EnergyTech2015.com Track 4 Session 1

1. NUCLEAR EMP AND SOLAR GMD
EFFECTS, NATIONAL PROTECTION
IMPASSE, AND RECOMMENDED
SOLUTIONS
George H. Baker, Professor Emeritus
James Madison University
Congressional EMP Commission
Foundation for Resilient Societies
Infragard EMP SIG

2. Outline
• Threat Thumbnail
• EMP Commission:
Recommendations and
Implementation Status
• Progress Impediments
• Prevalent Misconceptions re. Effects, Costs
• Reluctant Stakeholders
• No One in Charge
• Recent Developments
• Recommendations

3. Electromagnetic Threat Thumbnail
• Three electromagnetic effects have the potential to
debilitate the electric power grid over large regions
• Solar Superstorm Geomagnetic Disturbance (GMD)
• High Altitude Burst Nuclear EMP
• Radiofrequency Weapons (RFWs)
• Effects are known to cause failure of electrical and
electronic systems necessary for the operation of
critical infrastructures
• Preparedness initiatives should address these in a
combined fashion
• Operational “work-around” procedures are helpful but insufficient
• Physical protection is necessary for critical infrastructures

4. High Altitude Burst EMP
Environments
4
• Short duration, high peak field
• Broad-band frequency content
• Couples efficiently to short and
long conductors
Ground
E1
E3
• Long duration, low peak field
• Very low-frequency energy
• Couples efficiently only to very long
conductors (kilometers in length)
Power Spectra
Waveform

5. EMP Distinguishing Feature: Single Weapon
Produces Effects Over Multi-State Regions
• Even a modestly sized
nuclear weapon could affect
a large region of the United
States.
• A relatively low-yield
weapon – 10 kilotons in this
case – detonated at an
altitude of 70 km above the
earth, would generate an
electromagnetic pulse a
circular area of more than
1000 mile diameter
• Graphic shows the strength
and area that would be
affected by an EMP weapon
targeted at DC area
• Infrastructure would be
debilitated across the
northeast corridor
21,000 Volts/m
18,000 Volts/m
15,000 Volts/m
12,000 Volts/m
9,000 Volts/m
6,000 Volts/m
3,000 Volts/m
10 Kiloton Weapon
70km Burst Altitude
580 mile radius

6. Solar Storm Physics and Effects
• Waveform, earth coverage, system effects and
protection methods similar to EMP/E3
• Solar GMDs are the result of excursions in the flux
levels of charged particles from the Sun
(comprising the “solar wind”) interacting with the
earth’s magnetic field.
• Protons are the chief component.
• There is also an x-ray photon precursor useful for
warning.
• Distortion of earth’s magnetic field induces
voltages in long lines analogous to EMP/E3
• Effects: over-voltages in long conducting lines
affecting electric power grid, communication systems,
and pipeline operation
• Long Term Outages possible if systems are damaged
Storm Analysis Consultants

7. Radiofrequency Weapon (RFW)
Characteristics
• Environment and effects comparable to EMP/E1, except:
• Design frequency range extends higher [10 MHz – 10 GHz]
• Local effects only:
• RF energy falls off as 1/r2
• Effective range from 1 meter to few km depending on weapon size
• May be narrow-band (sinusoidal waveform) or wide-band (pulsed waveform)
Gigawatt-Class
Truck-Mounted RFW
Kilowatt- Class
Briefcase RFW
RFWs
Comparative Power Spectra

8. Direct1 System Effects vs. Threat
System Type EMP/E3 or
GMD
Vulnerability
EMP/E1
Vulnerability
RF Weapon
Vulnerability
Grid High Voltage Transmission/
Distribution Equipment
3 3 2
Electric Power Grid Electronic
Control, Monitor Systems
1* 3 3
Telecom/Internet
Communication & Data Centers
1* 3 3
Telecom/Internet Long-Haul
Lines & Repeaters for Data
Transmit
3 3 3
Ubiquitous SCADA, Process
Control Systems
1* 3 3
Vehicles, Ships, Aircraft
Electronics
0 2 3
Hand-held Electronics 0 2 3
3 – High Vuln.
2 – Medium Vuln.
1 – Low Vuln.
0 – No Vuln.1As opposed to cascading
*Vulnerable to transformer saturation harmonics
Electric
Power
Telecom/
Internet
Common
Electronics

