International Relations and Diplomacy Journal Explores Increasing Women in Norwegian Military

International Relations
and Diplomacy
Volume 2, Number 5, May 2014 (Serial Number 8)
David
David Publishing Company
www.davidpublishing.com
PublishingDavid

International Relations and Diplomacy 2(2014). 293. Copyright©2014 by David Publishing Company
Publication Information:
International Relations and Diplomacy is published monthly in print (ISSN2328-2134) by David Publishing Company
located at 240 Nagle Avenue #15C, New York, NY 10034, USA.
Aims and Scope:
International Relations and Diplomacy, a professional scholarly peer reviewed academic journal, commits itself to promoting the
academic communication about recent developments on Relations and Diplomacy, covers all sorts of research on international
relations, international security studies, politics, international political economy, regional studies, local government, public law and
policy, military study, foreign affairs other relevant areas and tries to provide a platform for experts and scholars worldwide to
exchange their latest findings.
Editorial Office:
240 Nagle Avenue #15C, New York, NY 10034
Tel: 1-323-984-7526, 323-410-1082 Fax: 1-323-984-7374, 323-908-0457
E-mail: diplomacy@davidpublishing.com; order@davidpublishing.com; shelly@davidpublishing.com
Abstracted / Indexed in:
★Electronic Journals Library (EZB), Germany;
★Index Copernicus, Poland;
★Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD), Norway;
★NewJour, Georgetown University Library, USA;
★ProQuest Social Science Collection, Public Affairs
Information Service (PAIS), USA;
★Polish Scholarly Bibliography (PBN);
★Summon Serials Solutions, USA;
★Universe Digital Library S/B, Malaysia;
★Ulrich’s Periodicals Directory, USA;
★Scientific Indexing Services;
★Google Scholar;
★Academic Keys;
★CiteFactor, USA;
★Scholar Steer, USA;
★J-Gate.
Subscription Information:
Print $520 Online $320 Print and Online $600 (per year)
For past issues, please contact: shelly@davidpublishing.com, order@davidpublishing.com
Copyright ©2014 by David Publishing Company and individual contributors. All rights reserved. David Publishing
Company holds the exclusive copyright of all the contents of this journal. In accordance with the international convention,
no part of this journal may be reproduced or transmitted by any media or publishing organs (including various websites)
without the written permission of the copyright holder. Otherwise, any conduct would be considered as the violation of the
copyright. The contents of this journal are available for any citation, however, all the citations should be clearly indicated
with the title of this journal, serial number and the name of the author.
240 Nagle Avenue #15C, New York, NY 10034
Tel: 1-323-984-7526, 323-410-1082 Fax: 1-323-984-7374, 323-908-0457
E-mail: order@davidpublishing.com
www.davidpublishing.com
DAVID PUBLISHING
D

International Relations and Diplomacy 2(2014). 293. Copyright©2014 by David Publishing Company
Editorial Board Members of International Relations and Diplomacy:
★Abdel-Hady (Qatar University, Qatar);
★Abosede Omowumi Bababtunde (National Open
University of Nigeria, Nigeria);
★Adriana Lukaszewicz (University of Warsaw, Poland);
★Alessandro Vagnini(Sapienza University of Rome,Rome);
★Ali Bilgiç(Bilkent University, Turkey);
★Amedeo Arena (University of Naples, Italy);
★András Mérei (University of Pécs, Hungary);
★Anna Rosario D. Malindog (Ateneo De Manila University,
Philippines);
★Aruna Kumar Malik (Gujarat National Law University,
India);
★Basia Spalek (Kingston University, UK);
★Beata Przybylska-Maszner (Adam Mickiewicz University,
Poland);
★Brian Leonard Hocking (University of London, UK);
★Caner Bakir (KoçUniversity, Turkey);
★Chandra Lal Pandey (University of Waikato, New
Zealand);
★Constanze Bauer (Western Institute of Technology of
Taranaki, New Zealand);
★Christian Henrich-Franke (Universität Siegen, Germany);
★Christos Kourtelis (University of Westminster, UK);
★David J. Plazek (Johnson State College, USA);
★Dimitris Tsarouhas (Bilkent University, Turkey);
★Fatima Sadiqi (International Institute for Languages and
Cultures, Morocco);
★Giuseppe Caforio (Torino University, Italy);
★Guseletov Boris (Just World Institute, Russia);
★Hanako Koyama (The University of Morioka, Japan);
★Kyeonghi Baek (State University of New York, USA);
★John Opute (London South Bank University, UK);
★Leila Simona Talani (King’s College London, UK);
★Léonie Maes (United Nations University, Japan);
★Marius-Costel ESI (Stefan cel Mare University of
Suceava, Romania);
★Marek Rewizorski (Koszalin University of Technology,
Poland);
★Martha Mutisi (African Centre for the Constructive
Resolution of Disputes, South Africa);
★Menderes Koyuncu (Univercity of Yuzuncu Yil-Van,
Turkey);
★Myroslava Antonovych (University of Kyiv-Mohyla
Academy, Ukraine);
★Nermin Allam(University of Alberta, Edmonton,Canada);
★Nadejda Komendantova (International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis, Austria);
★Ngozi C. Kamalu (Fayetteville State University, USA);
★Niklas Eklund (UmeåUniversity, Sweden);
★Peter A. Mattsson (Swedish Defense College, Sweden);
★Peter Simon Sapaty (National Academy of Sciences of
Ukraine, Ukraine);
★Raymond Lau (The University of Queensland, Australia);
★Raphael Cohen Almagor (The University of Hull, UK);
★Romi Jain (Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, India);
★Satoru Nagao (Gakushuin University, Japan);
★Sanjay Singh (Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law
University, India);
★Shkumbin Misini (University of Prishtina, Yugoslavia);
★Sotiris Serbos(Democritus University of Thrace, Greece);
★Stéphanie A. H. Bélanger (Royal Military College of
Canada, Canada);
★Timothy J. White (Xavier University, Ireland);
★Tumanyan David (Yerevan State University, Armenia);
★Zahid Latif (University of Peshawar, Pakistan);
★Zinaida Shevchuk (Masaryk University, Czech Republic);
★Valentina Vardabasso (Pantheon-Sorbonne University,
France);
★Xhaho Armela (Vitrina University, Albania);
★WANG Yi-wei (Renmin University of China, China) .
The Editors wish to express their warm thanks to the people who have generously contributed to the
process of the peer review of articles submitted to International Relations and Diplomacy.

International Relations
and Diplomacy
Volume 2, Number 5, May 2014 (Serial Number 8)
Contents
The Issue of Increasing The Share of Military Women and A Case Study of US-Japan
Conflict Over Commercial Whaling
Is it Possible to Increase the Share of Military Women in the Norwegian Armed Forces? 293
Frank Brundtland Steder
Coordination, Compromise, and Change: A Case of US-Japan Conflict Over Commercial
Whaling 310
Takashi Sekiyama
The Legacy of 1968 and European Neighborhood Policy Study
The Legacy of 1968: The Prague Spring, the Invasion of Czechoslovakia, and Poland’s
March Events 323
Stephen E. Medvec
A Wider Europe: Does the European Neighborhood Policy Work? 336
Martin Nilsson, Daniel Silander
The Unknown Pages of Anna Tumarkin
Anna Tumarkin—The First Female Doctor of Philosophy in Europe: The Unknown Pages
of Her Life 354
Lilia Zabolotnaia

International Relations and Diplomacy, ISSN 2328-2134
May 2014, Vol. 2, No. 5, 293-309
Is it Possible to Increase the Share of Military Women in the
Norwegian Armed Forces?
Frank Brundtland Steder
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), Skedsmo, Norway
Ever since Norway introduced general conscription for men in 1897, the participation of women in the Norwegian
Armed Forces (NorAF) has been an issue for discussion. In 1984 the NorAF introduced occupational equality for
men and women. This means that women have the same possibilities and rights as men in the whole organization.
However, the share of women in the NorAF (9%) has not increased over the years, and the goal of 20% seems to be
hard to reach. Based on data from the project ―Research on age cohorts for the NorAF‖, this paper presents the
concept, theory and empirically based hypotheses behind nine initiatives that I believe will contribute to a
substantial increase in the number of women in the NorAF. The initiatives are a combination of short-term,
long-term, preventive and drastic measures. The author argues that the suggested measures will affect future
recruitment, retention, military (masculine) culture and the selection process of military personnel to the NorAF.
Keywords: gender, diversity, recruitment, selection process, retention, turnover, military culture, measures
Introduction
Ever since the general conscription for Norwegian men was introduced in 1897 (Johansen, 2000),
women’s participation in the military has been discussed (Værnø& Sveri, 1990). Despite a great contribution
by Norwegian women during the Second World War and positive experiences with women in both officer’s
training school and boot camp for the army communication units in the first period after the war, the
Norwegian Parliament debated and decided in 1953 that women could not serve in the military (Værnø& Sveri,
1990). However, they did settle on an interim solution to establish new military ―female inspector positions‖,
within which women would primarily focus on mobilization procedures for women into the NorAF.
In 1976 the Norwegian Parliament reconsidered its decision of 1953 and decided to allow women into the
military in non-combatant positions on a voluntary basis. The first female ever to start officer training in the
NorAF was enrolled in 1977 (Værnø& Sveri, 1990). As the first women started on various educational and
career paths at the different non-combatant schools, the politically sensitive debate concerning female
participation in combat positions continued (Værnø & Sveri, 1990). In 1984 the Norwegian Parliament
introduced the so-called military occupational equality for men and women. This means that women have the
same opportunities and rights as men, on a voluntary basis, throughout the organization and in all functions. At
this time Norway was a pioneer in NATO and in decisions concerning organizational gender equality,
especially when it came to allowing women to participate in all military functions (only Belgium and the
Frank Brundtland Steder, M. Econ., Analysis Division, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI).
DAVID PUBLISHING
D

