Final with proper citation

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page 1: Table of Contents
Page 2: Introduction by Stephen Martin
Page 5: Sleep Deprivation Interrogation Techniques & the Implications Their use Has on the
Admissibility of Evidence
- 5: Detainees and the War on Terror
- 6: What is a Detainee?
- 7: Sleep and Sleep Deprivation's Impact on the Body
- 11: What is Torture?
- 13: Argument: Sleep Deprivation Techniques Caused Severe Physical Suffering, and are
Therefore Torture
- 17: Argument: Sleep Deprivation Techniques Caused Severe Mental Suffering, and are
Therefore Torture
- 19: Argument: The Use of Sleep Deprivation Techniques Caused Hallucinations Similar to
Mind-altering Substances, said Techniques are Therefore Torture
- 21: Argument: Sleep Deprivation Techniques Themselves are a Mind-altering Procedure, said
Techniques are Therefore Torture
- 23: Argument: The Use of Sleep Deprivation Techniques on Detainees Constitutes an
Imminent Threat of Death, Its use is Therefore Torture
- 24: Argument: Confessions Obtained Via the Use of Sleep Deprivation Techniques are
Inadmissible Due to Undue Coercion
- 35: Argument: Sleep Deprivation Interrogation Techniques Render Their Victims Incompetent
to Confess
- 38: Conclusion
- 39: Works Cited
Page 43: Mosaic Theory Intelligence Analysis & The Phenomenon of Falsified-Information-Feedback-
Loops
Page 65: Conclusion by Stephen Martin
Page 66: Appendix
- 66: Presentation Script
- 71: Miranda Rights Explanation
- 72: Selective Overstimulation Method of Public Speech Construction
Page 89: Special Thanks to

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Introduction
Stephen Martin
Imagine being held in a dark, cold cell. You are often kept naked, and hypothermia is a real
potential issue for your health. Your hands are shackled above your head so that you must remain
standing in order to keep the shackles from digging into your wrists and cutting off circulation from
your hands. You are often left in this position for so long that blood pools in your feet, causing painful
swelling and edemas. You are kept awake for periods ranging from 48 to 180 hours. Sometimes you are
kept awake simply by the pain of the shackles and edemas, other times those who have you detained
will question you nonstop so that any time you are about to drift to sleep their questions keep you
awake. This continues until you begin to hallucinate, and often will continue long after you have begun
to do so. While it may seem like something out of a horror movie, this scenario is all too real for US
military detainees.
The use of sleep deprivation techniques in conjunction with enhanced-interrogation-techniques
is illegal, impractical, and immoral. These pieces hope to address this issue by detailing a number of
steps those trying to advocate against the use of enhanced-interrogation-techniques can use to advocate
to the courts, the military, and the public.
The centerpiece of this work, and by far the largest body of work involved, is a legal report on
the use of sleep deprivation on US military detainees. This work gives specific focus to the issues of
admissibility surrounding the evidence produced using sleep deprivation techniques. While the
question of whether sleep deprivation is or is not “torture” is a significant portion of this report, it is not
the only question pertaining to the admissibility of the evidence produced using sleep deprivation
interrogation techniques. If it were demonstrated that the use of these techniques on detainees made the
evidence they provided during interrogations inadmissible in court it would act as a significant
deterrent to the further use of said techniques. This paper primarily argues that the information

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produced by sleep deprivation is inadmissible using many arguments, of which the fact that it is torture
is only one. This argument stands out because if sleep deprivation techniques were found by a court to
be torture it would necessitate the immediate cessation of any sleep deprivation based interrogation by
US military personnel or on detainees in US custody.
In addition to the previously mentioned report this body of work includes a report on modern
Mosaic Theory Intelligence Analysis, and how its use in conjunction with “enhanced-interrogation-
techniques” has led to the consistent creation of falsified-information-feedback-loops. This report
acknowledges that Mosaic Theory Intelligence Analysis may on its own be a perfectly valid method of
intelligence analysis. However, the consistent production of falsified information due to Spanish-
Inquisition-esque interrogation strategies has made its modern use both unacceptable as a methodology
for the legal analysis of evidence and impractical as a basis for analyzing and acting upon intelligence.
The third and final piece is a presentation which serves to demonstrate the use of the Burke-
Furo Selective Overstimulation Method of Public Speech Construction. This demonstration uses the
hypothetical example of a person attempting to argue that “sleep deprivation is torture”. This
demonstration comes in the form of a slide show and accompanying script. The slideshow can be found
at the following link: http://prezi.com/tbsukdriutl7/?utm_campaign=share&utm_medium=copy and an
accompanying “script” to be read during the presentation can be found in the appendix.
Disregarding the subject of the demonstration piece, at first this body of work may seem
unrelated. In fact there is an explanation for the seemingly discordant nature of this Division III project.
This project should be viewed as a strategy recommendation for the ACLU (or other advocates) to end
the use of sleep deprivation techniques on US detainees. The first strategy, simple and straightforward,
is to challenge the admissibility of evidence produced by sleep deprivation's use in federal court. The
second strategy is to attack sleep deprivation use by challenging the broader system of enhanced
interrogation techniques within the context of Mosaic Theory Intelligence Analysis. This report

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demonstrates that the entire system of Mosaic Theory Intelligence Analysis has been rendered
unreliable by its use in conjunction with “enhanced-interrogation-techniques” (a label which includes
sleep deprivation). Using this information the ACLU should be able to demonstrate that it is
incompatible with the US legal system and also make a solid argument to the CIA/DoD themselves as
to why they should adapt new procedures which don't involve sleep deprivation and other “torture”-like
techniques. While this strategy does include a small section on the legal implications of the use of these
techniques in a Mosaic Theory Intelligence Analysis lens, it also serves the purpose of showing exactly
how the CIA/DoD is shooting themselves in the foot by not using a more efficient and reliable set of
interrogation procedures. While the first piece appeals primarily to the courts, it could be argued that
this second piece appeals primarily to the common sense of the CIA/DoD.
If the first two strategies were to fail, however, the only thing left for the ACLU (or other
advocates) to do is to lobby Congress to pass a law officially labeling sleep deprivation “torture”. To do
this they will have to lobby Congress for support, and lobby the American public to pressure Congress.
While the demonstration of the Burke-Furo Selective Stimulation Method of Public Speech
Construction will not serve to provide an actual “PR plan”, it would demonstrate to a hypothetical
person from the ACLU how to put this plan together with a little research and then put it into play. The
Burke-Furo Selective Stimulation Method of Public Speech Construction could be called a “PR plan
generator” which uses data points from Semantics, Crowd Psychology, and Neurology to determine
exactly how a person can phrase their arguments and can deliver public speeches in order to most
effectively sway the minds of those who hear them.
Together these three pieces represent detailed “how-to” guides for a competent advocate to take
whatever steps necessary to end the use of sleep deprivation, and possibly other enhanced-
interrogation-techniques, on US detainees.

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Sleep Deprivation Use on US Detainees and its Implications on the Admissibility of Evidence in
Federal Court
I. DETAINEES AND THE WAR ON TERROR (CONTEXT)
Since the events of September 11th
2001 the United States has been openly involved in what is
often termed the “War on Terror”. Fighting this war has involved both overseas and domestic
operations and the expansion of the United States' surveillance capabilities. Perhaps the most
controversial step that the United States has taken in fighting the “War on Terror” is the use of
“enhanced interrogation techniques”. Of the various enhanced interrogation techniques used, sleep
deprivation stood out to me as the most depraved, thus motivating my examination of the question of
its legality. Using the recently published “Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's
Detention and Interrogation Program” as a primary source, this report will examine whether
information gotten from US detainees using sleep deprivation interrogation techniques is admissible in
a federal court. When considering this question, a number of more specific questions must first be
answered. Are sleep deprived detainees competent to confess? Are the sleep deprivation techniques
used on detainees torture? Are the confessions given by sleep deprived individuals accurate enough to
be admissible? Lastly, do the sleep deprivation interrogation techniques used on US detainees qualify
as a violation of Miranda Rights (if US detainees even have Miranda rights)? Before we discuss these
various questions, it behooves us to first have a basic understanding of sleep and what it does for the
body as well as what a “detainee” is.
II. BACKGROUND
IIa. WHAT IS A “DETAINEE”?

