Presentation by Andy Stirling, STEPS Centre co-director, to a workshop on ‘responding to risks ‐ a key to dealing with socio‐ecological challenges’, Institut für Regional- und Umweltwirtschaft, Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, 23rd June 2014
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From Risk Regulation to Innovation Democracy: precaution, participation and the pluralising of progress
1. From Risk Regulation to Innovation Democracy:
precaution, participation and the pluralising of progress
www.steps-centre.org/
www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/
www.multicriteria-mapping.org
www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/people/peoplelists/person/7513
Andy Stirling
SPRU & STEPS Centre
University of Sussex
presentation to workshop on ‘responding to risks a key to dealing with socio‐ ‐
ecological challenges’, Institut für Regional- und Umweltwirtschaft,
Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, 23rd
June 2014
2. ‘Sound Science’ in ‘Risk Management’
chemicals: “ …sound science will be the basis of
the Commission's legislative proposal…”
Philippe Busquin
GM food “… this government's approach is to make decisions …
on the basis of sound science”
Tony Blair
energy: “cool-headed, evidence based
assessment … sweep away historic
prejudice and put in
its place evidence and science”Malcolm Wicks
Pressures for ‘justification’ (Collingridge) and ‘blame management’ (Hood)
‘Risk’ ‘decisions’ need ‘objective science’ and ‘evidence based policy’
nuclear “needs ... a properly objective and science-
weapons: based decision” Peter Kilfoyle
3. The Precautionary Principle
“Where an activity raises threats of
harm to the environment or human health,
precautionary measures should be taken
even if some cause and effect relationships are
not fully established scientifically.”
Wingspread, 1998
“The precautionary principle applies where
scientific evidence is insufficient, inconclusive
or uncertain and preliminary scientific evaluation
indicates that there are reasonable grounds for
concern that the potentially dangerous effects
on the environment, human, animal or plant
health may be inconsistent with the high level
of protection chosen by the EU” EU, 2000
Ambiguous as a definitive prescriptive ‘decision rule’
threat? seriousness? irreversibility? full scientific certainty? cost-effective?
Arbitrary in global legal processes: climate, chemicals, GMOs, biodiversity, trade
Non-operational and incapable of meeting political needs for justification
(eg: simple neat numerical values given by for risk and cost-benefit, analysis)
Compared with ‘science based’ risk assessment, seems
“ … Where there are threats
of serious or irreversible damage,
lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-effective measures
to prevent environmental degradation ”
Principle 15, 1992 Rio Declaration
4. The Precautionary Principle
Causes much anxiety, many strident critiques in ostensible name of reason…
- stifles discovery (Holm), limits innovation (Sunstein); “kills green revolution” (AEI)
- quest for “zero risk” (Majone) is irrational (Sunstein) sign of “unreason" (Taverne)
- “arbitrary & capricious” (Marchant); ;“spreads fear” (O’Neill); like “chemophobia” (AEI)
“ … Where there are threats
of serious or irreversible damage,
lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-effective measures
to prevent environmental degradation ”
Principle 15, 1992 Rio Declaration
5. The Precautionary Principle
Causes much anxiety, many strident critiques in ostensible name of reason…
- ‘no basis’ for policy (Peterson); “dangerous” (Graham); “harms society” (O’Neill)
- “battle between science and ideology”…about “religion” (Charnley)
- needs countering by new “proactionary” (More) and “innovation” principles (Bayer)
“ … Where there are threats
of serious or irreversible damage,
lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-effective measures
to prevent environmental degradation ”
Principle 15, 1992 Rio Declaration
6. “ … Where there are threats
of serious or irreversible damage,
lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-effective measures
to prevent environmental degradation ”
Principle 15, 1992 Rio Declaration
The Precautionary Principle
“If there is a threat of harm,
which is uncertain,
then some kind of action
should be taken.” Aldred, 2013
…or
uncertainty requires deliberation about action
- Reminds that ‘science based’ methods don’t reduce intractability of uncertainty
- Rejects ‘evidence based policy’ as unique basis for action under uncertainty
- Affirms essential need for deliberation, participation, accountability, democracy
Like any principle, not in itself a definitive decision rule, but a key to a process:
7. Energy regulation: most mature, sophisticated comparative analysis…
The Poverty of Risk Discourse
8. 0.001 0.1 10 1000
externality’: cUS/kWh (after Sundqvist et al, 2005)low RISK high
nuclear
power
The Poverty of Risk Discourse
Conventional regulatory risk analysis asks simply: - is this safe? - safe enough? - tolerable?
