1. Thomas Glavich
Mary White
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology.
Copyright 2010 California Institute of Technology. Government sponsorship acknowledged.
Used with permission

2. The Moon Mineralogy Mapper is a Discovery
Program Instrument of Opportunity, selected to fly
on Chandrayaan-1, India’s first lunar spacecraft. The
Project presented a variety of challenges ranging
from ITAR issues to interface negotiation, to cultural
differences in the working environment. The
presentation will detail some of the more unusual
challenges encountered in working with the Indian
Space Research Organization, and in achieving a
successful outcome for both NASA and India. The
benefits of a flexible approach to requirements,
interfaces and testing worked well for both parties.

3.  We are going to discuss some of the experiences of
the Moon Mineralogy Mapper Team in working
with the Indian Space Research Organization’s First
Mission to the Moon on Chandrayaan-1
 The entire experience was one of the best and most
enjoyable in our careers, and we would do it again
tomorrow

4.  M3 is a Discovery Program Instrument of
Opportunity
 Visible to near infrared grating spectrometer (~430 to 3000
nm)
 Two imaging modes
 Global (140 m / 10 nm) and Targeted (70 m / 20 to 40 nm)
 M3 flew on Chandrayaan-1
 India’s first Lunar and Deep Space Mission
 M3 Implementation Timeline
 Initial Funding was received in April 2005
 Preliminary Design Review was held August 2005
 Confirmation Review was held in February 2006
 Critical Design Review was held in May 2006
 Pre-Ship Review held in May 2007
 Launch October 2008
 Mission terminated August 2009

5. Global Mode image cube and selected radiance and apparent reflectance
spectra from an M3 data set acquired on the 5 February 2009 that includes
the Apollo 15 landing site near Hadley Rille (26° 26' N, 3° 39' E).

6. • M3 Key Deliveries and Activities
 Engineering Model (Command and Data Interface
Electronics only) delivered and tested against a
spacecraft simulator, November 2006
 M3 delivery and preliminary integration to spacecraft,
August 2007
 Payload Operations Center Replica, July 2008
 Final integration and check-out, August 2008
 Mission Plan
 Nominal mission duration: Four optical periods over
the two year mission
 Actual observations were in two optical periods with more time per
observation than planned
 Instrument was held in Survival mode and transitioned
to Decontamination mode before each optical period

7. • India is a developing nation
• The technical sophistication of the Indian Space
Research Organization is every bit the equal of
NASA’s
• The capabilities of the ISRO Staff Engineers and
technicians are equivalent to NASA Engineers
• Chandrayaan-1
• India’s first mission beyond earth orbit
• First mission involving multiple foreign contributions
• Used India’s new Deep Space Network facility

8. M3 on the Chandrayaan-1 Spacecraft
Single
spherical
24 degree FOV Chandrayaan -1
unobscured F/3.5
mirror Slit TMA Telescope Spacecraft
Grating
640 cross-track
MCT Detector
430 to 3000 nm
OS Filter
Passive Cooler
Optical
Bench
Instrument
PSLV
Assembly Launch
Electronics
Assembly System
Instrument Aperture
Thermal Shield
M3 Instrument

9. Chandrayaan Launch System
• Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV)
• 4 stage core, 6 strap-ons
• First Launch: 1993
• Launch Success: 8/9
• PSLV-XL (6 PSOM-XL improved stretched
strap-ons)
• 3 Qual Tests (1st 12/29/05 successful, 3rd Q
of 2006)
• First use for RISAT
• 3rd use for Chandrayaan
• 1304 kg in 240 km by 24,000 km GTO –like orbit
• 503 kg Chandrayaan dry mass
• 801 kg of propellants

10. CHANDRAYAAN-1
Mission Profile
Lunar Insertion
Manoeuvre
To achieve 100 x 100 km Lunar Polar Orbit.
PSLV to inject 1300 kg in GTO of 240 x 24000 km.
Lunar Orbital mass of 523 kg with 2 year life time.
Lunar Transfer
Scientific payload 55 kg. Final Orbit
Trajectory
100 km Polar
Initial Orbit
~ 1000 km
ETO
GTO
Mid Course Correction Moon at Launch
Trans Lunar
Injection ASTROSAT
Expanding the scientific knowledge about the moon, upgrading India’s technological capability
and providing challenging opportunities for planetary research for the younger generation

11. ISRO Satellite
Centre (ISAC)
Bangalore
Satish Dhawan
Space Centre
Sriharikota

12.  ISRO issued an Announcement of Opportunity for
foreign instruments for the Chandrayaan-1 Mission
 Principal Investigator Carle Pieters of Brown
University teamed with JPL to propose the Moon
Mineralogy Mapper
 The instrument was funded as a Discovery Instrument
of Opportunity