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In order for us to examine the treatment of detainees we must first understand exactly what a
detainee is. In 2006 the Department of Defense published Directive 2310.01E. Among other things, this
directive set forth a definitive definition of what qualified a person as a “detainee”:
“E2.1. Detainee. Any person captured, detained, held, or otherwise under the control of
DoD [Department of Defense] personnel (military, civilian, or contractor employee). It
does not include persons being held primarily for law enforcement purposes, except
where the United States is the occupying power. A detainee may also include the
following categories:
E2.1.1. Enemy Combatant. In general, a person engaged in hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners during an armed conflict. The term “enemy combatant”
includes both “lawful enemy combatants” and “unlawful enemy combatants.”
E2.1.1.1. Lawful Enemy Combatant. Lawful enemy combatants, who are entitled to
protections under the Geneva Conventions, include members of the regular armed forces
of a State party to the conflict: militia, volunteer corps, and organized resistance
movements belonging to a State party to the conflict, which are under responsible
command, wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry their arms
openly, and abide by the laws of war: and members of regular armed forces who profess
allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the detaining power.
E2.1.1.2. Unlawful Enemy Combatant. Unlawful enemy combatants are persons not
entitled to combatant immunity, who engage in acts against the United States or its
coalition partners in violation of the laws and customs of war during an armed conflict.
For purposes of the war on terrorism, the term Unlawful Enemy Combatant is defined to
include, but is not limited to, an individual who is or was part of or supporting Taliban
or al Qaeda forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners.
E2.1.2. Enemy Prisoner of War. Individuals under the custody and/or control of the
Department of Defense according to Reference (g), Articles 4 and 5.
E2.1.3. Retained Person. Individuals under the custody and/or control of the Department
of Defense according to Reference (g), Article 33.
E2.1.4. Civilian Internee. Individuals under the custody and/or control of the
Department of Defense according to Reference (h), Article 4.”
(Work, 2014)
Despite the CIA and DOD's assertions that their detainees are treated as the law intends they
should be, I believe the detainee programs are illegal because the treatment of US detainees at the

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hands of the CIA and DoD is unconstitutional. One of the more controversial techniques used in
detainee interrogations is sleep deprivation.
IIb. SLEEPAND SLEEP DEPRIVATION'S IMPACT ON THE BODY
Sleep is a dynamic process, an active event involving physiological changes in the organs of the
body. Sleep can also be thought of as an organized sequence of events following a regular cycle each
night. Brain activity can be measured using electroencephalograms (EEGs), and based on that, a single
period of sleep can be divided into various stages of sleep. There is REM sleep, which is characterized
by bursts of Rapid Eye Movements (REM). Humans are almost entirely paralyzed during REM sleep,
except for the heart, diaphragm, eye muscles, and smooth muscles. Then there is NREM, Non Rapid
Eye Movement sleep. NREM is divided into four parts based on the amplitude and frequency of brain
wave activity. (Hobson, 2003)
Sleep Deprivation has many physiological and psychological effects. These effects include an
overall decrease in general health and well-being (Eriksen & Akerstedt, 2006), cardiovascular problems
(Meerlo et al., 2008), a significant increase in the levels of the stress hormone cortisol (Spiegel et al.,
1999), an increased rate of psychiatric disorders (Meerlo et al., 2008), an increase in risk taking
behavior (Killgore et al., 2006 & Venkatraman et al., 2007), and an increased risk for the development
of diabetes (Spiegal et al., 2005).
Chronic REM sleep deprivation can also lead to a number of potentially fatal heart problems.
Chronic sleep deprivation complaints have, in epidemiological studies, been associated with an overall
increase in mortality and morbidity. Lack of proper sleep has been shown to aggravate cardiovascular
risk factors such as:
• blood pressure (Gottlieb et. al., 2006)

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• glucose metabolism (Gottlieb et. al., 2005)
• hormonal regulation (Colten, 2006)
• inflammation (Mullington, 2009)
Several studies have demonstrated that sleep deprivation in human experimentation leads to
increased blood pressure. In individuals with hypertension or prehypertension even half a night of sleep
deprivation has been observed leading to increases in blood pressure. (Mullington, 2009, Ogawa et. al.,
2003, Fugikawa et. al. 2009, Meier-Ewert et. al. 2004, Lusardi et. al. 1999)
REM sleep deprivation is also associated with increased inflammation, another risk factor for
cardiovascular disease. Recently studies have observed a rise in inflammatory mediators during both
short-term and acute sleep deprivation (Lusardi et, al, 1999, Kuhn et. al. 1968, Dinges et. al. 1994,
Born et. al. 1997, Shearer et. al. 2001). Other studies done on children have found “a significant
relationship [...] between high-sensitivity CRP levels and sleep duration, even after statistically
removing the variance attributable to age, sex, and body mass index” (Larkin et. al., 2005).
REM sleep deprivation has also been established as a significant risk factor in the development
of type II diabetes (Spiegel et al., 2005). This is likely due to the observed dysregulatory effect that
REM sleep deprivation has been observed having on the insulin dependent glucose feedback loop,
which leads to improper management of insulin blood levels. This is a likely explanation for the
statistically significant correlation between chronic REM sleep deprivation and the development of
type II diabetes (Van Cauter et. al., 1991). In the cases of the detainees who underwent multiple sleep
deprivation sessions which lasted forty-eight hours or longer during the week, such as those detailed in
the committee's report, this concern is especially pertinent. Chronic sleep loss has a large impact on
glucose metabolism and appetite regulation. Sleep loss and sleep disturbances contributes to the
development of insulin resistance and type 2 diabetes either directly by inhibiting glucose regulation or

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indirectly via the dysregulation of appetite, leading to weight gain and obesity (Meerlo et. al, 2008).
Blood levels of glucose are tightly regulated within a narrow range to avoid hypoglycemia (low
blood sugar) or hyperglycemia (high blood sugar). Glucose homeostasis is maintained through glucose
production by the liver and the use of glucose by muscles, fat, and the brain. Glucose homeostasis
depends on the ability of the pancreatic theta cell to release insulin acutely and in a sustained fashion as
well as the ability of insulin to prevent the overproduction of glucose, promoting glucose disposal.
Reduced insulin sensitivity, or insulin resistance, happens when higher levels of insulin are needed to
bring down blood glucose levels after the production of a regular amount of glucose. (Rogers et. al.,
2005)
Humans generally sleep in one 7-9 hour period, which is a large chunk of time that the body
must sustain itself without the intake of food. Van Cauter's 1991 study has shown blood levels of
glucose remain stable or fall slowly overnight. In contrast, glucose levels fall by an average of 0.5-1.0
mM over a 12 hour period, triggering a number of mechanisms in order to maintain stable glucose
levels during an overnight fast. (Van Cauter et. al., 1991)
The figure above shows the average profiles of 8 healthy young adults (age 20-27) plasma
glucose levels (blood sugar levels) as well as the Insulin Secretion Rates (ISR) over a 53-hour period

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including 8 hours of regular sleep, 28 hours of sleep deprivation, and then 8 hours of daytime recovery
sleep. A marked decrease in glucose tolerance (higher plasma glucose levels) is shown during nocturnal
as well as daytime recovery sleep. A smaller elevation of glucose and insulin also occurs during
nocturnal sleep deprivation. This shows that sleep deprivation has an effect on circadian dependent
mechanisms. During nocturnal sleep, the increase of plasma glucose ranged from 20-30%. The
maximum levels occur around the middle of the sleep period. During the first half of sleep, an increase
in plasma glucose is followed by an increase in insulin secretion. The major cause of the glucose
increase is a decrease of glucose usage. It is estimated that about two thirds of the fall in glucose usage
during early sleep is due to a decrease in brain glucose metabolism, related to the change to slow-wave
sleep (SWS), which is associated with a 30-40% reduction in cerebral glucose metabolism. The rest of
the reduction in glucose metabolism is due to decreased peripheral utilization. (Van Cauter et. al., 1991)
During the latter part of the night, in what is sometimes called “dawn phenomenon”, glucose
tolerance improves. During this period glucose levels decrease down to morning values, showing
increased glucose usage. This is largely due to the different stages of sleep. Glucose usage during REM
sleep is higher than during non-REM sleep. The end of the sleep period is associated with an increased
insulin sensitivity, reflecting a delayed effect of low cortisol levels during the evening and early part of
the night. (Van Cauter et. al., 1991)
Keep in mind for the reading of this report that many of these effects take different amounts of
time to manifest in different people. Also keep in mind that detainees underwent vastly different levels
of sleep deprivation. For some, sleep deprivation only lasted forty-eight hours and sessions were done
as few as 48 hours just once or twice a week, and for others sleep deprivation could last up to one
hundred and eighty hours. It is assumed for the sake of this report that “chronic” sleep deprivation as
discussed henceforth will refer to sleep deprivation sessions of at least 48 hours in length at least twice
a week, whereas previously it was used to refer to the specific standards set in each study from which

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the word “chronic” was quoted.
Having discussed some of the things sleep does for the body, let us now address the issue of
whether or not the sleep deprivation techniques used on US detainees constitutes torture.
IIc. WHAT IS TORTURE?
Torture is illegal in the United States. If it is found that the sleep deprivation techniques used on
US detainees constitutes “torture”, the information they provided as a result of these interrogations
would be inadmissible in a federal court. In order for something to be torture, under Code, U. C. (18).
USC § 2340: Section 2340: Torture: Definitions, it must:
• be committed by a person (person 1) acting under the color of law (acting on the orders of a
lawfully existing branch of US government)
• be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering
• be committed upon a person (person 2) within the custody or physical control of person 1
The definition of severe mental pain and suffering according to Code, U. C. (18). USC § 2340:
Section 2340: Torture: Definitions is “prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from”:
• the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering:
(pain/threats to inflict pain)
• the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind-altering
substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality:
(mind-altering experiences or substances, or anything not included in those categories which

