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BayThreat
December 6th, 2013

!
Nick Sullivan
@grittygrease

White-box Cryptography
What do you do when they’re in your server room?
My Background
• Systems Engineering at CloudFlare
• Cryptography at Apple
• Threat analysis at Symantec
• M.Sc. in Cryptography
• Undergraduate Pure Mathematics

!2
What this talk is about
• Introduction to white-box cryptography
• Why we need this now more than ever
• Key concepts for implementations
• Steps for the future — with an announcement

!3
Let’s talk about physical access
• If an attacker has physical access, they have everything, right?
• Cold Boot, Evil Maid, Jailbreak, etc.
• It only takes time
!

• Solution: Lock it up!

!4
Let’s talk about physical access
• What about servers?
• Where are modern servers kept?
• Your own data center?
• A “physically secure” co-location facility?
• On a virtual machine in the cloud?
• On a globally-distributed CDN?
• Under which national jurisdiction?

!5
Server Breaches Happen
• How long does it take to get your secrets?
• Reverse engineering skill of attacker
• Diminishing cost to attacker as skills and tools accumulate
!

• Wouldn’t it be great if there was a computational burden placed on the
attacker for every new secret?
• You could rotate your secrets on a fixed schedule

!6
Standard Crypto Model (Black-box)

Alice

Bob
Eve

adversary icons: Sam Small

!7
Side-channel Attacks (Grey-box)

Alice

Bob
Eve
adversary icons: Sam Small

!8
White-box threat model
Eve

Alice

Bob
adversary icons: Sam Small

!9
White-box threat model

Aleve

Bob
adversary icons: Sam Small

!10
White-box Cryptography
• Cryptographic implementations that hide the key from everyone
• Attackers on the wire
• Attackers outside the house
• Attackers inside the house (evil maids included)

!11
White-box cryptography
• Protection against key extraction in the strongest possible threat model
• Secures keys, not data
• White-box attackers no better off than black-box attackers

!12
For Example
• Digital Rights Management
• The key protecting streams from Spotify, Netflix, etc.
• Decryption and consumption of content happens in a controlled way
• The attacker is the consumer “Aleve”

!13
White-box cryptography
• History
• Invented in 2002 by Chow et al.
• Resurgence in academic attention in last two years — breaks, new constructions

• Work in progress
• No perfect white-boxes, only relatively strong ones
• General function obfuscator is not possible (Barak, 2001)
• Ciphers are not proven to be impossible to obfuscate

!14
What does it get you?
• Attackers cannot transform the key into a known form
• Algorithm or code has to be lifted or leveraged

• Prevents BORE (break once run everywhere) attacks
• Can’t plug into standard cryptography libraries
• Nation-state attackers use specialized hardware

• Traitor tracing
• You can rotate keys on a schedule since cost to break is bounded

!15
Which algorithms?
• Symmetric Key Cryptography
• DES
• AES
!

• Public Key Cryptography?
• RSA (maybe?)
• ECC (maybe?)

!16
Example Implementation
• 128-bit AES
• 16 byte key, 16 byte message block

• What about replacing implementation with a lookup table?
• Map from input to output indexed by order
• Lookup table has minimal information about structure of algorithm — black box
• 2^128 possible inputs of size 128bit
• Storage of 5 x 10^27 terabytes — too much

!17
Example Implementation
• AES Internals
• SubBytes — Byte-wise substitution
• ShiftRows — Permutation of bytes
• MixColumns — Linear combination of bytes
• AddRoundKeys — XOR a piece of the key

!18
AES

!19
Example Implementation
• AddRoundKey, SubBytes
• Can be merged into one operation — byte-wise lookup table called a T-box

• MixColumns
• Linear combination — byte-wise lookup table for constants
• Nibble-wise lookup tables for linear factors

• Lots of lookup tables can be combined

!20
Internal Encoding
• Composition of functions

• Chaining random lookup tables

!

!

!

!

!

!

!21
White-box compiler
• Inputs
• White box description
• Random seed
• Key value

4663900

• Output
• Implementation of encryption/decryption for given key

!22
Costs
• Key size — Pre-scheduling causes key inflation
• Memory cost — Large lookup tables
• Performance cost — 5-10x in some cases
• Engineering cost — Integration, other anti-tampering techniques

!23
In the industry
• Mostly licensed for digital rights management — $$$
• Practical breaks (marcan42, Alberto Battistello, Phrack Magazine)
!

• No commercial grade open source implementation
• An affordable solution is needed

!24
Introducing Open WhiteBox

!25
Introducing Open WhiteBox
• Group of individuals working to make white box cryptography accessible to the public
• Open source white box compiler (using LLVM)
• Working towards implementation of best current academic proposals
• Initial focus on server-side applications
!

