Counter Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia: How Effective Are They? by Rommel C. Banlaoi

Yuchengco Center – De La Salle University-Manila

Counter Terrorism Measures
in Southeast Asia:
How Effective Are They?

Rommel C. Banlaoi

Yuchengco Center
De La Salle University
Manila
i

Counter Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia: How Effective Are They?

© Copyright 2009

by the Yuchengco Center

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ii


TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures …………………………………………….….………………… iv

List of Tables …………………………………………….…..………………… v

List of Acronyms …………………………...…………….…..……………… vi

Acknowledgement …………………………………………....……………… xi

Foreword …………………………………………………….………………… xiii

Abstract ………………………………………………………………………… xix

Introduction …………………………………….……….……………………… 1

Chapter I: Conceptualizing Terrorism in Southeast Asia:
Definition, Evolution and Causes ………………………..……………… 5

Chapter II: Terrorist Groups in Southeast Asia and
Modes of Operation ……………….………………….….…....………… 31

Chapter III: Impact of Terrorism on Socio-Economic
Development in the Region ………………...……….………………… 67

Chapter IV: National Responses to Terrorism ……………...…… 73

Chapter V: Regional Cooperation to Counter Terrorism…....… 89

Chapter VI: Support of Major Powers to
Counter Terrorism in Southeast Asia …………………..…….…..… 95

Chapter VII: The Future of Terrorism in
Southeast Asia ……………………………………………………………… 109

Summary and Conclusion …………………………...….…….……… 111

Bibliography ……………………………………………..…...…………… 113

Appendix:
ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism……………….……… 135

About the Author…………..………………………..…...…..………… 149
iii


List of Figures

Figure 1. Number of Published Books with
“Terrorism” in Their Title ………………..……………………………… 7

Figure 2. Mantiqi Structure of Jemaah Islamiyah ……………… 34

Figure 3. Organizational Structure of
Jemaah Islamiyah ……......……………………………………………… 35

Figure 4. Two Major Factions of Jemaah
Islamiyah ……………………………………………………………………… 36

Figure 5. Dream Map of Daulah Islamiya
Nusantara ………………………………………..…….…...……………… 37

Figure 6. ASG Organization Envisioned by
Abdurajak Janjalani ………………………………………...….………… 50

Figure 7. Strength of the ASG, 2000-2008 …………………….… 52

Figure 8. ASG Current Organizational
Structure ……………………………………………………...……………… 53

Figure 9. ASG Cellular-Type Organizational
Structure ………………………………………………..……..…………… 54

Figure 10. ASG – Al-Qaeda Link Through
Transnational Islamic Organizations ……………………...…...… 59

Figure 11. Philippines’ Most Wanted
Terrorists ………………………………………………….......…………… 82

iv


List of Tables

Table 1. UN Conventions’ Response to Various
Criminal Acts of Terrorism in Southeast Asia …………..…….…… 11

Table 2. Four Class Divisions of Terrorism in
Southeast Asia………………………………………………....…………… 18

Table 3. JI Regional Partners and Linkages in
Southeast Asia………………………………………………………………… 21

Table 4. Major ASEAN Declarations and Conventions
Against Terrorism After 9/11 …………………………….…..………… 26

Table 5. Australia’s Counter Terrorism Capacity
Building Initiatives in Southeast Asia………………………………… 97

Table 6. Areas and Scope of ASEAN-India
Counter Terrorism Cooperation ………………………….….……… 98

Table 7. Areas of Cooperation in ASEAN-Canada
Joint Declaration for Cooperation to
Combat International Terrorism……………………………….….... 99

Table 8. Japan’s Counter Terrorism Support
to Southeast Asia ………………………………..……………….…..… 103

v


List of Acronyms

ACCT ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism
ADB Asian Development Bank
ADMM ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting
AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines
AHAI Al Harakatul Al Islamiyyah
AMLO Anti-Money Laundering Office
AMMTC ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational
Crime
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM Asia-Europe Meeting
ASG Abu Sayyaf Group
ATA Anti-Terrorism Assistance
ATC Anti-Terrorism Council
ATTF Anti-Terrorism Task Force
BCTP Bali Counter Terrorism Process
BI Balik Islam
CATR Council for Asian Terrorism Research
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CGCC Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation
CIDG Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
CITOC Counter International Terrorist Operations
Center
COCIS Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal
Security
COCIT Committee of Counter-International Terrorism
CPP Communist Party of the Philippines
CRS Congressional Research Service

vi


CSTPV Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political
Violence
CTCB Counter Terrorism Capacity Building
CTFP Counter Terrorism Fellowship Program
DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DI Darul Islam
DIN Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara
DJACT Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism
DND Department of National Defense
DOD Department of Defense
EG Executive Group
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FMF Foreign Military Financing
FMS Foreign Military Sales
FRTFSI Fund for Regional Trade and Financial Security
Initiative
FSDMF Fi-Sabilillah Da’wah and Media Foundation
FTO Foreign Terrorist Organization
GWOT Global War on Terrorism
ICC International Criminal Court
ICG International Crisis Group
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP Internally Displaced Persons
IEC Islamic Executive Council
IED Improvised Explosive Device
IIRO International Islamic Relief Organization
ILEA International Law Enforcement Academy
IMET International Military Education and Training
ISCAG Islamic Studies, Call and Guidance
vii


ISD Internal Security Department
JCTC Joint Counter Terrorism Centre
JI Jemaah Islamiyah
KMM Kampulan Mujahidin Malaysia
MALSINDO Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia
MBG Misuari Breakaway Group
MCFF Mujahideed Commando Freedom Fighters
MDT Mutual Defense Treaty
MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MMI Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia
MNLF Moro National Liberation Front
M1 First Mantiqi
M2 Second Mantiqi
M3 Third Mantiqi
M4 Fourth Mantiqi
NACTAG National Counter Terrorism Action Group
NADR Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and
Related Activities
NATCG National Anti-Terrorism Coordination Group
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDF National Democratic Front
NICA National Intelligence Coordinating Agency
NII Negara Islam Indonesia
NISP National Internal Security Plan
NPA New Peoples’ Army
OMA Office of Muslim Affairs
PAS Islamic Party of Malaysia
PIPVTR Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and
Terrorism Research
PISCES Personal Identification Secure Comparison and
Evaluation System
viii


PNP Philippine National Police
PUPJI Pedoman Umum Perjuangan-Al-Jama-ah Al-
Islamiya (The General Guide for the Struggle of
Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah)
ReCAAP Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating
Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia
RM Rabitatul Mujahidin
RSIM Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement
RSM Rajah Solaiman Movement
SEACAT Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism
SEARCCT Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter
Terrorism
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission
SOMTC Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crimes
UN United Nations
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSC United Nations Security Council
US United States
WOG Whole-of-Government

ix


x


ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

In writing this work, I am extremely grateful to
Yuchengco Center, particularly Dr. Trinidad Osteria, for the
research grant. Without the generous support of Yuchengco
Center, this work could not have been accomplished. I am also
deeply appreciative of the friendship and encouragement of Dr.
Rizal “Rollie” Buendia for opening my doors to the Yuchengco
Center.

I sincerely thank my colleagues at the Council for Asian
Terrorism Research (CATR), particularly RADM Richard
Porterfield, Dr. Caroline Ziemke and Dr. Katy Oh Hassig, for
putting me in the loop of terrorism scholars in the Asia Pacific. In
CATR, I always enjoy the company of Hekmat Karzai, Praveen
Swami and Ranga Kalansooriya. I also convey my sincerest
respect to Ambassador Hussin Nayan, the founding head of the
Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter Terrorism
(SEARCCT), and Major General Alexander P. Aquirre, Chairman
of the Strategic and Integrative Studies Center where I had a
pleasure of working as Executive Director. I acknowledge Dr.
Andrew Tan, Dr. Peter Chalk, Dr. Carl Ungerer, Dr. Rohan
Gunaratna, Dr. Kumar Ramakrishna, Dr. Kit Collier, Dr. Carlyle
Thayer, Prof. Peter Anderson and Prof. Clive Williams for a very
valuable intellectual exchange on terrorist threats in Southeast
Asia.

At the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and
Terrorism Research (PIPVTR), the following colleagues are
extremely helpful: “Boogie” Mendoza, “Bert” Ferro, Noor Muog,
Billy Rodriguez and Diane Mendoza. From the military and police
sector, I thank General Arturo Lomibao, General Juancho
Sabban, General Nelson Allaga, General Ben Dolorfino, Col. Greg
Catapang, Col. Dan Lucero, Col. Caloy Quita and Col. Ben
Basiao. From the media, I thank Maria Ressa and Marites Vitug.
From the Philippine academe, I thank Dr. Clarita Carlos, Dr.
Renato de Castro and Prof. Raymond Quilop.

xi


Most importantly, I owe enormous debt to my wife,
Grace, who always bears with me every time I write my piece. I
deeply thank her for the patience and understanding. I also
thank my two children, Zed and Zoe, for the reality check – that
beyond books and papers, there are two growing human beings
needing my greater attention.

xii


FOREWORD

Examining the effectiveness of counter terrorism
measures in Southeast Asia is indeed a daunting task on two
grounds. First, the definition of the term “terrorism” is in itself
controversial and contested because it is used by states to
delegitimize political or foreign opponents and potentially
legitimize the state's own use of terror against them. John
Whitbeck, writing in the International Herald Tribune in 2004,1
says that virtually every recognized state confronting an
insurgency or separatist movement has eagerly jumped on the
“war on terrorism” bandwagon, branding its domestic opponents
– if it had not already done so – “terrorists.” On the other hand,
“terrorism” can also be seen as the only means available to the
poor and repressed of the world to defend themselves against
the overwhelming strength of their oppressors. The ambiguity in
the term makes it hard to delineate the line that separates a
terrorist act from an act that advances lawful dissent within the
purview of defending democratic socio-economic, political and
cultural rights and freedoms.

