch from their older Very High Frequency (VHF) system
(State of Utah, 2013, p. 13).
Utah’s plan highlights the necessity of incorporating communications training and
exercises into existing programs, and they set goals around this idea. Their goals for
incorporating communications into training and exercises includes a technical assistance course,
web-based training, reviewing current formal curriculum for fire and emergency medical service
programs, and establishing a formal agreement with the state Emergency Management division
to put communications in exercise guidelines (State of Utah, 2013, Table 4). Also, by October
2013, Utah was to conduct a statewide communications full-scale exercise (State of Utah, 2013,
Table 4).
Maryland
As previously noted, Maryland’s SCIP is far more verbose than the other plans examined.
Part if the reason for its length is that it reads more like an operations plan than an executive
strategy tool. It covers history and resources in the state relative to communications, contains
detailed information on existing technology and who uses it, lists points of contact throughout
the State and adjacent extra-state jurisdictions, and fully incorporates the Tactical Interoperable
Communications Plans (TICPs—similar to the previously referenced TCIPs) of the State’s two
urban centers, Baltimore and the National Capital Region (NCR) (State of Maryland, 2008).

Maryland’s plan does not specifically mention FirstNet like the others. This is probably
because Maryland has not waited for the federal government to push out their nationwide
broadband. The plan points out that the NCR already has two public safety broadband programs,
including a 12 site interoperable multimedia capability in the District of Columbia for video,
imaging, and data exchange, as well as a the Capital Wireless Information Net (CapWIN) for
access to law enforcement databases throughout the NCR (State of Maryland, 2008, p. 20).
Outside of the NCR, Maryland already has limited capability to push data over its 700 MHz
radio system, though that capability is limited to text messaging alerts (State of Maryland, 2008,
p. 167). However, the State has already allocated additional portions of the 700 MHz spectrum
they currently have to statewide broadband data, which will provide high speed data access for
everything from images and video to Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) (State of Maryland,
2008, p. 167).
Like the other plans, Maryland’s makes reference to the SAFECOM Interoperability
Continuum. The plan covers various ways that the State has put the Continuum to use, including
comparing Tactical Interoperable Communications Scorecards to the Continuum on an on-going
basis to identify deficiency or variance before problems occur (State of Maryland, 2008, p. 63).
The Maryland SCIP also contains a section where the State grades itself against the Continuum
in the areas of governance, SOPs, voice and data technology, training and exercises, and usage
(State of Maryland, 2008, pp. 165-170). Maryland rates itself from “very high” for governance
structure, through “reasonably high” for SOPs and technology, to “moderately high,” the worst
on their scale, for training and exercises, and usage. Those labels correspond to a score card that
lists five “critical success factors/action” under each section, and shows what action items
Maryland has completed (State of Maryland, 2008, Table 5-1).

Similar to the broadband subject, Maryland has already incorporated and deployed many
aspects of the P25 initiative in their architecture. The plan provides details on how the current
LMR is used for interoperability, including how they use gateways and roaming to link to P25
standards based systems (State of Maryland, 2008, p. 7). It also describes the State’s migration
plan for the statewide 700 MHz system to a fully P25 standard compliant system (State of
Maryland, 2008, p. 96), which has largely been accomplished since the plan was last updated—
Maryland deployed its statewide P25 system in 2012 (Jackson, 2012), and is on track to upgrade
to a Phase II system when that standard is defined (State of Maryland, n.d.).
Like the other plans, Maryland’s SCIP focuses on integrating interoperable
communications with the training and exercises that already occur. It calls on the Exercise and
Training Integration Committee to ensure communications interoperability is an objective of
other programs (State of Maryland, 2008, p. 116). The plan states that each of Homeland
Security’s 36 Target Capabilities, the National Preparedness Goals, and the Governor’s Goals are
addressed in the State’s three year exercise and training plan, which includes interoperable
communications (State of Maryland, 2008, p. 116). The State uses the HSEEP methodology for
planning, executing, and evaluating exercises, and offers assistance via the Maryland Emergency
Management Agency in developing compliant exercises (State of Maryland, 2008, p. 117).
According to the plan, statewide interoperability is exercised at least annually (State of
Maryland, 2008, p. 119).
An important uniqueness contained in Maryland’s SCIP deals with reserve caches of
communications equipment. These assets, including 1,250 portable radios and support
equipment, can be issued to responders in support of an incident to maintain interoperability with
local responders (State of Maryland, 2008, p. 53). The Strategic Technology Reserve (STR) is