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"disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality")
• the threat of imminent death: (a direct threat of death, may also include actions which a detainee
knows may lead to his death even if such a threat is not specifically stated, though this is one of
our weaker arguments): or
• the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or
suffering, or the administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality: (the definition of torture includes
threatening a person in one's custody/physical control that another person will be subjected to
something that meets the definition of torture).
We know that the use of sleep deprivation interrogation techniques on detainees was done
“under the color of law” because it was typically done by and under the orders of US military
personnel, but was it specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering? We
have an exhaustive definition of severe mental suffering, but first let us focus on whether or not the
sleep deprivation interrogation techniques used on detainees constitutes “severe physical suffering”.
LEGALARGUMENTS
III. THE SLEEP DEPRIVATION TECHNIQUES USED ON DETAINEES CONSTITUTED
TORTURE
A. THE SLEEP DEPRIVATION TECHNIQUES USED ON DETAINEES CAUSED SEVERE
PHYSICAL SUFFERING
A1. GIVEN THAT THESE TECHNIQUES CAUSED SEVERE PHYSICAL SUFFERING,
THEIR USE QUALIFIES AS TORTURE.

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We know from the recently released “Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's
Detention and Interrogation Program” that contrary to prior reports, the “frequent flyer program”
methodology of sleep deprivation was not typically used on detainees. The “frequent flyer program”
was a method of sleep deprivation in which detainees were moved from room to room once an hour
and allowed to rest in between, this program was not used as often as previously claimed, however.
Rather, detainees were typically kept awake without rest for periods varying from 48 to 180
hours. The committee's report includes many examples in which detainees were, while being deprived
of sleep, shackled in “stress positions” (U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Page 3). These
positions generally involved having the detainees' hands being shackled above their heads so they were
forced to stand, or detainees were handcuffed to the floor between or behind their legs so they were
forced to hunch down (U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Page 3). In some of these cases
the detainees were left in one position so long that it resulted in edemas in their hands or legs (U.S.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Page 91). Given that one of the symptoms of edemas is pain
in the affected limbs (Edema Symptoms), this seems to be evidence of severe physical suffering as a
direct result of the methodology of the sleep deprivation interrogation techniques used. In order to more
thoroughly understand the treatment US detainees typically underwent, let us examine some of the
examples provided by the Committee's report.
One story which can help illustrate the nature of the stress positions detainees were often placed
in while being sleep deprived is the story of Abu Hudhaifa, a US detainee. While the report itself is
redacted as to the source of information concerning his detainment and treatment, it makes no attempt
to censor the story told in the footnotes of the report. Abu Hudhaifa was detained and began his
interrogation, during which he was subjected to both ice baths and 66 hours of standing sleep
deprivation, possibly concurrently though the report does not specify. What it does specify is that after

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this interrogation Abu Hudhaifa was released when the CIA determined he was likely not the person
they'd originally believed him to be. (U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Page 16)
Another story we also have solid information on is Arsala Khan's. Arsala was detained by the
US and shortly thereafter began being interrogated. First Arsala was subjected to 56 hours of standing
sleep deprivation, after which he was “barely able to enunciate” (U.S. Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, Page 109). At this point Arsala was “visibly shaken by his hallucinations depicting dogs
mauling his family” (U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Page 109). Arsala led interrogators
to believe he thought they were responsible for feeding his family to dogs. To be clear, at no point was
Arsala's family fed to dogs so far as the report is concerned. Arsala was subsequently allowed to sleep,
then two days later was subjected to an additional 21 hours of additional standing sleep deprivation.
Approximately a month later, after the CIA decided Arsala Khan was likely not involved in “current
plans or activities against US forces” he was transferred from “DETENSION SITE COBALT” to US
military custody, where he was held an additional four years despite the CIA recommending his release.
(U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Page 16)
Another detainee whose treatment we have solid information on is Janat Gul. Janat came into
the CIA's custody in 2004 and soon thereafter began being interrogated. While the source of this
information is blacked out in the report, and the report also fails to mention how long Janat Gul was
subjected to sleep deprivation techniques, it was long enough that Janat Gul became “not oriented to
time or space” and began to experience auditory and visual hallucinations in the form of “his wife and
children in the mirror and [he] had heard their voices in the white noise”. The interrogation of Gul
continued, and though the CIA temporarily refrained from further “enhanced interrogation techniques”
Gul still asked repeatedly to “die, or just be killed”. On August 19th of 2004 the CIA's detention site
personnel wrote that they did not believe Gul to be withholding information on an imminent threat.
CIA HQ stated that they still believed he was, and that enhanced interrogation techniques were to be

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used during interrogations with him. Gul continued not to provide information, and the CIA's detention
site personnel once again asserted they did not believe he had information, and began to doubt the
validity of the CIA HQ's sources. Despite this, the use of enhanced interrogation techniques continued.
We do know that shortly before he was released Gul was subjected to a 47 hour standing sleep
deprivation session, after which he was “allowed to remove his diaper, given a towel and a meal, and
permitted to sleep”. Subsequently it was revealed that the CIA's source for the information indicating
Gul's involvement had fabricated the information implicating Gul in activities against US forces, and
he was transferred to a foreign government before being released. (U.S. Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, Page 16)
However, not all detainees were placed in stress positions when being interrogated using sleep
deprivation techniques. Some, such as Abu Zubaydah, underwent a different kind of interrogation:
“Rather than being placed in a stress position during sleep deprivation, Abu Zubaydah was kept
awake by being questioned nearly non-stop by CIA and FBI interrogators. Records further indicate that
during breaks in the interrogations at this time, Abu Zubaydah was allowed to briefly sleep.” (U.S.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Page 29)
Sometimes the method of constant-stimulus-exposure-sleep-deprivation was used without
breaks and in conjunction with stress positions and a host of other techniques, such as in the case of al-
Najjar:
“With respect to al-Najjar specifically, the legal advisor indicated that the CIA's interrogation plan
included 'isolation in total darkness: lowering the quality of his food: keeping him at an uncomfortable
temperature (cold): [playing music] 24 hours a day: and keeping him shackled and hooded.' In addition,
al-Najjar was described as having been left hanging - which involved handcuffing one or both wrists to
an overhead bar which would not allow him to lower his arms - for 22 hours each day for two
consecutive days […] It was also noted al-Najjar was wearing a diaper and had no access to toilet
facilities.” (U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Page 53)

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In addition to auditory stimulus overload and total darkness immersion, some other techniques
were used in conjunction with sleep deprivation as in the case of Gul Rahman. His interrogation
included the use of “48 hours of sleep deprivation, auditory overload, total darkness, isolation, a cold
shower, and rough treatment” (U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Page 54). Later Rahman
died during one such sleep deprivation session, of a combination of hypothermia and dehydration.
Notably, the severity of dehydration can be exasperated by sleep deprivation.
The amount of time that the detainees were sleep deprived varies. There are cases where
detainees were sleep deprived for little over twenty four hours total. In the middle of the spectrum there
are cases like al-Shibh's where the sleep deprivation stretched beyond 72 hours. And on the far end of
the spectrum there are even cases like Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's, where the detainee underwent
periods of nearly continuous sleep deprivation totaling over 180 hours (U.S. Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, Pages 77 & 85). Ultimately, however, it is safe to assume most detainees experience
sleep deprivation upwards of 48 hours within the period of little more than two days.
If the arguments that the edemas, the increased risk for cardiovascular diseases and incidents,
and the increased risk for the development of type II diabetes do not qualify as evidence that these
sleep deprivation techniques cause severe physical harm, there are examples of other detainees who
have undergone physical harm even more severe than that. In one case, a detainee died during a sleep
deprivation session while shackled in a stress position. His cause of death was listed as a combination
of hypothermia and dehydration. Common sense would dictate that any interrogation method which
included “death” as a result would also include “severe physical suffering” as a result. This would hold
especially pertinent in an incident where the death was not quick but was rather due to the slow death
of hypothermia and dehydration while significantly sleep deprived, which can exacerbate the severity
of the toll the dehydration takes on the body. (U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Page 55)
One potential flaw in the argument that “a detainee dying during a sleep deprivation session is