9. Congressional EMP Commission Conclusions
• The EMP threat is one of a few potentially catastrophic
threats to the United States
• By taking action, the EMP consequences can be reduced to
manageable levels
• U.S. strategy to address the EMP threat should balance
prevention, preparation, protection, and recovery

10. EMP Commission Strategy and Recommendations
~ Pursue Intelligence, Interdiction, and Deterrence to
Discourage EMP Attack
– highest priority is to prevent attack
– shape global environment to reduce incentives to create EMP
weapons
– make it difficult and dangerous to try
X Protect Critical Components of Key Infrastructures
– especially “long lead” replacement components
X Maintain Ability to Monitor/Evaluate Condition of Critical
Infrastructures
– absence of information can make things worse either
through inaction or inappropriate action.
– Salutary example ~ Blackout of August 13, 2003
~ Recognize EMP Attack and Understand How Effects
Differ from Other Disruptions
~ Plan to Carry Out Systematic Recovery of Key Infrastructures
–demonstrate will and capacity to recover from any attack

11. ~ Train, Evaluate, “Red Team,” and Periodically Report to Congress
X Define the Federal Government’s Responsibility/Authority to Act
–Governance distributed among Federal, State, regional and
variety of non-governmental entities and associations
–DHS has unique responsibility to coordinate homeland response to threat
–DOD has unique responsibility to assure survivability and continued
operational effectiveness of our military forces in face of EMP threat
X Recognize Opportunities for Shared Benefits
– planning for rapid recovery/restoration of key infrastructures confers
protection against other disruptions; natural, accidental, or advertent
– some protective steps may enhance the reliability and quality of critical
infrastructures
~ Conduct Research to Better Understand Infrastructure System
Effects and Develop Cost-Effective Solutions to Manage Effects
EMP Commission Strategy and
Recommendations, (2 of 3)

12. X Homeland Security Council
• Prioritize government- and society-wide efforts to counter the small
number of threats that can hold our society at risk
X Department of Homeland Security
• Establish a specific, dedicated program for protection of America against
society-threatening attacks
• Establish a senior leadership position with accountability, authority, and
appropriate resources for the mission of defending against the most
serious threats
• Develop metrics for assessing improvements in prevention, recovery, and
protection
• Provide regular, periodic reporting on the status of these activities
EMP Commission Strategy and
Recommendations (3 of 3)

13. Impediment 1: Prevalent Misconceptions
• Convenient to adopt misconceptions that
avoid need for action
• Threat minimization places action on back-burner
• Threat exaggeration places action in the too hard column,
perpetuates “additional studies” mode
• Most harmful misconceptions. The following statements
are untrue:
X Nuclear EMP will burn out every exposed electronic system.
X EMP/GMD effects will be very limited and only result in “nuisance” effects in
critical infrastructure systems.
X Megaton class weapons are needed to cause any serious EMP effects –
low yield, “entry-level” weapons will not cause serious EMP effects.
X To protect our critical national infrastructure against EMP and GMD is not
affordable

14. Impediment 2: Stakeholder Reluctance
• Concern about costs and liabilities makes stakeholders in the
private sector and government reluctant to admit vulnerabilities
• Swayed by the familiar, the convenient, the bottom line
• Familiarity and profitability are the touchstones of acceptability
• Tendency to downplay the likelihood of EMP and GMD
• In cases where stakeholders have decided to take action, the
actions have been limited, delayed, and ineffective
• NERC task force to set reliability standards for GMD rejected EMP
responsibility – Resulting GMD-only standards are procedure-based,
do not apply to Generator Authorities and Load-Balancing Authorities
and are contrived to require essentially no physical protection
• Nuclear Regulatory Commission-accepted 2011 Petition for
Rulemaking to protect nuclear plants – still unaddressed
• White House wide-area electromagnetic threat SWORM
framework addresses GMD only and is non-directive
• Present bi-furcated “stove-pipe” grid preparedness/protection
approach is cost- and outcome-ineffective.