IS IT POSSIBLE TO INCREASE THE SHARE OF MILITARY WOMEN294
Netherlands were earlier in taking this decision).
However, Norway has not maintained its status as a pioneer for women in the military. The proportion of
women has not changed significantly over the last 30 years and in recent times it has fallen below the average
for NATO, together with Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy and Poland (Cawkill, Rogers, Knight,
& Spear, 2009). In the United States, where women are soon to be accepted for elite combat training, the share
of women is about twice as high as in Norway (Cawkill et al., 2009).
The NorAF effort on gender equality and increased diversity within the NorAF can be described as a
fragmented series of initiatives and measures. Since 1984, 199 unique measures have been suggested to raise
the share of women (Sand & Fasting, 2012). There are 75 publications on the subject (Sand & Fasting, 2011).
However, despite these efforts, few of these measures have been implemented with success. Yes, the share of
military women has risen a few percentage-points since 1984, but whether this is due to the outcome of
effective and active measures, or the outcome of a natural variation in preferences for the military service
among Norwegian women, is difficult to verify.
Figure 1. The share of 92-age-cohort-group that completes one year of Military service.
One of the latest measures (and the first research measure) has been put forward in Parliament White
Paper # 36 (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2007), leading to the successful implementation and initiation (Sand &
Fasting, 2012) of the FFI project ―Research on age cohorts for the NorAF‖. This article aims to summarize and
promote nine effective measures suggested by the research of the FFI project to improve gender equality and
greater diversity in the NorAF. The suggested measures are relatively comprehensive and emphasize the need
for a basic and continuous holistic effort and insight to raise the share of military women. Before the measures

IS IT POSSIBLE TO INCREASE THE SHARE OF MILITARY WOMEN 295
are presented, I will present a brief summary of the NorAF’s ability to recruit and retain personnel, especially
military women. Such a brief summary highlights the need for preventive and drastic measures to reach the
ambitions described in the Parliament White Paper # 36.
The NorAF’s Ability to Recruit
If one looks closer at NorAF’s recruitment, there are some significant gender differences. Based on
quantitative population data from the new Gender Neutral Selection Process for General Conscription (GNSGC)
to the NorAF1
it is possible to illustrate the apparent gender differences; the huge difference in dropout rates
between women and men entering the military (see Figure 1).
The main reason for the large difference in motivation and interest in the military among 17-year-olds are
probably due to the fact that the NorAF still practice voluntary conscription for women and general
conscription for men.
The GNSGC Part 1 is an annual online survey sent out to all 17-year-olds in Norway (about 60,000). This
population survey states that only one in four 17-year-old women show interest in military service (Fauske,
2011; Fauske, 2012). Furthermore, only half of the women who are interested in military service are being
summoned for GNSGC Part 2. The main reason for this relatively high dropout rate is explained by the
NorAF’s physical requirements (good state of health), formal education and the NorAF’s zero-tolerance for
criminal records. In GNSGC Part 2, where candidates in addition to the information meeting and conversation
with different selection officers, go through a variety of theoretical examinations, physical tests and a medical
examination, additional dropout occurs. Based on the NorAF’s demand for soldiers, and a varying number who
have applied for a postponement from earlier age cohort groups, about 60% of women and 40% of men are
summoned for military service. Only half of the women who are summoned choose to (voluntary) meet for
military service. The corresponding figure for men is about three-quarters (general conscription).
There is no gender difference regarding how many complete the military service—about 85% of those
who are summoned complete their one year military service. Hence, for a given age cohort of women one can
expect that less than 2% to complete the military service. This does not include those who apply for deferment.
The corresponding figure for men is about 13%. If one looks closer at the different age cohorts over time,
which includes those seeking postponement from the selection process, the figures are somewhat higher,
especially for men.
The main reasons for women who are qualified and summoned for military service to change their minds,
include changes in personal motivation, illness, admission to college and likewise. Another factor that explains
the high dropout rate is that many women are uncertain whether they will achieve satisfactory results on the
physical tests. The physical dimension and the physical requirements are of significance for the individual and
personal formation of expectations about the military service and the first meeting with the NorAF.
The main reason for not pursuing a military career, given by approximately 75% of the 17-year-old
women, is simply that they lack interest in the military. This is supported by my qualitative research where one
1
Since 2009, the age 1992 cohort group—both men and women have to meet the NorAF for an comprehensive evaluation
process.

finds typical statements such as ―The NorAF has no place in my life plans‖ or ―I’m not a military person‖ or
―The NorAF is too physically demanding‖ (Hennes, 2009).
The NorAF’s Ability to Retain
Previous work shows that the variation in tasks/job functions, wage levels and wage dispersion is greater
among military men than among military women (Steder, Hellum, & Skutlaberg, 2009; Steder, 2010; Steder,
2007). The gender based difference in wage level and wage dispersion is primarily explained by men’s
inclination to seek out a wider range of different tasks, especially in operational service. Most women tend to
work within logistics, support and personnel functions where the wage level is lower and wage dispersion is
narrower. Other issues that the author has found to be interesting include differences in preferences and
interest in work content between women and men, where women tend to be more altruistic than men (Schanke,
Lauritzen, & Leirvik, 2008) and that men tend to be more concerned about their future career, salary level and
operational tasks than women (Schanke et al., 2008). Moreover, there are fewer men working part-time than
women (Steder et al., 2009; Steder, 2010).
This identified gender-based variety in choice of tasks/functions implies that the NorAF is in many ways a
mirror reflection of Norwegian society. Women and men have different interests, and they seek out the tasks
and functions that they are most comfortable with, according to individual preferences about during different
life phases, status, according to personal interests, and so forth. From a macro perspective both men and women
are encouraged to seek non-traditional jobs and functions, but most Norwegians still make the traditional
gender-based choices. In general Norway is one of the most equal-status and gender-balanced countries in the
world. However, Norway also has one of the most gender-segregated labor markets. This is also reflected
within the NorAF, where military women are more likely than military men to seek positions in logistics,
support, administration and personnel functions. One of the reasons the NorAF fails to raise the proportion of
women can be explained by the tilted effort to increase the share of military women—the aims and efforts are
mainly aligned towards the communities where the percentage is at its lowest –the military communities that
Norwegian women traditionally do not apply to or leave first (operative sector).
Turnover, or access and departure of personnel to/from the military positions in the NorAF, also varies
with gender. Women exit the NorAF to a greater extent than men, especially in the younger age groups (under
30 years). The young women who exit the military are more commonly exiting from positions in the operative
sector, where the share of military women is already at its lowest (Steder et al., 2009; Steder, 2010). The
NorAF, already perceived as a masculine organization with relatively few women in the first place, seeks not
only to convince more women to start, but they seek to persuade women to start in the typical masculine part of
the NorAF (the operative sector) where the pressure to maintain typical masculine values is at its greatest
(Kristiansen, Boe, Bakken, Skjæret, & Granlund, 2008; Kristiansen, Boe, & Skjæret, 2010).
Nine Preventive and Drastic Measures to Increase the Share of Women
Based on the work of the FFI-project ―Research on age cohorts for the NorAF‖ this paper will present
nine selected measures to improve gender equality and greater diversity in the NorAF. These measures are not
necessarily new or different from those that have been suggested over the past 30 years, but they represent what

The author believes that it is necessary to raise the share of military women from the current level (about 9%).
Some of the measures have a greater cultural influence and can thus be perceived as somewhat extensive and
drastic measures. They will probably face greater resistance in the NorAF than other measures. After I have
described the suggested measures in more detail, the article will briefly refer to a risk analysis related to the
uplift of military women in the NorAF. The measures are presented in a non-prioritized order of importance or
preference.
Improved Rationale for More Military Women
Many military women in the NorAF claim that the rationale being used to increase women in the military
is superficial, minimal and at times provocative. To many military women, the rationale is portrayed as a goal
in itself; the NorAF need to increase the share of military women—no matter what! When the strategic level is
addressing why it is important to increase the share of women, three campaigns-like arguments are used: The
right’s, utility, and diversity arguments. Typical statements from the strategic level are as follows:
The low proportion of women in the NorAF is not in accordance with the Government’s gender equality
policy, as embodied in the Soria Moria-Declaration. At a time when women have great opportunities for
education and there is female participation in virtually all arenas of society, a NorAF consisting of 93% men is
not representative of the development of society at large (Minister of Defence in Dagbladet, August 3, 2007).
The demand for more women in the NorAF is not exclusively Norwegian antics. The international
community recognizes the unequal distribution of power between men and women and requires change.
Norway cannot and does not want to withdraw from this development. Hence there must be a connection
between the objectives we set ourselves at home with what we’re doing out there (Minister of Defence, speech
in People and Defence Annual Meeting, March 8, 2012) .
Although this rationale is ―intelligible‖ and ―right‖ in itself many military women perceive that the only
reason for the NorAF to increase the share of military women is because there are too few of them in the first
place (Lauritzen, Leirvik, Schanke, & Ellingsen, 2009; Ellingsen et al., 2008).
The most commonly used argument for why there should be more military women in the NorAF is the
justice and democracy argument for equality (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2012). An equal society is created when
benefits and burdens are evenly and fairly shared between men and women. Hence, a NorAF that is has an even
distribution of men and women will contribute to improved decision-making in the organization.
This argument/aspect suggests that men and women, as far as possible, should have equal rights and duties
in society when power is exercised. In the exercise of power the NorAF is in a special position, and therefore
both men and women should be able to influence this.
However, despite the fact that these two arguments are understandable, it is still not sufficient for many
military women for explaining why the NorAF requires more military women.
Hence, the typical resource arguments (Hernes, 1984) were also used when arguing for increased diversity.
In the resource argument there is a difference between men’s and women’s experiences, values, interests and
priorities. More women in male-dominated areas will provide new insights, perspectives and solutions that
could improve both efficiency and productivity in the organization.
The utility aspect derived from these three arguments indicates that the NorAF benefits when recruiting