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evidence of sleep deprivation itself being torture” is that it may not have been the sleep deprivation that
killed him. However, Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 87 S. Ct. 1338, 18 L. Ed. 2d 423 (1967) tells us
that when determining whether or not an interrogation is too coercive the courts must consider the
“totality of the circumstances” (affirmed in Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519 (1968), see also
Haynes v. Washington 373 U.S. 503 (1963), Davis v. North Carolina 384 U.S. 737 (1966), and Fikes v.
Alabama 352 U.S. 191 (1957)). Given that sleep deprivation interrogation techniques were being used
on the detainee when he died, and these techniques do take a negative toll on physical health during
and after their usage, and these techniques are known to exacerbate one of the conditions which
directly attributed to this detainee's death (dehydration), these techniques must be acknowledged as an
important element of the “circumstances” which fit into the “totality” of the situation leading to the
detainee's severe suffering and subsequent death. It seems then that there is some evidence of the sleep
deprivation interrogation techniques used on detainees as having caused severe physical suffering. If,
however, the argument that these techniques qualified as having caused severe physical suffering was
not enough to decisively label them as torture, or if these arguments were altogether rejected, a lawyer
could also argue that these techniques qualify as having caused severe mental suffering.
B. THE SLEEP DEPRIVATION TECHNIQUES USED ON DETAINEES CONSTITUTES
SEVERE MENTAL SUFFERING
B1. GIVEN THAT THE USE OF SLEEP DEPRIVATION TECHNIQUES CAUSES SEVERE
MENTAL SUFFERING, ITS USE CONSTITUTES TORTURE.
The definition of “severe mental suffering” includes, “the administration or application, or
threatened administration or application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to
disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality” (18 U.S. Code). We can infer from this definition, that

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an interrogation technique which had similar effects as a “mind-altering substance” would qualify as
torture. One pertinent question, then, is whether or not the sleep deprivation techniques used on
detainees had similar effects on the detainees as a “mind-altering substance” would.
We know from the committee's report that a number of detainees were kept awake long enough
to begin suffering hallucinations. Some notable incidents include:
• A detainee hallucinating dogs were killing his family. (U.S. Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, Page 109)
• Hassan Ghul experienced [auditory and visual] hallucinations, but was told by a psychologist
that his reactions were "consistent with what many others experience in his condition", and that
he should calm himself by telling himself that his experiences are normal and will subside when
he decides to be truthful. The “truth” in question being the narrative the CIA was asking him to
support. (U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Page 132)
• In 2004 Janat Gul was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including
continuous sleep deprivation, ... until he experienced auditory and visual hallucinations.
According to a cable, Janat Gul was "not oriented to time or place" and told CIA officers that he
saw "his wife and children in the mirror and had heard their voices in the white noise." (U.S.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Page 137)
• “After approximately a week of interrogating al-Masri using the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques, including sleep deprivation that coincided with auditory hallucinations, CIA
interrogators reported that al-Masri had been 'motivated to participate' at the time of his
arrival.”. (U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Page 139)
We also know that,

19
“Multiple CIA detainees subjected to prolonged sleep deprivation experienced hallucinations,
and CIA interrogation teams did not always discontinue sleep deprivation after the detainees
had experienced hallucinations.” (U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Page 412)
C. THE USE OF SLEEP DEPRIVATION TECHNIQUES ON DETAINEES CAUSED
AUDITORY AND VISUAL HALLUCINATIONS
C1. AUDITORY AND VISUAL HALLUCINATIONS CAN BE CAUSED BY MIND ALTERING
SUBTANCES
C2. THE USE OF SLEEP DEPRIVATION IS THEREFORE TORTURE
If, then, it can be demonstrated that there are mind-altering substances which cause auditory
hallucinations, visual hallucinations, or a combination of the two, then these interrogation techniques
would have a demonstrably similar effect to mind-altering substances. This would be strong evidence
that these sleep deprivation techniques caused “severe mental suffering” as defined in 18 US Code
2340, and would thus qualify as torture, making the admissions or evidence gathered using these
techniques inadmissible in court. Considering there is a whole class of substances named specifically
for their ability to cause hallucinations (hallucinogens, see also: deliriants), and that altering the mind's
functions so that a person experiences sensory input which does not exist would seem to indicate a
substance qualifies as “mind-altering”, this is a rather strong argument for asserting that these sleep
deprivation techniques are, in fact, torture.
D. SLEEP DEPRIVATION CAUSES SIMILAR MIND ALTERING EFFECTS AS ALCOHOL
D1. ITS USE IS THEREFORE TORTURE

20
If, however, the above argument was found to be flawed there is still evidence that sleep
deprivation causes similar effects as mind-altering substances. Consider, for example, the study by
Williamson, A. M., & Feyer, A. M. (2000). During this study a number of volunteers from an
Australian trucker's union and the Australian military were deprived of sleep for up to twenty-eight
hours and then put through a number of cognitive tests. Later the same volunteers were given alcohol
and put through the same tests. The results showed:
“After 17-19 hours without sleep, corresponding to 2230 and 0100 performance on some tests
was equivalent or worse than that at a BAC of 0.05%. Response speeds were up to 50% slower
for some tests and accuracy measures were significantly poorer than at this level of alcohol.
After longer periods without sleep, performance reached levels equivalent to the maximum
alcohol dose given to subjects (BAC of 0.1%).” (Williamson, 2000)
This demonstrates that sleep deprivation has the effect of creating similar cognitive defects as
alcohol, which is typically acknowledged in US courts to be a mind-altering substance. It also
demonstrates that these effects get worse the longer the sleep deprivation goes on, which is important
given that this test only went up to twenty hours of sleep deprivation and most of the detainees
experienced between 48 and 180 hours of continuous sleep deprivation. In any case, we can infer from
this that the detainees experienced at least similar mind-altering effects as they would have had the
“administration or application... of mind-altering substances” been forced upon them in the form of
alcohol consumption. Given that some of the detainees experienced up to nine times as much sleep
deprivation as the volunteers in this study, it is likely the cognitive deficits affecting them would be
much more extreme then that of a BAC of 0.1%, which would make them cognitively similar to a
severely drunken person. Consider, for reference, that a 200 pound man is at serious risk for death due
to alcohol poisoning with a BAC of 0.19% according to the Brad21 BAC chart. (BAC chart)

21
E. SLEEP DEPRIVATION IS ITSELF A MIND ALTERING PROCEDURE
E1. ITS USE IS THEREFORE TORTURE
If both the hallucinations and cognitive deficiencies similar to alcohol use were not sufficient to
qualify these sleep deprivation interrogation techniques as torture, there may be some merit to the
argument that these sleep deprivation interrogation techniques themselves are mind-altering procedures
(irrespective of their similarity to other mind-altering substances). We already know that these sleep
deprivation techniques cause hallucinations, which would seem to be both an alteration of the mind and
a procedure which “disrupts profoundly the senses”. Sleep deprivation is also linked to an increased
risk of HPA axis dysregulation (Buckley, 2005), which has been linked to schizophrenia (Altamura,
1999). If the link between HPA axis dysregulation, sleep deprivation, and schizophrenia is legitimate
this would have troubling implications on the use of sleep deprivation. It may be that sleep deprivation,
quite literally, causes a physical alteration of the mind which might lead to schizophrenia or other
psychiatric disorders. Were a detainee to have developed psychiatric disorders (especially
schizophrenia) during or after his interrogation it could be argued the sleep deprivation he went through
was a significant factor in this disorder's development.
In addition to the prior listed cognitive deficiencies, REM sleep deprivation has been observed
leading to a host of other cognitive deficiencies. Among these are:
• Impairment of the working memory (which is significantly involved in language reasoning,
learning, and comprehension) and the phonological loop (which stores and rehearses speech
information in both native and non-native languages). (Durmer, 2005)
• Long term memory inhibition. (McDermott et. al., 2003)

22
• The inhibition of short to long term memory conversion and the inability to focus. . (Shiromani
et. al., 1979)
• And high suggestibility to leading questions: “reduced cognitive ability or motivation to
discriminate and detect discrepancies between original and misleading information.” (Blagrove,
1996)
Ultimately the host of symptoms accompanying the kind of sleep deprivation that detainees
underwent seems to indicate that said techniques would qualify as a “mind altering procedure” and thus
be considered torture. It is possible, however, that a judge would disagree with this assertion. In that
case, however, these symptoms still hold a number of implications as to the competency of a person to
confess.
Any of these symptoms could qualify as a significant enough defect on a person's mental
competency that it could render confessions made while experiencing these symptoms invalid. In order
to understand what lens a judgment of “incompetency” might be made under, one can look to the
precedent set by Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 80 S. Ct. 274, 4 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1960) a in which
there was a discussion of confessions made by those who may have been suffering insanity at the time
of their confession,
“Though it is possible that petitioner confessed during a period of complete mental
competence, the evidence here establishes the strongest probability that he was insane and
incompetent at the time he allegedly confessed.” (Blackburn v. Alabama, 1960)
Given that these sleep deprivation techniques actively aid the development of insanity, it seems
possible that a judge may conclude that the “strongest probability” is that a detainee was “insane and
incompetent at the time he allegedly confessed”. This concern is especially relevant since such

