Is F-22 Raptor reall

1. F22 analysis

2. Mismanagement
● Costs grew, orders were reduced:
– 1986 – 750 planes
– 1991 – 648
– 1993 – 442
– 1997 – 339
– 2003 – 279
– 2005 – 178

3. Mismanagement
● Lt Gen Daniel Darnell estimated that USAF will be
short of it 2250 fighters requirement by 800
aircraft in 2024
● “fly before you buy” policy abandoned – bugs
discovered and hastily patched up during
production – or not patched up at all

4. Costs
● In 2011, F22s flyaway cost 250 million USD
● Unit procurement cost 411 million USD
● Operating cost – 61 000 USD per hour
● F15C flyaway cost 100 million USD, operating cost
30 000 USD per hour
● F16 flyaway cost 60 million USD, operating cost 5
000 USD per hour
● F22 electronics not federated – upgrade requres
replacement of entire electronics suite

5. F22 numbers
● Too few – more stress on single airframe, degrades
faster, more maintenance required, impact on
training
● Only 50 planes avaliable for Pacific theatre, 50 for
European theatre, 80 for home defense –
insignificant numbers in any possible war against
China
● Only 130 F22s are combat-coded
● In 2009, unit avaliability 60%
● 180 F22s bought can generate 60 combat sorties /
day – F16s bought for same cost – 1480 sorties

6. 1000
F16
900
F16
800
700
600
500 F15 F15 F15
F16
F22
400
300
200 F22
F22
100
0
Number Total sorties
Number of planes Number of sorties flown
For same cost

7. Effects of training
● US commander in Gulf War: “Had we exchanged
equipment with the enemy, result would have
been same.”
● In '70s and '80s, instructors in F5s whipped
studensts who flew F14, F15 and F4

8. BVR vs WVR combat
● BVR (beyond visual range) combat cannot be relied
on
– Low probability of kill – between 7 and 8 %
– Iraqi and Serbian planes had no ECM or radar; did
not manouver
– Forces turn off radar and IFF to avoid being tracked
● WVR combat
– Probability of kill 15% for IR missiles, 31% for gun
– Allows visual identification of target

9. Effects of numbers
● Lanchester square criteria
– Per-unit combat effectiveness of outnumbered side
must be square of outnumbering side's numerical
advantage just for outnumbered side to break even
– In WW2, USAF had quantitative advantage; in both
Gulf wars and in Operation Allied Force, USAF
had both qualitative and quantitative edge

10. F22s shortcomings
● 26 % increase in weight lead to thrust-to-weight
ratio and wing loading inferior to that of F15C;
promised increase in manouverability not
achieved
● Fuel fraction decreased from 0,36 to 0,28 –
insufficient persistence
● Supersonic cruise ability worse than that of F15
● Very large – very visible in visual, infrared and
acoustic spectrum
● Radar can be sensed by advanced RWRs –
imprudent to rely on it as main battlefield sensor

11. F22 shortcomings
● No passive sensors that can detect non-radiating
enemy fighter
● Weapons held in bays / covered by doors due to
stealth requrements – unable to perform quick
shots

12. Anti-stealth
● UHF radars display continual increase in capacities
● Long wavelength (VHF) radar can easily detect any
stealth fighter due to their dimensions creating
resonance; stealth coatings ineffective for reasons
of physics
● IRST – can detect fighters from distances of 50+
km; missile launch can be detected from 90 km
● Passive radar – forces VLO fighter to rely on IRST
or risk being detected by using its own radar

13. Anti-stealth
● LIDAR – Light Detection And Ranging – can
detect particles from exhaust at distance of
beyond 100 km
● Background scanning – stealth fighter shows as a
hole in data in front of background being scanned
● Multistatic radar – emitter and receiver not in same
place
● Over-the-horizon radar

14. Anti-stealth
● Acoustic detection
● LPI radar uses narrow spread of frequencies; can be
detected by spread-spectrum RWR

15. Exercises
● Exercises featuring F22 with F15s have been set-up
to play on F22s strengths – F22s always Blue
force; Red force not allowed to use radar
detectors, IRST, anti-radiation missiles; BVR
missiles assigned wishfully high probability of
kill

16. Link to full article
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