from the entire population – it ensures that all values and experiences in society are reflected in the NorAF.
Furthermore the diversity aspect says something about how the military develops values, attitudes and behavior
so that the organization better adapts to changes in tasks and functions (Forsvars-departementet, 2007). In
addition to the fact that the latter aspects are somewhat overlapping, they complement the justice and
legitimacy aspect.
The basis of a desire to increase diversity is that diversity is better than equality/uniformity, although it
―produces‖ both advantages and disadvantages. Furthermore, it should be obvious that the variation in military
tasks and functions requires variation in intellectual and physical capital. This is not the case! Prevailing
recruitment and selection processes should reflect this principle, not be based on a gender-differentiation as
today, but rather a task or function-based differentiation in the recruitment process. In short, the NorAF seeks
diversity in gender, ethnicity, age cohorts, skills, knowledge, physical and mental capital because it is the best
for the organization.
The value of diversity is well presented in welfare theory, migration theory and organizational theory
(Hong & Page, 2001; Leonard & Levine, 2006; Llopis, 2011). It is also prominent in educational theory (Gurin,
1999). All theories conclude that inequality affects productivity and the development of a given community,
both positively and negatively.
The biggest challenge of inequality is the increased risk of conflict (Hong & Page, 2001; Leonard &
Levine, 2006; Gurin, 1999; Öberg, Oskarsson, & Svensson, 2009). However, this must be viewed in the context
of the clear advantages that are produced by inequality, especially the level of improved knowledge, creativity,
management and cognitive skills in a given group (Leonard & Levine, 2006; Llopis, 2011). A high level of
intellectual engagement, motivation and skill level is also reducing turnover (Leonard & Levine, 2006).
The arguments used in NorAF’s recruitment and retention efforts should be communicated more
understandably, with an easier, more varied, timely and comprehensive approach. By this I mean that the
NorAF’s public arguments for increased diversity should vary in content and expressed outwardly, reflecting
the desire of diversity– because it has a value in itself.
Furthermore, the arguments about the desire to retain military women should reflect that military women
are valued for who they are, not who they are perceived to be. As Defence Minister Anne-Grethe
Strøm-Eriksen said in a speech at a discussion evening in Oslo Military Society (October 30, 2006):
The most important factor is that women are women, and thus have a complementary competency that men do not
have, or can get, even if they train ever so much. Being a woman is a skill in itself, and I’m certainly not sure everyone
sees this value .
Take Better Care of the Advantages From the GNSGC Part 1
In general a questionnaire should be as specific as possible and satisfy the primary purpose given to
it—selection of ―the best‖ in this case. The secondary purpose (in this case)—to recruit more women—must
also be achieved in the same questionnaire.
The main purpose of GNSGC Part 1 is to select the best candidates for further evaluation in GNSGC Part
2, where they are finally evaluated and selected for military service and/or military training (Fauske, 2011;
Fauske, 2012; Køber & Strand, 2013).

The content and appearance of a given questionnaire signals different values and important properties to
the respondents. When a 17-year-old sits before his/her computer answering GNSGC Part 1, it is usually one of
the first meetings ever with the NorAF. The design and content of the questionnaire gives them an impression
of what properties are emphasized by the NorAF, and perhaps also what criteria the NorAF value. It is likely
that many respondents are uncertain about ―their own priorities‖ when they answer the GNSGC Part 1. Given
that women do not have general conscription, the questionnaire should be designed so that it motivates the
―doubters‖ and those who have no knowledge of what it actually means to be in the NorAF.
The questionnaire in GNSGC Part 1 begins with a comprehensive set of questions about the respondent’s
health (about physical fitness, diseases and other health problems as well as issues related to school and social
skills). At this time it is likely that the respondent has been influenced by the questions asked so far. Following
these basic questions of requirement she or he is asked about their motivation and interest to serve the NorAF.
The NorAF has, through GNSGC Part 1, a unique opportunity to inform respondents and identify the
interest and motivation in the entire population of 17-year-olds. There are no other institutions that have the
capacity or the right to carry out such a population survey. It is of great significance that this opportunity is
taken well care of as an active instrument and initial selection tool into the NorAF. To date, I still believe that
this possibility is not fully utilized.
This article only illustrates some initial considerations related to the changes that I believe can improve the
questionnaire. But the main recommendation is that a proper review and evaluation of the questionnaire design,
content and level of conveying information about the NorAF is needed in the GNSGC Part 1.
Evaluate the Effect From Gender Based Measures
In many contexts it still appears to be an adopted truth that girls are weak! However, different statements
from male soldiers in their conscription service convey that women on their platoon/team are as strong, or even
stronger and/or tougher than men (Batt-Rawden & Skålholdt, 2010). When talking about, or when evaluating
measures to recruit/select women to the NorAF, the allegeable ―truth‖ about the weaker sex appears frequently.
According to our research this ―truth‖ is one of the reasons the majority of the military women are not
unconditionally positive towards measures aimed specifically for women, for example, women-camps or other
preferential treatments in the selection process (Lauritzen et al., 2009). When designing measures aimed at a
specific gender, there is a risk that the stereotypes about who or what gender fits better in a function is being
reproduced, rather than that measure actually contributing to a change of culture and/or increased
recruitment/retention. Some military women argue that preferential treatment in the selection process is good
because women tend to exclude themselves, partly because they do not think they will manage to carry out the
physical requirements: ―It is typical of girls to have poor confidence regarding the physical requirements.
Women-camp can help women gain more confidence in their physical capacity‖. Others argue that when
separating men and women in the selection process women will be confronted to a greater extent with wrongful
claims later on, claims such as they are only accepted into the NorAF through unfair measures of affirmative
action. The trend in the NorAF is that young military women do not want preferential treatment! All they want
is to be treated equally, to be a part of the group/unit on equal terms and not stand out from the crowd. The aim
is to be ―one of the guys‖ on equal terms and conditions as men.
Preferential treatment has good intentions, but it is a measure that increases and points out the difference

between men and women which suggests that women are not naturally fit for service in the NorAF.
However, it is important that the NorAF is aware of the recruitment and retention of women, although not
by being as explicit as preferential treatment, affirmative action and the like. The NorAF should give women
and men equal opportunities, equal rights and equal obligations, although it may involve unequal treatment of
women and men, or unequal treatment within gender, ethnicity, age cohorts, physical capacity, etc..
Make Better Use of the Public School as an Effective Arena of Recruitment
Every year the NorAF visits 500-600 of the nation’s public schools and informs large groups of students
about the military, the military education and the day-to-day service in the NorAF (Forsvaret, 2011). According
to a survey conducted in 2005 by the NorAF Media Centre, school visits are one of the arenas where many girls
have their first personal contact with the NorAF (Kristiansen et al., 2008). However, there is little or no
evaluation of these visits. We really don’t know how they are executed or how the students respond to the
information or their actual level of knowledge about the NorAF.
In short, we don’t know the effect/outcome from the school-visits. What are the students wondering about
at the different school-visits? Do they consider applying for an education in the NorAF? These and many other
questions were most likely asked at the different school visits, but the questions, answers, reflections, level of
knowledge concerning the military, interests, motivation, etc., are not recorded anywhere. We simply don’t
know the effect of school visits other than it is one of the most important and primary introductions (on a
personal level) about the NorAF.
Figure 2. The use of audiences’ response system is regarded very useful for collecting data at different school visits.

However, a relatively efficient way to follow up school visits and measure the variations in level of
knowledge about the NorAF, military education, etc., is to use an audience response system. This is an easy to
use and fairly inexpensive method for recording different variables at the school visits.
Most audience response systems are primarily based on a simple slideshow (i.e. in PowerPoint), and
results can be stored in a preferred database. If one has two sets of questions at each school visit, some
questions are repeated every year, at every school visit, and some are more appropriate time and case sensitive,
one gains easy access to studying longitudinal trends concerning the NorAF, motivation for service, etc., in
younger age cohorts. This is a great opportunity to interact with the students, evaluate the outcome of the visit
and record data. Actual data from younger age cohorts, a few years before they are eligible for service, is
regarded very valuable for both recruitment officers, the further development of the current recruitment strategy
and for preparing different marketing campaigns.
Another area within the public school system to consider for better recruitment to the NorAF is the
―business deployment program‖. Through the Knowledge-Promise (Ministry of Education and Research, 2004),
all students (ages 14-15) are entitled to choose the adapted teaching and discipline subject ―educational choice‖.
This practical hands-on subject program provides a personal insight into working-life through deployment/
internship at a local workplace. All schools and institutions/employers in Norwegian society are encouraged to
form a closer dialogue and better practise concerning this practical 5-day exchange program between public
schools and local businesses (Andreassen et al., 2008; Andreassen, 2009).
There are several reasons for this encouragement. One of the main reasons given is to affect the traditional
choice in education and future occupation. Norwegian youths’ choice of education and employment is still
strongly linked to traditional gender-roles and social background (Schanke et al., 2008). In the subject
―educational choice‖ students can meet others who have chosen non-traditional roles and they build personal
and perhaps better individual based knowledge of what it actually means to make an unconventional choice
(Watts, 2006). The student need is the primary basis for this cooperation with local industry. A bonus and
secondary objective with the arrangement is the local business’s need for recruitment (EU, 2004).
Picture: Ola Tomter (reklame@east.no)
Figure 3. Happy youths at a NorAF deployment program.