Energy regulation: most mature, sophisticated comparative analysis…
9. 0.001 0.1 10 1000
externality’: cUS/kWh (after Sundqvist et al, 2005)low RISK high
nuclear
power
The Poverty of Risk Discourse
Where comparisons made, selective and circumscribed
Appear to deliver clear, objective distinctions
Contrast emotive subjectivity of precaution or participation?
coal
power
Energy regulation: most mature, sophisticated comparative analysis…
10. 0.001 0.1 10 1000
externality’: cUS/kWh (after Sundqvist et al, 2005)low RISK high
coal
oil
gas
nuclear
hydro
wind
solar
biomass
The Poverty of Risk Discourse
In a single particular study: ‘sound scientific’, ‘evidence based’ risk discourse implies clear orderings of choices bysimple scalar numbers
Energy regulation: most mature, sophisticated comparative analysis…
11. 0.001 0.1 10 1000
coal
oil
gas
nuclear
hydro
21
wind
solar
biomass
n =
‘externality’: cUS/kWh (after Sundqvist et al, 2005)
minimum maximum25% 75%
low RISK high
The Poverty of Risk Discourse
but ‘objective’ peer-reviewed data typically varies radically
Energy regulation: most mature, sophisticated comparative analysis…
12. coal
oil
gas
nuclear
hydro
36
20
wind 18
solar 11
biomass 22
31
21
16
n =
The Poverty of Risk Discourse
…‘evidence based’ risk literatures can be used to justify any choice
Tho’ concealed, the same is often true for all options
Energy regulation: most mature, sophisticated comparative analysis…
13. transportmaterialscomputingmilitaryroboticssynthetic biology
“we'll restore science to
its rightful place”…
“Our hope … relies on scientific
and technological progress”
“One can not impede
scientific progress.””
…“history is a race to
advance technology”
PROGRESS
TECHNOLOGY
SCIENCE
Lisbon Strategy: “pro-
innovation action” for
“Innovation Union”
“… the Government’s strategy
is pro-innovation”
“strives to stay in the race”
”“give technology the
status it deserves”
The Myth of One-Track Progress
Why are do we tolerate such
narrow understandings
of risk?
14. PROGRESS
TECHNOLOGY
SCIENCE
synthetic biology
“we'll restore science to
its rightful place”…
“Our hope … relies on scientific
and technological progress”
“One can not impede
scientific progress.””
Innovation studies also
emphasises linearity:
- advance (Nelson)
- diffusion (Rogers)
- early movers (Teece)
- first moving (Lieberman)
- catching up (Santangelo)
- latecomers (Tellis)
- forging ahead
(Abramowicz)
- leapfrogging (Brezis)
So even academic analysis
restricts attention to:
how much?
how fast?
what risk?
who leads?
Misses out:
which way?
what alternatives?
says who ?
why?
