1. MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: 2013 Prospective on Cote d’Ivoire
Background:
Cote d’Ivoire, a former French colony, had one of the most developed and promising economies
in West Africa up until 1999, when a coup overthrew the democratically elected government.
Later subsequent failed elections led to the outbreak of a civil war that divided the nation in two
in 2002. This culminated into a disputed transfer of power in 2011 when former President
Laurent Gbagbo refused to cede power after his election loss causing violent clashes between
supporters of both sides. Thiscrisis has left the country vulnerable as it attempts to reconcile the
divided nation, reform the security sector and repair the economy. U.S. - Ivoirian relations have
traditionally beenfriendly. The United States currently provides more than a quarter of the
funding for UNCOI (United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire).
Key issues in 2013:
National Divisions:
Nationality and identity are the core cause of the internal crisis that has plagued Cote d’Ivoire
since 2001. The country has long benefited from the steady inflow of immigrants from other
West African states who have added to the agricultural sector, which dominates the economy.
The north of the country has a majority Muslim and immigrant population and remains largely
underdeveloped. The south is prominently Christian and is far more developed. Out of the
twenty-two million people living in Cote d’Ivoire an estimated eight million are immigrants,
generally from other West African states.i These immigrants, and the descendants of immigrants,
do not receive recognition as citizens and remain without a path to citizenship, leading to a
conflict over national identity. Political tensions have risen in the country as nearly twenty
percent of the population goes without representation and limited rights.
Tensions still remain from the violent and delayed transfer of power. President Ouattara, while
democratically elected, had to take his seat by force through rebels who supported him. There is
also tension stemming from the intervention of U.N. and French troops who monitored the
ceasefire. This has complicated Ouattara’s legitimacy as opponents perceive his accession to the
presidency as a tribute of force and support by the former colonizer, France. The trial of former
President Gbagbo for crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court in March 2013
could reignite these tensions and divide the nation once again. Several hundred supporters have
already taken to the streets in protest in February 2012.iiWhile there has been a significant
amount of progresson charging individualsfrom Gbagbo’s camp, Ivorian authorities have not
arrested or charged any members of the pro-Ouattara rebel forces who also committed grave
crimes during the crisis.iii
Border Security:
There have been several attacks along the borders since the 2010 elections. In June 2012 an
attack on the Liberian border resulted in the death of seven UN peacekeepers and twenty-seven
civilians. In September 2012 there was an attack on the Ghanaian border which resulted in eight
deaths and caused a closure of the border with Ghana. In January 2013 Guinean troops seized the
2. Ivorian village of Kpeaba as part of a long standing dispute about the delimitation of the western
border. President Ouattara has promised to diplomatically solve this issue.ivSeveral conflicts with
mercenaries on the Liberian border have added to the chaos.This cross-border violence poses a
threat, furthering political tensions and insecurity throughout the country. There have been
several attacks on tankers offof the coast of Cote d’Ivoire, the most recent of which occurred
early February 2013 when a French tanker, M/V Gascogne was hijacked.v
Security Sector Reform:
The security situation remains unstable with several recent attacks on army and police basesand
on border posts during August and September 2012. An increasing number of reports accusing
the military of mistreatment and illegal detentions have occurred.vi The root of this issue is
political as the current administration does not trust the current police force, which was trained
largely under the previous regime. This has led to a disarming of the police force and a reliance
on armed soldiers for security.vii The army has been poorly integrated with thousands of former
Ouattara’s rebelspushed into the regular army increasing the army by nearly 50,000 troops. This
integration has caused tensions with army officers.viiiCote d’Ivoire must depoliticize the army
while training them to fight the remaining paramilitary groups and rebels.ix Reform in
increasingly needed as UNCOI’s mandate expires in July 2013.