If the NorAF chooses to further exploit this ―business deployment program‖ as a local and/or national
partner, the military organization could aid the public school in their national goals of ―educational choice‖.
The NorAF will also improve its own recruitment by utilizing the public school as an active recruitment arena.
A British study (Brown et al., 2003) showed that different business deployment programs or business-visits are
one of five strong predictors/initiatives that have a positive effect on youngsters’ future career choice. Other
studies (Watts, 2006) show that personal experience, and temporary placement in a work place, provides
experiential learning and first-hand knowledge of the labor market.
Today’s utilization, practice and exploitation of the ―business deployment program‖ is relatively
unstructured and random. The deployment is usually an outcome of the parents’ network or the school
counselor, rather than active military promotion for a placement in the local military camp or base. With a
relatively modest effort, about the same or less than using in gender-based measures mentioned in chapter 4.3,
the North may achieve a better recruitment tool and structured deployment period for the secondary school
students. Unlike the gender-based recruitment arena, the deployment exchange program is offered to both
young men and women, in a period where they, especially the young women, already have begun to consider
future career options (Schanke et al., 2008).
Improved Selection Process for the Officer’s Cadet School
There is a relatively higher dropout rate among women than men in the first week of selection for
Officer’s Cadet School (Stornæs, 2011; Værnø, 2012). This is mainly explained by the difference in physical
performance.
Among women who have completed the physical tests in the period 2007 to 2011, on average, 19% have
failed the physical tests during the first week (Stornæs & Fasting, 2011). The corresponding figure for men is
6% (Stornæs & Fasting, 2011). However, this is not necessarily explained by the poor physical performance of
women. It could also be that today’s physical requirements are too low for men (or too high for women).
According to the results of physical tests and the actual outcome for new cadets in the selection process, the
gender-based difference in physical requirements is skewed towards men. Hence (relatively speaking) the tests
are easier for the average man compared to the average woman.
Military women are often met with attitudes that they are physically inferior and do not meet the physical
requirements of combat or close-combat roles. It is true that men’s physical strength and endurance are
different from women’s—but that does not mean that women are physically unsuited for a close combat
position.
The modernization of the NorAF for the past 20 years has run its course—towards a more capital-and
technology-intensive organization. The number of officers and soldiers is reduced, and the demand for skills,
organization, combat techniques, strategies and military tasks has changed. One would think that the formal
physical requirements have changed in line with these technological, organizational and procedural
changes, but they have not. In essence, it is still the same gender-based differentiated requirements and tests
that have been conducted since 1984—the year of introducing and allowing women into all positions within the
NorAF.
Based on empirical data from the selection process to the Officer Cadet School, where 19% of women and
6% of men fail the physical tests (Stornæs & Fasting, 2011), I recommend not to continue with the current
gender-based practice. If one is to maintain differentiated requirements the physical requirements should reflect

the actual biological differences that exist.
The author recommends that the importance of formal physical requirements decreases in the overall
assessment of the candidates. Given the change in demand for military skills, capital intensity and tasks, the
author recommends an increasing importance of psychological and cognitive testing in the overall assessment
of the future candidates.
Furthermore it is also recommended that the physical tests no longer are gender based—but function and
position based—that is, the tests are equal for men and women but differ with position, function and the
(objective) physical requirements needed. This will also ease the commonly held notion that women are
unfairly selected based on affirmative action.
Another area within the selection process for Officer’s Cadet School is the rather subjective evaluation
process of the candidates. In my opinion the selector’s personal interpretation of the ―occupational code‖ and
the selector’s professional identity, creates a bias in the current selection process. The candidates are more or
less selected on biased subjective attitudes, not the NorAF stated values and formal requirements for leadership
and core values (Rones & Fasting, 2011; Kristiansen, 2011). In short, there is a risk that the selected cadets are
production of the current officers, current informal culture and thus an obstacle to greater diversity in the
NorAF.
Implement a Life-Cycle Oriented Personnel Policy
It should be obvious that the need for balance between work, leisure and family varies with age. One of
the findings from the FFI-project is that the main differences among the employees in the NorAF are not
necessarily based on differences in gender, but on differences in age (Steder et al., 2009; Steder, 2010;
Kristiansen et al., 2010). A life-cycle oriented personnel policy implies recognition of the career-related phases
across different age cohorts—acknowledging that needs, requirements, limitations and opportunities vary with
age, not gender.
A good life-phase policy at all levels and for all age groups implies that both managers and employees are
flexible in their everyday life and that individual arrangements to balance work, leisure and family,
are accepted. In many instances it is not necessarily formal or costly barriers that prevent the facilitation of a
good life-cycle-phase policy, but simple administrative regulations and cultural obstacles (Kristiansen et al.,
2010). If one aims for higher retention in the NorAF one must consider facilitating a proper life-cycle-phase
policy.
Practice a Targeted Awareness of Diversity in the Education of Soldiers and Lower Ranking Officers
Knowledge and practice of diversity at lower ranks are highly variable in the NorAF. A practical and
systematic knowledge-based execution of awareness concerning the idea of diversity, which is anchored at all
levels in the organization must be monitored continuously.
It should not be implemented as a project next to daily operations. Diversity is a perspective and an idea
that should be included in the tasks undertaken by the NorAF—at all levels and at all functions. Efforts and
measures to retain critical and unique employees must be integrated into the individual function and different
military units.
The vast majority of today’s soldiers and junior officers are educated and trained by relatively young
officers with relatively little variation in education, work and life experience. Many young leaders in the NorAF

are still completely unprepared for different gender and diversity issues in their own units and handle
challenges as they arise, often without foundations in past experience or in education (Kristiansen et al., 2008).
In my opinion, it should be a level-consistent subject in leadership and management at the different academies,
based on military education, sociology and/or psychology that examines and reflects upon different attitudes,
behaviors, power and language, awareness of gender-related challenges in a given military unit. The subject
and the knowledge-conscious education/reflection should be coated with empirical examples from daily life in
the NorAF. Furthermore, I recommend that the issues in the course run from the individual aspect (psychology
and sociology) towards the organizational level as personnel receive higher education, rise in military rank and
gain expanded responsibilities.
The strong need for a knowledge-based subject, and efforts to increase diversity and improve formal
education in the NorAF, are illustrated by describing two typical statements/situations that especially military
women experience more or less every day. The first example is based on a typical attitude and accusations that
military women are often confronted with, and the second example is based on the negative employment
relationship that often occurs between military women and men.
Close Combat Roles and Team Cohesion
Military women are often confronted with stories and allegations about their role and performance in a
military unit and its context. One of the allegations they frequently hear is related to women’s performance in
combat positions. Some of these closely related stories are directly misleading and are often gratuitous
regarding further service in the NorAF.
Picture: Lars Magne Hovtun, NorAF
Figure 4. A female soldier at a NorAF exercise.
The allegation is that women’s presence in an operational combat unit, especially under ―hostile pressure‖,
affects the team morale and cohesion among the male soldiers in a negative way—they focus more on their
female team mates than the fight itself. These allegations are based on a myth from the Arab-Israeli war in 1948
that the presence of women has had a devastating impact on the effectiveness of men in battle (Dougherty,
2001). The Israeli women were never allowed in combat—hence women’s presence could not have affected the

male soldiers. They were simply not there! Israeli women were actually not allowed in close combat positions
before 2000 (Cawkill et al., 2009; Israel MFA, 2009).
In my opinion the NorAF can draw some lessons from the discussion on women’s participation in close
combat positions, especially regarding allegations of team cohesion and gender in a combat area. From my own
research (Steder et al., 2009; Kristiansen et al., 2010), the author recognized the resistance towards women in
combat units. By confronting the masculine culture, especially in the combat units, one can hopefully reduce
some of the daily ―suspicion‖ about the alleged inadequacy and incompetence the military women face.
Bullying and Condescending Behavior
The second example that illustrates the need for a targeted awareness of diversity in the NorAF is
presented through a set of typical scenarios/situations for military women from their everyday working life for
the NorAF.
In my conscription year, I had a platoon leader who supposedly did not like women in the military. The author had
heard rumors and stories about him, but would like to make up my own mind. At the end of the conscript year I received
recognition from the other cadets, but there was little support during the year. He patted me on the butt in front of the
entire battalion, talked condescendingly to me, and I always had to perform extra. (Kristiansen et al., 2010)
―Today I got up at half past four to clean my closet, ironing my clothes and tuck my hair in close to the
head. Always just nice to feel and look like a man‖ (Jørstad, 2010).
The author standout, as I’m a woman. The whole camp knows who I am, and I don’t know who anyone else is. I get
the looks, the whistles and stuff. It’s not accepted to whistle at women, and I get annoyed by it. I feel like I’m being
demeaned as an officer, they don’t see me as an officer, they only see me as a woman. (Håvimb, 2010)
All the platoons are divided into different teams competing against each other. Younger officers are in
charge of the different activities in a given trail/route where we had to navigate between various posts. At his
particular post the task was to make as many words as possible from what one was wearing. ―You get more
points for more dirty words‖, says the officer. He looks at me, startled, ―I did not notice you at first‖ and laughs
a little. Several of the soldiers got undressed and used the different uniform articles, watches and dog-tags for
spelling words. Words like fuck, cunt, cock, and various combinations of words with a sexual nature/content
are spelled out on the ground (Harsvik, 2010).
At the officer’s cadet school, the results in physical tests are obvious to everyone. In the hallway to the
cadets the individual score is put up on a common board/list and the girls are marked in red. The girls
performance stands out compared to the boys performance—partly because it is marked in red, but mainly
because the girl’s names are at the bottom of the common result list (Håvimb, 2010).
Had she been strong enough, of course she would have been given the chance, but it is not given that she was fit for it.
It’s all about the social interaction and the physical capacity. If women are to serve here (in this unit) they cannot be a
girly-girl, they must be more of a man, a tomboy, with male humour, otherwise I feel sorry for them. I think one has to
look a long time to find women who ―have it‖ to be stationed here. (Totland, 2009)
The selected quotations represent at times an extremely masculine culture. Many military women feel that
they step into a masculine arena and adapt to the masculine norms and behavior. This is clearly expressed
through language and repression of feminine properties. The call to introduce a zero-tolerance for unwanted
behavior is as much a call for awareness of acceptable behavior, and it is not necessarily true that extremely
masculine culture is accepted by all men as well. In my opinion, it occurs to such an extent that it can be a

barrier to recruiting and retaining women for the NorAF.
Improved Longitudinal Studies
Based on GNSGC one can draw a stratified random sample and follow the respondents for a long period
of time, even if they are not in the NorAF at all times. Through improved longitudinal studies one can uncover
cultural influence, individual attitudes, beliefs and behaviors and how they change in different stages and
settings. One can also create one or more follow-up studies regarding the attitude towards women in the
military to investigate whether views on women in the military change throughout one’s career. In my opinion
and experience an improved longitudinal study can with greater certainty identify the cultural characteristics
that influence attitudes toward women in the military.
Gender-neutral Conscript System
Over the past 30-40 years, many countries have abandoned general conscription in favor of an
all-volunteer force. Last in this development were Sweden and Germany, who introduced it as late as 2010.
The underlying value that women and men are to be treated equally is a fundamental value in
Norwegian society. However, the proposal in the latest long-term plan to implement a gender-neutral conscript
system from 2015 is not only seen as an opportunity to increase the proportion of women in the military, but
also to improve the production for increased operational capability, and better availability, of all military
resources.
Table 1
An Overview of a Simple Risk Analysis of the Suggested Measures for Increased Share of Military Women in
the NorAF
Suggested measures to increase the share of military women in the
Norwegian Armed forces
HR-value chain
Rec S Ret Cost Culture
1 Improved strategic arguments for more military women
2 Take better care of the advantages from the GNSGC Part 1
3 Evaluate the effect of the gender based measures
4 Make better use of the public school as an effective arena of recruitment
5 Implement a life cycle oriented personnel policy
6 Implement a life cycle oriented personnel policy
7 Practice a targeted awareness of diversity in the education
8 Improved longitudinal studies
9 Evaluate the general conscript system
Improvements Rec Recruitment
Little or no change S Selection process
Worsening (i. e. increased costs) Ret Retention
Costs Fixed and variable costs
Culture NorAF organizational cuture
The current practice of conscription for men and voluntary service for women is controversial. When
including women in the general conscript system the NorAF affects the entire capability production process,
not only reconsidering the fairness and duty between men and women. The suggested gender-neutral
conscription system (GNCS) represents a change in recruitment for both men and women, not a change in duty

