1. MOTION TO STRIKE
Vogel Denise Newsome vs.
Recognizing Their CRIMINAL Clients: United States of Page Kruger & Holland P.A., Thomas Y.
America President Barack Obama (Appears Impersonating
Government Official Through The Use Of A Fake/False Page, Louis G. Baine III, Linda Thomas…
Certificate Of Live Birth Created By His Legal Team, George
Zimmerman – Appears the Killer/Murderer of Trayvon Martin
in Florida Shooting - Understanding HOW it appears they are able to
get documents CREATED through the use of GOVERNMENT Agencies!

2. VOGEL DENISE NEWSOME
Post Office Box 14731
Cincinnati, Ohio 45250
(601) 885-9536 or (513) 680-2922
July 14, 2012
VIA PRIORITY MAIL: Tracking No. 03102010000042767904
United States District Court - Southern District (Jackson, MS)
ATTN: J. T. Noblin (Clerk of Court)
500 E. Court Street, Suite 2.500
Jackson, Mississippi 39201
RE: Vogel Denise Newsome v. Page Kruger & Holland P.A., et al., Civil Action No.
3:12-cv-00342, United States District Court Southern District (Jackson, MS)
PLEASE NOTE: Newsome is requesting to be advised of ANY/ALL
Conflict-Of-Interests in regards to this lawsuit.
Dear Mr. Noblin:
Attached please find the following documents:
1) Certified Mail Return Receipt Cards regarding the service of
Notice of A Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a
Summons and Waiver of the Service of Summons for: Page
Kruger & Holland P.A., Thomas Y. Page, Louise G. Baine III
and Linda Thomas;
2) Waiver of the Service of Summons for: Page Kruger & Holland
P.A., Thomas Y. Page, Louis G. Baine III and Linda Thomas –
i.e. please NOTE: These are NOT the Waiver of the Service of
Summons issued by Newsome and was accompanied by a
document entitled, “NOTIFICATION ACCOMPANYING
WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS”
3) DVD containing Newsome’s Motion to Strike Motion To Dismiss and
Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss; Motion for Rule 11
Sanctions of and Against Defendants; and Motion for Default
Judgment (Jury Trial Demanded in this Action) and supporting
Memorandum Brief with EXHIBITS in accordance with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure – i.e. for Costs efficiency purposes.
Newsome encloses TWO copies of the FIRST Page only of her pleading. Please stamp
“FILED” one of these copies and return to her in in the self-addressed postage-paid envelope
enclosed. By copy of this letter, Newsome is providing opposing counsel with a copy of the above
referenced pleading on DVD as well. Newsome has in good faith also placed these pleadings at the
following locations via the INTERNET due to the PUBLIC/GLOBAL/INTERNATIONAL interests
in matters involving her, United States of America President Barack Obama, United States of
America Government, Florida A&M University Robert Champion matter, Trayvon Martin/George
Zimmerman matter, etc. which appears to have a DIRECT impact and/or connection to the recent
and VICIOUS attacks and ONGOING Conspiracies (i.e. involving BAKER DONELSON
BEARMAN CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ and their CLIENTS and PARTNER Law Firms as
PHELPS DUNBAR, etc.) that have been leveled against Newsome for sharing information that are
matters of PUBLIC interests. Therefore, please feel free to retrieve these pleadings, should problems
occur with viewing, from: http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/071412-motion-to-strike-page-
kruger-holland-matter and/or https://secure.filesanywhere.com/fs/v.aspx?v=8a706a8d5e6473bcaa69 .

3. Unite d SLates District Co urt - Southern District (Jackso n, IS)
ATTN: ,J. T. Noblin (Clerk of C o urt )
RE: Vogel Denise Newsome ", Page Krug er & llolland p./l.. et 01 , Ci vil Actio n :':0, 3 :12-cv-(J0342 , Lnitcd States Di strict Court
.
Southern Distr ict (Jackson, IS )
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Please feel free to visit www.vogeldellisenewsome.net andwW.slideshare.llet/vogeldenise
where documents involving this matter may be made available due to the INCREASING interests in
matters (i.e. such as Newsome vs Page Kruger & Holland) involving Vog el Denise Newsome,
Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.
With Warmest Regards ,
/0
Vogel Denise Newsome
1!/-eA~
Post Office Box 1473 I
Cincinnati, Ohio 45250
(601 ) 885-9536 and/or (513) 680-2922
Enclosures
cc : PHELPS DUNBAR LLP - W. Thomas Siler, Jr., Esq.lJason T. Marsh, Esq.

4. IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT – JACKSON DIVISION
VOGEL DENISE NEWSOME PLAINTIFF
V. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-cv-00342
PAGE KRUGER & HOLLAND P.A., ET AL. DEFENDANTS
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISMISS; MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS OF AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS; AND MOTION FOR DEFAULT
JUDGMENT (JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN THIS ACTION) 1
COMES NOW Plaintiff Vogel Denise Newsome (“Newsome” and/or “Plaintiff”) WITHOUT waiving her
OBJECTIONS to Judge Tom S. Lee presiding over this matter in that a CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST exist which
requires RECUSAL as well as Newsome’s OBJECTIONS to Magistrate assignment in this matter and files this, her
Motion to Strike Motion To Dismiss (Doc. No. 5) and Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss (Doc. No. 6);
Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions of and Against Defendants; and Motion for Default Judgment (Jury Trial Demanded in
this Action) (“MTS-MTD&MFR11SDefault”) pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule 12(F)
governing matters regarding motion to strike; FRCP Rule 12(G) governing matters regarding consolidation of
defenses and objections; FRCP Rule 11 governing sanctions and/or signing of pleadings, motions, and other
documents; FRCP Rule 55 governing default judgments; and the Fourteenth and Seventh Amendment to the
Constitution. In support of this instant MTS-MTD&MFR11SDEFAULT, Newsome attaches her Affidavit at
EXHIBIT “1” – incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full herein. Said Affidavit contains PERTINENT
and RELEVANT information that Newsome believes will aid this Court and provide it with an UNDERSTANDING
as to what is really taking place behind the scenes in FURTHERANCE of the Conspiracies addressed in
Newsome’s Complaint filed in this lawsuit. In support thereof Newsome states:
1. This instant MTS-MTD&MFR11SDEFAULT is submitted in good faith and is not submitted for
purposes of delay, harassment, hindering proceedings, embarrassment, obstructing the administration of
justice, vexatious litigation, increasing the cost of litigation, etc. and is filed to protect and preserve the
rights of Newsome secured/guaranteed under the United States Constitution and other laws of the United
States.
2. Newsome attaches her supporting Affidavit at EXHIBIT “1” which is incorporated herein by reference
as if set forth in full.
1
NOTE: Boldface, caps, small-caps, italics, highlights and underline represents “emphasis” added.
Page 1 of 38