The conceptual and syntactical difficulty of the term led
to the development of alternative concepts with more positive
connotation, such as national liberation movements, resistance
movements, freedom fighters, and others to describe and
characterize the activities of terrorist organizations. By resorting
to such tendentious nomenclatures such as “peoples’
movements,” some terrorist organizations and their supporters
gloss over the realities of terrorism, establishing their activities
on more positive and legitimate foundations. Moreover, terms
not opposed to the basic values of liberal democracies, like
“peoples’ revolutionary violence,” “national liberation,” etc., carry
very few negative connotations than “terrorism.”

1
John V. Whitbeck, “A world ensnared by a word,” International Herald Tribune, 18
February, 2004.
xiii


Second, Southeast Asia is one of the most
heterogeneous regions in the world. Although it is generally
referred to as a region, the principal basis for this designation is
the geographic propinquity of its component states and the fact
that collectively, they occupy the territory between China and
the Indian subcontinent. The fundamental strata of the
traditional cultures of nearly all the peoples of Southeast Asia set
them apart from those of India and China. The range of
contemporary political systems in Southeast Asia is strikingly
varied encompassing a spectrum as broad as the differing
cultures and divergent historical conditionings that have
profoundly influenced their character.

Given the complexity of terms and concepts and the
intricacy of Southeast Asia, voluminous studies and researches
have been undertaken to unravel the complexity of the issues as
well as provide answers to the continuing questions haunting
academic circles and policymakers concerned with security and
conflict studies. Hence, an attempt to study the effectivity of
counter terrorism measures in the region, as this research has
done, is a challenging undertaking.

Professor Rommel Banlaoi’s efforts to examine terrorism
as a concept, analyze terrorist groups in the region, assess the
responses to terrorism of states (at least by the five founding
members of ASEAN), gauge the regional cooperation to counter
terrorism, investigate the support of major powers against
terrorism in the region, and explore the future of terrorism in
Southeast Asia is an audacious task to intelligently comprehend
the intricacies of terrorism in the region and variations of policies
against terrorism of countries which are heavily influenced by
their own domestic politics. The study does not only serve the
scholarly interests of the academic sector but also the pragmatic
concerns of the policymakers of states both in the region and
the world.

Definitely, this volume is a significant contribution to the
literature on a range of research areas apart from terrorism and
Southeast Asia. This includes the themes of regional
cooperation, non-traditional security, conflict management and
peace building, comparative politics, international relations, and
policy research, to mention a few.

xiv


Finally, the study reflects and advances the Yuchengco
Center’s foremost objective of contributing to public knowledge
and awareness of a topic that is extremely important and
relevant to states of the region, and to academics and policy
scientists. The Yuchengco Center as a regional think tank has
enhanced its leadership in policy research and advocacy through
this excellent piece of scholarly work of Professor Banlaoi.

Rizal G. Buendia, Ph.D.
London, United Kingdom
July, 2009

xv


xvi


The ink of the scholar is worth more than the blood of a martyr.
-the Prophet Muhammad

The pen is mightier than the sword.
-Jose Rizal

xvii


xviii


ABSTRACT

When the United States declared the global war against
terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks,
Southeast Asia was named the “second front,” next to
Afghanistan. The presence of Al-Qaeda linked and inspired
terrorist groups in the region, notably the Jemaah Islamiyyah
(JI) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), considered Southeast Asia
as one of the world’s epicenters of terrorism studies and counter
terrorism operations. Since 9/11, the region has seen the
implementation of various counter terrorism measures at the
national, bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. These
measures resulted in the arrest, neutralization and even killings
of key terrorist personalities in Southeast Asia. Some were
convinced to disengage from the use of political violence and
leave terrorism behind. Yet, terrorist threats continue to loom
large in the security agenda of Southeast Asian states as
surviving elements of JI and AS are still planning to and
wreaking terrorist havocs. While many leaders have been killed
in battle, executed, imprisoned or convinced to leave terrorism
behind, there are still younger members willing to take the place
of their predecessors. This is attributed to the fact that the
ideology of Al-Qaedaism that informs the actions of terrorist
groups in Southeast Asia remains alive. Moreover, terrorism in
Southeast Asia has long standing underlying ideological origins
that require comprehensive and more nuanced counter terrorism
measures.

xix


xx


Counter Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia:
How Effective Are They?

Rommel C. Banlaoi

INTRODUCTION

When the United States decisively launched the Global
War on Terrorism (GWOT) following the gruesome September
11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks on American soil, Southeast
Asia quickly received the controversial label of being the GWOT’s
“second front.”1 The presence of Indonesian-founded Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI) in the archipelagic Southeast Asia with the
avowed mission to build a region-wide Islamic Caliphate and the
reported existence of Al-Qaeda linked and Al-Qaeda inspired
terrorist groups in Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand have convinced the security officials in Washington that
the battleground against international terrorism next to
Afghanistan is inevitably Southeast Asia. Counter terrorism
measures in the region, therefore, were subsumed under this
“second front” military doctrine making Southeast Asia one of
the epicenters of terrorism studies and counter terrorism
operations in the world.

However, the idea of Southeast Asia as the “second
front” in the fight against terrorism has been strongly contested
by some scholars and analysts studying terrorist threats in the
region beyond the hawkish and alarmist prism of 9/11.2 While
the “second front” discourse triggered the significant flow of
international counter terrorism assistance to Southeast Asia, it
also led to some counter terrorism measures that were
challenged globally, regionally and domestically. This present
study is an attempt to take stock of almost a decade of counter
terrorism measures in Southeast Asia after 9/11 and to critically

1
The idea of Southeast Asia as a “second front” in the global campaign against terrorism
was first articulated in John Gershman, “Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?” Foreign
Affairs (July/August, 2002).
2
For a more scholarly analysis, see Andrew T.H. Tan, “Southeast Asia as the Second
Front in the War Against Terrorism: Evaluating the Threat and Responses,” Terrorism
and Political Violence, vol. 15, no. 2 (Summer, 2003), pp. 112-138. For a more recent
analysis of the issue, see Amitav Acharya and Arabinda Acharya, “The Myth of the
Second Front: Localizing the War on Terror in Southeast Asia,” The Washington
Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 4 (Autumn, 2007), pp. 75-90.


examine how effective these measures are in overcoming the
virulent terrorist threats that have been confronting the region.

This study is divided into seven chapters. Chapter I is
conceptual and theoretical as it discusses some definitional
issues surrounding terrorism discourse in Southeast Asia and
elsewhere in the world. It describes the evolution of terrorism in
the region and maps some known terrorist cells operating in the
area. This chapter also briefly examines the various
manifestations of terrorism in Southeast Asia and describes how
they have changed overtime with the intention of analyzing the
multidimensional causes of terrorism in the region.

Chapter II identifies some terrorist groups and their
modes of operation in Southeast Asia. It features some country
case studies of selected groups accused of terrorism in
Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore focusing on their
evolution, organizational structure, political and ideological
adherence, links with foreign terrorist organizations, their main
activities and targets of operations. This chapter only discusses
terrorist organizations associated with Islamic extremism.
Terrorist organizations like communist parties and non-Islamic
insurgent groups are beyond the scope of this study.

Chapter III examines the impact of terrorism on socio-
economic development of the region. It focuses on the impacts
of terrorism on tourism, foreign investment and human security
such as health, education, social welfare and displacements of
persons. This chapter also describes the military costs associated
with the fight against terrorism.

Chapter IV is more country-specific as it discusses the
national response against terrorist threats in Southeast Asia.
Three countries are selected for this part of the study:
Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore.

Chapter V moves from country study to regional analysis
by examining regional cooperation to counter terrorism in
Southeast Asia. It assesses the state of regional cooperation
against terrorism, the level of coordination to address the
international menace and the quantity and quality of
international assistance and support, particularly in the area of
intelligence sharing and cross border collaboration.

2


Chapter VI examines the role of extra-regional powers in
counter terrorism in Southeast Asia. It focuses on the role of
Australia, China, India, Japan and US in the fight against
international terrorism in the region.

Chapter VII analyzes the future of international terrorism
in Southeast Asia. It attempts to describe the configuration of
terrorism in Southeast Asia in the coming years and to address
how regional cooperation can be effectively forged to maximize
the effects of counter terrorism in Southeast Asia.

