Yale University hosted a Food Systems Symposium. More about it here: http://yalefoodsymposium.org/program/panel-schedule/ This presentation is also available on my site: http://axr.be/yale

1. Food Security Policies and
Responses After Nuclear
Emergencies (Case of Chernobyl
and Lessons for Fukushima)
Dr. Alexander Belyakov, Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada
Belyakov@ryerson.ca
http://fromchernobyltofukushima.com
Yale University, October 19, 2013, 3:00 – 4:30 pm

3. Why do I care about Chernobyl?
My personal experience:
•Various visits to the affected areas in
Ukraine and Belarus in 1992-2011.
•Member of the International Chernobyl
Research and Information Network
(UNDP, IAEA, UNICEF, WHO).
•Journalist for the national newspaper
“Robitnycha Gazeta” (Worker’s
Newspaper), Kyiv, Ukraine, 1993-1997,
and the national newspaper "Echo
Chernobylja" (Echo of Chernobyl), Kyiv,
Ukraine, 1992-1993.

5. Why do I care about Chernobyl?
•Member, Board of Advisors, Chernobyl
Foundation, Toronto, Canada.
•Charity projects
Speaker about Chernobyl at:
•Toronto and Region Conservation
Authority
•Environmental Speakers Club, Ministry
of the Environment, Toronto
•Seniors’ Political Club at the Ukrainian
Canadian Social Services Toronto branch
•Bernard Betel Centre, Professionals
Club, Toronto
•CultureLink, Toronto

6. Chernobyl: Overview
• Introduction
• Overview of Chernobyl disaster, its health
consequences, aspects of food adequacy (including
first of all safety) after the disaster
• Governmental management decisions after the
disaster
• Food safety: control measures
• Managing food accessibility and adequacy
• Risk communication on food safety and food choices

7. Overview (cont.)
• Changes in perceptions, behavior of population and its
exposure to radioactive food after Chernobyl
• Perception of population and its specific groups on food
safety
• Influence of economic and political factors on food
consumption
• What are the lessons learned from Chernobyl? (and in
the Fukushima Case)
• Conclusions and recommendations
• Future cooperation: organizing a multidisciplinary
Working group (format, tasks, open nature of
membership)

8. Overview (cont.)
• This presentation reviews:
– food security policies and responses after nuclear
emergencies,
– applicability of definitions,
– accessibility and adequacy in a context of food
security issues in nuclear disaster management
based on the case of Chernobyl nuclear
catastrophe.
• There is also a link to the Fukushima disaster
recovery.

9. Purpose of the research
The purpose of the research is to determine:
• What issues have emerged with food accessibility
and adequacy on affected areas;
• How the population was informed on these issues
and why uncertain statistics were presented;
• How scientists access information about the
Chernobyl tragedy;
• What management decisions were made by the
USSR and Ukrainian governments to address food
adequacy and accessibility immediately after the
Chernobyl disaster

10. Purpose of the research
• Whether these decisions were adequate in
preventing consumption by the population of
radioactively contaminated food;
• When an immediate response policy or
activity after the disaster can be considered as
violation of the right to food;
• What kind of lessons we all need to learn from
the Chernobyl tragedy and how they can help
for a recovery after the Fukushima disaster.

11. Methodology of the research
Methodology of the research includes:
– literature review,
– interviews of Ukrainian and Japanese experts,
– personal insights and research findings of the author
after his field trips to Chernobyl including visits in
1990s and the most recent trip to affected areas in
Belarus (Belyakov 2011, p. 13).
The local actions are compared with international
ones, including recommendations of experts from
other countries.

12. Overview of Chernobyl disaster
Source: http://users.owt.com/smsrpm/Chernobyl/glbrad.html

13. Overview of Chernobyl disaster
• An explosion and fire at Chernobyl sent a
radioactive cloud over a large part of Europe.
• Signs of pollution also were found in Asia and
North America.
• The Chernobyl catastrophe had an effect on
thyroid disease development in the US (Reid and
Mangano, 1995; Gould et al, 1996).
• This nuclear disaster also had serious
consequences for Canada (Health Protection
Branch 1986, Kerr et al, 1992).

14. Overview of Chernobyl disaster
• Medvedev criticized Soviet officials, as no
valuable scientific studies have been made
public with all collected data.
• “It is, therefore, irrelevant to discuss the
health impact in figures of possible cancer
deaths in the next 70 years which might be
attributive to Chernobyl” (Medvedev, 1990,
190).

15. Overview of Chernobyl disaster
• Furthermore, scientists stress: “Official secrecy (until
May 23rd, 1989) and irreversible state falsification of
medical data during the first three years after the
catastrophe, as well as an absence of authentic
medical statistics in the former USSR, highlights the
inadequacy of materials concerning primary
epidemiological consequences of this catastrophe”
(Yablokov, 2006, p.5).
• Some of these factors explain ignorance among
Western scientists of the data gathered by their
colleagues in the former USSR countries (Abbott,
Barker, 1996, p.658).