5. 3. That a CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST presently exists with the assignment of this lawsuit to Judge Tom S.
Lee. The record evidence CLEARLY supports that Newsome has timely, properly and adequately
NOTIFIED this Court of the Conflict-Of-Interest regarding Judge Tom S. Lee. See Doc. No. 2 –
“Motion Conflict-Of-Interest Information. . .” As a direct and proximate result of this Court to comply
with the MANDATORY requirements of statutes and laws governing said matters, Newsome has been
irreparably injured/harmed and deprived rights – i.e. equal protection of the laws, privileges and
immunities, and due process of laws guaranteed under the United States Constitution and other
governing laws.
4. That Newsome OBJECTS to the assignment of a Magistrate to this Lawsuit in that she has timely,
properly and adequately NOTIFIED this Court in writing as to her OBJECTIONS. Furthermore, said
OBJECTION is in accordance with Rules governing said matters as well as in accordance to Rule 73 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636 and any and all applicable statutes/laws
governing said matters. Furthermore, Newsome states in support thereof:
Rule 73 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
(a) Trial by Consent. When authorized under 28 U.S.C. §636(c), a magistrate judge may, if all parties
consent, conduct a civil action or proceeding, including a jury or nonjury trial. A record must be
made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §636(c)(5).
(b) Consent Procedure:
(1) In General. When a magistrate judge has been designated to conduct civil actions or
proceedings, the clerk must give the parties written notice of their opportunity to consent under
28 U.S.C. §636(c). To signify their consent, the parties must jointly or separately file a statement
consenting to the referral. A district judge or magistrate judge may be informed of a party's
response to the clerk's notice only if all parties have consented to the referral.
(2) Reminding the Parties About Consenting. A district judge, magistrate judge, or other court
official may remind the parties of the magistrate judge's availability, but must also advise them that
they are free to withhold consent without adverse substantive consequences.
(3) Vacating a Referral. On its own for good cause—or when a party shows extraordinary
circumstances—the district judge may vacate a referral to a magistrate judge under this rule.
See EXHIBIT “2” – Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure attached hereto and incorporated
by reference as if set forth in full herein. In fact, this Court has the REQUIRED Form AO 085 that was
to be distributed to parties NOTIFYING of Magistrate Assignment (if any) – See EXHIBIT “3” – Form
AO 085 which has been marked DECLINED attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set
forth in full herein. Nevertheless, this Court failed to comply with the statutes/laws governing said
matters. As a direct and proximate result of this Court to comply with the MANDATORY
requirements of said Rule 73 and any and all applicable statutes/laws governing said matters, Newsome
has been irreparably injured/harmed and deprived rights – i.e. equal protection of the laws, privileges
and immunities, and due process of laws guaranteed under the United States Constitution and other
governing laws.
5. Newsome hereby timely, properly and adequately OBJECTS to this Court’s FAILURE and Defendants
and their Counsel’s FAILURE to provide this Court with the REQUIRED “DISCLOSURE
STATEMENT” in accordance to Rule 7.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and/or statutes/laws
governing said matters. Newsome hereby demands that Named Defendants and their counsel file the
MANDATORY “Disclosure Statement” IMMEDIATELY. Furthermore, Newsome states in support
thereof:
Rule 7.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
(a) Who Must File; Contents. A nongovernmental corporate party must file 2 copies of a
disclosure statement that:
Page 2 of 38

6. (1) identifies any parent corporation and any publicly held corporation owning 10% or
more of its stock; or
(2) states that there is no such corporation.
(b) Time to File; Supplemental Filing. A party must:
(1) file the disclosure statement with its first appearance, pleading, petition, motion,
response, or other request addressed to the court; and
(2) promptly file a supplemental statement if any required information changes.
COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2002
. . . The information required by Rule 7.1(a) reflects the “financial interest” standard
of Canon 3C(1)(c) of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges. This information will
support properly informed disqualification decisions in situations that call for automatic
disqualification under Canon 3C(1)(c). It does not cover all of the circumstances that may call
for disqualification under the financial interest standard, and does not deal at all with other
circumstances that may call for disqualification.
Although the disclosures required by Rule 7.1(a) may seem limited, they are
calculated to reach a majority of the circumstances that are likely to call for disqualification on
the basis of financial information that a judge may not know or recollect. . . .
See EXHIBIT “4” – Rule 7.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure attached hereto and incorporated
by reference as if set forth in full herein. As a direct and proximate result of this Court to comply with
the MANDATORY requirements of said Rule 7.1 and any and all applicable statutes/laws governing
said matters, Newsome has been irreparably injured/harmed and deprived rights – i.e. equal protection
of the laws, privileges and immunities, and due process of laws guaranteed under the United States
Constitution and other governing laws.
6. UNDISPUTED is the fact that Page Kruger & Holland, P.A. is a “PRIVATE” company/corporation.
Therefore, subject to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and any and all other statutes/laws governing
said matters.
Plummer vs. Chicago Journeyman Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, U.A., 452
F.Supp. 1127 (1978) - . . . plaintiff's action under section pertaining to equal
rights under the law would stand. . .
[19] Plaintiffs alleging discrimination in employment could have
proceeded by first bringing action under civil rights section pertaining to
equal rights under the law to avoid any statute of limitations problems. . .or
plaintiffs could also have proceeded with separate and independent action
under equal rights under the law section . . .
[25] Section of Civil Rights Act pertaining to equal rights under the
law provides federal remedy against discrimination in PRIVATE
employment on the basis of race, whereby claimant may be entitled to legal and
equitable relief, irrespective of whether claimant has pursued Title VII
administrative remedies. . . .
[19] Plaintiffs correctly state that the Supreme Court suggested in
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, supra, 421 U.S. at 465, 95 S.Ct. 1716,
that plaintiffs file their section 1981 suit to avoid the tolling of the statute of
limitations while the EEOC processes their Title VII charges. Nonetheless, this
suggestion does not support the procedure that plaintiffs followed. They filed
their Title VII suit, while three plaintiffs were still processing their charges
through the EEOC, in order to file in conjunction with their section 1981
action. They then filed two amended complaints after these plaintiffs received
right to sue notices. The Court in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, supra at
466, 95 S.Ct. 1716, stated that section 1981 and Title VII are separate and
independent remedies for discrimination. Plaintiffs could have proceeded by
first bringing a section 1981 action to avoid any statute of limitations problem.
They could then have petitioned the court for a stay of the section 1981 action
Page 3 of 38

7. until the Title VII efforts at conciliation and voluntary compliance had been
completed. Id. at 465, 95 S.Ct. 1716. At that point, they could have filed a
supplemental pleading pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(d), adding the Title VII
claim. Plaintiffs could also have proceeded with the separate and independent
section 1981 action. They could then have filed their Title VII action after
jurisdictional prerequisites had been fulfilled and could have sought
consolidation pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a). Plaintiffs' procedure of filing
their Title VII claims before jurisdictional prerequisites had been completed
certainly did not provide an orderly procedure. Their continued updating with
respect to the satisfaction of Title VII jurisdictional prerequisites resulted in
two amendments to the complaint and five rounds of complex briefing. – See
EXHIBIT “5” – Plummer matter attached hereto and incorporated by
reference as if set forth in full herein.
7. UNDISPUTED is the fact that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and supporting Memorandum Brief in
this lawsuit is premised on claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against “STATE” and/or
“Government” employers/officials/employees. UNISPUTED is the fact that Newsome’s instant lawsuit
is a premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1981 – Equal Rights Under The Law which allows for one to “to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens . . .” Therefore,
NOT even with a MAGNIFYING GLASS will a JURY and Court find any such § 1983 claims as asserted
by the Defendants in this lawsuit.
8. UNDISPUTED is the fact that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and supporting Memorandum Brief in
this lawsuit appears to have been taken from their Counsel’s FORMS Pleading Manual and or that of its
CONSPIRING outside Law Firms with an interest in this lawsuit (EMPHASIS added). Furthermore,
the frivolous allegations asserted by Defendants and their Counsel clearly are IRRELEVANT and: (i)
an insufficient defense to the Complaint filed by Newsome; (ii) redundant; (iii) immaterial; (iv)
impertinent and/or (v) scandalous and provided for purposes of delay, harassment, obstructing justice,
embarrassment, sham/frivolousness, commit fraud upon this Court, and other reasons known to
Defendants and their Counsel.
9. For this Court to grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Newsome would be prejudice and deprived
equal protection of the laws, equal immunities and privileges and due process of laws. Rights
secured/guaranteed under the United States Constitution and other governing laws.
A. JURISDICTIONAL/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS:
Walton v. Utility Products, Inc., 424 F.Supp. 1145 (D.C.Miss. 1976 ) - (n.1) Since statute
guaranteeing equal rights under the law contains no statute of limitations, period of
limitations applicable to action under statute is determined by reference to most analogous statute
of limitations in force in state in which cause of action arises. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981.2
2
[1] The court rejects defendant's contention that the three-year limitations period of Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-29 (1972) bars
plaintiff's section 1981 claim. Defendant correctly states that since section 1981 contains no statute of limitations, the ap plicable period of
limitations is determined by reference to the most analogous statute of limitations in force in the state in which the cause o f action arises. Section
15-1-29 pertains to actions founded on implied contracts. . . .
(n. 2) Under law of Mississippi, general six-year period of limitations rather than three-year period of limitations which
applies to action founded on implied contracts and action to recover back pay governs employment discrimination suit charging violation of
federal statute guaranteeing equal rights under the law. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981; Code Miss.1972, §§ 15-1-29, 15-1-49.
(n. 3) Under law of Mississippi, three-year statute of limitations applicable to action seeking recovery of back wages acts as
limitation upon back pay liability of employer charged with racial discrimination but does not operate to bar entire back pay claim or claim for
declaratory or injunctive relief. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981; Code Miss.1972, § 15-1-29.
(n. 4) Under law of Mississippi, employee's claim against employer charging violation of federal statue guaranteeing equal
rights, filed within six years of alleged racial discrimination, was not time barred. Code Miss.1972, § 15-1-49; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981.
[2] [3] [4] This court is of the opinion that the reasoning . . . is equally applicable to a section 1981 employment discrimination
action. As there is no Mississippi statute of limitations for civil rights actions, or a specific Mississippi statue of limitations for actions analogous
to actions based on racial discrimination in employment, the general six-year period of limitations provided by Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49,
rather than the three-year period provided by section 15-1-29, determines the time within which a section 1981 employment discrimination suit
must be filed. As noted previously, section 15-1-29 does act as a limitation upon an employer's back pay liability, but it does not operate to bar
Page 4 of 38