The Myth of One-Track Progress
15. carbon capture
grassroots innovation
behaviour change
distributed renewables
market reform nuclear power
new eco-cities
centralised renewables
Pathways to ‘Sustainable Energy’
History, economics, social science, philosophy, politics,
show divergent branching infrastructure innovation trajectories
eg: alternative infrastructures for ‘the’ zero carbon transition …
… alternatives are matters for political, not managerial, institutions
16. social shaping (Bijker, 85) co-construction (Misa, 03)
studies: expectations (Brown, 03) imaginations (Jasanoff, 05)
Social choices get politically closed down
carbon capturebehaviour change
distributed renewables
market reform nuclear power
centralised renewables
eg: alternative infrastructures for ‘the’ zero carbon transition …
Pathways to ‘Sustainable Energy’
17. history: contingency (Mokyr, 92) momentum (Hughes 83)
path-dependence (David, 85) path creation
(Karnoe, 01)
carbon capturebehaviour change nuclear power
centralised renewables
eg: alternative infrastructures for ‘the’ zero carbon transition …
Pathways to ‘Sustainable Energy’
Social choices get politically closed down
18. philosophy: autonomy (Winner, 77) closure (Feenberg, 91)
/politics entrapment (Walker, 01) alignment (Geels, 02)
carbon capturenuclear power
eg: alternative infrastructures for ‘the’ zero carbon transition …
Pathways to ‘Sustainable Energy’
Social choices get politically closed down
19. economics: homeostasis (Sahal, 85) lock-in (Arthur, 89)
regimes (Nelson & Winter, 77) trajectories (Dosi,
82)
nuclear power
eg: alternative infrastructures for ‘the’ zero carbon transition …
Pathways to ‘Sustainable Energy’
Social choices get politically closed down
20. Politics reduced to risk: from ends: strategic choices between visions
to means: detailed regulation of modalities
Not all that is scientifically realistic, technically practicable,
economically feasible, socially viable, will be historically realisable
eg: alternative infrastructures for ‘the’ zero carbon transition …
nuclear power
Pathways to ‘Sustainable Energy’
21. Politics reduced to risk: from ends: strategic choices between visions
to means: detailed regulation of modalities
“We have no alternative
to nuclear power …
Nuclear because: “We
need to do everything…
“We need to keep the
nuclear option open”
‘Elite’ ‘green’ “no alternatives” rhetoric
also miss the politics of direction
focus on “tolerability” of incumbent path… not uncertain choice
Risk Debate Closes Down Social Choice
nuclear power
22. Politics reduced to risk: from ends: strategic choices between visions
to means: detailed regulation of modalities
increasing visible in high-level ‘planetary management’ discourse
“…the non-negotiable
planetary preconditions that
humanity needs to respect…
‘Anthropocene’
‘planetary boundaries’ and
‘control variables’ define:
…fear of “catastrophe”
…is “non negotiable”
…with “absolutely no uncertainty” …
brooking “no compromise”
“Sustainability” as an ‘Apolitical’ Control Agenda
But … gravity and urgency do not negate uncertainty, politics, democratic choice
24. unproblematic
problematic
unproblematic problematic
knowledge
about
likelihoods
knowledge about possibilities
RISK
UNCERTAINTY
AMBIGUITY
INCERTITUDE
Sustainability increasingly uses language of ‘evidence based policy’
Deliberating about Uncertainty
what is benefit or harm?
how fair? which alternatives?
whose values and societies?
- Socrates, Lao Tzu, Knight, Keynes, Shackle, Collingridge, Dovers, Ravetz, Wynne ...
25. unproblematic
problematic
unproblematic problematic
knowledge
about
likelihoods
knowledge about possibilities
RISK
UNCERTAINTY
AMBIGUITY
IGNORANCE
novel agents or vectors
surprising conditions
new alternatives
wilful blinkers
INCERTITUDE
Sustainability increasingly uses language of ‘evidence based policy’
Deliberating about Uncertainty
- Socrates, Lao Tzu, Knight, Keynes, Shackle, Collingridge, Dovers, Ravetz, Wynne ...