3


4


CHAPTER I

CONCEPTUALIZING TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:
DEFINITION, EVOLUTION AND CAUSES

What is Terrorism in the Region’s Context?

Though terrorism has been a problem of the humanity
since the dawn of recorded history, it is regrettable that until
now, there has been no clear-cut definition of the concept.3 It is
said that the word terrorism originated after the French
Revolution of 1789. It was first used during the “Reign of Terror”
between 1793 and 1794. Yet, there has been no clarity on the
meaning of terrorism. The US-based Terrorism Research Center
laments that terrorism “by nature is difficult to define.”4 Even the
Scotland-based Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political
Violence (CSTPV) underscores the enormous dilemma in coming
out with an iron-clad definition of terrorism.5 The Center on
Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC), an independent
think-tank founded by members of the United Nations (UN),
recognizes the arduousness of defining the term terrorism.6 The
Council for Asian Terrorism Research (CATR), the largest
network of terrorism think-tanks in the Asia Pacific, also admits
the difficulty of coming out with a precise definition of terrorism.

As early as 1937, the defunct League of Nations
attempted to define terrorism as “all criminal acts directed
against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of
terror in the minds of particular persons or groups of persons or
the general public.”7 However, this definition failed to get wider

3
Gus Martin, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives and Issues (London
and California: Sage Publications, Inc., 2003), pp. 1-10.
4
Terrorism Research Center at http://www.terrorism.com/.
5
Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at http://www.st-
andrews.ac.uk/~wwwir/research/cstpv/index.php.
6
Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation at http://www.globalct.org.
7
Quoted in Carlyle A. Thayer, “Political Terrorism and Militant Islam in Southeast
Asia,” (Paper delivered at a Forum on Regional Security and Political Developments
organized by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies at Grand Copthorne Water Front
Hotel, Singapore on 24 July, 2003), p. 6.

5


acceptance because of divergent national perspectives on the
threat of terrorism.

In the mid-1980s, scholars listed a total of 109
definitions of terrorism with 22 different definitional
characteristics. These definitions continue to be debated upon.8
In the mid-1990s, another scholar counted more than 100
definitions of terrorism but the search for a commonly accepted
definition goes on.9 In 1999, the United Nations drafted a
definition of terrorism but it also failed to reach global consensus
because of different domestic considerations among member
nations, particularly in the developing world.

In the aftermath of 9/11, the definitional problem of
terrorism continues to haunt scholars, experts and policymakers.
This situation continues to make many counter terrorism
measures not only problematic but also contested. An internet
search of the phrase “definition of terrorism” yielded 6,630,000
results for Google while 25,400,000 result for Yahoo as of this
writing. Even the term “terrorism” alone revealed 261,000,000
results for Yahoo while 49,100,000 results for Google. Using
Google Book search results in 118,431 publications written on
terrorism to date. One study shows that since 9/11, there has
been a drastic increase in the number of published books with
terrorism in their title.10 (Figure 1) This clearly indicates the
overwhelming interests of readers and publishers on the topic of
terrorism.

8
Alex P. Schmid, Albert J. Jongman, et al., Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors,
Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature (New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction Books, 1988), pp. 5-6.
9
Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 6.
10
Dipak K. Gupta, “Toward an Integrated Behavioral Framework for Analyzing
Terrorism: Individual Motivations to Group Dynamics,” Democracy and Security, vol.
1, no. 1 (January-July, 2005), p. 5.

6


Figure 1
Number of Published Books with “Terrorism” in Their
Title

Source: Dipak K. Gupta, “Toward an Integrated Behavioral Framework for Analyzing
Terrorism: Individual Motivations to Group Dynamics,” Democracy and Security, vol. 1,
no. 1 (January-July, 2005), p. 6.

Among the many publications on the topic, the most
widely-cited definition of terrorism is the one provided in 1983
by the US Department of State. It says that the term “terrorism”
means “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or
clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”11
Yet, this definition is being contested because it eschews the
state and its apparatuses in the definition considering that there
are studies focusing on state terrorism and state-sponsored
terrorism.12

11
See United States Department of States, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003
(Washington, DC: US Department of State, 2003), p. xii.
12
See for example Tal Becker, Terrorism and the State: Rethinking the Rules of State
Responsibility (New York: Hart Publishing, 2006) and Mark Selden, Alvin Y. So, War
and State Terrorism: The United States, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific in the Long
Twentieth Century (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).

7


There is no doubt, however, that terrorism is presently a
highly pejorative term - it is something what “bad guys do.”13

Post-9/11 terrorism scholars strongly acknowledge the
changing face of terrorism14 by differentiating new from old
terrorism.15 Whether old or new terrorism, there has been “no
authoritative systematic guide to terrorism, no Clausewitz, not
even a Jomini – and perhaps there never will be one simply
because there is not one terrorism but a variety of terrorisms
and what is true for one does not necessarily apply to others.”16
Thus, the worn-out saying, “a one person’s terrorist is the other
one’s freedom fighter” still catches scholarly attention.

One thing in common among many scholars is the view
that terrorism is fundamentally a violent act.17 Terrorism is a
politically motivated form of violence used by both non-state and
state players.

Conceptually, acts of terrorism are special kinds of
violence compared to military activities or guerilla wars.18
Military activities, guerilla wars and terrorist acts are also forms
of political violence but they can be distinguished in the following
words:

Military activity was bound by conventions entailing moral
distinctions between belligerents and neutrals, combatants
and non-combatants, appropriate and inappropriate targets,
legitimate and illegitimate methods;

13
Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Terrorist Threat
(London: John Murray Publishers, 2006), p. 19.
14
Rohan Gunaratna (ed), The Changing Face of Terrorism (Singapore: Marshall
Cavendish International, 2004).
15
Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna (eds), The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends and
Counter-Strategies (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International, 2002). Also see Ian O.
Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanimi, Countering
the New Terrorism (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1999).
16
Walter Laqueur, No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (New York
and London: The Continuum International Publishing Group, Inc., 2003), p. 8.
17
Cindy C. Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, Second Edition (New Jersey:
Prentice Hall, 2000), p. 8.
18
Alex P. Schmidt, “Frameworks for Conceptualizing Terrorism,” Terrorism and
Political Violence, vol. 16, no. 2 (Summer, 2004), p. 203.

8


Guerilla war was a special kind of military activity, in which
hit-and-disappear tactics to disperse the enemy’s military
forces were employed to wear down and gradually defeat
the enemy; and
The traditional distinguishing characteristic of the terrorist
was his explicit refusal to accept the conventional moral
limits that defined military and guerilla action. Because a
terrorist knew that others did think that violence should be
limited, he exploited the enemy’s vigorous responses to his
outrages. The terrorist perpetrated atrocities and
manipulated reactions to them.19

Despite these distinctions, there are still many
challenges conceptualizing terrorism20 because the term “had
appeared in so many forms and under so many different
circumstances that a comprehensive definition was impossible.”21
The meaning and the usage of the word terrorism have, in fact,
changed over time that making a consistent definition has
proved increasingly elusive.22

Southeast Asia is not immune to the definitional problem
of terrorism. Immediately after 9/11, members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed on 5
November, 2001 the Declaration on Joint Action to Counter
Terrorism (DJACT). However, this Declaration does not provide
any clear definition of terrorism other than stating that terrorism
is a “direct challenge to the attainment of peace, progress and
prosperity of ASEAN.”23 There was even a deliberate attempt on
the part of ASEAN not to provide a definition of terrorism
because of the presence of Muslim communities in the region

19
Ibid., p. 205. Also see David Rapoport, “The Politics of Atrocity” in Yonah Alexander
and Seymour Maxwell Finger (eds), Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (New
York: John Jay Press, 1977), p. 47.
20
Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler, “The Challenges of
Conceptualizing Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 16, no. 4 (Winter,
2004), pp. 777-794.
21
Ibid, p. 777. Also see Walter Laquer, Terrorism (Boston: Little Brown, 1977), p. 5.
22
Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 28.
23
For more discussions, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia
(Quezon City: Rex Book Store International, 2004), pp. 9-16.