16. Overview of Chernobyl disaster
• The way in which numerical risks are presented is also
crucial.
• At Chernobyl, the same cancer risk could have been
conveyed in the following ways:
– 131 cancers expected in the lifetimes of the 24.000 people
within 15 kilometers of the plant;
– a 2.6 percent increase in cancer rate of that exposed
population;
– or, an increase in cancer of .0047 percent of the population
among 75 million people exposed in Ukraine and Belarus
(Wilson, Crouch, 1987; Susskind, 1996, 116).

17. Overview of Chernobyl disaster
• Soviet scientists themselves had no access to the
accurate data and the whole picture remained unclear
for them.
• Some Ukrainian scientists including the well-known
radiobiologist Grodzinsky had restricted access to their
own laboratory equipment. These measures were
designed to prevent any independent investigation not
approved by the Communist Party.
• For about two years, individuals were treated as
criminals, if they possessed their own dosimeters
(Medvedev, 1990, 149).

18. Shelter
• Soviet crews sealed the most radioactive areas
of the destroyed bloc No. 4 with a concrete
Shelter (also known as the Sarcophagus).
• The Shelter – built in a hasty and poorly
organized cleanup – has formed numerous
cracks that have been studied by many
scientists.

19. Shelter
•“There is also uncertainty
in determining the quantity
of radionuclides discharged
from the reactor: from 50
million Ci (Soviet official
data) up to 3,500 millions Ci
(several independent
estimations)” (Yablokov,
2006, p.5).
•Creation of a new
construction base on the
Shelter begun in 2012.
•Another concrete Shelter
should be built around the
existing one by 2015.

20. Influential factors affected
food security of Ukraine
• 1) The consequences of Chernobyl disaster.
• 2) The long-term economic consequences of the collapse of
the USSR.
• As one of the 10 major grain producers and importers,
Ukraine has been enormously affected by those factors.
• Radionuclide contamination of vast areas in Ukraine after
Chernobyl resulted in lower consumption of dairy and meat
products, as well as wild berries and mushrooms.
• This led to decrease in caloric consumption, fat and protein
consumption.
• Ingestion of contaminated food is one of the main factors
contributing to population radiation exposures.

21. The right to food
• 160 countries including Ukraine are parties of the
UN International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights.
• Its article 11 states: “The State Parties to the
present Covenant recognize the right of everyone
to an adequate standard of living for himself and
his family, including adequate food” (OHCHR).
• Many governments already reaffirmed the right
to food in their national legislation. Our particular
interest about adequate food follows the social
justice cases after the nuclear disasters.

22. Governmental management decisions after the
Chernobyl disaster
Food safety: control measures
What was important in terms of governmental decisions
on food security and specifically food safety, is that
people in affected areas should have been immediately
informed (but actually were not) about:
• the emergency situation and its possible impacts;
• which foods are safe and which are not, which can be
radioprotectors (preventing absorption of
radionuclides);
• what the government did to ensure food safety and
what it plans to do next and why;
• how to protect one´s family and decrease risk of
exposure through inter alia educated effective food
choices.

23. Governmental management decisions after the
Chernobyl disaster
Some preventive actions that were not taken, are indeed very simple.
• One of the biggest threats of the disaster was radioiodine carried by
clouds to thousand kilometers away. Potassium iodide tablets can block
radioiodine uptake by thyroid. Nevertheless, even a population of the
town Pripyat near the Chernobyl nuclear station did not received it.
• Face masks are an easy tool to prevent inhalation of radioactive dust,
but they were also not distributed. Furthermore, even official warnings
to stay indoors were missing.
• A proper evacuation was challenged by a requirement to avoid panic, so
a staff responsible for it avoided providing many important safety
messages.
• As a result, many children spend April, 26, 1986 outdoors unaware about
a high radioactive pollution (Smith, Beresford, 2005, p.5-6).
• People did not receive any warning about water and food intake that
were already polluted.
• The USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev appeared on television
addressing the crisis only on the May 14, 1986.

24. Consequences of Chernobyl
for food safety across Europe
• The UK Food Standards Agency has the UK
Post-Chernobyl Monitoring Program.
• A live sheep monitoring program ‘Mark and
Release’ ensured that the level of consumer
risk enormouslydecreased.
• Nevertheless, about 2.5% percentage of sheep
today still have the risk of exceeding 1,000
Bq/kg of radiocaesium, according to the study
(Field 2011).

25. Consequences of Chernobyl
for food safety across Europe
• Different groups were studied in Norway.
• It is reported that a majority (40-80%) of the
groups (farmers, hunters and Sami reindeer
herdsman) were forced to significantly change
their diets.
• The major sources of radiocesium intake were
freshwater fish, milk, and reindeer meat. The
action plan included dietary advices and
agricultural decontamination (Strand et al, 1992).