8. See EXHIBIT “6” - Walton v. Utility Products, Inc. attached hereto and incorporated herein by
reference as if set forth in full herein. This citation is not new to the Defendants in this lawsuit in that it
is addressed at Footnote (“Fn.”) 6 at page 7 of the Complaint. Along with other case law provided in:
Heath v. D. H. Baldwin Co., 447 F.Supp. 495 (N.D.Miss.Greenville.Div., 1977) -
General six-year statute of limitations in Mississippi was applicable to suit by . .
.employee against employer . . . claiming racial discrimination. Code Miss. 1972, § 15-
1-49; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981.
Howard v. Sun Oil Co., 294 F.Supp. 24 (S.D.Miss.Hattiesburg.Div.,1967) - Ordinarily,
suit in tort for damages brought more than six years after commission of tort is barred
by Mississippi six-year statute of limitations. Code Miss.1942, § 722.
See Fn.6 at page 7 of Complaint filed in this instant lawsuit. Moreover, EXHIBITS “7” – Heath and
“8” – Howard respectively attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.
Newsome having highlighted information that is PERTINENT and RELEVANT in that it goes to the
relief of SANCTIONS that Newsome seeks of and against Defendants and/or their Counsel – i.e.
supports what facts, evidence and legal conclusions were available at the time of their preparation of
the Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 5] and supporting Memorandum Brief [Doc. No. 6] submitted in this
lawsuit.
10. Newsome believes this Court upon receipt of the Complaint in this lawsuit, may have reviewed the
“CIVIL COVER SHEET” and statements provided under “JURISDICTION” of Complaint and
determined arguments to be well-founded and proceeded to file Newsome’s lawsuit.
Truvillion vs. King's Daughters Hospital, 614 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. Miss. 1980) - .
. .(4) claim against employer grounded on civil rights statute was governed by
Mississippi six-year catchall statute of limitations rather than three-year statute
of limitations governing unwritten contracts. . . .
[6] Job discrimination suit filed under civil rights statute was
governed by Mississippi six-year catchall statute of limitations, rather than
three-year statute of limitations governing unwritten contracts. . .
[6] . . ."(a) person suing under Section 1981 to enforce his right to
be free of discrimination predicates his claim on the right to contract
guaranteed in the statute. The contractual nature of claim under Section 1981
dictates application. . . But the statutory right Ms. Truvillion asserts is not the
right to enforce an unwritten contract as the district court assumed . . .
Because Mississippi has no statute of limitations designed to cover actions
seeking redress for the tort of employment discrimination, the State's catch-all
statute is applicable. [FN16] See Heath v. D.H. Baldwin Co., N.D. Miss. 1979,
447 F.Supp. 495, 504; Walton v. Utility Products, Inc., N.D. Miss. 1976, 424
F.Supp. 1145, 1147. The statute runs for six years, and does not bar Ms.
Truvillion's claim.
FN16. The statute provides:
All actions for which no other period of limitation is
prescribed shall be commenced within six years next after
the cause of such action accrued, and not after.
See EXHIBIT “9” – Truvillion matter attached hereto and
incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.
11. The filing of this lawsuit should come as no surprise to Defendants Page Kruger & Holland, P.A.
(“PKH”), Thomas Y. Page (“TPage”), Louis G. Baine III (“LBaine”), and Linda Thomas. (“LThomas”)
the entire back pay claim, or a claim for declaratory or injunctive relief.FN1 Since plaintiff filed his section 1981 claim well within the six-year
period, defendant's motion to dismiss this portion of the complaint must be denied.
[5] The court also does not agree with defendant's contention that Title VII relief is precluded because of plaintiff's failure to file this
action within 90 days of receipt of the EEOC failure of conciliation notice. . . . Defendant's motion to dismiss the Title VII aspects of plaintiff's
complaint is accordingly denied.
Page 5 of 38

9. [collectively known as “Named Defendants”] because the record evidence will support that as early as
May 16, 2006, Named Defendants were timely, properly and adequately notified of Newsome’s intent to
bring a lawsuit. See EXHIBIT “10” – Newsome’s May 16, 2006 Email to Named Defendants attached
hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. Said email which states in part:
In that I believe that I have been unlawfully terminated, I am requesting that
PKH PRESERVE my employment records, any other documents, audio,
etc. regarding my employment and reasons for termination.
In that PKH was given an opportunity to provide me with written
documentation as to their reasons for my termination, I will only conclude
that any other reasons which may be offered AFTER the fact/termination
will be PRETEXT in nature - provided in an effort to COVER-UP/SHIELD
PKH's unlawful employment action taken against me.
Said email was also provided with the Complaint in this lawsuit at Exhibit VI. It is an UNDISPUTED
fact that Named Defendants ACKNOWLEDGE referenced statement as sufficient NOTIFICATION
on Newsome’s intent to bring suit and/or legal action regarding her termination. The U.S. Supreme
Court finding:
Burnett v. New York Cent. R. Co., 85 S.Ct. 1050 (1965) - Statutes of limitations are
designed primarily to assure fairness to defendants; they promote justice by preventing
surprises through revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has
been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.
Policy of repose, designed to protect defendants, is frequently outweighed
where interests of justice require vindication of plaintiff's rights.
Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank, 118 S.Ct. 1408 (1998) - The object of a statute of
limitation in keeping stale litigation out of the courts would be distorted if statute were
applied to bar otherwise legitimate defense to timely lawsuit, for limitation statutes are
aimed at lawsuits, not at consideration of particular issues in lawsuits. [EMPHASIS
ADDED].
Named Defendants CANNOT say that evidence was lost and/or assert memories have faded, etc.
because they were timely, properly and adequately requested to PRESERVE the record. Named
Defendants and their counsel’s FRIVOLOUS assertion alleging § 1983 claims NOT provided in
Newsome’s Complaint clearly supports their KNOWLEDGE that any attacks against Newsome’s claims
as being TIME BARRED is (i) an insufficient defense to the Complaint filed by Newsome; (ii)
redundant; (iii) immaterial; (iv) impertinent and/or (v) scandalous and provided for purposes of delay,
harassment, obstructing justice, embarrassment, sham/frivolousness, commit fraud upon this Court, and
other reasons known to Defendants and their Counsel.
12. It is well-settled by the court(s) that claims and/or cause of action is the determining factor as to which
statute-of-limitation is applicable:
King v. Otasco, Inc., 861 F.2d 438 (5th Cir.Miss.,1988) - When suit alleges several
distinct causes of action, even if they arise from single event, applicable limitations
period must be determined by analyzing each cause of action separately, rather than by
determining “essence” of plaintiff's claims considered as a whole.
Plaintiffs cannot be allowed to obtain trials for intentional tort claims after
statute of limitations has barred them merely by engaging in artful pleading; if however,
claim can plausibly withstand motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, it cannot be
treated as mere rewording of barred claim, and thus, instead of probing for essence of
suit, district court should analyze each claim on its own merits.
Alexander v. Taylor, 928 So.2d 992 (Miss.App.,2006) - What limitations statute or
statutes apply is determined from an examination of the claims that are made.
Shaw v. McCorkle, 537 F.2d 1289 (5th Cir.Miss.,1976) - In choosing applicable state
statute of limitations to apply to action brought under civil rights statute, court must
ground its decision on the basis of which statute will best effectuate the congressional
policies underlying the civil rights statute.
Page 6 of 38