13. • India is on the Designated Country list
• The Indian Space Program is closely tied to ISRO’s
military
• Little to no separation between the Nuclear Weapons
Development activity and the Space Program
• This was changing during the time that M3 was
going through its ITAR process
• Initially ISRO refused to sign the ITAR agreements

14.  The term “Technical Assistance” in the ITAR agreement
was a major choking point for the Indian Government
 They repeatedly pointed out that it was their spacecraft,
and they were helping us, not the other way around
 We had several lengthy discussion sessions with all
levels of ISRO Management on ITAR and its
implementation
 M3 had a requirement to have a signed TAA prior to our
confirmation review, and a confirmation date that was
not changing

15.  Schedule and budget constraints required that we make
progress, even though the TAA was not yet in place
 M3 had been selected last – development schedule
was very constrained
 M3 team had been staffed and the taxi meter was
running
 Chandrayaan-1 schedule was firm
 Developed an “Assumed Requirements” document
 Internal use only
 Contained key requirements
 Based on information obtained from ISRO, but not
verified to be current

16.  The signing of the TAA and our participation in the
Chandrayaan mission was directly tied to US-India
government relations, and in particular the
agreement on Nuclear Energy
 The TAA was signed the day before a final deadline
after repeated intercessions from the State
Department and the US Embassy in New Delhi

17.  ISRO ISAC did not usually develop an ICD between the
spacecraft and each instrument
 Mechanical and electrical interface drawings were used but not a
written document as is common for NASA
 M3 team spent 1 week at ISRO ISAC (Bangalore)
 Four days in conference room creating the document
 Ch-1 Project Director (PD), System Engineers, Subsystem
Leads
 M3 Project Manager, System Engineers, Subsystem Leads,
Export Compliance Officer, D&NF Program Management, two
engineers from MSFC (could communicate more freely having
an MOU in place, while M3 team did not yet have a TAA)
 Fifth day, signed the ICD, with just a few TBD’s

18.  Although both the Ch-1 and M3 teams spoke English,
communication during telecons was challenging
 Acronyms and abbreviations, grammatical and vocabulary
differences
 Telecons started ~9pm for M3 team
 Some of M3 team called in from home, others at JPL
 Pre-telecon email exchange of Agenda in Q& A format
 Typically two cycles by email prior to each telecon
 WebEx during telecon to assist with communication
 Discussions were based on the existing Q&A, then clarifying
information was typed in as it was discussed

19.  Program management in general appears more diffuse in
India than it is in the United States
 It’s certainly harder for us to understand who is in charge of
what, and who holds authority for decisions
 The ground data system was developed independently
of the spacecraft and instrument complement
 Coordination of the two appeared to us to be mostly informal
 The Review process is very different from NASA
 Major project reviews consist of reports by subsystem review
chairs
 Test verification and validation processes are much less formal
and rigorous than NASA

20.  Chandrayaan-1 project did not use Earned Value
 Scheduling was done with Excel and PowerPoint
 The real schedule and all schedule control resided with the
Project Director
 Chandrayaan-1 project did not use schedule tracking software to
manage critical path and near critical path items,
 Their understanding of the critical path came from prior
experience developing similar spacecraft
 The day to day I&T schedule relied on key staff that held
corporate knowledge gained from many previous projects
 Late in development, schedule problems were solved by
eliminating previously planned tests

21. CHANDRAYAAN-1 SCHEDULE (1-AUG-2004 to 31-AUG-2005)
SL
ACTIVITY A S O N D J F M A M J J A
N0
04 04 05 05
1 Configuration Finalisation
2 Configuration Review
3 P/L Review
4 Layout, FOV exercise
5 S/S & S/C level PDR
6 S/C Configuration Doc
21

22. CHANDRAYAAN-1 SCHEDULE ( contd.)
1-SEP-2005 to 30-SEPT-2006
SL S O N D J F M A M J J A S
N0
ACTIVITY
05 05 06 06
1 EID and matching
2 Harness fabrication
3 P/Ls Eng/Ele Model Delivery
4 Data handling Pkg
5 BMU Availability
6 P/L I/F checks
7 Structure & Thermal work
8 Propulsion Integration
9 Thermal work on RCS
10 Electrical wiring
11 Sensors availability
12 Inertial Systems
availability
13 HILS
14 Panels & Thermal work 22