23
confessions were often gotten from detainees during or shortly after the sleep deprivation sessions
which caused visual and auditory hallucinations and a disorientation “from time and space”. More
importantly, the period in which such a probability was the “strongest” could last a significantly long
time after a sleep deprivation session,. We know this because sleep science tells us that the longer a
person is deprived of REM sleep the longer it takes them to get back into REM sleep (Colten, 2006).
More discussion on competency to confess will come later in this report.
If, however, neither the auditory and visual hallucinations, the increased risk for psychiatric
disorder and schizophrenia, the similarity in effects to mind-altering substances in terms of auditory
and visual hallucinations or the similarity to mind-altering substances in terms of cognitive defects, are
found to be enough evidence to suggest these techniques cause severe mental suffering, there is still the
argument that these techniques are a “threat of imminent death”.
F. THE USE OF SLEEP DEPRIVATION TECHNIQUES ON DETAINEES CONSTITUTES A
THREAT OF IMMINENT DEATH
F1. ITS USE IS THEREFORE TORTURE
Of key importance to this argument is the question of whether or not an implied threat of
imminent death would suffice to categorize these techniques as torture just as a verbally communicated
threat of death would. For example, let us suppose one of these detainees was a doctor familiar with the
bodily consequences of sleep deprivation. This doctor knows eventually these techniques might kill
him by clogging his arteries with plaque and giving him a heart attack, dysregulating his body's glucose
and insulin homeostasis, elevating his body's cortisol levels and giving him a heart attack, or increasing
inflammation around his heart and giving him a heart attack . He is also under the impression, if the
medical staff tell him what they told Hassan Gul, that this treatment will not cease until he has told his

24
interrogators what they want to hear. In this scenario, is his continued deprivation of sleep a “threat of
imminent death”? If knowing that continuing in the way he has leads to ever increasing odds of his own
death counts as a “threat of imminent death” it is likely that what many of the detainees have
undergone could be construed as a “threat of imminent death”.
Additionally, since at least one detainee died in custody during a sleep deprivation session, it is
not unreasonable at all to assume that even an uneducated detainee unfamiliar with the consequences of
sleep deprivation might have reason to assume continued sessions could kill him. This, however, is
likely the weakest argument as it would require a detainee being aware of either the basis of sleep
science or the previous death of other detainees due to treatment similar enough to what they are
experiencing that it would justify a sincere belief in the likelihood of their imminent death. As long as a
detainee believes that these sessions will kill him, regardless of the validity of this belief, his treatment
should stand as a “threat of imminent death”.
In the event that sleep deprivation techniques are not found to be torture, they may still be held
as too coercive to provide evidence in a US court.
IV. COMPARING THE TREATMENT OF THE DETAINEES TO EXISTING US LAW, THE
CONFESSIONS OBTAINED VIA THE USE OF SLEEP DEPRIVATION ARE INADMISSIBLE
A. THE CONFESSIONS OBTAINED VIA THE USE OF SLEEP DEPRIVATION ARE
INADMISSIBLE BECAUSE OF UNDUE COERCION
There are, separate from the set of standards whose parameters dictate that an interrogation
must not qualify as torture (standard set A), other standards that a confession must meet in order to
prove it is not too coercive (standard set B). It is important to remember that while almost every
instance of set A will also qualify under set B, the reverse is not true. For our purposes a violation of

25
either standard has the same result, namely that it means information produced in a way which does not
meet these standards cannot be used in a US federal court to convict a person. One particularly relevant
set of precedents which can help us establish better the parameters of standard set B can be found in the
cases of Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S. Ct. 515, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1986) and Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978).
Mincey was a suspect who had been present at the site of a narcotics raid during which a
number of police officers were shot. After investigating the scene, homicide detectives travelled to the
hospital in which Mincey was being treated. After questioning Mincey for four hours (eight P.M. to
“approximately midnight”) Mincey confessed to the murder of a police officer. Later, Mincey went on
to challenge the validity of his questioning, saying that though he had responded multiple times that he
wanted a lawyer and did not want to continue with the interrogation, his requests had been unheeded.
“It is apparent from the record in this case that Mincey's statements were not 'the product of his
free and rational choice.' Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 521. To the contrary, the
undisputed evidence makes clear that Mincey wanted not to answer Detective Hust. But Mincey
was weakened by pain and shock, isolated from family, friends, and legal counsel, and barely
conscious, and his will was simply [p402] overborne. Due process of law requires that
statements obtained as these were cannot be used in any way against a defendant at his trial.”
(Mincey v Arizona)
The above quote argues that in the context of an interrogation of a potential criminal a person
must make statements that are “the product of his free and rational choice”. This context is similar to
the context that detainees find themselves in during their interrogation, though notably they are military
detainees, this may not alone justify depriving them of the right to have statements not made as the
product of a free and rational choice held against them in a court of law. Of importance to our purposes
are two phrases in the above quote, taken from the majority opinion of the Mincey Supra case. First,
this case affirms the standard set forth in Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 88 S. Ct. 1152, 20 L.

26
Ed. 2d 77 (1968). which determined that confessions must be “the product of free and rational choice”.
Second, the phrase “weakened by pain and shock, isolated from family, friends, and legal counsel, and
barely conscious, and his will was simply overborne”. First, a discussion of Greenwald v. Wisconsin
and how the “free and rational choice” standard set forth within was later struck down in Colorado v.
Connelly, and how this dichotomy in standards relate to our case.
In Greenwald v Wisconsin, a man (Greenwald) was charged with a series of burglaries. It is
important to note that while Greenwald was on psychiatric medication, it is unclear in the case files
whether or not they would affect his state of mind. After Greenwald's interrogation began he asked for
a lawyer, but his request was ignored. Eventually Greenwald confessed because, according to him, he
knew if he did not his interrogators would not leave him alone:
“It is our duty, in a case such as this, to make an examination of the record in order to ascertain
whether petitioner's [390 U.S. 519, 521] statements were voluntary. * See Davis v. North
Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 741 -742 (1966). We believe that, considering the "totality of the
circumstances" surrounding the statements, see Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967), it was
error for the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to conclude that they were voluntarily made.”
(Greenwald v Wisconsin)
“All of the above recited facts are, under our decisions, relevant to the claim that the statements
were involuntary: the lack of counsel, especially in view of the accused's statement that he
desires counsel (see Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 730 , 735 (1966): cf. Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)): the lack of food, sleep, and medication (see Clewis v. Texas, 386
U.S. 707 (1967)): the lack or inadequacy of warnings as to constitutional rights (see Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 630 (1961): Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 730 (1966)).
Considering the totality of these circumstances, we do not think it credible that petitioner's
statements were the product of his free and rational choice.” (Greenwald v Wisconsin)
In the first above quote we can see the factors which led to the decision, made in the second
quote, that the confession was not made as a “product of his free and rational choice”. Of particular
importance is the “the lack of food, sleep, and medication”. We know from the Committee's report that
detainees who undergo sleep deprivation are often refused medical treatment, as in the case of Hassan

27
Ghul (U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Page 109). We know from having access to a
dictionary that detainees who undergo sleep deprivation are exposed to “the lack of […] sleep,”. We
also know from the Committee's reports that detainees undergoing sleep deprivation also often undergo
simultaneous food deprivation (U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Page 13). Given that
these three parameters are met, it would seem that these detainees' confessions are not made as a
“product of free and rational choice”. This standard, however, is not universally accepted in the legal
community.
In Colorado v Connelly, a mentally ill man (Connelly) confessed to murder because “god had
told him to”. Later, after a psychiatrist determined that Connelly was suffering from “command
hallucinations”, Connelly challenged his confession-as-evidence as unconstitutional. His defense cited
the “product of free and rational choice” standard which had been recently affirmed in Greenwald v
Wisconsin. The Supreme Court of Colorado ruled his confession was inadmissible under said standard.
However the US Federal Supreme Court reversed the ruling:
“We think that the Supreme Court of Colorado erred in importing into this area of constitutional
law notions of 'free will' that have no place there. There is obviously no reason to require more
in the way of a 'voluntariness' inquiry in the Miranda waiver context than in the Fourteenth
Amendment confession context. The sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda
was based, is governmental coercion. Indeed, the Fifth Amendment privilege is not concerned
'with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official
coercion.' The voluntariness of a waiver of this privilege has always depended on the absence of
police overreaching, not on 'free choice' in any broader sense of the word […] Respondent urges
this Court to adopt his 'free will' rationale, and to find an attempted waiver invalid whenever the
defendant feels compelled to waive his rights by reason of any compulsion, even if the
compulsion does not flow from the police. But such a treatment of the waiver issue would 'cut
this Court's holding in [Miranda] completely loose from its own explicitly stated rationale.'
Miranda protects defendants against government coercion leading them to surrender rights
protected by the Fifth Amendment: it goes no further than that. Respondent's perception of
coercion flowing from the 'voice of God,' however important or significant such a perception
may be in other disciplines, is a matter to which the United States Constitution does not speak.”
(Colorado v Connelly)