10. In this instant lawsuit Newsome brings the following Counts and claims, facts, evidence and legal
conclusions to sustain them will support that Newsome’s claims are subject to the six-year statute of
limitation and were not barred – while some of the Counts may be misnumbered, it has NO bearing on
the claims, facts and legal conclusions provided by Newsome to support her Complaint. Moreover,
misnumbering is a MINOR issue which can be corrected through an Amended Complaint should it be
deemed necessary. The supporting statement of claims set forth PARAGRAPHS in Newsome’s
Complaint are DISTINCTLY numbered as required by the Rules/Statutes governing said matters. The
Counts being as follows: Count I - 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against Defendants;
Count II - 42 USC § 1985: Conspiracy To Interfere With Civil Rights and 42 USC § 1981: Equal
Rights Under The Law Against Defendant(s); Count III - 42 USC § 1986: Action For Neglect To
Prevent and 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against Defendant(s); Count IV - Negligent
Interference with Employment and 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against Defendant(s);
Count V - Discrimination in Employment and 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against
Defendant(s); Count II [Sic] – Retaliation and 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against
Defendant(s); Count IIIII [Sic] - Breach Of Express Employment Agreement 42 USC § 1981: Equal
Rights Under The Law Against Defendant(s); Count VIII – Breach Of The Covenant Of Good Faith
And Fair Dealing 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against Defendant(s); Count IX –
Negligent Infliction Of Emotional Distress and 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against
Defendant(s); Count X – Fraud Against [sic] and 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against
Defendant(s); Count XI – Negligent Interference With Employment – Malicious Conspiracy To Cause
Discharge From Employment and 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against Defendant(s);
Count IVII – Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution – Due Process and 42
USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law; and Count VII – Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution – Equal Protection and 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against
Defendant(s)
I. MOTION TO STRIKE/
CONSOLIDATION OF DEFENSES
Pendleton County v. Amy, 80 U.S. 297 (1871) - Defendant's pleas which were
inartistically framed and were argumentative and set up nothing which could not have
been taken advantage of for what it was worth under the general issue might have been
stricken from the record on motion.
Brown v. Lamb, 112 Ohio App. 116, 171 N.E.2d 191 (1960) - (n.4) Motions to strike
pleadings and papers from the files are ordinarily employed to strike pleadings for
failure to comply with previous orders . . . or to test its form with respect to
certification, and the office of such motions is not to inquire into the merits of the case.
(n.8) A pleading is “frivolous” when it is clearly insufficient on its face and
does not controvert material points of the opposite pleading and is presumably
interposed for mere purposes of delay or to embarrass the opponent.
Sherrill v. Stewart, 21 So.2d 11 (Miss.,1945) - A “frivolous pleading” is one so clearly
untenable or the insufficiency of which is so manifest upon bare inspection of
pleading that court is able to determine its character without argument or research.
McDowell v. Minor, 131 So. 278 (Miss.,1930) - Where pleading is manifestly sham and
frivolous, motion to strike is available.
Pursuant to Rule 12 (F) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Newsome through this MTS-
MTD&MFR11SDEFAULT moves this Court to strike the statements, contents and any supporting exhibits of
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and the supporting Memorandum Brief. Under said Rule it states:
Rule 12(F) Motion to Strike. The Court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or
any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. The court may act:
(1) on its own; or
Page 7 of 38

11. (2) on motion made by a party either before responding to the pleading or, if
a response is not allowed, within 20 days after being served with the
pleading.
Therefore, in an effort to provide specificity Newsome moves for the striking of contents/statements in Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss and the supporting Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss in that the asserted Rule 12
(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss and its Memorandum Brief are IRRELEVANT and IMMATERIAL. In further support of
this instant MTS-MTD&MFR11SDEFAULT, Newsome moves this Court to strike the contents/statements for the
following reasons:
A. MOTION TO DISMISS
The entire contents of “Motion to Dismiss” which include; however, is not limited to the Style and Headings
of said pleading in that it is: (ii) redundant; (iii) immaterial; (iv) impertinent and/or (v) scandalous and provided for
purposes of delay, harassment, obstructing justice, increasing costs of litigation, embarrassment, sham/frivolousness,
unduly burdensome, provided for purposes of committing fraud upon this Court, and other reasons known to
Defendants and their Counsel and the following:
13. Opening paragraph on beginning unnumbered page which begins with “COME NOW, Defendants,
Page Kruger & Holland, P.A. (“PKH”), Thomas Y. Page (“Page”), Louis G. Baine, III (“Baine”), and
Linda Thomas (“Thomas”)” in that it is - (ii) redundant; (iii) immaterial; (iv) impertinent and/or (v)
scandalous and provided for purposes of delay, harassment, obstructing justice, increasing costs of
litigation, embarrassment, sham/frivolousness, unduly burdensome, provided for purposes of committing
fraud upon this Court, and other reasons known to Defendants and their counsel (Phelps Dunbar LLP,
W. Thomas Siler, Jr. and Jason T. Marsh [hereinafter, “Phelps Dunbar,” “Siler” and/or “Marsh”)] herein
collectively known as “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
14. ¶1 on unnumbered page which begins with, “This action arises out of Plaintiff’s employment
termination from PKH” and the referenced Footnote 1 in that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT
CLAUSE.”
Heath vs. D. H. Baldwin Company, 447 F.Supp. 495 (N.D. Miss. 1977) - . . . (4)
Mississippi six-year statute of limitations was applicable to action under Civil Rights Act
of 1870 . . .
[5] General six-year statute of limitations in Mississippi was applicable to suit
by laid off employee aganst employer and union claiming racial discrimination. Code
Miss. 1972, § 15-1-49; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981. . . .
For the reasons set forth by Chief Judge Keady in Walton v. Utility Products,
Inc., 424 F.Supp. 1145, 1147, (N.D. Miss. 1976) the court finds that the 6-year limitation
period of Miss. Code Ann. s 15-1-49 (1972) is applicable and therefore Heath's s 1981
claim was timely filed. Defendants' motion to dismiss the s 1981 claim is not well taken
and will be denied.
15. ¶2 on page 2 which begins with, “For the reasons fully set forth in the accompanying Memorandum in
Support” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
16. ¶3 on page 2 which begins with, “In further support of this Motion, Defendants have attached the
following exhibit” and the supporting “Exhibit ‘A’ – Email from Vogel Newsome” in that it is -
“STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
Page 8 of 38

12. UNDISPUTED is the fact that Newsome’s Complaint is premised upon 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and is
supported by PURPOSEFUL discrimination, etc. While Named Defendants and their counsel assert 42
U.S.C. § 1981 claims which are NOT made by Newsome, the United States Supreme Court has also
found that the six-year statute of limitation may be applicable in § 1983 claims.
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN MISSISSIPPI - A HANDBOOK FOR CITY
OFFICIALS - . . .42 U.S.C. § 1981 forbids racial discrimination only in the "making
and enforcing" of contracts. . . .
A plaintiff must establish purposeful discrimination to succeed under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 . . .
The federal district courts have jurisdiction over suits based on 42 U.S.C. §
1981. Generally, the applicable statute of limitations in § 1981 actions has been
construed to be Mississippi's one-year limitations period governing unwritten contracts of
employment, or failure to employ, but Mississippi's "catch-all" statute of limitations
has also been applied. (Code, § 15-1-49; Truvillion v. King's Daughters Hospital 614
F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1980)) . . .
The United States Supreme Court has determined that the statute
of limitations most appropriate for § 1983 claims is Mississippi's residual limitations
period by Code, § 15-1-48. (Owens v. Okure, 109 S.Ct. 573 (1989)). Therefore, a § 1983
suit must be brought within six (6) years of the date the plaintiff knew or should have
known of the alleged wrongful act forming the basis of the suit. See EXHIBIT “11” –
Municipal Government In Mississippi document attached hereto and incorporated by
reference as if set forth in full herein.
17. On page 2, paragraph which begins with, “WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendants,
Page Kruger & Holland, P.A.” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
18. On page 2, the paragraph which begins with “Further, Defendants request that the Court find that the
Complaint was filed frivolously, without foundation in law or fact” in that it is - “STRICKEN
STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
19. On page 3, the remaining contents of the Motion to Dismiss and Certificate of Service and the contents
therein in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
20. “Exhibit A” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
Now that the statutes/laws governing said matters require the STRIKING of the entire contents, statements,
exhibits, etc. as noted above, there remains NO responsive pleading of record. Therefore, Newsome is entitled to the
relief (Rule 11 Sanctions and DEFAULT Judgment, etc.) sought herein.
B. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
The entire contents of “Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss” which include; however, is not
limited to the Style and Headings of said pleading in that it is: (ii) redundant; (iii) immaterial; (iv) impertinent and/or
(v) scandalous and provided for purposes of delay, harassment, obstructing justice, increasing costs of litigation,
embarrassment, sham/frivolousness, unduly burdensome, provided for purposes of committing fraud upon this Court,
and other reasons known to Defendants and their counsel (Phelps Dunbar LLP, W. Thomas Siler, Jr. and Jason T.
Marsh [hereinafter, “Phelps Dunbar,” “Siler” and/or “Marsh”)] herein collectively known as “STRICKEN
STATEMENT CLAUSE.” and the following:
Page 9 of 38

