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Colt IP Guardian




© 2010 Colt Technology Services Group Limited. All rights reserved.
Agenda
    • DoS and DDoS Attacks

    • Colt Proposition: IP Guardian


    • Technical View




2
DoS attack: definition
    • A Denial of Service (DoS) attack is an explicit attempt by attackers to
     prevent legitimate users from using that service. Examples include:
     – Attempts to flood a network, thereby preventing legitimate network traffic
     – Attempts to use all available processing power on the end system to prevent
       regular users access
     – Attempts to disrupt connections between two machines, preventing access
       to a service
     – Attempts to prevent a particular individual from accessing a service
     – Attempts to disrupt service to a specific system or person




3
What is a Distributed Denial of Service Attack?
    (1/2)
    • A DDoS attack is the most prominent form of DoS attack
     – The attacker scans millions of computers on the Internet to identify
       unsecured hosts to be used as launch pads
     – Then secretly installs software on a master computer and a collection of
       compromised zombie computers
     – The attacker hides their true identity and location by using these zombie
       machines to launch the attacks
     – The attack results in denial of service to legitimate users because their
       infrastructure is overwhelmed with illegitimate requests, thereby choking off
       the site's available bandwidth




4
What is a Distributed Denial of Service Attack?
    (2/2)
    Areas vulnerable to attack include:         Zombies on
                                                                                                       Zombies on
                                                                                                       innocent computers
                                                innocent computers
    •   Routers                             A                                                    A
                                            S                                                    S
    •   Firewalls                                                    ISP Backbone

    •   Web servers
    •   DNS servers                                                                              Infrastructure level
                                                                                                        attacks
    •   Mail Servers
    •   VoIP gateways

    Indirect victims, elements that share the
                                        A
    victims’ network (for example, otherS
                                            Zombies on
    servers in a server farm)               innocent computers         Bandwidth level attacks

                                                                                                      Enterprise
                                                                          Server level attacks




5
Real world proposals …
    • Someone offers a DDoS service
    -----Original Message-----

    From: Martyn Clapham [mailto:DDoS1033er@caulf.freeserve.co.uk]

    Sent: Friday, 16 May 2003 2:45 PM

    To: ********************

    Subject: Offer from irc.mad.pp.ru 2787!

    Do you want to get rid of your competitors? Or blackmail your boss because he didn't pay you? We can help! Ddos
    attack on any internet server. We pay admins of irc.icq.com for hosting so our bandwidth is huge and our knowledge of
    such attacks allows us to fulfill any requirement. If you are in need of Ddos attacks, or simply looking for specific content
    for your web site (like child porn or anything weird) - tell us and will give you what you need!

    Our contacts are: irc.mad.pp.ru 2787

    • Someone else offers protection you can’t refuse
      (if you don’t pay, you will be attacked)
    • So-called “cyber mafia” mainly based in Russia
      and Eastern Europe


6
Typical Targets of a DDoS Attack
    • Typical Targets of a DDoS attacks are:
     – eCommerce
     – On line banking
     – On line trading
     – iGaming
     – iGambling
     – Content Providers
     – Governmental organizations
     – ISPs

    In general, all those companies that make business providing
    online/Internet services




7
Agenda
    • DoS and DDoS Attacks


    • Colt Proposition: IP Guardian


    • Technical View




8
Colt Proposition: IP Guardian
    • Proposal
     – Colt will protect the customer bandwidth by detecting attacks whilst still
       within the Colt network
     – Customer traffic is diverted only in case an attack is detected  no impact
       for customers during normal operations

    • How?
     – By expanding the existing state of the art platform built using Arbor Peakflow
       monitors and Arbor TMS (Threat Management System) and locating them
       throughout Colt’s Tier1 pan-European network




9
Service Variants
     • Continuous
      – Automatic redirection/mitigation if anomaly detected
      – Reports via customer portal

     • On-Demand
      – Customer control via portal
      – alerts via email/SMS,
      – customer reviews anomaly on Colt portal
      – triggers mitigation if it is deemed to be an attack

     • Emergency Implementation
      – Set up temporary IPG service in midst of attack
      – No baselining, default profile
      – Can migrate to full service (Continuous or On-Demand)