• Participate in the conversation on Twitter @OpenWhiteBox

!26
Questions?

BayThreat
December 6th, 2013

!
Nick Sullivan
@grittygrease
@OpenWhiteBox

!27

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White-box Cryptography -BayThreat 2013

  • 1. BayThreat December 6th, 2013 ! Nick Sullivan @grittygrease White-box Cryptography What do you do when they’re in your server room?
  • 2. My Background • Systems Engineering at CloudFlare • Cryptography at Apple • Threat analysis at Symantec • M.Sc. in Cryptography • Undergraduate Pure Mathematics !2
  • 3. What this talk is about • Introduction to white-box cryptography • Why we need this now more than ever • Key concepts for implementations • Steps for the future — with an announcement !3
  • 4. Let’s talk about physical access • If an attacker has physical access, they have everything, right? • Cold Boot, Evil Maid, Jailbreak, etc. • It only takes time ! • Solution: Lock it up! !4
  • 5. Let’s talk about physical access • What about servers? • Where are modern servers kept? • Your own data center? • A “physically secure” co-location facility? • On a virtual machine in the cloud? • On a globally-distributed CDN? • Under which national jurisdiction? !5
  • 6. Server Breaches Happen • How long does it take to get your secrets? • Reverse engineering skill of attacker • Diminishing cost to attacker as skills and tools accumulate ! • Wouldn’t it be great if there was a computational burden placed on the attacker for every new secret? • You could rotate your secrets on a fixed schedule !6
  • 7. Standard Crypto Model (Black-box) Alice Bob Eve adversary icons: Sam Small !7
  • 11. White-box Cryptography • Cryptographic implementations that hide the key from everyone • Attackers on the wire • Attackers outside the house • Attackers inside the house (evil maids included) !11
  • 12. White-box cryptography • Protection against key extraction in the strongest possible threat model • Secures keys, not data • White-box attackers no better off than black-box attackers !12
  • 13. For Example • Digital Rights Management • The key protecting streams from Spotify, Netflix, etc. • Decryption and consumption of content happens in a controlled way • The attacker is the consumer “Aleve” !13
  • 14. White-box cryptography • History • Invented in 2002 by Chow et al. • Resurgence in academic attention in last two years — breaks, new constructions • Work in progress • No perfect white-boxes, only relatively strong ones • General function obfuscator is not possible (Barak, 2001) • Ciphers are not proven to be impossible to obfuscate !14
  • 15. What does it get you? • Attackers cannot transform the key into a known form • Algorithm or code has to be lifted or leveraged • Prevents BORE (break once run everywhere) attacks • Can’t plug into standard cryptography libraries • Nation-state attackers use specialized hardware • Traitor tracing • You can rotate keys on a schedule since cost to break is bounded !15
  • 16. Which algorithms? • Symmetric Key Cryptography • DES • AES ! • Public Key Cryptography? • RSA (maybe?) • ECC (maybe?) !16
  • 17. Example Implementation • 128-bit AES • 16 byte key, 16 byte message block • What about replacing implementation with a lookup table? • Map from input to output indexed by order • Lookup table has minimal information about structure of algorithm — black box • 2^128 possible inputs of size 128bit • Storage of 5 x 10^27 terabytes — too much !17
  • 18. Example Implementation • AES Internals • SubBytes — Byte-wise substitution • ShiftRows — Permutation of bytes • MixColumns — Linear combination of bytes • AddRoundKeys — XOR a piece of the key !18
  • 20. Example Implementation • AddRoundKey, SubBytes • Can be merged into one operation — byte-wise lookup table called a T-box • MixColumns • Linear combination — byte-wise lookup table for constants • Nibble-wise lookup tables for linear factors • Lots of lookup tables can be combined !20
  • 21. Internal Encoding • Composition of functions • Chaining random lookup tables ! ! ! ! ! ! !21
  • 22. White-box compiler • Inputs • White box description • Random seed • Key value 4663900 • Output • Implementation of encryption/decryption for given key !22
  • 23. Costs • Key size — Pre-scheduling causes key inflation • Memory cost — Large lookup tables • Performance cost — 5-10x in some cases • Engineering cost — Integration, other anti-tampering techniques !23
  • 24. In the industry • Mostly licensed for digital rights management — $$$ • Practical breaks (marcan42, Alberto Battistello, Phrack Magazine) ! • No commercial grade open source implementation • An affordable solution is needed !24
  • 26. Introducing Open WhiteBox • Group of individuals working to make white box cryptography accessible to the public • Open source white box compiler (using LLVM) • Working towards implementation of best current academic proposals • Initial focus on server-side applications ! • Participate in the conversation on Twitter @OpenWhiteBox !26
  • 27. Questions? BayThreat December 6th, 2013 ! Nick Sullivan @grittygrease @OpenWhiteBox !27