9


that might perceive any definition as anti-Islamic in the context
of the emergence of militant Islam in Southeast Asia.24
Nonetheless, the Agreement on Information Exchange and
Establishment of Communication Procedures initially signed by
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines (The Trilateral
Agreement) on 7 May, 2002 attempts to define terrorism as:

Any act of violence or threat thereof perpetrated
to carry out within the respective territories of the
Parties or in the border area of any of the Parties
an individual or collective criminal plan with the
aim of terrorizing people of threatening to harm
them or imperiling their lives, honor, freedoms,
security or rights or exposing the environment or
any facility or public or private property to hazards
or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a
national resource, or international facilities, or
threatening the stability, territorial integrity,
political unity or sovereignty of independent
States.25

Based on DJACT, the Trilateral Agreement and other
ASEAN declarations related to terrorism, ASEAN reached a
milestone in regional counter terrorism when members signed
the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (ACCT) on 13
January, 2007. The ACCT provides a definition based on various
UN conventions that criminalize acts of terrorism. (Table 1)
However, the ACCT is being criticized because ASEAN does not
have yet the necessary institutions needed to enforce the
Convention.26

24
See Barry Desker, “Islam and Society in Southeast Asia After September 11,” IDSS
Working Paper Series, no. 3 (September, 2002); Willem van der Geest, ed., “Mapping
Muslim Politics in Southeast Asia After September 11,” The European Institute for Asian
Studies Publications, vol. 2, no. 5 (December, 2002); and Harold Crouch, Ahmad Fauzi
Abdul Hamid, Carmen A. Abubakar and Yang Razali Kassim, “Islam in Southeast Asia:
Analyzing Recent Developments,” ISEAS Working Paper Series, no. 1 (January, 2002).
25
Cited in Ibid., p. 9.
26
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, “Analysis:
ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism” (31 January, 2006) at
www.pvtr.org/pdf/Legislative%20Response/ASEAN%20Convention%20on%20Counter%
20Terrorism.

10


Table 1
UN Conventions’ Response to Various Criminal Acts of
Terrorism in Southeast Asia
a. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation, concluded at Montreal on 23
September, 1971;
b. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic
Agents, adopted in New York on 14 December, 1973;
c. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages,
adopted in New York on 17 December, 1979;
d. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,
adopted in Vienna on 26 October, 1979;
e. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at
Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 24 February,
1988;
f. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at Rome on 10 March,
1988;
g. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf,
done at Rome on 10 March, 1988;
h. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings, adopted in New York on 15 December, 1997;
i. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism, adopted in New York on 9 December, 1999;
j. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism, adopted in New York on 13 April, 2005;
k. Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material, done at Vienna on 8 July, 2005;
l. Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done
at London on 14 October, 2005; and
m. Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the
Continental Shelf, done at London on 14 October, 2005.

Source: “Article II,” ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism, 2007.

11


Though ASEAN members already adopted a legal
definition of terrorism as articulated in the ASEAN Convention,
the scholarly community has little consensus on the definition of
terrorism in the region. In Southeast Asia, terrorism has always
been associated with domestic armed rebellions and local
insurgencies with known deep historical, political, social and
economic roots.27 Thus, a “more complete understanding of the
terrorism phenomenon therefore requires the examination of
terrorism from a more holistic and even historical perspective, in
order to arrive at a more in-depth understanding of the
complexities of this historical phenomenon, particularly the
fundamental motivations or grievances that underlie the use of
terrorism.”28 As such, terrorism in Southeast Asia “cannot be
viewed in narrow definitional terms nor is it amenable to a set of
generalizations, and hence narrow prescriptive
countermeasures.”29

How and Where Did Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia
Evolve?

Terrorism in Southeast Asia predated the seminal events
of 9/11. The region has confronted several local armed
rebellions, which used terrorism as a favored tactic. Most of
these armed rebellions were in the form of communist
insurgencies, ethnic conflicts or wars of national liberation.30
In recent years, Southeast Asia has seriously encountered
terrorist threats emanating from violent extremist Islamic
groups. Several studies have shown that the current terrorist
threats in Southeast Asia have evolved from a complex mix of
indigenous and external origins that date back to the colonial
era.31 From the existing scholarly literature, there are three basic

27
Andrew T.H. Tan, “Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia” in Andrew T.H. Tan
(ed), A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia (Great Britain and
Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2007), p. 5.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid., p. 6.
31
Ibid. Also see Linell Cady and Sheldon Simon (eds), Religion and Conflicts in South
and Southeast Asia: Disrupting Violence (London and New York: Routledge, 2007);
David Martin Jones and Mike Lawrence Smith,“From Konfrontasi to Disintegrasi:
ASEAN and the Rise of Islamism in Southeast Asia,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,
vol. 25 (2002), pp. 343-356; S. Yunanto, et. al, Militant Islamic Movements in Indonesia
and Southeast Asia (Jakarta: Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, 2003); and Andrew T.H. Tan,

12


approaches that attempt to explain the evolution and dynamics
of terrorism in the region: the globalist, the regionalist and the
nationalist perspectives.32

The globalist or the international terrorism approach
traces the evolution of terrorism in Southeast Asia from the
threat emanating from Al-Qaeda.33 This approach regards Al-
Qaeda as the cornerstone of any meaningful analysis of terrorist
threats in the region. It rests on “Al-Qaeda-centric paradigm”
that strongly links terrorism in Southeast Asia with Osama bin
Laden who provides the global leadership. The Afghan War of
the 1980s was the turning point in the formation of Al-Qaeda’s
global network of terror that included Southeast Asia.

Rohan Gunaratna has been recognized as the foremost
exponent of the globalist approach. In his book, Inside Al-
Qaeda, Gunaratna pinpoints Al-Qaeda as the determining factor
in the emergence of new terrorism in Southeast Asia.34 He
regards terrorist groups in Southeast Asia as integral parts of the
global network of terror with Al-Qaeda as the hub.35 Maria Ressa
may also be considered as a globalist when she highlights the
role of Al-Qaeda in her analysis of terrorist threats in Southeast
Asia.36 She describes JI as the Al-Qaeda of Southeast Asia
indicating her Al-Qaeda centered analysis.37

“Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia: Persistence, Prospects and
Implications,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 23, no. 4 (January, 2000), pp. 267-
288.
32
Carlyle Thayer popularized these three perspectives. See Carlyle Thayer,“New
Terrorism in Southeast Asia” in Damien Kingburry (ed), Violence in Between: Conflict
and Security in Archipelagic Southeast Asia (Victoria and Singapore: Monash University
Press and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), pp. 53-74.
33
For a good reference on Al-Qaeda, see Jane Corbin, Al-Qaeda: The Terror Network
That Threatens the World (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2002).
34
Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2002).
35
In my various conversations with Rohan Gunaratna from 2005-2008, he underscores
the role of Al-Qaeda in understanding terrorist threats in Southeast Asia.
36
Maria Ressa, Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda’s Newest Center of
Operations in Southeast Asia (New York and London: Free Press, 2003).
37
In my conversation with Maria Ressa on 30 May, 2009 in Singapore, she admits that
she is a globalist for focusing her analysis on Al-Qaeda.

13


From the globalist perspective, in short, the evolution of
terrorism in Southeast Asia cannot be fully understood without a
full grasp of Al-Qaeda’s origin and global expansion.38
Gunaratna argues that Al-Qaeda’s influence in Southeast Asia
spread from the Philippines “where its network is long-standing,
well-entrenched and extensive.”39 Through the machinations of
Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, Osama bin Laden’s brother-in-law, Al-
Qaeda penetrated the region in the mid-1980s using the
Philippines as a springboard and logistical center. Gunaratna
writes, “After establishing a logistics network in the Philippines
from 1988-1993, Al-Qaeda launched Oplan Bojinka in 1994.”40 It
is believed that Oplan Bojinka provided the blueprint for 9/11.
Ressa echoed this view in her writings.

The regionalist or regional security perspective, on the
other hand, regards the evolution of terrorism in Southeast Asia
as part and parcel of the evolution and development of JI.
Though JI has established global links with Al-Qaeda in the
1990s, the regionalist approach regards it as “home grown” that
pre-dated Al-Qaeda and 9/11. Southeast Asian rebels founded JI
long before Al-Qaeda reached the region. JI emerged in
Southeast Asia not because of Al-Qaeda’s global plan but in
response to regional conditions and local grievances that existed
even before Al-Qaeda was formed. In other words, JI, with its
vision of Pan-Islamism in Southeast Asia, has evolution and
dynamics of its own separate from Al-Qaeda. The regionalist
approach in Southeast Asian terrorism studies is therefore JI-
oriented rather than Al-Qaeda-centered.

The well-known disciple of regionalist approach is
Zachary Abuza who adopts a more JI-oriented paradigm in
grappling with the evolution and development of terrorism in
Southeast Asia. In his book, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia:
Crucible of Terror, Abuza explains that terrorist groups in
Southeast Asia are indeed homegrown but “have effectively

38
For excellent discussions of Al-Qaeda’s global expansion, see Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda:
Casting a Shadow of Terror (London: IB Tauris, 2003). Also see Jane Corbin, Al-Qaeda:
The Terror Network that Threatens the World (London and New York: Simon and
Schuster and Nation Books, 2002).
39
Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda, p. 175.
40
Ibid.

14


linked up with transnational organizations like Al-Qaeda.”41 The
hub of terrorist groups in Southeast Asia is JI and not Al-Qaeda.
However, Abuza also carries a globalist tone when he asserts
that “JI must be seen as an integral part of Al-Qaeda.”42
Indeed, it was through JI that Al-Qaeda expanded its network in
Southeast Asia.43 Understanding terrorism in Southeast Asia,
therefore, requires a comprehension of JI origin, ideology and
organizational dynamics.44

Finally, the nationalist approach or country studies
perspective is challenging the Al-Qaeda-centric and JI-oriented
paradigms in Southeast Asian terrorism studies. It contends that
terrorism in Southeast Asia can best be understood by analyzing
the underlying domestic conditions and national state failures
that provide the fertile environment for the emergence of
terrorism. This approach regards terrorism as a symptom of
state failure to address the domestic roots of various armed
rebellions in the region.