10
Benefits of the IP Guardian Service
     • “In the cloud” DDoS protection
       – DDoS protection on site can be useless – attacks can flood the pipe however good
         the mitigation devices are. IP Guardian stops the attack before it can reach you
     • Anomaly monitoring
       – Constant monitoring of Netflow telemetry data to ensure rapid detection of any
         abnormal activity
     • Resiliency
       – Protection deployed at multiple strategic locations throughout Colt global network to
         ensure near continuous uptime of the IP Guardian service and the best possible round
         trip time (RTT) in case traffic needs to be diverted
     • Productivity
       – Avoid downtime – you can carry on working as normal if the attack is successfully
         mitigated
     • Flexibility
       – New ‘On Demand’ Variant provides more customer control to avoid false positives



11
IP Guardian: how it works (1/3)
      – IP Guardian is a dedicated service in                        Arbor TMS
        which the customer traffic is
                                                                                           Arbor Peakflow SP
        continuously monitored ensuring that
        the customer is continually prepared to
        react against DDoS attacks
      – The traffic to the customer is constantly     Public
                                                                                       Colt
        monitored while it follows its path in the   Internet
                                                                                     Backbone
        network. The Arbor Peakflow SP
        Collectors gather traffic statistics
        (network telemetry data) from all
        peering and transit routers, which it
                                                       Arbor SP constantly
        constantly analyzes to construct a            monitors traffic destined
        network-wide view of possible traffic            to the customer

        and network anomalies
                                                                                  Customer Network




12
IP Guardian: how it works (2/3)
      – An alert is generated if the behaviour is                         Arbor TMS         TMS is
        found to be abnormal.                                                             triggered
                                                                                                      Arbor Peakflow
      – When an attack is detected by Arbor                                                           SP
        Peakflow SP, traffic is automatically
        diverted to Arbor TMS, which mitigates         Public                         BGP
        the attack based on traffic patterns          Internet                    Announcement
        learnt by Arbor Peakflow SP




                                                     Arbor SP constantly
                                                    monitor traffice detined
                                                       to the customer

                                                                                Customer Network
                                                      Malicious Traffic
                                                      Cleaned Traffic




13
IP Guardian: how it works (3/3)
      – The customer never feels the full
                                                                         Arbor TMS
        impact of an attack as their
        circuit is being continually                                                              Arbor Peakflow SP

        monitored and protection
        triggered automatically by the            Public                                Colt
        platform                                 Internet                            Backbone

      – Only the cleaned traffic flows
        toward the customer, which will
        be provided with high levels of
        protection                             Whenever an attack
                                                 occurs, traffic is
                                            reqdirected to Arbor TMS,
                                             the attack mitigated and
                                            cleaned traffic only flows
                                                 to the customer
                                                                               Customer Network
                                                     Malicious Traffic
                                                     Cleaned Traffic




14
IP Guardian: Proactive eMail Alerting
     •   In case an attack is detected, an email is sent to the customer
     •   Another email is sent once the attack is mitigated
     •   The structure of such emails is provided below as an example.


         –   From:         "Peakflow SP" traffic@peakflow.oss.colt.net
         –   Date:         date/time
         –   To:           Customer’s Address (this address shall be reachable in case of attacks)
         –   Subject:      [Peakflow SP] Bandwidth attack #[Attack ID] Incoming to [Customer] Done
         –   Type:         (Bandwidth, Protocol)
         –   ID:           a number identifying the attack
         –   Resource:     Customer’s name
         –   Severity:     high
         –   Started:      date/time (UTC) referred to the attack beginning
         –   Ended:        date/time (UTC) referred to the attack mitigation
         –   Link rate:    traffic (in Mbps) related to the attack
         –   Router:       Colt peering router and interfaces involved
         –                 Input If: Input Interface
         –                 Output If: Output Interface
         –   URL:          www.colt.net


15
Customer Portal
     •   View traffic profiles
     •   View anomalies
     •   Trigger mitigation (On-Demand Only)




16
Agenda
     • DoS and DDoS Attacks


     • Colt Proposition: IP Guardian


     • Technical View




17
IP Guardian: Platform Deployment

            Controller
                                                                      8x
                                                                                          CPH
                                                              STO
                                       BHX
            Collector      DUB                                AMS          CGN      DUS
                                                                                          HAM
                                         LON
                                                                                           HAJ

                                               BRU

            TMS                  PAR
                                                        FRK
                                                                                    STR   FRK
                                                                                          BER

                                                        BAS

                         NYC
                                                                ZUR
                                                        GEN
                                               PARTUR
                                                                MIL
                           LIS     MAD       BCN                            VIE     MUN