and obligations for women.
At the end of the day the supply of future soldiers (about 60,000) exceeds far beyond the demand for
soldiers (about 8,000). In other words, the main outcome from the GNCS is that the NorAF can select the best
soldiers, independent of sex. My data suggest that the share of unwilling soldiers through the conscript system
is low, in other words, most soldiers are willing and able to complete their mandatory military service on a
voluntary basis. However, it is possible that an increase of women in the NorAF can reduce the overall level of
motivation for service, for both men and women.
Conclusion: Is it Possible to Increase the Share of Military Women in the NorAF?
According to the Parliament White Paper # 36 (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2007), there ―are no formal
obstacles that suggest that the NorAF should not be able to reach a target of equal representation of women and
men in the organization. Hence, a realistic goal in the NorAF is at least 20% military women by 2020‖ .
Since the White Paper was presented in 2007, the share of military women has been more or less
unchanged (around 9%). In fact, the share of military women has never really been consistent with the overall
objectives since women were allowed to serve in the NorAF more than 30 years ago.
The development in recent years also suggests that the NorAF will yet again fail to reach the overarching
objective. Given the historical development and the current situation, is it at all realistic that the military
achieves 20% military female representation by 2020?
First, new measures must be implemented and monitored effectively—immediately. However, there is a
great risk that it is already too late. The author is convinced that it is difficult to increase the share of military
women without consequences—positive and/or negative.
In summary, most of the measures will result in increased costs for the NorAF. The author also believes
that most of the measures have a positive effect on the recruitment and the ability to retain, and that the current
culture changes for the better. However the measures have little or no direct effect on the current selection
process—but there is an indirect effect through cultural changes (see Table 1).
The nine measures I have proposed here are to be regarded as complementary measures. That is, they have
different effects or sets of impact on different areas or sub-processes within the Human Resource value chain,
the NorAF economy and the military culture.
If the nine measures, or if a set of corresponding measures, are selected, they will most likely increase the
share of military women. If one chooses to implement some of the measures, and wait with others, it will most
likely have less effect than a comprehensive approach (all nine). In order to be successful with a diversity
strategy, it is recommended that one must be comprehensive, continuous and authentic at all times (Llopis,
2011).
References
Andreassen, I. (2009). Utdanningsvalg—mulighetenes valg. Notat fra Høyskolen i Bergen påoppdragfra Utdanningsdirektoratet.
Andreassen, I., Hovdenak, S., & Swhan, E. (2008). Utdanningsvalg: Identitet og karriere-veiledning. Fagbokforlaget.
Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen (2006). Kvinner med kompetanse i Forsvaret.Diskusjonsaften i Oslo Militære Samfund, 30. august
2006 (Defence Minister Anne-Grethe Strøm-Eriksen in a speech at a discussion evening in Oslo Military Society, October 20.
2006)
Batt-Rawden, K., & Skålholdt, A. (2010). Andre notat i prosjekt Forskning påårskull med resultater fraLuftforsvaret. ØF/Notat
nr. 13/2010, Østlandsforskning.
Brown, S. D., Krane, N., Ryan, E., Brecheisen, J., Castelino, P., Budisin, I., Miller, M., & Edens, L. (2003). Critical ingredients of

career choice interventions: More analyses and new hypotheses. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 62, 411-428.
Cawkill, P., Rogers, A., Knight, S., & Spear, L. (2009). Women in ground close combat roles: The experiences of other nations
and a review of the academic literature. DSTL/CR37770 V3-0.
Dagbladet. (2007, August 3). Flere kvinner i Forsvaret. (Minister of Defence in Dagbladet)
Dougerty, J. (2001, February). Debunking the Israeli women in combat myth. Worldnetweekly.
Ellingsen A., Karlsen, G. R., Kirkhaug, R., & Røvik, K. A. (2008). Monolitt eller mosaikk—Pilotundersøkelse med særlig fokus
pårekruttering av kvinner i forsvaret og programutkast for studier av kultur i Forsvaret. UIT.
Europeiske Union. (2004). Council resolution on better integration lifelong guidance into lifelong learning strategies.
Fauske, M. F. (2011). Jeg vil inn i Forsvaret—hvem er jeg? FFI-rapport 2011/01204.
Fauske, M. F. (2012). Analyse av data fra Sesjon del 1 i 2011. FFI-rapport 2012/00706.
Forsvarsdepartementet. (2007). Økt rekruttering av kvinner til Forsvaret. Stortingsmelding nr. 36 (2006-2007).
Forsvarsdepartementet. (2012). Et forsvar for vår tid. Stortingsproposisjon nr. 73S (2011–1012).
Forsvaret. (2011). Forsvarets årsrapport for 2011.
Gurin, P. (1999). The compelling need for diversity in education, Expert report prepared for law suits. University of Michigan.
Harsvik, M. (2010). Kom igjen gutta. Masteroppgave i sosialantropologi, UIO.
Håvimb, J. (2010). I konstant rampelys—kvinnelige sersjanters opplevelse av å være kvinne i Hæren. Enkvalitativ studie.
Masteroppgave i pedagogikk, NTNU.
Hernes, H. (1984). Women and the welfare state: The transition from private to public dependence. In Holter H. (Ed.)., Patriarchy
in a welfare society. Oslo: Norwegian University Press.
Hennes, K. (2009). Delrapport fra VPV ifm Forskning påårskull. Vernepliktsverket.
Hong, L., & Page S. E. (2001). Groups of diverse problem solvers can outperform groups of high-ability problem solvers.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the United States of America, 101(46), 16385-16389.
Ine Marie Søreide Eriksen (H). (2012, April). i forbindelse med Interpellasjonen fra representantMarit Nybak til
Forsvars-ministeren ved taler (Hovedinnlegg). Stortinget, møte mandag 16. april kl. 12.00.
Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2009, March). About integration of women in defense.
Johansen, I. (2000). Praktisering av verneplikten i Norge 1814–2000. FFI-rapport 2000/02708.
Jørstad, I. J. (2010). Garderekutt Jørstad 08.10.2010.(blog)
Køber, P., & Strand K., (2013). Første møte med Forsvaret - en kvantitativ analyse av data fra sesjon i 2012. FFI-rapport
2013/01850
Kristiansen, S. T. (2011). Fortjener du åbli offiser—om offiseryrkets seleksjonskoder. KS-Fagrapport 1/2011.
Kristiansen, S. T., Boe, O. C., Bakken, B. T., Skjæret, S. W., & Granlund, L. M. (2008). Kunsten årekruttere og beholde jenter i
Forsvaret—Skisse til ny strategi for økt kvinneandel i Forsvaret. KS Fagrapport nr. 2.
Kristiansen, S. T., Boe, O., & Skjæret, S. W. (2010). Ikke en av gutta—et mangfoldsperspektiv på inkludering av kvinner i
Forsvaret. KS Fagrapport nr. 1.
Lauritzen, T., Leirvik, B., Schanke, T., & Ellingsen, A. (2009). Vi er ikke sånne jente-jenter. ØF-notat nr.09/2009.
Østlandsforskning.
Leonard, J. S., & Levine, D. I. (2006). The effect of diversity on turnover: A large case study. Industrial & Labor Relations
Review, 59(4), article 2.
Llopis, G. (2011, June). Diversity management is the key to growth: Make it authentic.
Öberg, P. O., Oskarsson, S., & Svensson, T. (2009). Rethinking the relationship between diversity andtrust. Uppsala
Universitet.
Rones, N., & Fasting, K. (2011). Befalsskolestudien—Felles opptak og seleksjon 2010. Hva skjeri felt(et). Rapportserie, Norges
idrettshøgskole / Forsvarets institutt 2011/01.
Sand, T. S., & Fasting, K. (2011). Flere kvinner i Forsvaret?—En analyse av studier om rekruttering avkvinner og kvinners
erfaringer i og med Forsvaret. Rapportserie NIH/F 04/2011.
Sand, T. S., & Fasting, K. (2012). Flere kvinner i Forsvaret?—Tiltak for åøke kvinneandelen iForsvaret. Rapportserie NIH/F
01/2012.
Schanke, T., Lauritzen, T., & Leirvik, B. (2008). Kvinner i Forsvaret. Kunnskapsunderlag med fokus påtre tema; Ungdoms valg
av utdanning og yrke, det kjønnsdelte arbeidsliv og mangfold iorganisasjoner. ØF-Notat nr. 05/2008,
Østlandsforskning.
Steder, F. B. (2007). Kostnytteperspektiv påverneplikten og mannskapsproduksjonen i Forsvaret. FFI-Rapport 2007/00022.