Sydney Jones and Kit Collier45 are staunch advocates of
the nationalist or country studies approach.46 They pay attention

41
Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (Boulder,
Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003), p. 1.
42
Zachary Abuza, “Understanding Al-Qaeda and its Network in Southeast Asia” in
Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan (eds), After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in
Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies and World
Scientific Publishing, Co., Pte. Ltd., 2003), p. 144.
43
For more discussions on this topic, see Zachary Abuza, “Tentacles of Terror: Al-
Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 24, no. 3
(December, 2002), pp. 427-465.
44
My interactions with Zachary Abuza on April 12-13, 2006 revealed his JI-centered
analysis. See International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research,
Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Threat and Response (Singapore: Institute of Defence and
Strategic Studies and the Office of the Coordinator for Counter Terrorism, US
Department of State, 12-13 April, 2006).
45
My meeting with Kit Collier in March 2009 in Quezon City showed his great interests
on country-study approach.
46
Sidney Jones is the project director of various studies made by the International Crisis
Group (ICG) on terrorism in Southeast Asia. See ICG Website at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm. Also see Sidney Jones, “The Changing
Nature of Jemaah Islamiyah,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 59, no. 2
(June, 2005), pp. 169-178. Kit Collier, on the other hand, was also a consultant to the
ICG and a research fellow at the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at the
Australian National University. He is regarded as one of Australia’s country studies

15


to “local realities, not externally imposed organigrams.”47 Collier,
for example, underscores that JI is “not an integral part of Al-
Qaeda” but its roots “are thoroughly Indonesian” with the
ultimate objective of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia.48
He also argues that terrorist and insurgent groups in Southeast
Asia “resemble bundles of personal associations more than
integral corporate bodies.”49 Their ties to Al-Qaeda “are
incarnate in individual associations, not bureaucratic flow
charts.”50

John T. Sidel may also be categorized in the third
approach when he offers an “alternative” and more “country
specific” perspective in analyzing Islamist terrorist threats in
Southeast Asia. He vehemently rejects the alarmist views of the
globalist and the regionalist for being exaggerated and
fundamentally misleading.51 He presents a “more balanced,
nuanced, and properly contextualized analysis” of terrorism
situation in Southeast Asia by paying attention to local conditions
rather than external influence.52 He examines terrorist threats in
Southeast Asia in the context of domestic dynamics in Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. He further contends that
the turn towards terrorist violence by Islamist militants in
Southeast Asia must be understood as “a symptom of and
reaction to the decline, domestication, and disentanglement
from state power of Islamist forces in the region.”53 In his study
of Indonesia, he argues that the recent terrorist bombings in

specialists on the Southern Philippines. See Kit Collier, “Dynamics of Muslim
Separatism in the Philippines,” in Kingsbury (ed), Violence in Between, pp. 155-174.
47
Kit Collier, “Terrorism: Evolving Regional Alliances and State Failure in Mindanao”
in Daljit Singh and Lorraine C. Salazar (eds), Southeast Asian Affairs 2006 (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), p.27.
48
Ibid., p. 33.
49
Ibid., p. 34.
50
Ibid, p. 33.
51
John T. Sidel, The Islamist Threat in Southeast Asia: A Reassessment (Washington DC
and Singapore: East West Center Washington and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
2007), p. x.
52
Ibid., p. 3.
53
Ibid., p. 54.

16


Indonesia are not a product of external influences but a result of
domestic conditions, a recurring theme in Indonesian history.54

Greg Barton may also belong to the third category of
terrorism scholars in Southeast Asia when he examines JI as a
manifestation of radical Islamism in Indonesia.55 Drawing from
the research outputs of Sidney Jones, Barton presents the
indigenous origins of JI as an Indonesian-based movement that
spills-over to neighboring countries in Archipelagic Southeast
Asia. He underscores that JI is not simply an imported problem
but part of the continuation of the Darul Islam (DI) struggle of
the 1950s.56

What are the Manifestations of Terrorism in Southeast
Asia?

Terrorism in Southeast Asia has various manifestations
because of its historical complexities and current political
realities. Andrew T. H. Tan formulated a four-class division of
terrorism and insurgency to highlight the complexities of terrorist
threats in the region.57 (Table 2)

The first division consists of separatist insurgencies that
utilize terrorism as part of their tactics. These separatist groups
are marginalized and regarded as victims of political exclusion.
They carry the features of long-running civil conflicts that pose
great challenge to the legitimacy of existing regimes in the
region.

The second division pertains to armed anti-government
political opposition groups created to address some deeply-
rooted political, economic and social grievances. These groups
have “special operation units” that use terrorism to attract
political attention.

54
John T. Sidel, “It is Not Getting Worse: Terrorism is Declining in Asia,” Global Asia,
vol. 2, no. 3 (Winter, 2007), pp. 41-49.
55
Greg Barton, Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islamism in Indonesia (Singapore: Singapore
University Press, 2004).
56
Ibid., p. 77.
57
Tan, “Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia,” p. 11.

17


The third division refers to radical Islamist groups aiming
to establish an Islamic State through the violent overthrow of
the existing governments in the region. These groups justify the
use of terrorism through its violent extremist ideology. Groups
belonging to the third category are linked to Al-Qaeda and/or
part of what is called the Afghan mujahedeen network.

Finally, the fourth division is largely based in Indonesia.
It pertains to overt and legitimate radical organizations that are
sympathetic to radical Islamist groups. Though these groups
assert their right to participate in the democratic political
process, Tan argues that these groups have the potential to use
violence because of their ideological and personal associations
with groups involved in terrorist acts.

Table 2
Four Class Divisions of Terrorism in Southeast Asia

Category Groups Country
1. Separatist Fretilin, Organisasi Papua Indonesia
Insurgencies Merdeka, Gerakan Aceh
Merdeka

Hmong rebels Laos
Karen National Union, Myanmar
Kachin Independence
Organization, China
National Front, Shan State
Army, Rohingya Solidarity
Organization

Moro Islamic Liberation
Front, Abu Sayyaf Group, Philippines
Rajah Solaiman Islamic
Movement

Pattani United Liberation
Organization, Barisan Thailand
Revolusi Nasional

2. Armed Anti- Burma Student Democratic Myanmar
Government Front, National Council
Political Union of Burma
Opposition

18


Groups Communist Party of the Philippines
Philippines/New People’s
Army/National Democratic
Front

Communist Party of Thailand
Thailand

3. Radical Islamist Jemaah Islamiyah Indonesia
Groups
Kampulan Majahideen Malaysia
Malaysia

Rohingya Solidarity Myanmar
Organization

Moro Islamic Liberation
Front, Abu Sayyaf Group, Philippines
Rajah Solaiman Islamic
Movement

Gerakan Majahideen Islam
Pattani Thailand

4. Overt Radical Majelis Muhajideen Indonesia
Organizations Indonesia (Laskar
Jundullah, Laska Jihad,
Front Permbella Islam and
Komite Solidaritas Islam)

Islamic Studies, Call and Philippines
Guidance (ISCAG), Darul
Hijra Foundation, Fi-
Sabilillah Da’wah and
Media Foundation
(FSDMF)
Sources: Andrew T.H. Tan, “Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia” in Andrew
T.H. Tan (ed), A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia (Great Britain
and Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2007), pp. 11-13; Rommel C.
Banlaoi, “Transnational Islam in the Philippines” in Peter Mandaville, Farish Noor,
Alexander Horstmann, Dietrich Reetz, Ali Riaz, Animesh Roul, Noorhadi Hasan, Ahmad
Fauzi Abdul Hamid, Rommel C. Banlaoi and Joseph C. Liow, Transnational Islam in
South and Southeast Asia: Movements, Networks and Conflict Dynamics (Seattle,
Washington: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2009), pp. 182-184.

19


Mapping Terrorism Cells in Southeast Asia

The US State Department identifies only three groups in
Southeast Asia listed as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs):
JI (Indonesia), Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG, the Philippines) and the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples’ Army
(CPP/NPA, the Philippines).58

This paper will not cover terrorist organizations
emanating from communist parties and non-Islamic insurgent
groups. Analysis is limited to militant or radical Islamic groups
accused of terrorist acts: JI and ASG.

Among the listed terrorist groups in Southeast Asia, JI
has established various terrorism cells in the region. It received
international notoriety because of its involvement in various
terrorist attacks in the region. The well-known attack it
perpetrated was the 12 October, 2002 Bali Bombing, considered
as “the most devastating terrorist strike in the world since 9/11,”
having killed 2002 civilians, most of whom were Australians.59
The 2002 Bali Bombing was, in fact, JI’s Plan B. Its Plan A was
the bombing of Western targets in Singapore in December,
2001.60

It also masterminded the 5 August, 2003 car bombing of
JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta where 11 people died and 150
others injured. The bombing of Australian Embassy in Jakarta on
9 September, 2004, which resulted in the death of 11
Indonesians and wounding of 160 others, was also blamed on
JI. On 1 October, 2005, JI bombed Bali once again which killed
20 persons and injured 129 more.