                                                                ROM




                                                                                  MIL
                                                MAD




18
Technicalities
     • The service is available to customers with a service bandwidth of at least
      10Mbps and 30/40% of spare bandwidth (recommended)
     • Traffic content is not monitored or stored: IP Guardian is not what is known as
      “Deep Packet Inspection”
     • The maximum number of packets that can be dealt with is 1 Million packets
      per second
     • Maximum bandwidth up to 2Gbps per TMS – this means a maximum of
      2Gbps in case of a DoS attack managed by one TMS or Nx2Gbps DDoS
      attack through multiple entry points (N=6, the number of TMS installed)
     • Simultaneous TCP connections during a SYN attack per device: 100,000
     • Source and destination HTTP host pairs per device: 1 Million
     • Zombies per device: 20,000




19

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Colt IP Guardian Protects Against DDoS Attacks

  • 1. Colt IP Guardian © 2010 Colt Technology Services Group Limited. All rights reserved.
  • 2. Agenda • DoS and DDoS Attacks • Colt Proposition: IP Guardian • Technical View 2
  • 3. DoS attack: definition • A Denial of Service (DoS) attack is an explicit attempt by attackers to prevent legitimate users from using that service. Examples include: – Attempts to flood a network, thereby preventing legitimate network traffic – Attempts to use all available processing power on the end system to prevent regular users access – Attempts to disrupt connections between two machines, preventing access to a service – Attempts to prevent a particular individual from accessing a service – Attempts to disrupt service to a specific system or person 3
  • 4. What is a Distributed Denial of Service Attack? (1/2) • A DDoS attack is the most prominent form of DoS attack – The attacker scans millions of computers on the Internet to identify unsecured hosts to be used as launch pads – Then secretly installs software on a master computer and a collection of compromised zombie computers – The attacker hides their true identity and location by using these zombie machines to launch the attacks – The attack results in denial of service to legitimate users because their infrastructure is overwhelmed with illegitimate requests, thereby choking off the site's available bandwidth 4
  • 5. What is a Distributed Denial of Service Attack? (2/2) Areas vulnerable to attack include: Zombies on Zombies on innocent computers innocent computers • Routers A A S S • Firewalls ISP Backbone • Web servers • DNS servers Infrastructure level attacks • Mail Servers • VoIP gateways Indirect victims, elements that share the A victims’ network (for example, otherS Zombies on servers in a server farm) innocent computers Bandwidth level attacks Enterprise Server level attacks 5
  • 6. Real world proposals … • Someone offers a DDoS service -----Original Message----- From: Martyn Clapham [mailto:DDoS1033er@caulf.freeserve.co.uk] Sent: Friday, 16 May 2003 2:45 PM To: ******************** Subject: Offer from irc.mad.pp.ru 2787! Do you want to get rid of your competitors? Or blackmail your boss because he didn't pay you? We can help! Ddos attack on any internet server. We pay admins of irc.icq.com for hosting so our bandwidth is huge and our knowledge of such attacks allows us to fulfill any requirement. If you are in need of Ddos attacks, or simply looking for specific content for your web site (like child porn or anything weird) - tell us and will give you what you need! Our contacts are: irc.mad.pp.ru 2787 • Someone else offers protection you can’t refuse (if you don’t pay, you will be attacked) • So-called “cyber mafia” mainly based in Russia and Eastern Europe 6
  • 7. Typical Targets of a DDoS Attack • Typical Targets of a DDoS attacks are: – eCommerce – On line banking – On line trading – iGaming – iGambling – Content Providers – Governmental organizations – ISPs In general, all those companies that make business providing online/Internet services 7
  • 8. Agenda • DoS and DDoS Attacks • Colt Proposition: IP Guardian • Technical View 8
  • 9. Colt Proposition: IP Guardian • Proposal – Colt will protect the customer bandwidth by detecting attacks whilst still within the Colt network – Customer traffic is diverted only in case an attack is detected  no impact for customers during normal operations • How? – By expanding the existing state of the art platform built using Arbor Peakflow monitors and Arbor TMS (Threat Management System) and locating them throughout Colt’s Tier1 pan-European network 9