intended to support the NCR, and the equipment is stored at three sites around the District of
Columbia: Fairfax County, Virginia, Montgomery County, Maryland, and within the DC
Metropolitan Area (State of Maryland, 2008, p. 53). The support equipment located with each
cache includes gateway equipment to permit interoperability, as well as portable repeaters and
reprogramming equipment (State of Maryland, 2008, p. 53). When deployed for an event, these
assets will be accompanied by a support staff that includes NIMS-qualified Communications
Unit Leaders and technicians, to aid the using organization in setting up the equipment and
achieving interoperability (State of Maryland, 2008, p. 53).
Federal Responders
Large and/or specialized incidents may overwhelm the capabilities of state and local
responders. To deal with these types of events, there are federal teams with additional resources
and specialized skill sets that can be called on to respond. These teams usually have a regional
area of responsibility that they are assigned to. It is necessary to understand how these teams
handle communications to get an idea of how they can “plug in” with state and local responders.
This study will consider the following federal teams: Civil Support Teams (CST), Urban Search
and Rescue (USAR), and the U.S. Marine Corps’ Chemical Biological Incident Response Force
(CBIRF).
Civil Support Team-Weapons of Mass Destruction (CST-WMD)
Although not technically a federal team, since they usually fall under Title 32 and work
for the state governor, the CST-WMD teams are military forces that are federally funded and
trained, and they can be federalized under Title 10, so their equipment and training can present
challenges to interoperability with first responders. There are currently 57 CST teams, at least

one in each state and territory. They provide their state with enhanced Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) response capabilities.
The heart of the CST’s communications capability is found in the Unified Command
System (UCS) vehicle. The UCS provides voice and data connectivity to nearly any system
(HF/VHF/UHF/Satellite) via on-board equipment (Consequence, 2005). Tactical
communications, those within the CST, are accomplished through their organic portable radios
over encrypted radio networks authorized for use by the National Guard (Consequence, 2005, p.
30). The CST team achieves interoperability with local responders by way of the UCS. The
command and operations elements of the CST can communicate with local responders on any
radio network via the UCS Tactical Digital Intercom System (TDIS) (Consequence, 2005, p. 30).
Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Team
USAR teams are a response element under the Department of Homeland Security,
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Their purpose is to fill the Emergency
Support Function (ESF) #9 for Urban Search and Rescue under the Federal Response Plan
(FEMA, 2003). There are 28 USAR task forces throughout the United States (FEMA, 2014). As
part of FEMA, the USAR teams are purely federal, and accessible by state Governors through
the usual Stafford Act channels.
USAR teams generally communicate over UHF in the federal 406-420 MHz band
(FEMA, 2000), though they are equipped and typically have frequencies assigned in the
VHF/FM, HF, and VHF/AM bands (FEMA, 2000, pp. I-5 to I-7). Each task force also has the
ability to communicate on the local government net in their home area (FEMA, 2000, p. I-4).
USAR team communications frequencies are well documented and published, and their usual
SOP is to operate on their own assigned and published frequencies after coordinating with the