Steder, F. B. (2010). Kvinner i Forsvaret—Status quo Vadis. Norsk Militært, tidsskrift nr. 5-6.
Steder, F. B., Hellum, N., & Skutlaberg, K. (2009). Forskning påårskull fra sesjon og framover—kjønn,ledelse og rekruttering i
Forsvaret. FFI-rapport 2009/01335.
Sheppard, C. (2007). Women in combat. USAWC Strategy Project.
Stornæs, A., & Fasting, K. (2011). Befalsskolestudien 2010—Felles opptak og seleksjon 2010. RapportserieNIH/F 03/2011.
Totland, O. (2009). Det operative fellesskapet. Masteroppgave i sosialantropologi, UIO.
Utdannings-og forskningsdepartementet. (2004). Kunnskapsløftet—Læreplan for grunnskolen ogvideregående opplæring.
Værnø, G. (2012). Kvinnenes Forsvarshistorie Bind II. Kvinners Frivillige Beredskap, Oslo.
Værnø, G., & Sveri, E. (1990). Kvinnenes Forsvarshistorie. Kvinners Frivillige Beredskap, Oslo.
Vernepliktsverket. (2011). Vernepliktsverkets handlingsplan for rekruttering av kvinner.
Watts, A. G. (2006). Erfaringsbasert læring om arbejde. In Watts, A. G., Law, B., Killeen, J., & Kidd, J.M. (Eds.), Uddannelses-
og erhvervs-vejledning—Teori og praksis (2 utg. ). Fredensborg.

International Relations and Diplomacy, ISSN 2328-2134
May 2014, Vol. 2, No. 5, 310-322
Coordination, Compromise, and Change: A Case of US-Japan
Conflict Over Commercial Whaling
Takashi Sekiyama
Meiji University, Tokyo, Japan
This paper, for the goal of revealing the mechanism of compromise and change in coordination, will focus on
US-Japan conflict over commercial whaling. The regime like the international whaling regulation, where countries
agree in general but disagree on coordination methods, is known as the Battle of the Sexes in game theory. It has
been believed that in regimes presented as the Battle of the Sexes (BoS) situation, once the countries could
somehow coordinate their interests and reach an agreement on the specific method of coordination, neither country
would have the incentive to withdraw from that agreement. This case study, however, shows that this belief is not
always true. From the analysis of this study, it will be concluded that coordination methods change over time even
in regimes where the countries agree in general and disagree on coordination methods. In this case, “power,”
“institution” and “consensus” are pointed out as incentives to make the two countries accept a specific coordination
method.
Keywords: the Battle of the Sexes (BoS), International Whaling Commission (IWC), The United States, Japan,
coordination, compromise
Introduction
The need for coordination arises whenever countries believe that they can obtain some gains by working
together. In today’s interdependent international relations, however, we often find a situation where at least one
party must compromise to avoid the coordination from breaking down. In other words, even if there is a
coordination method more favorable for our country, we will accept the coordination method more favorable to
the other country to avoid a breakdown in coordination. In such a situation, a country must accept the
coordination method with smaller gains even though a coordination method with larger gains does exist. A
question here is what factors decide which country should compromise. Why the one country dares to accept
the coordination method with smaller gains while the other country can enjoy a coordination method with
larger gains?
For example, the international whaling regime has experienced a series of such compromises. The
protection and management of whales cannot be achieved by a single country since whales swim in oceans all
over the world. Protection is only possible through the international coordination of many countries, and the

Acknowledgement: The original idea of this article was presented as a chapter of the Ph.D. dissertation submitted to the
University of Tokyo. The author would like to thank Prof. Tatsuo Yanagita, Prof. Takayuki Minato, Prof. Jin Sato, Prof. Akio
Takahara, and Prof. Tomoo Marukawa for their patient guidance, enthusiastic encouragement and useful critiques. The author also
thanks anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions on the manuscript. The preparation of this article was supported
by Meiji University.
Takashi Sekiyama, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Organization for International Collaboration, Meiji University.
DAVID PUBLISHING
D

A CASE OF US-JAPAN CONFLICT OVER COMMERCIAL WHALING 311
International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) and International Whaling Commission (IWC)
based on the ICRW exist for the preservation of whale species and orderly development of the whaling industry.
The US is one of the original members of the IWC, which was set up in 1946. Japan became a member in 1951.
In other words, it can be said that both the US and Japanese governments, as members of the IWC, share the
idea that there is a need to manage whale resources.
The two countries, however, have been in conflict since the 1970s regarding whether or not there is a need
for a total ban on commercial whaling. The United States was the world’s largest whaling nation in the 19th
century. The decreased demand for whale oil led to the deterioration and eventual demise of the US whaling
industry in the 1970s. Meanwhile, interest in the protection of whales, mainly led by conservation groups,
gained momentum in the United States. Thus, the US government played a major role in adopting the
moratorium on commercial whaling. On the other hand, unlike the United States and European countries, Japan
continued to hunt whales for whale meat even after the United States and European countries had withdrawn
from whaling as they no longer needed whale oil. Thus, the Japanese government still insists on limited
sustainable use of non-endangered species such as the minke whale while supporting the protection of
endangered species such as the blue whale. In other words, it is the situation where the parties agree in general
but disagree on the details.
Under such circumstances, coordination until the mid-1980s tolerating commercial whaling had been
favorable to the Japanese government. However, the situation changed in the second half of the 1980s,
becoming favorable to the US government with the ban on commercial whaling. In 1982, the IWC adopted a
moratorium to suspend the commercial whaling of large species (13 including blue and minke whales), and
subsequently the killing of whales for commercial purposes has been banned since the 1986 coastal and
1985/1986 pelagic seasons1
. As will be mentioned in detail later, the US government played a major role in this
moratorium on commercial whaling. It started calling for the termination of commercial whaling at the IWC in
1972, and the IWC finally adopted the proposal a decade in 1982. The Japanese government initially lodged an
objection regarding this moratorium, but ended up withdrawing its objection and suspending commercial
whaling in 1988.
Why had international coordination until the mid-1980s tolerating commercial whaling been favorable to
the Japanese government? What was behind the US compromise? Also, why did the situation change in the
second half of the 1980s, becoming favorable to the US government with the ban on commercial whaling? Why
did the Japanese government decide to accept the moratorium on commercial whaling? What was behind the
Japanese compromise? And, why has the Japanese government not defected from the IWC?
The existing studies have not yet answered these questions, although there are many studies on
international whaling across a diverse range of academic fields spanning from international law to biology.
Lary (1941), Birnie (1985), and others talked about the history of whaling regulations in terms of international
law, while Peterson (1992) analyzed the impact of environmental groups on IWC international whaling
regulations. On the topic of Japanese whaling diplomacy, Clapham et al. (2003), Ishii & Okubo (2007), and
many others took a critical view. For studies regarding the US government’s whaling diplomacy, Martin &
Brennan (1989) focused on how economic sanctions have played a role in achieving the moratorium on
commercial whaling. US-Japan relations regarding commercial whaling, however, still need more exploration.
The regime like the international whaling regulation, where countries agree in general but disagree on
1
Paragraph 10 (e), Schedule, ICRW.

A CASE OF US-JAPAN CONFLICT OVER COMMERCIAL WHALING312
coordination methods, is known as the Battle of the Sexes (BoS) in game theory. Although the Japanese
government still insists on limited sustainable use of some whales, Tokyo has been supporting the protection of
endangered species such as the blue whale. In the other word, Washington D.C. and Tokyo agree in general
with the protection of whales. The difference between them exists in their ideas about how to protect them. The
US government thinks that the total ban on commercial whaling is necessary, while the Japanese government
argues that limited sustainable use of some whales will not endanger the species. Similarly, the international
coordination of radio frequencies, privatization of international telecommunications, and negotiations for
international standardization have been pointed out as examples of the BoS situations (Krasner, 1991;
Mattli & Buthe, 2003).
It has been believed that in regimes presented as BoS situations, once the countries could somehow
coordinate their interests and reach an agreement on the specific method of coordination, neither country would
have the incentive to withdraw from that agreement. Then, an agreement reached in BoS situations has been
believed to be “self-enforced” and “stable” (Stein, 1982, p. 314; Snidal, 1985, p. 932; Martin, 1992, p. 775). In
these situations, one side must make a compromise and accept the method of coordination more favorable to
the other country to avoid the worst outcome, the breakdown of coordination. Once two countries reach an
agreement in a BoS situation, at least country A, which managed to achieve the agreement through a favorable
method, would not be motivated to change the status quo. Then, even if country B, which ended up making a
compromise by accepting an unfavorable method (in other words, smaller gains), tried to change the status quo,
there is no chance that country A would agree to changing the status quo. If country B bulled through its
demand to change the situation, it would only lead to the breakdown of negotiations. Therefore, it is assumed
that even country B would not try to withdraw from the agreement.
The case in this study, however, shows that this belief is not always true. The United States and Japan
have challenged the status quo when it was unfavorable to them, and indeed the agreements reached in the
initial negotiation were changed in favor of challenger countries. Indeed, some previous studies have pointed
out the possibility that a longer duration of the BoS game gives players incentives to be more concerned with
the exact distributional consequences of particular coordination outcomes (Stein, 1982, p. 314; Snidal, 1985, p.
936; Hausken, 2005; Sekiyama, 2014). Nevertheless, this possibility has never been thoroughly examined by
case studies. It has been rare to discuss the situation where the players agree in general but disagree on the
details regarding coordination methods in the discipline of International Relations.
Then, in regimes where the countries agree in general but disagree on coordination methods, an agreement
reached in such a situation would be really self-enforced and stable as a BoS game suggests? If players were
able to revise the outcome of their negotiations later, would the agreement reached in the initial negotiation be
always stable? If not, what mechanism can explain coordination, compromise, and change in a situation where
players agree in general but disagree on the details?
This paper, for the goal of revealing the mechanism of compromise and change in coordination, will focus
on Japan and the United States as the main pro-whaling and anti-whaling countries, analyzing how negotiations
have progressed regarding this issue where the parties agree in general but disagree on the details. The first
segment notes that the US and Japanese governments had been in conflict regarding commercial whaling ever
since the 1970s. While both governments were in general agreed with the necessity for the protection of the
endangered whales, they disagreed over the details of whether or not commercial whaling should be totally
banned. Then, it will be demonstrated that the US and Japanese governments have been forced to compromise