28
The Supreme Court argues, essentially, that because Connelly's hallucinations were not directly
caused by his interrogators, Connelly's hallucinations cannot serve as a basis to rule his confession
inadmissible. We have, then, two distinct standards that may determine the parameters of the earlier
referenced standard set B. On the one hand, Mincey v. Arizona would set forth the standard that a
confession must be the product of a “free and rational choice”. On the other hand Colorado v Connelly
would add a caveat to this standard by saying that any inhibition of a person's ability to act freely and
rationally must be directly or (possibly) proximately caused by their interrogators in order to count
such a confession as inadmissible on account of coercion.
Fortunately for our purposes, either standard would almost certainly apply to a sleep deprived
detainee. The sleep deprivation techniques which cause the inhibitions to the detainees' abilities to
make a “free and rational choice” to confess were done by their interrogators, thus meeting both the
standards set forth in Colorado v Conelly and Arizona v Mincey. These standards, however, are relevant
only if it is decided that a detainee has Miranda rights. If a detainee does not have Miranda rights, the
argument that their interrogation violated the safeguards typically afforded to American citizens by the
Fifth Amendment's right against self-incrimination.
Keep in mind that the above cases occurred in the context of an interrogation of a person with
Miranda rights. The contexts of the cases above are similar in that they deal with improper
interrogation procedure, however such precedents may be struck down on the basis that the rights held
by American citizens which protect them from the treatments detailed in the quotes above do not apply
to military detainees. While the contexts are similar enough that these precedents should protect even
those without Miranda rights, they may not apply to interrogations of those without Miranda rights. It
behooves us, if we are attempting to defend against the use of information against said detainees that
was obtained via the use of sleep deprivation techniques, to consider precedent which may provide
evidence for such an assertion which rests outside of the Miranda ruling.

29
One such example of precedent can be found in the case of Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S.
199, 80 S. Ct. 274, 4 L. Ed. 2D 242 (1960). In Blackburn v Alabama, a veteran who had been
diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia was accused and convicted of a robbery which occurred during
a period when he was not present at the mental institution he usually resided within. During his case he
was examined, upon a judge's order, by three separate physicians. These physicians concluded there
were “reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was insane either at the time of the commission
of [the] offense or at the present time”. According to Alabama law the Superintendent of the Alabama
State Hospitals was required to convene a “lunacy commission”. This commission resulted in a
unanimous verdict that Blackburn was insane, and Blackburn was committed by the judge of his case
to a mental hospital, until such a time that his sanity had returned to him. Four years later (after having
escaped from his hospital, committing another crime, being declared insane again, and returned to the
hospital again) Blackburn was declared fit to stand trial once again. (Blackburn v. Alabama)
According to Blackburn's medical report during his time in the Army, one of his symptoms was
“complete amnesia” in regards to his prior behavior, which appeared to be recurrent. Blackburn
claimed not to remember his confession, the crime he had committed, or much of the period he had
been interned at the hospital at all. When the prosecution sought to enter his confession as evidence
against him, his defense objected and the members of the previously convened lunacy commission
were summoned. There was a disagreement about whether or not Blackburn was insane at the time of
his confession, with one of the members of the commission having an “astonishing about-face” in
regards to his prior statements that Blackburn had seemed insane at the time of his confession.
(Blackburn v. Alabama)
During the debate over whether or not Blackburn's confession was legitimate enough to
introduce into the court, there was some discussion of the methodology by which Blackburn had been
interrogated. It surfaced that the interrogation was done in a small, confined room for about nine hours

30
continuously, often with three officers present in the room with him. Blackburn had mentioned he was
a patient in a mental institution during the interrogation. When the Alabama state courts declared this
confession to be admissible in court, Blackburn's defense filed certiorari with the Federal Supreme
Court, who took his case and reversed the decision on the inclusion of his confession as evidence:
“In the case at bar, the evidence indisputably establishes the strongest probability that
Blackburn was insane and incompetent at the time he allegedly confessed. […] a most basic
sense of justice is affronted by the spectacle of incarcerating a human being upon the basis of a
statement he made while insane: and this judgment can without difficulty be articulated in terms
of the unreliability of the confession, the lack of rational choice of the accused, or simply a
strong conviction that our system of law enforcement should not operate so as to take advantage
of a person in this fashion. And when the other pertinent circumstances are considered - the
eight- to nine-hour sustained interrogation in a tiny room which was upon occasion literally
filled with police officers: the absence of Blackburn's friends, relatives, or legal counsel: the
composition [361 U.S. 199, 208] of the confession by the Deputy Sheriff rather than by
Blackburn - the chances of the confession's having been the product of a rational intellect and a
free will become even more remote and the denial of due process even more egregious.”
(Blackburn v. Alabama)
The above quote brings to light three relevant points. First, as we have discussed earlier in this
report, that a person must simply demonstrate that it was “the strongest possibility” that they were
insane at the time of their confession. Second, the key points which the judge states as his own third set
of standards to determine the admissibility of a possibly coercive confession (standard set C). These
standards are based on the Fourteenth Amendment, making them independent of the previous Colorado
v Connelly ruling which sought to add the previously mentioned caveat to Arizona v Mincey's
specification of a person's Miranda right. Similar to the earlier specifications of Arizona v Mincey
which were modified in Colorado v Connelly, Blackburn v Alabama sets forth the distinction that a
confession must be, “ the […] rational choice of the accused”. This may have been the basis of the
Arizona v Mincey opinion which was overturned in Colorado v Connelly, though it is important to note
again that the Connelly caveat only applies to cases involving a challenge based on a violation of

31
Miranda rights instead of Fourteenth amendment rights. Thus, even if the Connelly caveat did apply to
violation of Fifth and Sixth amendment rights, it likely will not apply to Fourteenth amendment
violations. Ultimately this is irrelevant, since detainees would still qualify in either case as their
interrogators directly cause the insanity they experience and develop. Blackburn v Alabama could also
be used as a fallback position in case a judge rules that the insanity caused by these sleep deprivation
techniques was only proximately caused and thus did not meet the stringent standards set forth in the
Connelly caveat, if said caveat is determined not to apply to proximate cause of insanity.
The third relevant point from the above quote is the following: “when the other pertinent
circumstances are considered - the eight- to nine-hour sustained interrogation in a tiny room which was
upon occasion literally filled with police officers: the absence of Blackburn's friends, relatives, or legal
counsel: the composition [361 U.S. 199, 208] of the confession by the Deputy Sheriff rather than by
Blackburn - the chances of the confession's having been the product of a rational intellect and a free
will become even more remote and the denial of due process even more egregious.” (Blackburn v.
Alabama)
Compare the earlier quote to from Arizona v Mincey, “ Mincey was weakened by pain and
shock, isolated from family, friends, and legal counsel, and barely conscious, and his will was simply
[p402] overborne”. In both cases the judges specified that the isolation from counsel, family, and
friends were important factors in determining the voluntariness of a confession. Blackburn v Alabama
adds the additional standard that the confession must not be composed by the interrogator, though
going back to Clewis v Texas this is only an element of the “totality of the circumstances” and might
not qualify a confession as involuntary all on its own. Still the similarity between Blackburn's and a
detainee's is, in the case of isolation from friends/family/counsel and the construction of the confession
by an interrogator instead of a detainee, too striking to ignore the potential within.
Breaking down the latter two points from the quote, we can make two conclusions. Though

32
Colorado v Connelly states that violations of Miranda rights must be directly or (possibly) proximately
caused by interrogators, this is not the case with Fourteenth Amendment right violations such as found
in Blackburn v Alabama. Thus, should it be determined that the interrogators did not cause the insanity
within the detainees at the time they confessed, such evidence would still be inadmissible and such a
confession would still be voluntary. We can further infer that the totality of the circumstances detainees
find themselves would be, so far as the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, insufficient to be
determined as voluntary. Blackburn v Alabama states that an interrogation in which a mentally insane
person is:
• interrogated for at least nine hours in a crowded room
• without access to friends, family, or counsel
• whose confession is constructed for them
is inadmissible as evidence due to violations of the fourteenth amendment rights of the
confessor. We know that detainees undergoing sleep deprivation are typically kept awake for at least
forty eight hours, and the committee's reports include descriptions of most of their interrogations being
constant for these periods of time (U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence). This would seem to
meet the nine hour guideline, though the crowded room standard would be more difficult to prove. We
know that detainees were kept without access to family, friends, or counsel (U.S. Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence). This would seem to meet the second guideline. Finally, we know from the
Committee's report that typically the detainees do not construct the narratives they confess to. For these
reasons Blackburn v Alabama would seem to indicate that even if these interrogations are not violations
of the fifth and sixth amendment, they are violations of the fourteenth. Much like the cases based on
Miranda rights, however, the above referenced cases occur in a separate context from what detainees go
through. It may be that because military detainees do not have the same rights against self-