local incident command staff. Interoperability under this system is achieved through radio
exchange with the local Incident Commander, as needed (FEMA, 2000, p. I-15).
Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF)
The Marine Corps CBIRF is the nation’s only full-time, active duty (Title 10) military
unit tasked with emergency response. Located 26 miles south of the District of Columbia in
Indian Head, Maryland, CBIRF is a battalion sized Marine Corps unit of about 700 Marines and
Sailors. CBIRF is worldwide deployable, but is mostly intended to support and augment
domestic response capabilities for CBRNE, Hazardous Materials, technical rescue, and other
specialized or large scale events and incidents. The unit maintains two Incident Response Forces
(IRF) at all times, at least one of which is always on a 24-hour recall notice. CBIRF is
accessible to local and state responders through request by the Governor to the President and
Secretary of Defense. i
CBIRF’s communications plan is identical to that of the CST-WMDs previously
discussed. CBIRF communicates internally via organic assets on assigned military frequency
spectrum (United States Marine Corps, 2008, Annex K Appendix 4). CBIRF has two UCS
vehicles, one for each IRF, that deploy with their advanced party and link up with local
responders (United States Marine Corps, 2008, Annex K Appendix 1). Interoperability with
local responders is achieved through the UCS vehicle.
Exercise Evaluations & After Action Reports
Each of the SCIPs looked at call out some use of exercises to practice and evaluate
interoperable communications. Several after action reports were reviewed in an effort to
identify problem areas. They are mostly silent on the subject of interoperable communications.
Since the SCIPs all point towards using the HSEEP evaluation criteria, and interoperable

communications is a “fundamental capability” within the Target Capabilities List (Department
of, 2007), the assumption is that interoperable communications are being exercised and
evaluated, and that no major problems are being identified.
Most after action reports and lessons learned documents do not cover areas where things
went right. Two After Action reports from CBIRF, one from an exercise event in Canada in
2008 (S-3 Training & Operations, 2008) and the other from the Republican National Convention
(RNC) in 2008 (S-3 Training & Operations, 2008), only discuss problem areas and
recommended solutions, although the RNC report mentions the successful use of the USC suite
to transmit a live feed video from a robotics platform back to the Rear Area Operations Center
(RAOC) in Indian Head (S-3 Training & Operations, 2008, p. 11).
An exception is the after action report from North Carolina’s USAR Task Force 10 in
2011 (North Carolina Task, 2011). This report includes a section titled “things that went well,”
and indicates that communications worked well during the mission. The only problems
identified in this report were over tasking of available talk groups by responders, which was
addressed by the USAR team using their own internal communications frequencies until local
communications plans were worked out (North Carolina Task, 2011, pp. 1-2). The report also
points out the length of time it took to program the task force’s cache of equipment with the
correct frequencies for the mission (North Carolina Task, 2011, pp. 2-3).
Another After Action Report that was examined was from the 2012 Radiological
Emergency Preparedness Exercise at the Farley Nuclear Power Plant in Alabama (Fema, 2012).
Farley is located in southeastern Alabama, very near the borders with Georgia and Florida.
Because of its location, this exercise provided a good test for interoperable communications
between multiple counties, as well as the states of Alabama and Georgia (participation with the

State of Florida was not evaluated) (Fema, 2012, p. 8). In fact, objective six of the exercise was
to “demonstrate the effectiveness of…emergency information communications” (Fema, 2012,
pp. 5, 6-10). The report revealed no problems with communications during the exercise. In fact,
the exercise gave all the jurisdictions around the plant an opportunity to practice how they would
receive information from the plant and their own Emergency Operations Centers, and how they
would disseminate that information to both the public and within their own government chain of
authority. It cites effective use of technology at the State Emergency Operation Center for both
Alabama and Georgia because they were able to maintain situational awareness and track
resource requests throughout the exercise (Fema, 2012, p. 13), and Emergency Alert System
(EAS) messages, Prompt Notification System (PNS) activation, and other communications
flowed well from the plant’s EOC to other stakeholders (Fema, 2012, p. 15). The State of
Georgia had an authorized representative of the Governor in Atlanta who approved protective
action decisions during the exercise (Fema, 2012, p. 15), even communicating via video
teleconference with the Early County (Georgia) Emergency Operations Center (Fema, 2012, p.
21). The report repeatedly praises the staff and operators for their familiarity and efficiency with
communications technology, plans, and SOPs.
National Level Exercise (NLE) 2011 had communications as a major objective. NLE
11 was a functional exercise that included and ran concurrently with several local-level full scale
exercises. It involved over 10,000 response “players” at more than 135 sites across the country,
including several Federal departments/agencies, four FEMA regions, and eight states—Alabama,
Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, and Tennessee) (Fema, 2011, p. 7).
NLE 11 occurred from May 16 to 19, and was based on a magnitude 7.7 earthquake occurring
between Marked Tree, Arkansas and Ridgley, Tennessee and another magnitude 6.0 near Mt.