26. unproblematic
problematic
unproblematic problematic
knowledge
about
likelihoods
knowledge about possibilities
RISK
UNCERTAINTY
AMBIGUITY
aggregative analysis
patronage, pressure
political closure
insurance limits
reductive models
stochastic reasoning
`
science-based
policy
institutional
remits
political
culture
liability protection
harm definitions indicators /
metrics
IGNORANCE
risk focus is shaped by power – Beck’s “organised irresponsibility”
Power Closes Down Risk Discourse
27. CONTROL RISK
`
Climate Change fixations with risk and control easily lead to
geoengineering…
ACKNOWLEDGE
INCERTITUDE
thropocene
domination’
‘fear of
catastrophe’
‘planetary
management’
‘non-negotiable’
‘control variables’
absolutely
no uncertainty’
‘no compromise’
33. Mapping Discursive Diversity
Multicriteria Mapping ‘opens up’ politics and power in expertise
Analysis of 12 UK government GM advisors (2001)
organics
low input
intensive
GM 1
GM 2
GM 3
organics
low input
intensive
GM 1
GM 2
GM 3
34. UK Government
ecology chair
organics
low input
intensive
GM 1
GM 2
GM 3
organics
low input
intensive
GM 1
GM 2
GM 3
UK Government
safety chair
GM industry
research executive
Green NGO
scientist
Acknowledging assumptions, values, uncertainties ‘plural & conditional’ approach is rigorous & democratic
offers basis for Dryzek and Niemeyer’s ‘meta-consensus’
Multicriteria Mapping ‘opens up’ politics and power in expertise
Mapping Discursive Diversity
35. temporality of dynamics – are ‘disturbances’ envisaged as:
shocks
(transitory
disturbance to
otherwise
continuous
trajectory) time
driver of change
quality level
food: - supply bottlenecks
- price spikes
floods - severe rain episodes
magnitude
From Knowledge to Action
(Precaution: ‘uncertainty requires deliberation about action’)
36. shocks
food: - market trends
- resource depletion
floods: - higher rainfall
climate
temporality of dynamics – are ‘disturbances’ envisaged as:
driver of change
quality level
stresses
(pressure for
enduring
disturbance to
orientation of
trajectory)
From Knowledge to Action
37. shocks
control
food: - mandate supply chains
- regulate prices
floods: - water flow
management
style of action – do interventions aim at:
driver of change
quality level
From Knowledge to Action
38. shocks
control
food: - market structuring
- resource substitutions
floods: - engineered defence
style of action – do interventions aim at:
driver of change
quality level
stresses
From Knowledge to Action
39. response
food: - agile supply chains
- price elasticity
floods: - retrofit flood resistance
driver of change
quality level
2: style of action – do interventions aim at:
shocks
From Knowledge to Action
40. response
food: - foresighted institutions
- diverse dependencies
floods: - managed retreat
driver of change
quality level
shocks
stresses
2: style of action – do interventions aim at:
From Knowledge to Action
52. technological ‘lock-in’
institutionalised
technical risk
assessment
multiple feasible
Innovation trajectories
restricted
appreciation
knowledge
economy
‘closed down’
politics
POSSIBLE
PATHWAYS
presumed benefits
case-by-case focus
narrow remits
aggregated attention
regulatory capture
technocratic procedures
risk
narrow
practices
Options $
IIIIII
privileged
trajectories
single ‘best’ / ‘optimal’ /
most ‘legitimate’
decisions
€
Towards Innovation Democracy
prevailing ‘risk regulation’ or ‘transition management’ model
53. reconciles:
science and democracy:
neither ‘no alternative’ nor
‘anything goes’
IIIIII
$
IIIIII
$
IIIIIIIIIIII
$
POSSIBLE
PATHWAYS
diverse
pathways
innovation
democracy
“broaden out”
inputs to appraisal
“open up”
space for politics
“plural conditionality”
“meta-consensus”
accountability
robustness
Sustainability
Options
choice
discourse
more
options,
issues,
uncertainties,
perspectives
“letting go”
diversity
experiment
tools and practices for ‘broadening out’ , ‘opening up’ and ‘letting go’
Towards Innovation Democracy
Editor's Notes
roland: analytic believe in method, intuitive believe in results
Abstract
The governance of science and technology is conditioned by some pervasive fallacies and fantasies. None are more extensive or deeply embedded, than those concerning the ability of human agency deliberately to control key features of interest in the world. Aspects and implications of the associated dilemmas arise both in the ways knowledge itself is understood, as well as the styles of intervention that society seeks to undertake. Common to both areas, are the neglected dynamics of power - encouraging exaggeration both of the quality of knowledge and the tractability of action.
Focusing on the example of energy systems, this talk will quickly review some of the practical policy implications. It will argue for attention to a range of neglected 'broader based' methods for 'opening up' policy appraisal of energy systems. It will also conclude for greater attention to governance strategies that do not depend on claims and aspirations to control. Again, some practical implications will be discussed relating to resilience rather than stability in energy systems and transformation rather than deterministic transition. In all these respects, a concrete energy policy strategy that repeatedly comes to the fore is that of deliberate diversification.