13. 21. On first unnumbered page with opening paragraph which begins with, “COME NOW, Defendants, Page
Kruger & Holland, P.A. (“PKH”)” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
22. On first unnumbered page, “I. INTRODUCTION” and paragraph which begins with, “This action arises
out of Plaintiff’s employment termination from PKH” along with the referenced Footnote 1 and the
contents therein which begins with, “In her Complaint, Plaintiff asserts a litany of federal constitutional
claims” in that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
UNDISPUTED is the fact that Newsome’s Complaint has been filed within six-years. UNDISPUTED
is the fact that Named Defendants are PRIVATE actors. UNDISPUTED is the fact that Newsome’s
Complaint is premised upon 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 claims and NOT 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 claims.
Therefore, § 1981 implicitly creates an independent cause of action AGAINST PRIVATE actors
because no other statute created such a remedy.
Myers v. Mississippi Office of Capital Post-Conviction Counsel, 720 F.Supp.2d 773 (S.D.
Miss. Jackson 2010) - Section 1981 implicitly creates an independent cause of action
against private actors because no other statute created such a remedy, but does not create
any right of action against state actors separate from § 1983. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981, 1983.
Tramble v. Converters Ink Co., 43 F.Supp. 1350 (1972) - [2] Civil rights statute generally
guaranteeing equal rights under the law applies to private job discrimination based on
race and is not limited to acts under color of state law. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981.
23. On page 2, “II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND” and paragraph which begins with, “Plaintiff began
working for PKH as a temporary legal secretary” along with the referenced Footnotes 2, 3, and 4 as well
as the contents therein, in that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
UNDISPUTED is the NEXUS/CAUSAL Link between Newsome’s March 15, 2006, lawsuit (i.e. in
Newsome vs. Spring Lake Apartments LLC, et al. - a protected activity which alleges discriminatory
practices, etc.) and PKH’s May 15, 2006 termination (approximately two (2) months later) of
Newsome’s employment based on being contacted and notified of her engagement in this lawsuit and/or
other protected activities. See EXHIBIT “10” – Newsome’s May 16, 2006 Email attached hereto and
incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full herein. PKH’s termination of Newsome’s
employment coming approximately three (3) days prior to hearing/proceedings on or about May 18,
2006, in Newsome vs. Spring Lake Apartments LLC, et al. [EMPHASIS added]. See EXHIBIT “12” –
Motion Docket Sheet attached hereto and incorporated by reference. Note: Also provided at Exhibit VII
of Complaint filed in this lawsuit.
The prohibited retaliatory practices of PKH were KNOWN at the time Named Defendants counsel
(Phelps Dunbar/Siler/Marsh) executed the Motion to Dismiss and supporting Memorandum Brief. For
instance see one of PHELP DUNBAR’S cases - Callahan v. Bancorpsouth Ins. Services of Mississippi,
Inc., 244 F.Supp.2d 678 (S.D. Miss. S.Div. 2002):
[3] Title VII prohibits retaliation in either of two instances: ( 1) where the employee has
opposed any unlawful employment practice; or (2) where the employee has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e–3(a). –
EXHIBIT “13” Callahan matter attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set
forth in full herein.
Actions brought pursuant to 42 USC § 1981 are governed by the SAME standards applicable to claims
raised under Title VII. Such information is NOT new to Named Defendants’ counsel in that it appears
they work closely with the law firm Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz (“Baker
Donelson”) and provide this firm with employees. See EXHIBIT “15” – Phelps Dunbar Attorneys who
have become employed by Baker Donelson attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth
in full herein. [EMPHASIS added – Nexus/Causal connection for continuing CONSPIRACY claims,
etc.]. See for instance Baker Donelson’s cases – Liddell v. Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc., 836
F.Supp.2d 443 (S.D. Miss.S.Div. 2011):
Page 10 of 38

14. Claims which assert violations of § 1981 are governed by same standards applicable to
claims raised under Title VII, with exception that § 1981 claims do not require
exhaustion of remedies. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981; Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. . . .
[8][9] Claims which assert violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are governed by the
same standards applicable to claims raised under Title VII, with the exception that
Section 1981 claims do not require exhaustion of remedies. Jones v. Robinson Prop.
Grp., 427 F.3d 987, 992 (5th Cir.2005); Wilks v. Fedex Ground Package Sys., 359
F.Supp.2d 539, 541 ( S.D.Miss.2005); Ellison v. Darden Restaurants, Inc., 52 F.Supp.2d
747, 754 n. 7 ( S.D.Miss.1999). . . .Pre-existing causes of action are subject to a
“borrowed” state limitations period, or the most analogous state tort statute of limitations.
Id.; see also Mitchell v. Crescent River Port Pilots Ass'n, 265 Fed.Appx. 363, 368 (5th
Cir.2008).
In fact, Phelps Dunbar is proud of its working relationship with PARTNERING firm Baker Donelson as
shared through cases as provided in the “CLUMP” of trashed Opinions dumped on this Court through
their Memorandum Brief in support of Motion to Dismiss. See for instance Hambrick vs. Bear Stearns
Residential Mortgage a/k/a Encore Credit Corp. a/k/a Performance Credit Corp and Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. d/b/a America's Servicing Company, 2008 WL 5132047 (N.D. Miss.). See EXHIBIT “15” –
Hambrick matter attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.
24. On page 2, paragraph which begins with, “Plaintiff’s employment with PKH ended on May 15, 2006”
along with the referenced Footnotes 5 and 6 as well as the contents therein, in that they are -
“STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
UNDISPUTED is the fact that this instant lawsuit premised on 42 USC § 1981 claims, etc. was filed
within six years of the alleged violations and CONTINUING violations [EMPHASIS added]
addressed in this lawsuit. Furthermore, UNDISPUTED is the fact that Newsome’s claims premised
on 42 USC § 1981 fall under “all actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall
be commenced within six years;” therefore, the six-year statute of limitation under Mississippi’s
CATCHALL statute is applicable pursuant to Mississippi Code Ann. § 15-1-49:
Gates vs. Spinks, 771 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. S.D. Miss. 1985) - FN1. Although Mrs.
Gates formally denominated her complaint as being brought pursuant to “Title
42, U.S.C., Section 1981, et seq.”, the substance of the complaint states a cause
of action only under section 1983. We therefore treat Mrs. Gates' claim as one
brought pursuant to § 1983.
FN2. Section 15-1-49. Limitations applicable to actions not
otherwise specifically provided for - All actions for which no other period of
limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within six years next after the
cause of such action accrued, and not after.
. . . The six-year statute (section 15-1-49) is more general in the sense
that it is a general residual statute that applies to a broad class of actions-tort,
contract or statutory-not otherwise provided for.
A reasonable person/mind may conclude that Named Defendants’ counsel’s KNOWLEDGE that
Newsome’s Complaint premised on 42 USC § 1981 claims are subject to the six-year statute of
limitations. Therefore, Named Defendants’ counsel has FRIVOLOUSLY attempted to assert 42 USC §
1983 claims – i.e. as evidenced in the “CLUMP” of trashed Opinions dumped on this Court - when no
such § 1983 claims are made by Newsome through her Complaint filed in this lawsuit.
25. On page 2, paragraph which begins with, “The only material facts for this Motion are the date of
Plaintiff’s termination” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
UNDISPUTED is the fact, that Newsome instant lawsuit has been filed within the six-year statute of
limitation governing said matters but also within the six-year statute of limitation period in that, as
evidenced in this instant lawsuit, Named Defendants and their counsel CONTINUE to engage in
conspiracies that affect Newsome’s “EQUAL Rights Under the Laws!” Therefore, with EACH overt act
by Named Defendants, Newsome’s claims become subject to “TOLLING” doctrine requirements.
Page 11 of 38