15. Impediment 3: There is No One in Charge
• To a major extent, lack of progress
is due to amorphous/distributed
Federal agency responsibility
• No national protection plan or direction
because nobody is in charge
• Finger-pointing, duck-and-cover game at
present
• Catastrophes are continental in
scale – everyone is in trouble – at
all levels
• Action needed at local, state, and federal
levels
• Government and industry should be involved
• Lack of federal initiative has left states and
localities foundering

16. Current Events: Recent [amorphous] Developments
• New draft GMD standards – continuing issues
• Set by NERC – crafted to avoid liability and
protection investment
• FERC NOPR ‘request for comments’ is now closed
• Standard is under internal FERC consideration
• CIPA Bill
• In limbo – still in Committee
• Foundation for Resilient Societies Cost Study
• White House National Space Weather Strategy
• Omits EMP, RF Weapons
• Inconsistent with NERC GMD Standard [proposes data sharing]
• Majors on further studies and analysis rather than protection
• Imposes no requirements on named organizations
Electric Generation Plants $23,000M
Electric Transmission & Distribution $2,300M
Electric Grid Control Centers $1,390.M
Telecommunications $1,480M
Natural Gas System $640M
Railroads $1,380M
Blackstart Plant Resiliency $80M
$30,270M total

17. Current Events, Recent [amorphous] Developments,
• Federal Government R&D Initiatives
• DTRA SBIR: Electric Power Island-mode Enhancement Strategies
and Methodologies for Defense Critical Infrastructure
• DOE Grid Modernization Laboratory Consortium
• Edison Electric Institute “Fact” Sheet, Rebuttal
• JINSA EMP Task Force Report
• Foundation for Resilient Societies Petitions, Cost-Benefit
studies
• CSP State-level initiatives
• Infragard State and local initiatives, TTX’s/play book
• Ambassador Cooper - National Guard initiatives and letter
to the President
• DHS initiatives
• Draft EMP Protection Guidelines
• Draft EMP Scenario
• Recent Congressional Committee hearings
• House Oversight and Government Reform
• Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs
• Recent EMP brief to Virginia public officials at
State Police Fusion Center
continued

18. October 2015 JINSA EMP Task Force
Conclusions
• There are advantages to be
gained by addressing the
overlapping EM threat spectrum with integrated
solutions, rather than treating threats individually.
• Deterrence strategies specific to EMP can add
value.
• Leveraging the emergence of smart grids, micro-
grids; the rapid turnover of electronic systems;
and industry initiatives will add value.
• Public-private partnerships can be leveraged in
new ways for improved EM protection [including
insurance industry in process]
• Increased public awareness is essential.

19. Recommendations for Future Progress
• Come to grips as a nation with EMP/GMD preparedness challenges
• The consequences of these threats are preventable
• The engineering tools are available
• Huge cost benefits for protecting a meaningful set of high-priority infrastructures
• Initiatives that would aid in this endeavor:
• A designated national executive agency and EMP/GMD/RFW protection director is
needed – DHS and DoD are likely candidates
• Establishing a national EMP/GMD protection plan including a set of national
planning scenarios
• Coordination with State and Local stake-holders is crucial
• Begin a national program to protect the electric power grid including essential
infrastructures used for fuel supply and communication – protection standards are
important to ensure a unified approach
• Congress should address problems inherent in the regulation of electric reliability
as conceived in the Energy Policy Act of 2005.
• FERC-NERC oversight has proven ineffective
• A new independent commission solely focused on electric grid reliability would be helpful
• Commission should have the power to issue and enforce standards/regulations