regarding commercial whaling one after another. In this case, “power”, “institution” and “consensus” are
pointed out as incentives to make the two countries accept a specific coordination method. Finally, this study
concludes that coordination methods change over time even in international coordination where the countries
agree in general and disagree on coordination methods, although it has been believed that if an agreement is
reached under such circumstances, the countries do not have the incentive to withdraw from the agreement.
Agreement in General and Disagreement on the Details
The Stand Point of the United States
The United States may be anti-whaling today, but it was the world’s largest whaling nation in the 18th and
19th centuries. The nation was once a successful hunter of sperm whales, which were relatively easy to catch
and provided whale oil, said to be superior as lamp fuel and machine oil compared to that of right whales. The
mid-19th century, when Herman Melville published Moby Dick, was indeed the golden era of US whaling. The
United States’ whaling production in the 1830s accounted for more than 60% of the world’s production, and it
was one of the main industries in the country, ranked number five out of all domestic industries (Kakinuma,
2007, p. 9).
Afterward, as the use of petroleum oil became more widespread in the second half of the 19th century, the
demand for whale oil decreased. The California Gold Rush in 1849 also contributed to a decline in the whaling
workforce, and investors started to shift their investments from the whaling industry to other areas. This led to
the deterioration and eventual demise of the US whaling industry in the 1970s, and since this time, practically
no individuals or groups have gained profits from whaling or whaling products or suffered losses resulting from
the international ban on whaling in the United States.
Meanwhile, interest in the protection of whales, mainly led by conservation groups, gained momentum in
the United States. In 1969, media coverage of the Santa Barbara oil spill reported several dead gray whales
washed ashore, triggering interest in the protection of whales and motivating the Humane Society of the United
States and other groups to appeal to the government for a ban on whaling (Sanada, 2007, p. 146). Thus, since
there was nothing left to gain from whaling in the United States after the 1970s, the remaining whaling policy
had to do with animal protection.
In such a climate, the US Department of Commerce in 1971 decided to ban the capture of eight species of
whales including sperm whales, based on the Whaling Convention Act of 1949. Not stopping at banning
domestic whaling, the US Congress went on to ask the government to ban international commercial whaling
(Sanada, 2007, pp. 145-151; Nobuo, 2004, pp. 214-218). One of the factors behind this move was the 1971
IWC annual meeting held in Washington DC, drawing particular attention to the issue in the United States. The
US Senate unanimously adopted the resolution to ask the Secretary of State to call for an international
moratorium on commercial whaling on June 29, 1971, to coincide with the IWC annual meeting in
Washington.2
The House also adopted a similar joint resolution soon after. As a result, in 1972, the US
government started calling on the IWC to ban commercial whaling.
The Stand Point of Japan
Japan continued to hunt whales for meat rather than oil in the Southern Ocean even after the US and
2
S. J. Res.115 (Joint resolution requesting the Secretary of State to call for an international moratorium of ten years on the killing
of all species of whales).

European countries had withdrawn from whaling as they no longer needed whale oil (Clapham et al., 2003;
Ishii & Okubo, 2007). Historical records in Japan show that the Japanese have hunted right whales and gray
whales for whale meat and making tools since ancient times. While the main objective of the whaling industry
in the West had been to procure whale oil and baleen, discarding the whale meat, internal organs, and bones
overboard, Japanese whaling was about using all that the whale had to offer. The meat, skin, and internal
organs were cooked as food, the bones crushed to make fertilizer, and the baleen used as material for arts and
crafts. Eventually, Japan also introduced modern Western methods to its whaling practices. The first modern
whaling company in Japan was founded in 1899, and 12 whaling companies were established in 1908, all of
them operating in waters close to Japan. After World War II, the Japanese whaling companies began to
purchase whaling mother ships belonging to other countries that were starting to withdraw from whaling in
order to acquire their whaling quotas. As a result, Japan became the whaling country with the world’s largest
haul in the 1960-1961 season.
On the other hand, as interest in the protection of whales gained momentum in the international
community, the Japanese government had also in the 1960s taken the position to cooperate with whaling
regulations based on IWC regulations to help protect whale resources. Some Japanese newspapers also started
publishing articles appealing for the protection of whales in the 1960s.3
However, Japan always made it clear that it was against completely banning whaling, asserting that there
was no scientific basis for doing so and that it was based on a sentimental argument4
. The Japanese
government’s basic argument is more or less the same even today. It still insists on limited sustainable use of
non-endangered species such as the minke whale while supporting the protection of endangered species such as
the blue whale (Consulate-General of Japan in Sydney, 2012). In fact, the Japanese government has allowed its
people to continue whaling for scientific purposes even after accepting the moratorium on commercial whaling.
In March 2014, the International Court of Justice ruled that Japanese scientific whaling in the Antarctic is an
ICRW violation, but the Japanese government has made it clear that it will continue to conduct scientific
whaling (Japanese Fisheries Agency, 2014).
In terms of public sentiment in Japan, the majority of the nation has always believed in protecting the
culture of consuming whale meat and the history of traditional whaling of particular regions. One study points
out that many Japanese feel that international criticism of Japanese whaling is an attack on their culture (Ishii &
Okubo, 2007). Thus, the people of Japan believe they must protect their traditional whaling culture from the
rest of the world.
Conflict Over Commercial Whaling
Both the US and Japanese governments, as members of the IWC, share the idea that there is a need to
manage whale resources. However, as explained above, they have been in conflict since the 1970s regarding
whether or not there is a need for a total ban on commercial whaling. After 10 years of compromise, in 1982,
the US government successfully talked IWC into adopting a moratorium to suspend the commercial whaling.
Subsequently the killing of whales for commercial purposes has been banned since the 1986 coastal and
1985/86 pelagic seasons.
Thus, international coordination until the mid-1980s tolerating commercial whaling had been favorable to
3
For example, Asahi Shinbun “Nankyokukai no Kujira to Nihon” , May 7, 1963.
4
“Zenmen kinshi niwa hantai Otsubo Toshio Suisancho Kaiyo Ichi kacho no hanashi (Opposed to complete termination,
interview with Fisheries Agency Toshio Otsubo)”, Asahi Shimbun, June 10, 1972.

the Japanese government. However, the situation changed in the second half of the 1980s, becoming favorable
to the US government with the ban on commercial whaling. IWC members are legally obligated to comply with
the ICRW, but if a member objects to an amendment, it does not become effective for that member until the
objection is withdrawn5
. In 1982, the Japanese government, dissatisfied with the moratorium on commercial
whaling, objected to the amendment with the governments of Norway, the Soviet Union and Peru. But Japan
later withdrew its objection and accepted the moratorium in 1988.
Then, why had international coordination until the mid-1980s tolerating commercial whaling been
favorable to the Japanese government? What was behind the US compromise? Also, why did the situation
change in the second half of the 1980s, becoming favorable to the US government with the ban on commercial
whaling? Why did the Japanese government decide to accept the moratorium on commercial whaling? What
was behind the Japanese compromise?
The US Compromise Led by “Institution”
In 1972, the US government started calling on the biennial IWC meeting to ban commercial whaling. The
US government stated that the state of knowledge of the whale stocks was so inadequate that it was only
common prudence to suspend whaling.
The Biennial IWC Meeting 1972
The US government had already succeeded in adopting the resolution calling for a 10-year moratorium on
commercial whaling at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm just
before the IWC annual meeting in 1972. Though the resolution was not legally binding, the adoption of the
moratorium at an international meeting held great significance.
The US government then proposed a 10-year moratorium on commercial whaling at the IWC annual
meeting in 1972, but unlike the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, the proposal was met
with a negative reaction from the participants. IWC Scientific Committee said that a blanket moratorium on
whaling could not be justified scientifically since prudent management required regulations of the stocks
individually. The committee recommended that instead of a moratorium, support should be sought for a decade
of intensified research on cetaceans. In the course of discussion in the plenary session, opposition to the US
proposal was expressed on the grounds that there was no sound scientific basis for a moratorium, that a
cessation of whaling would result in reducing the research effort; that the introduction of a moratorium could
result in a complete setting aside of all that was being achieved by the IWC (IWC, 1974, pp. 24-25).
A moratorium on commercial whaling by the IWC specifically meant revising paragraph 10 (e) of the
ICRW schedule which outlined the catch limits for whale species subject to IWC management and bringing
down the number of whales to be captured in a season to zero.
In this regard, any amendment to a schedule of ICRW must be approved not by a simple majority vote, but
a three-quarters majority vote at the IWC annual meeting to pass.6
Therefore, the adoption of the US
government’s proposal for a moratorium also required support from more than three quarters of the IWC
countries.
However, the US government’s proposal failed to gain more than three quarters of the vote at the biennial
IWC meeting in 1972, and was rejected with four in favor, six against, and four abstentions. Though the US
5
Paragraph 3, Article 5, ICRW.
6
Paragraph 2, Article 3, ICRW.

government had succeeded in winning the non-binding resolution for a moratorium at the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment comprised of environmental groups, it had failed to foster support at
the IWC, which actually governs international whaling activities.
Three-Quarters Majority Vote Rule
Afterward, the US government continued to present the proposal at the IWC in 1973 and following years,
but it was rejected each time. Thus, the US government and environmental groups decided to recruit new
members, also using direct means such as providing money, to establish an advantage in numbers at the IWC
(Pash, 2008, p. 210). However, they ended up spending a decade unable to muster the required three-quarters
majority vote to amend the IWC schedule. Meanwhile, Japan continued commercial whaling according to the
IWC rules.
In other words, what forced the US government to compromise regarding commercial whaling by 1982
was the “institution” in the form of the ICRW or IWC, with the three-quarters majority vote rule for amending
the schedule for commercial whaling.
Power Politics Over the Moratorium on Commercial Whaling
Adoption of the Moratorium
In the late 1970s, some initial supporters of commercial whaling began changing their minds. For example,
Australia used to perform small-scale coastal whaling, but the increasing anti-whaling protests in the country
forced the government to change its policy to support a total ban on whaling in 1979. Canada also used to vote
against the moratorium, taking a position closer to the pro-whaling countries, but the growing activities of
domestic environmental groups finally persuaded it to leave the IWC in 1982.
In addition, as stated above, the US government and environmental groups eagerly recruited new members.
These efforts boosted the number of new anti-whaling members especially in the beginning of the 1980s.
Meanwhile, the Japanese government also made efforts to recruit the pro-whaling countries that had not yet
joined the IWC in order to bolster support and halt the adoption of the moratorium on commercial
whaling. However, despite Japan’s efforts, the presence of pro-whaling countries in the IWC diminished each
year.
As a result, the moratorium on commercial whaling was finally adopted at the IWC annual meeting of
1982 with 25 in favor, seven against, and five abstentions, and the amendment to paragraph 10 (e) of the ICRW
schedule was as follows:
(1) Catch limits for the killing for commercial purposes of whales from all stocks for the 1986 coastal and
the 1985/86 pelagic seasons and thereafter shall be zero;
(2) This provision will be kept under review, based upon the best scientific advice, and by 1990 at the
latest the Commission will undertake a comprehensive assessment of the effects of this decision on whale
stocks and consider modification of this provision and the establishment of other catch limits.
Thus, after a four-year grace period, IWC members were banned from the commercial whaling of whale
species subject to IWC management in all waters, including coastal waters, exclusive economic seas, and open
seas. After 10 years of compromise under the IWC’s three-quarters majority vote rule, the US government had
finally managed to amend the ICRW schedule.
Japan’s Objection
The Japanese government against this move recalled that the IWC Scientific Committee had stated in the