33
incrimination in a courtroom, that simply being incompetent at the time of a confession might not
render it inadmissible. This would, however, imply a lower standard of evidence necessary to convict
detainees than criminals. There is, in addition to the previously listed arguments, one more precedent
which would likely be relevant to someone attempting to establish that the sleep deprivation techniques
used on detainees renders information obtained via their use inadmissible as evidence in court.
In Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274, 66 S. Ct. 544, 90 L. Ed. 667 (1946), the husband of Mrs.
Zelma Ashcraft stood accused of being an accessory to his wife's murder. Initially Mr. Ashcraft was
convicted, then the case was bounced to the Supreme Court of Tennessee who in turn remanded the
case to the Criminal Court of Shelby County. Mr. Ashcraft was once more convicted, and the Tennessee
Supreme Court affirmed the convictions. Mr. Ashcraft filed for and was granted for certiorari, and the
Federal Supreme Court reversed his prior convictions due to questions of voluntariness concerning his
confession:
“At that t[r]ial the state had been permitted to introduce in evidence an alleged confession
which had been obtained from Ashcraft after thirty-six hours continuous grilling by
investigating officers, who were holding him incommunicado in the County jail. This alleged
confession was in large part written but Ashcraft had neither written nor signed it.” (Ashcraft v
Tennessee)
Once again the isolation from friends, family, and counsel (referenced in the above quote as
“holding him incommunicado”) and the construction of Ashcraft's confession by his interrogator were
key pieces of information in the court's decision to hold his confession involuntary. Unlike some of the
previous instances of involuntary confessions that we have discussed, however, Ashcraft v Tennessee
makes specific reference to the lack of sleep that Ashcraft suffered and its effect on the voluntariness of
his confession:

34
“It is inconceivable that any court of justice in the land, conducted as our courts are, open to the
public, would permit prosecutors serving in relays to keep a defendant witness under continuous
cross-examination for thirty-six hours without rest or sleep in an effort to extract a "voluntary"
confession. Nor can we, consistently with Constitutional due process of law, hold voluntary a
confession where prosecutors do the same thing away from the restraining influences of a
public trial in an open courtroom.” (Ashcraft v. Tennessee)
From this above quote we can infer that the lack of sleep Ashcraft suffered was indeed a key
factor in the decision to hold his confession involuntary, and thus the information it provided
inadmissible. Additionally, even if the specification of “thirty-six hours without rest or sleep” is held as
a strict constructionist parameter set on the necessary amount of sleep deprivation for a confession to
be ruled involuntary, we know that detainees typically underwent at least forty-eight hours of sleep
deprivation at minimum. We can conclude, then, that this precedent would indicate the information
provided by detainees was not provided voluntarily enough to qualify according to Ashcraft v
Tennessee so long as the context of a military interrogation was seen as similar enough to Ashcraft v
Tennessee to have said precedent qualify as relevant. Given that this case concerned fourteenth
amendment rights, the parameters it set forth in determining the voluntariness of a confession shall
henceforth be referred to as standard set C-1. This is because many of its points overlapped with the
previous standards we have determined apply to violations of fourteenth amendment rights. These
standards encapsulate all of the relevant information I have been able to find in regards to potential
challenges as to the voluntariness of information given using sleep deprivation techniques. What of the
competency of the detainee to confess though?
B. SLEEP DEPRIVATION INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES RENDER THEIR VICTIMS
INCOMPETENT TO CONFESS.
In the federal court system a person can be ruled incompetent to confess for a number of

35
reasons. We have already discussed in detail the physical and mental side effects of the sleep
deprivation techniques used on detainees. If we could conclusively demonstrate that these side effects
render a detainee incompetent to confess, it would classify the information they provided as
inadmissible in federal court.
In order to determine whether or not it is likely medical professionals would determine that the
sleep deprivation techniques used on detainees compromises a person’s mental competence thus
rendering information obtained from a sleep deprived person unreliable, we must first understand the
definition of the word competence. Black's Law Dictionary defines competence as, “duly qualified:
having sufficient capacity, ability, or authority.” If the first question is capacity, then we must ask
ourselves if it is realistic to assume that a medical professional would determine a person who was
experiencing the symptoms of sleep deprivation-- impaired language reasoning, impaired language
learning, impaired language comprehension, impaired speech storage in native and non-native
languages, impaired speech rehearsal in native and non-native languages, inhibited long term memory
and short to long term memory conversion, a loss of the ability to focus, auditory and visual
hallucinations, a “disorientation from time and space”, and a high suggestibility to leading questions--
would rule that a person had the “capacity, ability, or authority” to confess. In order to predict whether
or not a medical professional would see a sleep deprived person as competent of confession I turned to
the Psychological Evaluations for the Courts, Third Edition: A Handbook for Mental Health
Professionals and Lawyers. When discussing the competence to confess, the Handbook provides a
particularly relevant quote on the qualities of a person who is competent in that regard:
“The questions the mental health professional must consider when performing an evaluation of
competency to confess are clear, at least in the abstract: Was the defendant's behavior
"knowing" (ie., did the defendant understand that he or she was waiving rights)? Was it
"intelligent" (i.e., was the waiver of rights the product of a rational reasoning process)? Most
problematic, was it "voluntary" (i.e., was the situation in its totality - and in its interaction with

36
the defendant's state of mind - so coercive that the defendant's will was overborne)?” (Slobogin,
2007)
It is important to note that this discussion of competence does not give any mention to notions
of accuracy-based-competence, however earlier rulings discussed in this paper (namely Colorado v
Connelly) have established that, during a preponderance of evidence hearing on a Miranda waiver , the
accuracy of a confession is to be determined by applying the same standards as one would apply to
determine the voluntariness of a confession for admissibility purposes (if the burden of proof is on the
State), and would likely apply to a sleep deprived confession even if the issue of voluntariness was
found to not apply. We have, however, already acknowledged the possibility that detainees may not be
granted Miranda rights. It behooves us, then, to seek a way to justify the examination of said detainee
without relying on fifth or sixth amendment challenges. Two places to look for such justifications are
Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.2 section B states:
“If a defendant intends to introduce expert evidence relating to a mental disease or defect or any
other mental condition of the defendant bearing on either (1) the issue of guilt or (2) the issue of
punishment in a capital case, the defendant must—within the time provided for filing a pretrial
motion or at any later time the court sets—notify an attorney for the government in writing of
this intention and file a copy of the notice with the clerk. The court may, for good cause, allow
the defendant to file the notice late, grant the parties additional trial-preparation time, or make
other appropriate orders.” (Rule 12.2)
Therefore a defendant, who in this case confessed while intentionally deprived of sleep by their
interrogators, is allowed to introduce expert evidence relating to “any other mental condition of the
defendant” bearing on the issue of guilt. Given that the mental condition of the defendant during the
confession would fall under the category of “any other mental condition of the defendant bearing on the

37
issue of guilt”, there is some appeal to the argument that expert testimony, as related to the mental
status of the defendant during his confession, would be allowed in cases where the validity of a
confession is being questioned due to sleep deprivation (as this bears on the issue of guilt).
Further, given that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.2 section C4 states:
“No statement made by a defendant in the course of any examination conducted under this rule
(whether conducted with or without the defendant's consent), no testimony by the expert based on the
statement, and no other fruits of the statement may be admitted into evidence against the defendant in
any criminal proceeding except on an issue regarding mental condition on which the defendant:
(A) has introduced evidence of incompetency or evidence requiring notice under Rule
12.2(a) or (b)(1), or
(B) has introduced expert evidence in a capital sentencing proceeding requiring notice
under Rule 12.2(b)(2).” (Rule 12.2)”
It is likely that if mental health experts were to become aware of the sleep deprived status of a
person being interrogated at the time of their confession, they would be allowed to introduce their
testimony in court under the “evidence of incompetency or evidence requiring notice” exception clause
as evidence that the person being interrogated was sleep deprived would likely be seen as both
evidence of incompetence to confess at the time of the confession and requiring notice as to the
likelihood of its accuracy.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are a host of reasons which evidence obtained via the use of sleep deprivation techniques
is not admissible in US court. Many of these reasons as a standalone is enough to render the use of such
techniques meaningless if charges are meant to be pursued. Some, such as the argument that sleep
deprivation is torture, render their use illegal in its totality. Ultimately, however, sleep deprivation is not