Carmel, Illinois (Fema, 2011, p. 11). As a functional exercise, actual deployment of assets did
not occur for NLE 11, and role play for some entities was notional and performed by the Master
Control Cell (MCC) (Fema, 2011, p. 13), but full-scale exercises around the country were
incorporated into NLE 11, including a USAR exercise at the Muscatatuck Urban Training
Complex in Indiana (Fema, 2011, p. 8).
The NLE 11 report lists five observations regarding communications during the exercise,
three of which were identified at strengths, and the remaining two were identified as “area[s] for
improvement” (Fema, 2011, pp. 16-19). A notable strength was the ability of players to make
use of alternative forms of communication during the periods where the scenario caused
communications failures (Fema, 2011, p. 16). Specifically mentioned in the report was
Arkansas’s use of the Military Auxiliary Radio System (MARS) , which has also been used in
other exercises and events by USAR, CBIRF, and the CST. Another strength was FEMA’s
deployment of Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) teams to eight states, providing
on-site communications support within the first 48 hours of the exercise (Fema, 2011, p. 16).
That the states were able to employ private sector assets to restore and enhance communications
during exercise outages was also viewed as a strength (Fema, 2011, p. 17). A key area for
improvement during NLE 11 was similar to what was reported in the 2011 USAR mission:
prioritization and allocation of communications resources needs to be further explored and
validated (Fema, 2011, p. 18). Where the USAR mission cited troubles identifying and
prioritizing frequencies and talk groups, the NLE 11 report highlights the fact that long-term
outages were not fully tested during the exercise, and that how jurisidications will overcome
outages (particularly power-related) beyond the 72-hour mark should be evaluated because a
known capability gap exists if one considers that wide-spread power outages following an

earthquake stand a good chance of outlasting a jurisdiction’s ability to maintain generator power
for communications equipment (Fema, 2011, p. 18).
Conclusion
Interoperable communications is an important and vital functional area of emergency
management. Increased federal attention on communications has spurred progress towards
reaching the point where responders can readily communicate with each other consistently,
regardless of where they are from or what equipment they have organically. The states and local
governments have taken cues from the federal government and are working to achieve goals that
will ensure communications work when they are needed most. While important, it doesn’t take
much effort to ensure that local responders are able to communicate with each other, since
planning and coordinating with each other ahead of time is not difficult. It takes a little more
work to accomplish the same thing at the state level, but the tools and guidance for establishing
statewide interoperability are available, and the states examined for this report all seem to be
working towards that goal already.
The remaining challenge for establishing fully interoperable communications is with
regional and federal responders who may be called upon to assist with state and local responders.
A close look at the SOPs for those entities, and an analysis of exercise and event documentation
reveals that the interoperability goals established by the federal government are working
effectively in those instances as well. As long as interoperable communications remain a target
capability that is exercised and evaluated regularly, responders across the nation should be able
to accomplish their missions working as a cohesive team.

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State of Maryland. (2008). Maryland Statewide Communications Interoperability Plan (Version
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State of New York. (2014). New York 2014 Statewide Communication Interoperability Plan
[Brochure]. Retrieved April 1, 2015, from http://www.dhses.ny.gov/oiec/plans-policies-
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State of Utah. (2013). Utah Statewide Communication Interoperability Plan [Brochure].
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United States Marine Corps. (2008, Feb). CBIRF Incident Response Force Standard Operating
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i
The author is a former Operations Chief for CBIRF.

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