Though JI originated in Indonesia, it has established
networks with groups and sleeper cells in Southeast Asia
accused of various terrorist acts. Due to its existing regional
networks, it is said to be behind the “Talibanization of Southeast
Asia” and as such “has become an important and even key

58
US Department of State, “List of Foreign Terrorist Organizations” at
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/list/ (8 April, 2008).
59
Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan, “Is Southeast Asia a Terrorist Haven?” in
Ramakrishna and Tan, After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia, p. 1.
60
For detailed discussions of Plan A, see Ressa, Seeds of Terror, pp. 143-163.

20


element of the discourse on terrorism in Southeast Asia.”61 It is
closely connected with Islamist extremist groups in Indonesia,
Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand.

Table 3 shows JI’s regional partners and linkages that
form terrorism cells in Southeast Asia.

Table 3
JI Regional Partners and Linkages in Southeast Asia

Country Terrorism Cells
Indonesia Majilis Mujahidin Indonesia, Laskar Jihad, Laskar
Jundulla, GAM, FPI, DI, Jammah NIII, Laskar
Mujahidin, Mujahidin KOMPAK, ABB, AMIN and
RP11

Malaysia Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia, Al-Muanah

Myanmar Arakan Rohingya National Organization

Philippines Abu Sayyaf Group, Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF), Misuari Breakaway Group (MBG), Balik
Islam/Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement
(BI/RSIM)

Thailand Gerakan Mujahidin Pattani Islam
Source: Bilveer Singh, The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: Losing the War on Terror
to Islamist Extremists (Connecticut and London: Praeger Security International, 2007),
p. 86.

Common among these so-called terrorism cells
associated with JI is a fanatical adherence to a shared ideology
called by different scholars as Islamic radicalism, Islamic
extremism, Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic revivalism, Islamic
renewal, Muslim radicalism, Muslim extremism, radical Islamism,
militant Islam and others.62 All these terms have acquired

61
Bilveer Singh, The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: Losing the War on Terror to
Islamist Extremists (Connecticut and London: Praeger Security International, 2007), p.
51.

62
For an excellent discussion on these different labels, see Angel Rabasa, Cheryl Benard,
Peter Chalk, C. Christian Fair, Theodore Karasik, Rollie Lal, Ian Lesser and David
Thaler, The Muslim World After 9/11 (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2004). Also see
Peter Mandaville, Farish Noor, Alexander Horstmann, Dietrich Reetz, Ali Riaz, Animesh

21


pejorative, derogatory and sometimes anti-Muslim meanings in
the Western world because they have been associated with
political violence and terrorism. There is no doubt, however, that
these terms are loosely lumped within the broad universe of
political Islam.63

The origin of these terms is often attributed to the
Islamic preaching of Muhammad ibn Abd-al Wahhab, a Muslim
scholar who popularized a theology that was later called
Wahhabism. Abd-al Wahhab teaches the ‘purification’ of Islam
based on Salafi faith. The word ‘Salafi’ means ‘righteous
ancestors of Muslims’ in traditional Islamic scholarship. Salafism
advocates a return to a Sharia-minded orthodoxy that aims to
purify Islam from unwarranted accretions, heresies and
distortions.

Thus, Wahhabism and Salafism are theologically
connected. They are systems of belief that are said to have
vigorously informed the ‘terrorist acts’ of Osama bin Laden and
other radical Muslim personalities. They fight for the jihad,
seeking to re-create the Muslim umma and Sharia to build an
Islamic community worldwide.64 Wahhabi or Salafi movements
are found throughout the Muslim world.65 After 9/11, Islamic
movements and organizations adhering to Wahhabism and
Salafism, particularly those associated with Al-Qaeda, are labeled
inaccurately as terrorists because of their vigorous involvement

Roul, Noorhadi Hasan, Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, Rommel C. Banlaoi and Joseph C.
Liow, Transnational Islam in South and Southeast Asia: Movements, Networks and
Conflict Dynamics (Seattle, Washington: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2009). For
a very useful analysis of major ideological positions in Islam, see Cheryl Benard, Civil
Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources and Strategies (Santa Monica, California:
RAND, 2003). For a pre-9/11 discussion of the topic, see Dilip Hiro, Islamic
Fundamentalism (London: Paladin Grafton Books, 1989); Chandra Muzaffar, Islamic
Resurgence: A Global View, Social Issues in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 1988); Lionel Caplan (ed), Studies in Religious
Fundamentalism (Hongkong: Macmillan Press, 1987); John L. Esposito, Islamic
Revivalism in the Muslim World Today (Washington: American Institute for Islamic
Affairs, 1985); and G.H. Jansen, Militant Islam (London: Pan Book, Ltd, 1979).
63
See Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (New York:
Routledge, 1991).
64
Rabasa, et. al, The Muslim World After 9/11. See also GlobalSecurity.org, ‘Salafi
Islam,’ www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam-salafi.htm.
65
Ibid. Also see Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi, A Short History of the Revivalist Movement
in Islam (Lahore: Islamic Publication Ltd., 1981).

22


in a series of violent attacks, the largest of which was the 9/11
assaults on the United States.

Bilveer Singh calls the movement behind this Islamic
ideology in Southeast Asia as “Talibanization,” which is a political
rather than religious Islamic movement. It refers to the “growing
propensity to adopt extremist religious ideological interpretations
and practices in Muslim societies, especially in Southeast Asia.”66

Talibanization comes from the word “Taliban,” a violent
extremist militia force based in Kandahar, Afghanistan founded
by Mullah Muhammad Omar in September, 2004. The Talibans,
which means students or children of Jihad, established an
Islamic regime in Afghanistan that promoted rigid interpretation
and extreme practice of Islam anchored on Islamic orthodoxy of
Sunni Wahhabism and Salafism. This orthodoxy practices
intolerance not only towards non-Muslim but also to Muslims
who have failed in purifying their Islamic faith. In other words,
Talibanization aims for the purification of Islam found in
Wahhabi and Salafi faiths. Thus, it has become synonymous with
extremism, which currently informs JI ideology.67 Details of this
ideology will be discussed in the succeeding sections of this
paper. A major terrorist group associated with JI is the Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG).

Have the Features Changed Over Time?

Since the launching of the Global War on Terrorism
(GWOT) after 9/11, existing terrorist cells in Southeast Asia have
been disrupted. Many of the leaders and members of these cells
have been neutralized, arrested or convicted. Some underwent
“deradicalization” or “rehabilitation” programs to enable them to
leave terrorism behind. Others remain at large and are still
planning to wreak terrorist havocs.

Before 9/11, governments in Southeast Asia regarded
terrorist threats in the region as low-level. Some governments
were, in fact, in the utter state of denial on the existence of
terrorist cells in their countries because of domestic political
considerations. Other governments outside the region even

66
Singh, The Talibanization of Southeast Asia, p. 11.
67
Ibid., p. 12.

23


viewed terrorist threats in Southeast Asia as only local in scope.
Though some terrorist activities in the region in the 1980s and
1990s received international media attention, many governments
inside and outside the region viewed terrorism as posing no
clear and present danger to their countries’ over-all national
security interests.68

For the US, for example, Southeast Asia was not the
center of terrorist activities considering that prior to 9/11
incidents, the region only recorded a total of 186 international
terrorist incidents from 1984-1996 compared to 2,073 attacks in
Europe, 1,631 attacks in Latin American, 1,392 attacks in the
Middle East and 362 attacks in Africa.69 After 9/11, however, the
US radically altered its perceptions of Southeast Asian terrorism
when its intelligence agencies unearthed various evidences
linking terrorist groups in Southeast Asia with Bin Laden’s Al-
Qaeda Group.70 The US now views Southeast Asia as the major
breeding ground for terrorism that has the capability to wreak
havoc not only against America but also against substitute
targets in Asia.

Though 9/11 shocked the world, Southeast Asian
governments were cautious in their response against terrorism
perpetuated by Muslim extremists considering the significant
number of Muslim communities in the region, particularly in
Indonesia, with its largest Muslim population in the world; in
Malaysia, where Islam is embedded in the Constitution; and in
Southern Philippines and Southern Thailand where some Muslim
groups are fighting for separatism. In fact, Southeast Asian
governments expressed mixed reactions71 on the American-led
global campaign against terrorism because of national
sensitivities.72

68
Banlaoi, War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia, p. 17.
69
Ibid. Also see Mohammed Jawhar Hassan, “Terrorism: Southeast Asia’s Response,”
PacNet Newsletters, no. 1 (4 January, 2002).
70
Reyco Huang, “Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: Evidence and Response,” CDI Terrorism
Project (8 February, 2002).
71
Sheldon W. Simon, “Mixed Reactions in Southeast Asia to the US War on Terrorism,”
Comparative Connections: An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations (4th Quarter,
2001), p. 1.
72
Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Security Cooperation and Conflict in Southeast Asia After 9/11:
Constructivism, the ASEAN Way and the War on Terrorism” in Amitav Acharya and Lee

24


With increasing hard evidences proving the existence of
terrorist cells in the region, political leaders and law enforcement
officials took the threat of terrorism more seriously and adopted
cautious counter-terrorism responses to surmount the threat.
Southeast Asian countries became more circumspect on terrorist
threats facing the region when RAND Corporation, a US-based
policy think-tank, revealed that between 1968 and 1985,
Southeast Asia had recorded only 90 international terrorist
attacks. Between 1986 and 2002, the region suffered 194
terrorist attacks, more than double than the previous period.73
Thus, governments in the region paid greater attention on
counter terrorism.