38
a technique which can be used to provide evidence for a federal court.
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44
Mosaic Theory Intelligence and “Falsified-information-feedback-loops”
What is Mosaic Theory Intelligence?:
Mosaic Theory is a method of intelligence gathering and analysis which operates on the
principle that separate pieces of information, “though individually of limited or no utility to their
possessor, can take on added significance when combined” with other pieces of information (Emerging
Law). This method of intelligence analysis is based on the idea of Conditional Probability Analysis, a
mathematical method to determine the probability of one event occurring given the occurrence of
another. Mosaic Theory is a strong guiding principle behind modern US intelligence gathering and
analysis techniques, and has taken a central role to US operations in post-9/11 security culture. This
paper argues that Mosaic Theory Intelligence Analysis as used in CIA and DoD operations has led to
the creation of falsified-information-feedback-loops, resulting in invalid information. In order to get an
understanding of exactly how Mosaic Theory Intelligence Analysis and Conditional Probability
Analysis work, let's examine a hypothetical situation in which it might apply:
Suppose that we have three people lined up at buzzers, Person 1 and Person 2 and Person 3.
Person 1 has a buzzer they can push whenever they want, but they don't have to. Person 2 has a buzzer
they can push whenever they want, but they don't have to. Every time someone else pushes their
buzzer, Person 3 has to flip a coin and if it lands tails he pushes his buzzer. We know that the likelihood
of Person 3 pushing his buzzer (event X) is ½ every time Person 2 pushes their buzzer (event Y) or
Person 1 pushes their buzzer (event Z). Therefore we know that whether or not X occurs is dependent
upon whether or not Y or Z occur. Mosaic Theory Intelligence would also tell us that if we have
information that Person 3 and Person 2 pushed their buzzers, that is strong evidence that Person 1 also

45
pushed their buzzer. We can infer this because we know that since event X is more likely to occur if
events Y and Z both occur, transversely if events X and Y both occurred it is also more likely that event
Z occurred. Essentially if we were to simulate every way in which X, Y, and Z could interact we would
find that when X and Y occur Z will also be more likely than not to occur.
Taking this hypothetical one step further, let us suppose that a CIA operative spying on this
buzzer-pushing-terrorist-operation reports that he has information of questionable validity which says
event Z did in fact occur. Mosaic Theory Intelligence's principles would dictate that because event Z
occurring is more likely than not if events X and Y also occur, the CIA should put more faith in the
evidence's validity then they would if they evaluated it on its likely validity alone. The CIA would also
argue that even if the evidence that X and Y also occurred is of questionable validity, the information
that Z occurred supports the narrative that X and Y occurred, so even if all three pieces of evidence are
of questionable validity the narrative should be accepted because their mere presence in the context of
each other makes them (through the Mosaic Theory Intelligence Analysis lens) more valid. On the
other side of things, if the CIA is worried about people finding out about how likely it was that event X
occurred, this means they need to prevent people from finding out whether events Y or Z occurred. It
was in this context that Mosaic Theory Intelligence first came into public view.
Legal History of Mosaic Intelligence:
Mosaic Theory Intelligence's first foray into the public domain came during the nineteen
eighties. During this time it was typically utilized as a justification to deny Freedom of Information Act
requests, justifying the continued classification of material that might seem innocuous because said
information “though individually of limited or no utility to their possessor, can take on added

46
significance when combined with other items of information” (Emerging Law). US security operations
argued, and not without merit, that their Cold War enemy had intelligence operations complex enough
to make potentially significant interpretations from seemingly innocuous data using the Conditional
Probability Analysis based technique known as “Mosaic Theory Intelligence Analysis” (Pozen, 2005).
Mosaic Theory was, upon its birth into the forum of public discussion, initially labeled as a weapon of
the enemy which must be protected against. At its birth Mosaic Theory existed, at least as the legal
system viewed it, as a potential method that the USSR could use to undermine US security operations.
Though this may have been the narrative painted, however, its actual nature as a technique for
analyzing intelligence was rather banal in comparison. (Emerging Law)
Mosaic Theory's role in US security operations has evolved since its emergence into the public,
from a justification for classification to a rationalization for detainment and interrogation. Though its
role in the public forum is a matter of importance, this report's examination of the discussion focusing
on Mosaic Theory will be strictly from a legal lens and the lens of how pragmatic its use is for military
purposes. Through the examination of case studies of Mosaic Theory being applied in a real-world
setting, this paper will seek to demonstrate that the Mosaic Theory method of analysis often leads to the
creation of “falsified-information-feedback-loops” and is thus not an acceptable method of intelligence
analysis for the courtroom.
What is a falsified-information-feedback-loop?:
To illustrate the potential flaws in the use of Mosaic Theory Intelligence in its application to the
analysis of Human Intelligence (HUMINT), let us consider a hypothetical:

47
Suppose a person (Person A) is interrogated. In an attempt to extricate themselves from the use of
enhanced interrogation techniques, Person A provides falsified information. The CIA then uses this
falsified information as basis to capture someone new (person B) and interrogates Person B with the
specific intention of getting them to validate Person A's information. In order to get the interrogation to
stop, Person B provides falsified information which supports Person A's information. The CIA further
interrogate Person B. Because Person B's information lined up with Person A's information, both are
now accepted to be valid sources of information and likely involved with operations against US forces.
Additionally, because Person B validated Person A's information, any new information that arises as a
result of interrogating Person B is not only likely valid (according to mosaic theory) but also only
serves to further validate the previous information Persons A & B provided. The CIA takes this new
information, uses it to capture some new people or interrogate existing detainees based on falsified
information, returning to the first step in this hypothetical.
In the hypothetical above we can see how Mosaic Theory could potentially lead to a kind of
falsified-information-feedback-loop. This example is only a hypothetical, however, and it would
behoove a person attempting to demonstrate the potential flaws in Mosaic Theory to use real life
instances which demonstrate how this hypothetical can become a reality. Can we, then, find a specific
example of a detainee being interrogated based off of falsified information and having the information
they provide used as a basis to detain other people?
In order to find evidence that this hypothetical situation has actually occurred, we must find a
chain of events in which the following happened:
• A person is detained and provides falsified information

48
• This information is used as the basis to detain/interrogate a separate person seeking information
which validates the information provided in step 1
• Said information is validated by the interrogation in step two and used as the basis to
detain/interrogate other people.
Any event in which the above three steps occur qualifies as a “falsified-information-feedback-
loop”. Further, any system of intelligence gathering and analysis which consistently led to the creation
of falsified-information-feedback-loops would be anathema to the values enshrined in our legal system.
Real Examples of false-information-feedback-loops:
Can we, then, find an example where the previously listed three steps happened in reality?
Information provided by the recently released “Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's
Detention and Interrogation Program” would seem to indicate that examples of the previously listed
events happening in reality do exist. Let us examine some of the times that the CIA operated using
falsified information as detailed by said report:
“During this period, [Khalid Sheikh Mohammed] fabricated information on an individual who
he described as the protector of his children. That information resulted in the capture and CIA detention
of two innocent individuals.” (Committee Study, Page 83)
“March 9 2003 [Khalid Sheikh Mohammed] fabricated information indicating that Jaffar al-
Tayyar and Jose Padilla were plotting together. He 'felt pressure to produce information about
operations in the United States in the initial phases of his interrogation'.” (Committee Study, Page 85)
“A June 2006 CIA email stated Majid Khan said he “fabricated a lot of his early [CIA]
interrogation reporting to stop... what he called 'torture'.”” (Committee Study, Page 89)
Later, Majid Khan's falsified information (that KSM had told him to sneak some black-muslims

49
into the US for operations against US forces) was used as the basis to interrogate KSM, which led him
to produce more falsified information.
“As in the case of Janat Gul and Sharif al-Masri, the CIA's requests for OLC advice on the use
of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani were based on the
fabricated reporting on the pre-election threat from the same CIA source.” (Committee Study, Page
139)
“CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques provided significant
fabricated information on both the Second Wave plotting and the al-Ghuraba group.” (Committee
Study, Page 247)
“specifically, Hambali stated 'he lied about the pilot because he was constantly asked about it
and under stress, and so decided to fabricate.' According to a cable, Hambali said he fabricated these
claims 'in an attempt to reduce the pressure on himself,' and 'to give an account that was consistent with
what [Hambali]assessed the questioners wanted to hear.' The November 30, 2003, cable noted that CIA
personnel assesse[d] [Hambali]'s admission of previous fabrication to be credible.” (committee Study,
Page 257)
“On May 19, 2003 al-Baluchi stated he fabricated information while being subjected to the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques the previous day” (committee Study, Page 388)
“Of the remaining four detainees who did not provide information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti
until after being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, three were not substantially
questioned on any topic prior to the CIA's use of enhanced interrogation techniques. All three provided
information the CIA assessed to be fabricated and intentionally misleading.” (Committee Study, Page
392)
“The CIA regularly disseminated intelligence reports based on uncorroborated statements from
CIA detainees. The reports, some of which included fabricated or otherwise inaccurate information,
required extensive FBI investigations. For example, the CIA disseminated information that KSM had
sent Abu Issa al-Britani to Montana to recruit African-American Muslim converts.” (Committee Study,
Page 485)
Perhaps one of the most interesting falsified-information-feedback-loops that the committee's
report discusses is the one between Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) and Majid Khan. To better
understand the context of the following events, remember that both of these two were subjected to
brutal “enhanced interrogation techniques” and were both likely desperate to get said enhanced
interrogation techniques to stop.

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