15. PERTINENT and RELEVANT information KNOWN to Named Defendants and/or their counsel
(Phelps Dunbar/Siler/Marsh). For instance, see one of PHELPS DUNBAR’S cases – Walker vs. Epps,
550 F.3d 407 (5th Cir. Miss. 2008):
Under Mississippi law, “continuing tort,” for which limitations period resets at each
wrongful act, is one inflicted over period of time; it involves wrongful conduct that is
repeated until desisted. See EXHIBIT “16” – Walker matter attached hereto and
incorporated by reference.
UNDISPUTED is the fact that PKH is involved in the Newsome vs. Spring Lake Apartment matter.
Which as recent as July 2008, Newsome had to have removed from this Court and is a matter that
Newsome is presently working on through the continued MASSIVE Conspiracies leveled to obstruct
said matter. See EXHIBIT “17” – Spring Lake matter Docket Sheet attached hereto and incorporated
by reference as if set forth in full herein. Note: This Docket Sheet was provided at Exhibit XXIII of
Complaint filed in this lawsuit. Continued tort claims are timely, properly and adequately asserted in
Newsome’s Complaint filed in this instant lawsuit:
¶5 Pg. 21 ¶(xii) Pg. 63 ¶214-216 Pg. 94 ¶278 Pg. 121
¶(xii) Pg. 22 ¶165 Pg. 70 ¶217 Pg. 95 ¶1 Pg. 122
¶105 Pg. 41 ¶170 Pg. 71 ¶l Pg. 96 ¶292 Pg. 127
¶¶106, 107 Pg. 43 ¶175 Pg. 73 ¶ 233-235 Pg. 108 ¶296 Pg. 127
¶110 Pg. 47 ¶176 Pg. 74 ¶237, 238 Pg. 109 ¶297 Pg. 130
¶117 Pg. 48 ¶177 Pg. 75 ¶m Pg. 111 ¶298 Pg. 130
¶119 Pg. 49 ¶(xii), (xvii) Pg. 77 ¶245 Pg. 112 ¶1 Pg. 131
¶ (xii) Pg. 51 ¶188 Pg. 82 ¶253, 259 Pg. 114
¶136 Pg. 60 ¶197 Pg. 85 ¶260 Pg. 115
¶138-139 Pg. 61 ¶198-199 Pg. 87 ¶261 Pg. 116
¶140 Pg. 62 ¶l Pg. 89 ¶l Pg. 117
26. On page 2, “III. STANDARD OF REVIEW” and paragraph which begins with, “Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal of a plaintiff’s lawsuit” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT
CLAUSE.”
27. On page 3, paragraph which begins with, “Generally, matters outside the pleading are not to be
considered in deciding a motion to dismiss” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
28. On page 3, “IV. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES” and paragraph which begins with, “Plaintiff’s
143-page Complaint asserts thirteen counts, many which are improperly numbered” in that it is -
“STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
UNDISPUTED is the fact that Newsome’s Complaint is premised on 42 USC § 1981 claims and subject
to the six-year statute of limitation. This is why the Named Defendants’ counsel (Phelps
Dunbar/Siler/Marsh) has “DUMPED a CLUMP” of trash on this Court masked through FRIVOLOUS
Opinions asserting 42 USC § 1983 claims against Named Defendants. Furthermore, Newsome’s 42
USC § 1981 claims are further protected under the statute of limitation governing “CONTINUING
tort!” Newsome’s Complaint asserts “CONTINUING” violations – i.e. which as evidence in this instant
lawsuit continues:
Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (1973) - [18] Where continuing
violations were alleged, complaint under statute providing that all persons within United
States shall have same right to make and enforce contracts as is enjoyed by white citizens
was not barred by limitation. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981
Hendrix v. City of Yazoo City, Miss., 911 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. Miss. 1990) - In case in
which original violation occurred outside statute of limitations, but is closely related to
other violations that are not time barred, recovery may be had for all violations, on theory
that they are part of one, continuing violation.
Stevens v. Lake, 615 So.2d 1177 (Miss.,1993) - “Continuing injury” doctrine did not
enable surviving business partners to avoid bar of six-year statute of limitations
applicable to legal . . . action alleging attorneys' negligent failure to record trust prepared
Page 12 of 38

16. for now-deceased partner, even though surviving partners continued to sustain losses
each year after alleged negligence; attorneys' alleged act of negligence occurred entirely
in year that was more than six years before malpractice suit was filed. Code 1972, § 15-1-
49. [NOTE: In Newsome’s lawsuit it is UNDISPUTED of PKH’s and/or Named
Defendants’ role and/or interest in the Newsome vs. Spring Lake Apartments matter.]
Winters v. AmSouth Bank, 964 So.2d 595 (Miss.App.,2007) - A “continuing tort”
sufficient to toll a statute of limitations is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not by
continual ill effects from an original violation.
Randolph v. Lambert, 926 So.2d 941 (Miss.App.,2006) - If the claim is a continuing tort,
the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the date of the last injury.
WW, Inc. v. Rainbow Casino-Vicksburg Partnership, L.P., 2011 WL 4037024 (Miss.
2011) - Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury, the cause of action accrues
at, and limitations begin to run from, the date of the last injury, or when the tortious acts
cease.
Bryant v. Military Department of Mississippi, 597 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. Miss. 2010) - Under
Mississippi law, a “continuing tort,” for which the statute of limitations is tolled, is one
inflicted over a period of time, it involves a wrongful conduct that is repeated until
desisted, and each day creates a separate cause of action.
29. On page 3, “1. COUNT I - 42 U.S.C. § 1981: Equal Rights Under the Law Against Defendants” along
with the referenced Footnote 7 as well as the contents therein, in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT
CLAUSE.”
30. On page 3, “2. COUNT II - 42 U.S.C. § 1985: Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights and 42 USC §
1981: Equal Rights Under the Law Against Defendants” along with the referenced Footnote 8 as well as
the contents therein, in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
31. On page 3, “3. COUNT III – 42 U.S.C. § 1986: Action for Neglect to Prevent and 42 U.S.C. § 1981:
Equal Rights Under the Law Against Defendants” along with the referenced Footnote 9 as well as the
contents therein, in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
32. On page 3, “4. COUNT IV – Negligent Interference with Employment and 42 U.S.C. § 1981: Equal
Rights Under the Law Against Defendants” along with the referenced Footnote 10 as well as the
contents therein, in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
33. On page 3, “5. COUNT V – Discrimination in Employment and 42 U.S.C. § 1981: Equal Rights Under
the Law Against Defendants” along with the referenced Footnote 11 as well as the contents therein, in
that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
34. On page 4, “6. COUNT II [sic] – Retaliation and 42 U.S.C. § 1981: Equal Rights Under the Law
Against Defendants” along with the referenced Footnote 12 as well as the contents therein, in that it is -
“STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
35. On page 4, “7. COUNT IIIII [sic] – Breach of Express Employment Agreement and 42 U.S.C. § 1981:
Equal Rights Under the Law Against Defendants” along with the referenced Footnote 13 as well as the
contents therein, in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
36. On page 4, “8. COUNT VIII – Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing and 42 U.S.C. §
1981: Equal Rights Under the Law Against Defendants” along with the referenced Footnote 14 as well
as the contents therein, in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
37. On page 4, “9. COUNT IX – Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and 42 U.S.C. § 1981: Equal
Rights Under the Law Against Defendants” along with the referenced Footnote 15 as well as the
contents therein, in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
Page 13 of 38