Economic Recovery:
The economy is still recovering from the conflict which interrupted its steady growth. Most
infrastructure has been repaired which has allowed the farmers and businesses to continue
exporting without needing to go through neighboring countries. This is promising for the
normalization of trade relations. However, the instability in the country has led to a severe
increase in food prices. Cote d’Ivoire remains the world’s largest exporter of cocoa as
international prices have risen to the highest prices in over three decades. In March 2013 cocoa
prices fell 1.2% for a total decrease of 8.1% since January 2012.xThe increase in cocoa prices
along with a tripling in local food prices has severely hindered Ivoirians ability to feed
themselves and families.In May of 2012 prices for the staple crop, Cassava, had risen 70%. And
rice had risen to nearly 50%, its highest process in five years.xiThis has hurt exports and has
caused some Ivorian farmers to turn to rubber production instead as the growing demand and
high prices are more lucrative for them, as the production is projected to increase by more than
110%.xii The abandoning of stable cropscause concerns of potential famine and food riots. In
July 2012 a commercial court was set up in Abidjan to encourage investments and economic
development. The court is meant to protect investments and enforce contracts, overall improving
the business climate.xiii
U.S. Strategic Interests:
A stable and democratic Cote d’Ivoire is essential to the U.S. goal of promoting good
governance and democracy throughout Africa. The U.S. holds several strategic interests, all of
which are rooted in the goal of stability. Its transition after its crisis will set a precedent for
similar countries. The internal stability will be crucial for maintain stability in an increasingly
3. important region. And while Cote d’Ivoire is not a comparatively large economic market for the
U.S., there is potential and some significance.
Good Governance:
A stable and democratic Cote d’Ivoire is imperative as the U.S. promotes good governance and
democracy. The instability and disputed transition of power sets a negative precedent for other
African countries, who are having elections and are attempting to transition and/or solidify into
democracies. Similar refusals to give up power were seen in violent disputes over electoral
processes in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Senegal subsequent to the Ivorian crisis.xiv
Good governance and democracy is also crucial as the Cote d’Ivoire currently holds the
chairmanship of ECOWAS, which has been taking a more proactive role in the region and
increasingly more powerful in numerous sectors in the region, such as monetary policies, trade,
energy and telecommunications, among others.
Stability in the Region:
Cote d’Ivoire is in the heart of West Africa and borders five countries: Ghana, Burkina Faso,
Guinea, Liberia and Mali. The recent crisis in Mali adds to the U.S. strategic importance on this
sub-region with the heightened prospect of terrorism and extremism, particularlythe AQIM
linked groups in Mali and Boko Haram in Nigeria. Further instability in Cote d’Ivoire could
potentially trigger similar problems throughout other West African states. Some of which have
already experienced serve crises in recent years making them more susceptible. President
Ouattara currently holds the chairmanship of ECOWAS, which has taken a much more proactive
role in the region. This was seen in withthe intervention in the civil war in Cote d’Ivoire in 2012
and the current deployment of 3,300 troops to Mali to intervene in the crisis against Islamic
rebels.xv
Economic Relations:
Economic recovery will help stabilize and further develop the country. Cote d’Ivoire is again
eligible for preferential trade with the African Growth and Opportunity Act. The U.S. exports
steel, machinery, plastics and agricultural products among others.However, exports fell more
than 20% to $130 million. U.S. imports rose 8% to $1.3 billion. Imports include cocoa,the largest
import at $871 million, rubber, wood, cashews and mineral fuel (oil).xviThe current U.S. trade
deficit is $1.1 billion dollars. U.S. firms have made significant investments in oil and gas
projects, banking, cocoa and international courier services.
4. i
“Africa Security Brief,”Africa Center for Strategic Studies. March 2012.
ii
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130216/pro-gbagbo-protest-dispersed-days-ahead-key-hearing
iii
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/ivory-coast-troubled-sided-justice-18630422
iv
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/africa/Ivory-Coast-Guinea-vow-peaceful-resolution-to-border-dispute-/-
/1066/1700168/-/ftcwu7/-/index.html
v
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21350451
vi
Monthly Forecast, UNSC Report, January 2013.
vii
http://www.economist.com/node/21555959
viii
http://www.economist.com/node/21555959
ix
“Africa Security Brief,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies. March 2012.
x
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-04/cocoa-falls-to-10-month-low-on-ivory-coast-rainfall-sugar-rises.html
xi
http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95497/COTE-D-IVOIRE-Traders-resist-rice-price-rules
xii
http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2013/feb/28/ivory-coast-farmers-cassava-rubber
xiii
http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/723228/Cote-dIvoire-sets-up-Commercial-Court-to-improve-
business-environment.aspx
xiv
“Africa Security Brief,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies. March 2012.
xv
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20292797
xvi
http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/west-africa/cote-divoire