One of the milestones in Southeast Asian counter
terrorism drives was the discovery of JI cells in Singapore. In
December, 2001, the Singapore Internal Security Department
(ISD) arrested 15 persons suspected of planning a series of
bomb attacks. Of the 15 persons arrested, 13 were detained for
being JI members. The remaining 2 were released. The
detention of 13 JI members revealed the plot to bomb water
pipelines, radar stations, train stations, the international airport
and some government buildings like the Ministry of Defense and
Ministry of Education.74

In August, 2002, the ISD arrested another 21 persons,
19 of whom were identified as JI members while 2 as members
of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). According to the
Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, these two major arrests
“exposed the most serious direct threat posed by any terrorist
organization to Singapore’s security” emanating from JI.75 Since
JI operates in Southeast Asia, it also poses a direct threat to
regional security.

Lai To (eds), Asia in the New Millennium (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic,
2004), pp. 32-55.

73
For more details, see RAND, Data Base of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents at
http://www.rand.org/ise/projects/terrorismdatabase <accessed on 10 June, 2009>.
74
For detailed discussion on this topic and specific list of targets, see Ministry of Home
Affairs, White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism
(Singapore: Ministry of Home Affairs, 2003).

75
Ibid., p. 2.

25


Another landmark event in counter terrorism in
Southeast Asia was the 12 October, 2002 Bali Bombings.
According to Ambassador Alfonso T. Yuchengco, if 9/11 was for
the US and the West, 10/12 was for Indonesia and Southeast
Asia.76 From a state of denial, the Bali Bombings “have
awakened Southeast Asia to the threat of Islamist terrorism.”77

Since the 2002 Bali Bombings, Southeast Asia has been
involved in a variety of counter terrorism initiatives to combat
the terrorist threat confronting the region. These initiatives led
to the adoption of various ASEAN declarations and plans of
action against terrorism culminating with the signing of the
ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism in January, 2007.
(Table 4)

Table 4
Major ASEAN Declarations and Conventions Against
Terrorism After 9/11

Title Year
ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to 5 November, 2001
Counter Terrorism

Joint Communiqué of the Special ASEAN 21 May, 2002
Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism

Declaration on Terrorism by the 8th 3 November, 2002
ASEAN Summit

Bali Regional Ministerial Meeting on 5 February, 2004
Counter Terrorism

ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism 13 January, 2007
Source: ASEAN Secretariat, 2009.

Aside from regionwide collaboration, ASEAN members
also pursued bilateral and trilateral cooperation. In fact, ASEAN
is viewed as complex web of bilateral relations among ten

76
Alfonso Yuchengco, “Islamist Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” Issues and Insights, no. 1-
03 (Honolulu: Pacific Forum CSIS, January, 2003), p. 1.
77
Ibid.

26


Southeast Asian countries. Bilateral meetings of ASEAN heads of
states “are perceived to be useful to ASEAN and to its regional
objectives of peace, progress and security” including intra-
ASEAN collaboration against international terrorism.78 States in
ASEAN also have trilateral security arrangements among them
like the Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment
of Communication Procedures signed by Indonesia, Malaysia and
the Philippines (later joined by Cambodia and Thailand) and the
Trilateral Coordinated Patrol Agreement among Malaysia,
Singapore, Indonesia (codename MALSINDO) to protect the
Straits of Malacca against piracy and terrorism. ASEAN also has
existing counter terrorism cooperation measures with its
dialogue partners like Australia, China, European Union, India,
Japan and the United States.

What are the Multidimensional Causes of Terrorism?

Terrorism in Southeast Asia, and elsewhere in the world,
has complex and dynamic underlying causes. Though poverty
(economic marginalization) and ignorance (lack of education or
illiteracy) have always been identified as its major causes, this
view is being challenged by some scholars, as there are
countries in the region where poverty and illiteracy abound but
terrorist threat is low, if not totally absent. Moreover, the profile
of notorious terrorist personalities in Southeast Asia and
elsewhere indicated that they were not poor or marginalized in
economic sense but rather well-to-do, educated and relatively
had a comfortable life.

Thus, pointing at poverty as the root cause of terrorism,
though still popular, does not have convincing empirical evidence
from a strictly scholarly perspective. In fact, a review of existing
evidence offers little reason for optimism that poverty reduction
or an increase in educational attainment would meaningfully
reduce the threat of international terrorism.79 It is argued that:

78
Estrella Solidum, “Bilateral Summitry” in The ASEAN Reader (Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 1992), p. 76.
79
Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a
Causal Connection? Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 17, no. 4 (Fall, 2003), pp.
119–144.

27


Any connection between poverty, education and
terrorism is indirect, complicated and probably
quite weak. Instead of viewing terrorism as a
direct response to low market opportunities or
ignorance, we suggest it is more accurately
viewed as a response to political conditions and
long-standing feelings of indignity and frustration
that have little to do with economics.80

Although economic marginalization has not provided
compelling evidence as the major cause of terrorism,
governments in Southeast Asia continue to regard poverty as
the root cause of terrorist threats. This view is evident from the
greater emphasis of ASEAN states to prioritize regional
economic integration rather than regional counter terrorism
cooperation. While terrorism may have several causes beyond
the issue of poverty, there is a strong belief in the region on the
need to pursue development intervention and promote socio-
economic reforms in order to ensure that the root causes of
terrorism and insurgency are adequately addressed.81 A
scholarly study asserts that while poverty as the root of
terrorism is under question, a global quantitative analysis of
relevant factors indicates that the root causes of terrorism are
indeed related to poverty and lack of democracy.82

Political exclusion and concomitant state repression also
provide a convincing explanation on the causes of terrorism
emanating from Islamist forces in Southeast Asia. This view is
gaining adherents among terrorism scholars and experts as this
cause is also found throughout the Muslim world. In his study
of Islamic violence in the Muslim world, for example,
Muhammed Hafez observes:

Muslims become violently militant when they
encounter exclusionary states that deny them
meaningful access to political institutions and

80
Ibid.
81
Andrew T.H. Tan, “The New Terrorism: How Southeast Asia Can Counter It?” in Uwe
Johannen, Alan Smith and James Gomez (eds), 9/11: September 11 & Political Freedom,
Asian Perspectives (Singapore: Select Publishing, Pte., Ltd, 2003), p. 108.
82
Timo Kivimäki, “Can Development and Democratization Address the Root Causes of
Terrorism in Southeast Asia?” The Pacific Review, vol. 20, no. 1 (March, 2007), pp. 49-
73.

28


employ indiscriminate repressive policies against
their citizens during periods of mass mobilization.
Political exclusion and state repression unleash a
dynamic of radicalization characterized by exclusive
rebel organizations that isolate Islamists from their
broader society and foster anti-system ideologies
that frame the potentially healthy competition
between secularism and Islamism as a mortal
struggle between faith and impiety. The cumulative
effect of political repression, exclusive organizations
and anti-system ideologies is protracted conflicts
against secular ruling regimes and ordinary civilians
who are perceived as sustaining those regimes.83

Historical factors caused by Western colonialism and the
forcible subjugation of Islam in Southeast Asia have also been
identified as causes of current Islamist terrorist threats in the
region. John T. Sidel’s alternative approach in understanding
Islamist threat in Southeast Asia underscores these historical
factors when he writes that the intrusions of the Portuguese,
Spanish, Dutch, British, French and American empires in
Southeast Asia “divided Muslims through the erection of state
borders and other barriers that divided them administratively”
and “reinforced existing linguistic and cultural differences
among them.”84 Legacies of Western colonialism created social
and political cleavages in a region already marked by
diversities.

There is a need to point out that those specific causes of
current Islamist terrorist threats in Southeast Asia vary in every
country in the region.

In Indonesia, for example, which is home to the largest
Muslim population in the world, the rise of Islamist terrorism is
attributed to the emergence of global jihad in Afghanistan in
the 1980s and the fall of the Suharto regime in the 1990s.
Though Islam in Indonesia is generally peaceful and tolerant, a

83
Muhammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic
World (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), pp. xv-xvi. Quoted in Sidel, The Islamist
Threat in Southeast Asia, p. 10.
84
Sidel, p. 11.

29


militant brand of Islam has penetrated the country through the
veterans of the Afghan war who became very active in the
country in the Post-Suharto era.85

In the Philippines, on the other hand, radical Muslim
terrorism is traced to the four centuries of struggle of the
Bangsamoro people for self-determination.86 The threat
emanating from the ASG is also traced to the Afghan war.
When Muslim resistant groups from the Philippines sent fighters
to Afghanistan, they acquired a violent extremist ideology of Al-
Qaeda, which also penetrated Muslim radicals in Brunei,
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.