17. 38. On page 4, “10. COUNT X – Fraud Against [sic] and 42 U.S.C. § 1981: Equal Rights Under the Law
Against Defendants” along with the referenced Footnote 16 as well as the contents therein, in that it is -
“STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
39. On page 4, “11. COUNT XI – Negligent Interference with Employment – Malicious Conspiracy to
Cause Discharge from Employment and 42 U.S.C. § 1981: Equal Rights Under the Law Against
Defendants” along with the referenced Footnote 17 as well as the contents therein, in that it is -
“STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
40. On page 4, “12. COUNT IVII [sic] – Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution –
Due Process and 42 U.S.C. § 1981: Equal Rights Under the Law” along with the referenced Footnote 18
as well as the contents therein, in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
41. On page 4, “13. COUNT VII [sic] – Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution –
Equal Protection and 42 U.S.C. § 1981: Equal Rights Under the Law” along with the referenced
Footnote 19 as well as the contents therein, in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
42. On page 4, paragraph which begins with, “All of Plaintiff’s causes of action (to the extent they exist)” in
that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
43. On page 5, continuance of paragraph from page 4 which states, “immediately following her employment
termination from PKH” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
44. On page 5, paragraph which begins with, “This email correspondence is being submitted to confirm that
as of Monday” and the “. . .” in that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
45. On page 5, paragraph which begins with, “I requested that PKH provide me with written
documentation” and the “. . .” which follows in that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
46. On page 5, paragraph which begins with, “My understanding as to the reason for my termination” and
the “. . .” which follows in that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
47. On page 5, paragraph which begins with, “8. While PKH acknowledged that I may bring lawsuits and it
is of no business to them” and the “. . .” which follows in that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT
CLAUSE.”
48. On page 5, paragraph which begins with, “In that I believe that I have been unlawfully terminated” in
that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
49. On page 5, paragraph which begins with, “In that PKH was given an opportunity to provide me with
written documentation as to their reasons for my termination” along with the referenced Footnote 20 and
the contents therein, in that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
50. On page 6, paragraph which begins with, “Plaintiff’s email clearly evidences her belief that, as of May
15, 2006” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
51. On page 6, paragraph which begins with, “Each count of Plaintiff’s Complaint will be examined” in that
it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
52. On page 6, paragraph which begins with, “A. Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Claims As Alleged In Counts
I, II, III, IV, V, II [Sic], IIIII [Sic], VIII, IX, X, XI, IVII [Sic], and VII [Sic] Are Time Barred” in that it
is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found:
King v. Otasco, Inc., 861 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. Miss. 1988) - When suit alleges several
distinct causes of action, even if they arise from single event, applicable limitations
Page 14 of 38

18. period must be determined by analyzing each cause of action separately, rather than
by determining “essence” of plaintiff's claims considered as a whole.
Therefore, attempts by Named Defendants and/or their counsel to CLUMP Newsome’s Counts together
to evade having to address each numbered allegation are impermissible.
53. On page 6, paragraph which begins with, “In every count of her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges race
discrimination and race-based retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981” in that it is - “STRICKEN
STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
54. On page 6, paragraph which begins with, “As demonstrated above, is undisputed that Plaintiff’s
employment was terminated” along with the referenced Footnotes 21, 22, and 23 as well as the contents
therein, in that they are - - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
55. On page 7, paragraph which begins with, “Because a claim for race discrimination and/or race-based
retaliation” along with the referenced Footnote 24 as well as the contents therein, in that they are -
“STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
56. On page 7, paragraph which begins with, “B. Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1985 Claim In Count II Is Time
Barred” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
UNDISPUTED is the fact that Newsome’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim incorporates/joins her 42 U.S.C. §
1985 claims and are dependent upon each other as set forth through the facts, evidence and legal
conclusions provided in Complaint addressing said claim(s). Therefore, attempts by Named Defendants
to separate these claims that are dependent upon the other are FRIVOLOUS.
57. On page 7, paragraph which begins with, “Count II of Plaintiff’s Complaint is for conspiracy to interfere
with civil rights” along with indented paragraph beginning, “engaged in a conspiracy(s) leveled against
Newsome” along with the referenced Footnote 25 as well as the contents therein, in that they are -
“STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
58. On page 7, paragraph which begins with, “Because there is no federal statute of limitations for actions,”
in that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
59. On page 8, continuance of paragraph from page 7 which states, “1-49 to a plaintiff’s claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983,” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
UNDISPUTED is the fact that Newsome’s Complaint is premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims and
NOT 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims asserted by Named Defendants and their counsel.
Gates vs. Spinks, 771 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. S.D. Miss. 1985) - FN1. Although Mrs. Gates
formally denominated her complaint as being brought pursuant to “ Title 42, U.S.C.,
Section 1981, et seq.”, the substance of the complaint states a cause of action only under
section 1983. We therefore treat Mrs. Gates' claim as one brought pursuant to § 1983.
FN2. Section 15-1-49. Limitations applicable to actions not otherwise
specifically provided for. - All actions for which no other period of limitation is
prescribed shall be commenced within six years next after the cause of such action
accrued, and not after.
. . . The six-year statute (section 15-1-49) is more general in the sense that it is
a general residual statute that applies to a broad class of actions-tort, contract or statutory-
not otherwise provided for. – See EXHIBIT “18” – Gates matter attached hereto and
incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.
Information which is pertinent in understanding why Named Defendants’ counsel is adamant about
asserting § 1983 claims that are VOID in Newsome’s claims and, instead, premised upon § 1981
claims.
60. On page 8, paragraph which begins with, “Because Plaintiff did not file her § 1985 claim (by and
through § 1983) within three (3) years,” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
Page 15 of 38

19. 61. On page 8, paragraph which begins with, “C. Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1986 Claim in Count III Is
Time Barred,” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
UNDISPUTED is the fact that Newsome’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim incorporates/joins her 42
U.S.C. § 1986 claims and are dependent upon each other as set forth through the facts, evidence
and legal conclusions provided in Complaint addressing said claim(s). Therefore, attempts by
Named Defendants to separate these claims that are dependent upon the other are FRIVOLOUS.
62. On page 8, paragraph which begins with, “Count III of Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1986,” along with the referenced Footnote 26 as well as the contents therein, in that they
are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
63. On page 8, paragraph which begins with, “PKH having knowledge of the 42 USC § 1981 and 42
USCA § 1985 violations,” along with the referenced Footnote 27 as well as the contents therein, in
that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
64. On page 8, paragraph which begins with, “Section 1986 provides, however, that “no action under the
provisions of this section,” along with the referenced Footnote 28 as well as the contents therein, in
that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
65. On page 9, paragraph which begins with, “Because the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s Complaint
occurred,” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
66. On page 9, paragraph which begins with, “D. Plaintiff’s Claim for Negligent Interference with
Employment in Count IV is Time Barred,” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
UNDISPUTED is the fact that Newsome’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim incorporates/joins her claims
for “Negligent Interference with Employment” and are dependent upon each other as set forth
through the facts, evidence and legal conclusions provided in Complaint addressing said claim(s).
Therefore, attempts by Named Defendants to separate these claims that are dependent upon the
other are FRIVOLOUS.
67. On page 9, paragraph which begins with, “Count IV of Plaintiff’s Complaint purports to allege a
claim for ‘Negligent Interference with Employment,’” along with the indented paragraph beginning,
“On or about May 16, 2006, PKH was timely, properly and adequately” and the referenced Footnote
29 as well as the contents therein, in that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
68. On page 9, paragraph which begins with, “To the extent that a claim for ‘Negligent Interference with
Employment’ exists,” along with the referenced Footnote 30 as well as the contents therein, in that
they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
69. On page 10, continuance of paragraph from page 9 which states, “(opinion attached). Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s claim for,” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
70. On page 10, paragraph which begins with, “E. Plaintiff’s Claim for ‘Discrimination in
Employment’ in Count V is Time Barred” and sub-indented paragraphs beginning, “This action
arises under the provisions,” “Named Defendants have discriminated against Newsome,” and
“Ethnic makeup of named Defendants TPage/LBaine/LThomas being WHITE” along with the
referenced Footnote 33 as well as the contents therein, in that they are - “STRICKEN
STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
UNDISPUTED is the fact that Newsome’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim incorporates/joins her claim(s)
for “Discrimination in Employment” and are dependent upon each other as set forth through the
facts, evidence and legal conclusions provided in Complaint addressing said claim(s). Therefore,
attempts by Named Defendants to separate these claims that are dependent upon the other are
FRIVOLOUS.
Page 16 of 38