  • 10. Service Variants • Continuous – Automatic redirection/mitigation if anomaly detected – Reports via customer portal • On-Demand – Customer control via portal – alerts via email/SMS, – customer reviews anomaly on Colt portal – triggers mitigation if it is deemed to be an attack • Emergency Implementation – Set up temporary IPG service in midst of attack – No baselining, default profile – Can migrate to full service (Continuous or On-Demand) 10
  • 11. Benefits of the IP Guardian Service • “In the cloud” DDoS protection – DDoS protection on site can be useless – attacks can flood the pipe however good the mitigation devices are. IP Guardian stops the attack before it can reach you • Anomaly monitoring – Constant monitoring of Netflow telemetry data to ensure rapid detection of any abnormal activity • Resiliency – Protection deployed at multiple strategic locations throughout Colt global network to ensure near continuous uptime of the IP Guardian service and the best possible round trip time (RTT) in case traffic needs to be diverted • Productivity – Avoid downtime – you can carry on working as normal if the attack is successfully mitigated • Flexibility – New ‘On Demand’ Variant provides more customer control to avoid false positives 11
  • 12. IP Guardian: how it works (1/3) – IP Guardian is a dedicated service in Arbor TMS which the customer traffic is Arbor Peakflow SP continuously monitored ensuring that the customer is continually prepared to react against DDoS attacks – The traffic to the customer is constantly Public Colt monitored while it follows its path in the Internet Backbone network. The Arbor Peakflow SP Collectors gather traffic statistics (network telemetry data) from all peering and transit routers, which it Arbor SP constantly constantly analyzes to construct a monitors traffic destined network-wide view of possible traffic to the customer and network anomalies Customer Network 12
  • 13. IP Guardian: how it works (2/3) – An alert is generated if the behaviour is Arbor TMS TMS is found to be abnormal. triggered Arbor Peakflow – When an attack is detected by Arbor SP Peakflow SP, traffic is automatically diverted to Arbor TMS, which mitigates Public BGP the attack based on traffic patterns Internet Announcement learnt by Arbor Peakflow SP Arbor SP constantly monitor traffice detined to the customer Customer Network Malicious Traffic Cleaned Traffic 13
  • 14. IP Guardian: how it works (3/3) – The customer never feels the full Arbor TMS impact of an attack as their circuit is being continually Arbor Peakflow SP monitored and protection triggered automatically by the Public Colt platform Internet Backbone – Only the cleaned traffic flows toward the customer, which will be provided with high levels of protection Whenever an attack occurs, traffic is reqdirected to Arbor TMS, the attack mitigated and cleaned traffic only flows to the customer Customer Network Malicious Traffic Cleaned Traffic 14
  • 15. IP Guardian: Proactive eMail Alerting • In case an attack is detected, an email is sent to the customer • Another email is sent once the attack is mitigated • The structure of such emails is provided below as an example. – From: "Peakflow SP" traffic@peakflow.oss.colt.net – Date: date/time – To: Customer’s Address (this address shall be reachable in case of attacks) – Subject: [Peakflow SP] Bandwidth attack #[Attack ID] Incoming to [Customer] Done – Type: (Bandwidth, Protocol) – ID: a number identifying the attack – Resource: Customer’s name – Severity: high – Started: date/time (UTC) referred to the attack beginning – Ended: date/time (UTC) referred to the attack mitigation – Link rate: traffic (in Mbps) related to the attack – Router: Colt peering router and interfaces involved – Input If: Input Interface – Output If: Output Interface – URL: www.colt.net 15
  • 16. Customer Portal • View traffic profiles • View anomalies • Trigger mitigation (On-Demand Only) 16
  • 17. Agenda • DoS and DDoS Attacks • Colt Proposition: IP Guardian • Technical View 17
  • 18. IP Guardian: Platform Deployment Controller 8x CPH STO BHX Collector DUB AMS CGN DUS HAM LON HAJ BRU TMS PAR FRK STR FRK BER BAS NYC ZUR GEN PARTUR MIL LIS MAD BCN VIE MUN ROM MIL MAD 18
  • 19. Technicalities • The service is available to customers with a service bandwidth of at least 10Mbps and 30/40% of spare bandwidth (recommended) • Traffic content is not monitored or stored: IP Guardian is not what is known as “Deep Packet Inspection” • The maximum number of packets that can be dealt with is 1 Million packets per second • Maximum bandwidth up to 2Gbps per TMS – this means a maximum of 2Gbps in case of a DoS attack managed by one TMS or Nx2Gbps DDoS attack through multiple entry points (N=6, the number of TMS installed) • Simultaneous TCP connections during a SYN attack per device: 100,000 • Source and destination HTTP host pairs per device: 1 Million • Zombies per device: 20,000 19