85
Noorhaidi Hasan, “Transnational Islam in Indonesia” in Peter Mandaville, Farish
Noor, Alexander Horstmann, Dietrich Reetz, Ali Riaz, Animesh Roul, Noorhadi Hasan,
Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, Rommel C. Banlaoi and Joseph C. Liow, Transnational
Islam in South and Southeast Asia: Movements, Networks and Conflict Dynamics, p. 123.
86
See Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Radical Muslim Terrorism in the Philippines” in Andrew
T.H. Tan, Handbook on Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia, pp. 194-224.

30


CHAPTER II

TERRORIST GROUPS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
AND MODES OF OPERATION

The US Department of State listed only two foreign
terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia with militant Islamic
ideology: JI and ASG. Though other academic studies listed
other groups, this paper only focuses on the JI and the ASG as
case studies since terrorist activities of these two groups
generated greater impact on national, regional and global
security.

The Jemaah Islamiyah

a) Evolution

Though many works have already been written about
the JI, there has been no single literature describing its precise
origin.87 Most studies traced its origin from the Darul Islam (DI
or “House of Islam”), a separatist rebel movement organized in
1948 in Indonesia by Soekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo who is
said to have a dream of establishing an Islamic state in the
archipelago (Negara Islam Indonesia or NII). The demise of DI
in 1962, as result of vigorous counter rebellion operations by the
Indonesian military, prompted its remaining members to hide
using several Islamic schools as cover.

In 1972, two DI leaders, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu
Bakar Bashir, established the Pesantren al-Mu ’min —an Islamic
boarding school in Solo, Central Java. This school continued the
propagation of DI ideology, particularly the concept of NII. In
1973, the school was transferred to the village of Ngruki to
escape police and military surveillance in Solo. It was in Ngruki

87
See for example Greg Barton, Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islamism in Indonesia
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005); Kumar Ramakrishna, Constructing the
Jemaah Islamiya Terrorist: A Preliminary Inquiry (Singapore: Institute of Defence and
Strategic Studies, 2004); International Crisis Group, Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast
Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous (Jakarta and Brussels: International Crisis Group,
2003); and Barry Desker, “Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Phenomenon in Singapore,”
Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 25, no. 3 (December, 2003), pp. 489-407.

31


where the school became popularly known as Pondok Ngruki.88
Due to continued persecution of remaining DI members,
particularly during the repressive Suharto Regime, Sungkar and
Bashir fled to Malaysia where the original plan to establish JI
was said to have taken place. These two DI leaders returned to
Indonesia after the fall of Suharto in 1998. However, Sungkar
died in 1999 and left the leadership to Bashir. Due to his
fanatical adherence to Wahhabi/Salafi ideology of Al-Qaeda,
Bashir was regarded as the “Osama bin Laden of Southeast
Asia.”89

Sungkar and Bashir were considered as key JI founders.
They were accused by Indonesian intelligence agencies as
responsible for establishing JI ties with Al-Qaeda.

However, the evolution of JI as a “terrorist movement”
remains obscure to date. Even JI terminologies vary as it is
sometimes called Jama’ah Islamiyah, Ja’maah Islamiyyah, Al-
Jama’ah Al-Islamiyyah, and Jemaah Islamiah.90 Some scholars
refer to DI and the Ngruki network as forerunners of JI.91 It may
be argued that JI is the reincarnation of DI in the post-9/11 era.

One study reported that Sungkar and Bashir organized
the JI sometime in 1993-1994.92 Another study mentioned that
JI was founded in 1996.93 There are, therefore, competing
claims on the exact founding of JI. When Sungkar died in 1999,
it is argued that Bashir took the helm of JI leadership using the
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), a legal Islamic organization,
as cover. While heading the MMI, Bashir organized a regional
coalition of jihadist groups in Southeast Asia called Rabitatul
Mujahidin (RM).

88
Peter Chalk and Carl Ungerer, Neighborhood Watch: Evolving Terrorist Threats in
Southeast Asia (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2008), pp. 9-10.
89
Banlaoi, War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia, p. 24.
90
91
See International Crisis Group, Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of “Ngruki
Network” in Indonesia (Jakarta and Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2003).
92
Chalk and Ungerer, Neighborhood Watch: Evolving Terrorist Threats in Southeast
Asia, p. 8.
93
Hasan, “Transnational Islam in Indonesia,” p. 128.

32


Among scholars writing on JI, Elena Pavlova provided
the most accurate description of the origin of the group. She
wrote that JI was founded on 1 January, 1993 as result of
factionalism within DI.94 Its first recorded terrorist attack was the
bombing of Medan church on 28 May, 2000. Its involvement in
terrorist activities prompted Bashir to resign as Amir in 2000.
Abu Rusdan, who believed that JI should wage armed Jihad,
took over. He masterminded the Medan church bombing in
2000, supported by Hambali, Azahari and Noordin Top who all
endorsed JI’s terrorist operations.95 Abu Rusdan was eventually
replaced by Abu Dujana.96

The Internal Security Department (ISD) of Singapore
discovered the existence of JI in Southeast Asia only after 9/11
with the arrest of 15 Muslim militants in December, 2001 and
the arrest of 21 others in August, 2002. These two major arrests
yielded significant information on the JI and its regional network.
This information is found in Singapore White Paper on JI.97 It
has been argued that the Singapore White Paper “missed many
other important developments that eventually led the DI
elements” to establish the JI.98

b) Organizational Structure

There is scholarly difficulty in describing the
organizational structure of JI being a clandestine organization.
Its known organization structure is based on the Singapore
White Paper. The discovery of a JI document entitled “The
General Guide for the Struggle of Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah
Pedoman Umum Perjuangan-Al-Jama-ah Al-Islamiya” (PUPJI)
also gave insightful information on the origin, organization and
ideology of JI.

94
Elena Pavlova, “Jemaah Islamiah According to PUPJI,” in Tan, Handbook of
Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia, p. 76.
95
Ibid., p. 77.
96
Zachary Abuza, “Abu Dujana: Jemaah Islamiyah's New Al-Qaeda Linked Leader,”
Terrorism Focus, vol., 3, issue 13 (4 April, 2006), p. 2.
97
Ministry of Home Affairs, The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism,
pp. 3-11.
98

33


The Singapore White Paper and PUPJI state that JI is
headed by an Amir who is guided by the members of Regional
Shura or the Regional Consultative Council. Below the Regional
Shura are four Mantiqis spanning the whole archipelagic
Southeast Asia including Australia and Southern Thailand, to wit:

1. First Mantiqi (M1) based in Malaysia, Singapore and
Southern Thailand;
2. Second Mantiqi (M2) based in the whole of Indonesia
(except Sulawesi and Kalimantan) particularly in Solo and
Central Java;
3. Third Mantiqi (M3) based in Southern Philippines (particularly
in Maguindanao), Brunei, Indonesia (particularly Sulawesi
and Kalimantan) and Malaysia (particularly in Borneo,
Sabah); and
4. Fourth Mantiqi (M4) based in Irian Jaya and Australia.

Figure 2 depicts the JI Mantiqi structure based on the
interrogation of JI personalities arrested and detained by
Singaporean authorities:

Figure 2
Mantiqi Structure of Jemaah Islamiyah

MANTIQI STUCTURE OF JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH

M1 - Malaysia M3- Brunei
Singapore East Malaysian States of Sarawak and Sabah
Southern Thailand Kalimantan and Sulawesi, Indonesia
Southern Philippines

M2- Solo
Central Java M4- Irian Jaya
Whole of Indonesia except Sulawesi and Kalimantan Australia

Sources: Various police and intelligence briefings, 2009.

34


It is interesting to note that the Manitiqi structure of JI
coincides with JI’s idea of Islamic State in Southeast Asia. Each
Mantiqi, divided into different wakalahs or branches, also has its
own consultative council called Majilis Shura. Figure 3 shows the
organizational structure of JI as described in the Singapore
White Paper. This organizational structure was adopted from a
Hezbollah model of social organization “in which most of the
group's activities are overt charitable work and provision of social
services even as a component of the organization clandestinely
pursues terrorism.”99

Figure 3
Organizational Structure of Jemaah Islamiyah

AMIR

REGIONAL
SHURA

MANTIQI 1 MANTIQI 2 MANTIQI 3 MANTIQI 4

Majilis Shura Majilis Shura Majilis Shura Majilis Shura

Wakalahs Wakalahs Wakalahs Wakalahs

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of
Terrorism, p. 10.

Recent discoveries, however, have indicated that the JI’s
Mantiqi structure has been dissolved as a result of various police
and military operations against the group. According to the
revelations of Zarkasih and Abu Dujana, who were arrested in
Indonesia in March and June, 2007, respectively, JI is now
organized into the following functional groups:

Dakwah (Islamic proselytization and outreach)

99
Zachary Abuza, “Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model Assessing Hezbollah's
Influence,” Middle East Quarterly (Winter, 2009), pp. 15-26.

35

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