20. Boykin vs. Georgia-Pacific Corporation, 706 F.2d 1384 (5th Cir. SD Miss.) - [6] Statute
of limitations applicable in employment discrimination case was six-year Mississippi
catchall statute. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.;
Miss.Code 1972, §§ 15-1-29, 15-1-49; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981
. . . This court held that the statute of limitations applicable to Section 1981
claims is the six year Mississippi catch-all statute. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1972).
Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 815 (5th Cir.1982). Truvillion v.
King's Daughters Hospital, 614 F.2d 520, 528 ( 5th Cir.1980) - See EXHIBIT
“19” – Boykin matter attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full
herein.
71. On page 10, paragraph which begins with, “Count V of Plaintiff’s Complaint appears to again state race
discrimination,” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
72. On page 10, paragraph which begins with, “F. Plaintiff’s Claim for ‘Retaliation’ in Count II [Sic] is
Time Barred,” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
UNDISPUTED is the fact that Newsome’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim incorporates/joins her
“Retaliation” claim(s) and are dependent upon each other as set forth through the facts, evidence and
legal conclusions provided in Complaint addressing said claim(s). Therefore, attempts by Named
Defendants to separate these claims that are dependent upon the other are FRIVOLOUS. Named
Defendants’ counsel is fully aware that Newsome need NOT assert a Title VII action for support her §
1981 claim(s) for retaliation. Furthermore, that Newsome has satisfied the prima facie requirements for
her retaliation claims. See for instance PHELPS DUNBAR’S case - Garner vs. Ashley Furniture
Industries Inc., 141 Fed.Appx.287, 2005 WL 1662109 (5th Cir. Miss.):
[1] Adverse employment action is a necessary part of a Title VII
plaintiff's prima facie retaliation claim. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a). . . .
To prove a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, the plaintiff
must establish that: (1) he engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) he
suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection
between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Shackelford
v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 407-08 (5th Cir.1999). An adverse
employment action is “[a] tangible employment action [that] constitutes a
significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision
causing a significant change in benefits.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998). See EXHIBIT “20” –
Garner matter attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in
full herein.
73. On page 10, paragraph which begins with, “Count II [sic] of Plaintiff’s Complaint (which is
improperly numbered) appears to again allege race-based retaliation,” in that it is - “STRICKEN
STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
74. On page 11, continuance of paragraph from page 10 which states, “part, that:” and sub-indented
paragraphs beginning, “As a direct and proximate result of Defendant(s)’ SYSTEMATIC
retaliatory practices,” “Newsome is now suffering and will continue to suffer irreparable
injury,” along with referenced Footnotes 34 and 35 as well as the contents therein, in that they
are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
75. On page 11, paragraph which begins with, “For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s race-
based retaliation claims,” along with the reference Footnote 36 as well as the contents therein, in
that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
UNDISPUTED is the fact that Newsome’s Complaint is premised upon 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims;
however, are subject to the SAME rubric of analysis for Title VII claims. Raggs v. Mississippi Power &
Light Co, 278 F.3d 463 (5th Cir. Miss. 2002).
Page 17 of 38

21. Payne vs. Travenol Laboratories Inc., 673 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. N.D. Miss) - [21] Title VII
and section 1981, although both applying to employment discrimination cases, have
independent remedies and independent statutes of limitations. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
701 et seq. as amended 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981.
[23] Mississippi's six-year statute of limitations governed civil rights claim
brought under section 1981, so that if proof supported it plaintiffs could represent section
1981 race discrimination class beginning six years before date when complaint was filed
in 1972. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981; Miss.Code 1972, § 15-1-49. . . .
FN22. Mississippi Code Annotated, Section 15-1-49 (1972) provides:
All actions for which no other period of limitations is prescribed shall be commenced
within six years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after.
See EXHIBIT “21” – Payne matter attached hereto and incorporated by
reference as if set forth in full herein.
76. On page 11, paragraph which begins with, “G. Plaintiff’s Claim for ‘Breach of Express Employment
Agreement’ in Count IIIII [sic] is Time Barred,” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
UNDISPUTED is the fact that Newsome’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim incorporates/joins her claim(s) for
“Breach of Express Employment Agreement” and are dependent upon each other as set forth through
the facts, evidence and legal conclusions provided in Complaint addressing said claim(s). Therefore,
attempts by Named Defendants to separate these claims that are dependent upon the other are
FRIVOLOUS.
77. On page 11, paragraph which begins with, “Count IIIII [sic] of Plaintiff’s Complaint is entitled, ‘Breach
of Express Employment Agreement,’” along with sub-indented paragraph beginning with “The wrongful
requirements and limitations placed on Newsome” in that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT
CLAUSE.”
78. On page 12, continuance of paragraph from page 11 which states, “rights due under the At-Will
Agreement” along with referenced Footnote 37 as well as the contents therein, in that they are -
“STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
79. On page 12, paragraph which begins with, “Plaintiff’s Complaint acknowledges that she was employed
by PKH at-will,” along with the referenced Footnotes 38 and 39 as well as the contents therein, in that
they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
80. On page 12, sub-indented paragraph which begins with, “Except as otherwise provided in the Uniform
Commercial Code,” along with referenced “Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-29,” in that they are - “STRICKEN
STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
81. On page 12, paragraph which begins with, “Accordingly, the one-year statute of limitations in §15-1-29
applies,” along with the reference Footnote 36 as well as the contents therein, in that they are -
“STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
82. On page 12, paragraph which begins with, “H. Plaintiff’s Claim for ‘Breach of the Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing’ in Count VIII is Time Barred,” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT
CLAUSE.”
UNDISPUTED is the fact that Newsome’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim incorporates/joins her claim(s) for
“Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing” and are dependent upon each other as set
forth through the facts, evidence and legal conclusions provided in Complaint addressing said claim(s).
Therefore, attempts by Named Defendants to separate these claims that are dependent upon the other
are FRIVOLOUS.
83. On page 12, paragraph which begins with, “First, ‘at-will employment relationships are not governed by
a covenant of good faith and fair dealing which gives rise to a cause of action for wrongful
termination’,” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
Page 18 of 38

22. 84. On page 13, continuance of paragraph from page 12 which states, “result, Plaintiff’s claim for ‘Breach
of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing’” along with referenced Footnote 40 as well as the
contents therein, in that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
85. On page 13, paragraph which begins with, “I. Plaintiff’s Claim for ‘Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress’ in Count IX is Time Barred,” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
UNDISPUTED is the fact that Newsome’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim incorporates/joins her claim(s) for
“Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress” and are dependent upon each other as set forth through
the facts, evidence and legal conclusions provided in Complaint addressing said claim(s). Therefore,
attempts by Named Defendants to separate these claims that are dependent upon the other are
FRIVOLOUS.
86. On page 13, paragraph which begins with, “According to the Complaint, the events giving rise to
Plaintiff’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress,” along with referenced Footnotes 41 and
42 as well as the contents therein, in that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
87. On page 13, paragraph which begins with, “Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, such claims are governed
by Mississippi’s three-year ‘catch-all’ statute of limitations,” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT
CLAUSE.”
88. On page 14, paragraph which begins with, “J. Plaintiff’s Claim for ‘Fraud Against’ [sic] in Count X is
Time Barred,” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
UNDISPUTED is the fact that Newsome’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim incorporates/joins her claim(s) for
“Fraud” and are dependent upon each other as set forth through the facts, evidence and legal
conclusions provided in Complaint addressing said claim(s). Therefore, attempts by Named Defendants
to separate these claims that are dependent upon the other are FRIVOLOUS.
89. On page 14, paragraph which begins with, “Count X of Plaintiff’s Complaint entitled ‘Fraud Against’
[sic]” and sub-indented paragraphs beginning with, “On or prior to March/April 2005,” “On May 15,
2006, without just cause and in violation” along with referenced Footnotes 43 and 44 as well as the
contents therein, in that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
90. On page 14, paragraph which begins with, “By her own allegations, Plaintiff became aware of the
alleged fraudulent misrepresentations by Defendants” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT
CLAUSE.”
91. On page 14, continuance of paragraph from page 13 which states, “statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s
fraud,” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
92. On page 15, paragraph which begins with, “K. Plaintiff’s Claim for ‘Negligent Interference with
Employment – Malicious Conspiracy to Cause Discharge from Employment’ in Count XI is Time
Barred” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
UNDISPUTED is the fact that Newsome’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim incorporates/joins her claim(s) for
“Negligent Interference with Employment – Malicious Conspiracy to Cause Discharge from
Employment” and are dependent upon each other as set forth through the facts, evidence and legal
conclusions provided in Complaint addressing said claim(s). Therefore, attempts by Named Defendants
to separate these claims that are dependent upon the other are FRIVOLOUS.
93. On page 15, paragraph which begins with, “In Count XI of the Complaint, Plaintiff purports to assert”
along with referenced Footnote 45 as well as contents therein, in that they are - “STRICKEN
STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
94. On page 15, paragraph which begins with, “If such claims existed, they would be time barred,” in that it
is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”
Page 19 of 38