23. AIT SCHEDULE - INTEGRATION TO LAUNCH (11 MONTHS)
1-OCT-2006 to 1-SEPT-2007
SL ACTIV ITY DAY O N D J F M A M J J A S O N
N0 S
1 Bus system Integration 30
2 Bus system open mode 30
IST
3 P/L Integration 27
4 P/L IST
5 Harness anchoring, X-ray, 20 15 5
connector potting, preparation
for closure of panels, quick IST
6 Assembly of all panels 05
7 ASSEMBLED IST, TH-VAC 15
Preparation, Antennae to AIT
8 TH. VAC TEST, SA to 21
AIT
9 Post TH VAC 25
10 DYNAMIC TESTS 14
11 Pre-shipment IST 10
12 ** CUSHION ** 30
13 SHIPMENT 02
14 SP-1 phase 30
15 Fuel filling phase 08
16 Launch Opportunity / pre- 18 23
laun

24.  Spacecraft Development Team
 Most (nearly all) team members have worked together
for many missions
 Know their routines
 Don’t require as much formal planning
 Incremental hardware changes from one mission to
the next
 Spacecraft
 Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV)
 Deep Space Network

25.  Sometimes not clear who was responsible for what
 Job titles might be the same as for JPL, but
responsibilities could be different
 This was most confusing in the realm of systems
engineering, quality assurance, contamination control
 Ch-1 procedures did not carry all detail
 Multiple activities would be carried in one block
 Blocks were not numbered
 A repeated procedure would be done without
reprinting; with new data recorded to the side

26.  Resources that are commonly available at NASA are
sometimes of limited availability at ISRO – due to
cost and security
 Paper, printers, copiers
 Internet access
 Cell phones
 Laptops
 Email – large file size and access from anywhere

27.  M3 team was ultra cautious about everything
 Two people in Bangalore from the start of spacecraft
I&T until 10 weeks post launch
 QA person attended nearly all mechanical and
electrical integration activity
 24/7 coverage from launch through 10 weeks
 M3 thermal engineer was the first to notice anomalous
condition while in transit to the moon

28. M3 with
Protection
M3 Pre-Ship and
Portrait Handling
Device

30. M3

31. ISRO
M3-related raw Telemetry M3 Archive (L0 + L1B Products)
JPL
M3 Data Products
M3 Science Team
PDS @ JPL
L1B Products
Chandrayaan-1
M3 Archive
(L2 Products) L2
H/K TM Science TM
Products
Science Telemetry S/C Navigation data
IGDS @ JPL
interactive validation L1B, L2
SCC, Bangalore Successful Products
Orbit
Acquisition
Reports
IDSN Ground Station
M3-relevant S/C TM
APL Ground Station S/C Navigation (PVAT) data
JPL Ground Station
Science Team (various sites)
H/K TM L1B, L2
Science TM Products
L1B,L2
H/K TM
MOS @ JPL Products
ISSDC, Bangalore
L1B, L2 Products

32.  M3 team generated a draft Operations ICD
 No response from Chandrayaan-1 team
 M3 generated an Operations Understanding document,
unilaterally
 Pre-launch rehearsals were minimal
 Not sure if this is typical
 Relied on person-to-person interface for all M3
operations
 First in person, later by phone, eventually per a script
 Priority for instrument operations was uncertain and
unstable

33.  Instrument operations were very simple
 Few commands
 Reasonably failsafe as far as operator error
 Stationed people in Bangalore for the duration of
spacecraft I&T
 M3 Instrument Operator sat next to the spacecraft
operator for commissioning, and was on phone for
early operations period
 Protection and Handling Device
 Involvement by Principal Investigator with the
spacecraft Project Director
 Insisted on a high quality nitrogen purge

34.  ISRO wanted NASA DSN support
 Increased the opportunities for M3 to downlink
 JPL Navigation support
 raised the JPL presence at ISRO

35.  More thermal margin
 Field of view of the passive cooler
 Though the instrument was sensitive to thermal
input on the Passive Cooler; it became a “solar
collector” and had potential to overheat the focal
plane
 Paid more attention to the planned spacecraft level
test flow, as it is different than ours
 Additional visit to ISRO for mechanical and thermal
interface clarification
 same time the electrical EM was delivered

36. • From the perspectives of ISRO and the M3
Science team, this mission was a great success
• Major discoveries
• M3 has generated lots of data
• Chandrayaan-1 and M3 Discoveries have been
reported in scientific journals as well as popular
media

37. From Science, 23 October 2009, cover. Reprinted with permission from AAAS.

38. • We received an enormous amount of help from too
many people to mention. In particular we would
like to acknowledge,
• Science Mission Directorate
• Tony Carro and the entire SMD staff
• NASA Office of External Affairs
• Discovery and New Frontiers Program Office
• Steve McClard
• JPL Office of Export Compliance
• JPL Management
• M3 Team