past that there was no scientific justification for a blanket moratorium. Japan also asserted that there were large
numbers in some whale stocks, and that the moratorium would violate ICRW aiming for the orderly
development of the whaling industry as well as infringing sovereign rights in coastal waters (IWC, 1983,
pp. 20-21).
Unlike the resolution adopted by UN Conference on the Human Environment, ICRW members are legally
obligated to comply with the moratorium adopted by IWC. However, ICRW also describes that if a member
objects to an amendment, it does not become effective for the member until the objection is withdrawn. In 1982,
the Japanese government, dissatisfied with the moratorium on commercial whaling, objected to the amendment
with the governments of Norway, the Soviet Union and Peru.
Japan’s Compromise by “Power”
The Japanese government initially lodged an objection regarding the moratorium, but ended up
withdrawing its objection and suspending commercial whaling in 1988. The Japanese government’s
compromise had been effectuated by pressure from the US government. Once the Japanese government lodged
its objection, the US government urged it to withdraw, threatening Japan with economic sanctions. In other
words, the US government forced the Japanese government into making a compromise through its “power.”
At the time, Japanese fishermen caught more than 100,000 tons of salmon and trout every year in the US
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The United States basically had two domestic laws that enabled it to
implement economic sanctions on countries that were hindering the impact of IWC whaling regulations. The
first was the Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen’s Protective Act of 1967, and the second was the
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Martin &
Brennan, 1989; Sumi, 1989; American Society of International Law, 2001). Thus, following the two laws, in
1984, the US government hinted that it might not permit Japanese fishing vessels in the US EEZ, because Japan
was diminishing the impact of global whale protection efforts.
Since Japanese fisheries involved in commercial whaling had also been operating in the US EEZ, if the US
government actually were to impose economic sanctions it would mean major losses. It was estimated that the
economic sanction would have cost the Japanese fishing industry approximately $60 million in 1983, which
was a considerably larger amount than the approximately $40 million brought in by the Japanese whaling
industry (New York Times, 1984).
As such, the Japanese and US governments engaged in talks regarding whaling from November 1984 to
March 1985. During the talks the US government forcefully expressed its desire for the Japanese government to
withdraw the objection regarding the moratorium on commercial whaling. Consequently, the Japanese
government gave in to the US pressure of economic sanctions and promised to withdraw its objection. The
Japanese government formally withdrew its objection on July 1, 1986, and ceased commercial whaling in 1988.
In other words, the US government forced the Japanese government into making a compromise through its
“power” .
Japan’s Compromise Precipitated by “Institution”
Japan’s Effort to Restart Commercial Whaling
As things turned out, however, the US government then decided to disallow the operation of any foreign
fishing vessels in the US EEZ from 1988, and this ban of course covered Japanese fisheries. In other words, the
Japanese government’s greatest incentive to give up commercial whaling disappeared.

Unsurprisingly, the Japanese government then started preparations to restart commercial whaling (Sumi,
1989; Ishii & Okubo, 2007). The commercial whaling moratorium was to be kept under review based on the
best scientific advice, and by 1990 the IWC was to have undertaken a comprehensive assessment of the effects
of the moratorium and considered the establishment of new catch limits7
. Also, the IWC recognizes scientific
whaling as an exception to the moratorium8
. Thus, the Japanese government started hunting whales in 1987 for
the purpose of scientific research to collect the necessary data to recommence commercial whaling (Clapham et
al., 2003; Childerhouse et al., 2006)9
.
The Japanese government had also been asking the IWC since 1988 to allow Japan to catch minke whales
in Japanese coastal waters as an initiative working towards the restart of commercial whaling. The IWC
currently recognizes aboriginal subsistence whaling as another exception to the moratorium. Aboriginal
subsistence whaling refers to aboriginal groups catching whales for meat and produce to be consumed in their
community10
. Tokyo asserts that its whale hunting by small boats in coastal areas can be considered aboriginal
subsistence whaling (Freeman, 1990).
However, the quota for commercial whaling has not been reviewed since 1986, and small-type coastal
whaling in Japan has not been recognized as aboriginal subsistence whaling. Thus, a major factor in restarting
commercial whaling would be the establishment of scientific management procedures regarding whale stocks.
One of the reasons why the moratorium was not lifted is that the anti-whaling governments disagree with the
pro-whaling governments regarding new methods of managing whale stocks. This conflict has prevented either
side from winning a three-quarters majority vote, resulting in the declaration bringing discussions to a standstill
at the 2006 annual meeting. There are no plans to resume discussions as of 2014.
Three-Quarters Majority Vote Rule
The key here is again the IWC’s rules for adopting resolutions. As explained before, any amendment to a
schedule of ICRW must be approved not by a simple majority vote, but a three-quarters majority vote at the
IWC annual meeting to pass. This means that it needs a three-quarters majority vote to amend the specific
decisions regarding the quota for commercial whaling, revised management procedure or aboriginal subsistence
whaling.
Recent voting behavior reveals that, in addition to the Asian countries such as South Korea, Cambodia and
Laos, many countries of Africa and the Caribbean also support sustainable use of whale resources. There were
39 IWC member countries as of 1982 when the moratorium on commercial whaling was adopted, and 89 as of
August 2012. It is believed that some 40 IWC members support whaling.
However, with the current IWC power balance, there is no hope that the restart of commercial whaling
will be approved by more than three quarters of the voting members. The present power balance makes it
impossible for both sides to gain the three-quarters majority vote required to amend the schedule. Although the
Japanese government has been calling for the restart of commercial whaling or permission for small-type
coastal whaling for a long time, its proposals have been unable to gain more than three quarters of the IWC
vote. It may be said that the Japanese government is forced to compromise because of the “institution” of the
7
Paragraph 10 (e), Schedule, ICRW.
8
Paragraph 13, Schedule, ICRW.
9
ICJ judged that Japan’s whaling programme was not for scientific research as claimed by Tokyo. It has ruled that the Japanese
government must halt its whaling programme in the Antarctic. There are also studies questioning the scientific contribution of
Japan’s scientific whaling, pointing out that it is an attempt to sustain the domestic whaling industry.
10
Paragraph 13, Schedule, ICRW.

IWC’s three-quarters majority vote.
Japan’s Compromise Led by “Consensus”
Since there is little hope that commercial whaling will be resumed any time soon, some people say the
Japanese government should simply leave the IWC, and the Japanese delegation has actually indicated the
possibility of leaving the IWC a number of times in the past. Recently, a Japanese representative is said to have
stated at the 2007 IWC annual meeting that the IWC is dysfunctional and that Japan may be forced to consider
leaving the IWC or establishing a new organization.11
However, if the Japanese government were to really leave the IWC, it would not escape censure from the
international community. It is not hard to imagine Japan being harshly criticized by the governments of the
anti-whaling bloc that accounts for more than half of the 89 IWC members, as well as the various
environmental groups, animal rights groups, and domestic and international media. Whether or not the
anti-whaling sentiment in Western countries is really shared by their citizens is open to discussion. However, it
is a fact that the current ban on commercial whaling has become widely established in the international
community with the 1972 moratorium on commercial whaling at the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, the 1982 moratorium at the IWC annual meeting, the 1994 Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary at
the IWC annual meeting, and other events.
Reluctance to fly in the face of international opinion is probably one of the strongest reasons why the
Japanese government has not actually left the IWC and has maintained its stance of trying to restart commercial
whaling within the IWC framework. In other words, it is the international community’s widespread
“consensus” on banning commercial whaling which keeps the Japanese government in the IWC. Then again, as
long as Japan remains an IWC member, there is no prospect for Japan to restart commercial whaling; in other
words, the “consensus” on banning commercial whaling is also preventing Japan from restarting commercial
whaling.
Conclusion
Summary
When countries agree on the need to collaborate but are in conflict regarding the specific method, one
player must always compromise regarding the specific method of coordination (in other words, accept smaller
gains). It has always been believed that if an agreement is reached under such circumstances, the countries do
not have the incentive to withdraw from the agreement.
However, as stated above, the case of US-Japan relations regarding commercial whaling shows that this
belief is not always true. Although the Japanese government still insists on limited sustainable use of some
whales, Tokyo has been supporting the protection of endangered species such as the blue whale. Both the US
and Japanese governments, as members of the IWC, share the idea that there is a need to manage whale
resources. Nevertheless, they have been in conflict since the 1970s regarding whether or not there is a need for
a total ban on commercial whaling. Japan continued to hunt whales for meat rather than oil even after the US
and European countries had withdrawn from whaling as they no longer needed whale oil. Under such
circumstances, coordination until the mid-1980s tolerating commercial whaling had been favorable to the
Japanese government. However, the situation changed in the second half of the 1980s, becoming favorable to
11
Yomiuri Shinbun, June 1, 2007.

International Relations and Diplomacy Journal Explores Increasing Women in Norwegian Military

International Relations and Diplomacy Journal Explores Increasing Women in Norwegian Military

Recomendados

Recomendados

Más contenido relacionado

Similar a International Relations and Diplomacy Journal Explores Increasing Women in Norwegian Military

Similar a International Relations and Diplomacy Journal Explores Increasing Women in Norwegian Military (17)

International Relations and Diplomacy Journal Explores Increasing Women in Norwegian Military