26. Consequences of Chernobyl
for food safety across Europe
• "In certain regions of Germany, Austria, Italy, Sweden,
Finland, Lithuania and Poland, wild game (including boar
and deer), wild mushrooms, berries and carnivorous fish
from lakes reach levels of several thousand Bq per kg of
caesium-137"
• Most extreme cases reported from Germany, where
“caesium-137 levels in wild boar muscle reached 40,000
Bq/kg. The average level is 6,800 Bq/kg, more than ten
times the EU limit of 600 Bq/kg" (Fairlie, Sumner 2006,
p. 9).
• Therefore, the European Commission continues the
restrictions on certain food components from most
affected Member States (Fairlie, Sumner, 2006).

27. Consequences of Chernobyl
for food safety across Europe
What was done in Ukraine in terms of direct control
measures on food safety was:
• Introduction of obligatory control of contamination
levels of food (first of all milk and meat) on farms (all of
which were state-owned at the time), on state-owned
retailers and on markets.
• On markets, wild berries and mushrooms were also
subject to control.
• Only buyers whose products passed control, were
allowed to sell.
• However, since it was not accompanied by an adequate
educational campaign, this caused confusion among
sellers and consumers.

28. Managing food accessibility and adequacy
According to a definition of the Centre for
Studies in Food Security at Ryerson University,
Canada,
accessibility means “physical and economic
access to food for all at all times”
adequacy is “access to food that is nutritious
and safe, and produced in environmentally
sustainable ways” (Ryerson).

29. Managing food accessibility and adequacy
The important food security management steps
after any nuclear disaster should be:
– preventing consumption of contaminated food;
– handling safe disposure of contaminated food;
– proposing consumers some alternative safe food and
making sure people (especially relocated ones and
those still living in contaminated areas) have access to
safe, affordable food;
– informing them on effective food choices and safe
food processing;
– informing on governmental decisions concerning food
security.

30. Managing food accessibility and adequacy
• According to Ukrainian physicians, the residents
of the contaminated areas in Ukraine received
exposures between 2 to 74 mSv.
• At the same time, exposures will rise up to 160
mSv during 70 years after the disaster (19862056).
• About 80-95% of radiation doses are expected
from the contaminated food (milk, meat,
vegetables, forest products) (Nyagu, 2006 p.7677).

31. Managing food accessibility and adequacy
The most significant contribution to the internal
dose caused by the Chernobyl disaster for rural
Ukrainian population (average estimates for most
contaminated areas) is from:
–
–
–
–
–
–
contaminated milk (70-75%),
meat (7%),
vegetables (7%),
other foods (9%),
water (1-2%),
air (1%) (Onishi et al. 2007, 123).

32. Management steps taken on food security after
the Chernobyl disaster
Relocation of people from 30 kilometer zone
Results / Comments on effectiveness
• Relocation of nearly one million people from areas with
contaminated soil was prescribed to avoid exposure to low
levels of radiation. This measure was later accessed as
pointless, both medically (as avoided external exposure dose
was small) and socially (Filyshkin 1996).
• The relocation allowed to reduce dose from contaminated
food and water, including from agricultural foods that could
have been produced in the area subjected to relocation.
• However, the relocation could have caused changes in the
diets of people, decrease food availability (it was more
available in Pripyat than in some villages to where people
were moved).

33. Management steps taken on food security after
the Chernobyl disaster
• Disposal of some contaminated food (which
was done without any public disclosure).
Results / Comments on effectiveness
• Public disclosure was needed.
• Food resilience.

34. Management steps taken on food security after
the Chernobyl disaster
• Distribution of some foods, which are natural
radioprotectors through state-owned enterprises.
Examples of such food included fruit candies or
marshmallows prepared from fruit puree – both
are high in natural radioprotector – pectin.
Results / Comments on effectiveness
• During Soviet times, these treats were not readily
accessible in stores, therefore their distribution
through state enterprises was welcomed by
employees. However, educational campaign was
lacking.

35. Management steps taken on food security after
the Chernobyl disaster
• Children under 16 living in affected areas (outside
the relocation zone, this included the capital of
Ukraine - Kyiv) were taken to camps to
recreational areas. This was funded by the state.
Results / Comments on effectiveness
• This allowed in most cases ensuring that children
would not eat food from areas with high
radiological contamination. However, this did not
mean children did not receive food contaminated
with pesticides or received high quality diverse
food in general.

36. Management steps taken on food security after
the Chernobyl disaster
• Phasing-out of milk selling from milk tanks to
people, who brought recyclable open jars to
buy their milk.
Results / Comments on effectiveness
• This allowed improve quality of consumed
milk (decrease its bacterial contamination).
Though contamination of milk with
radioactive air particles was high only in first
weeks after the disaster.

37. Management steps taken on food security after
the Chernobyl disaster
• People from some affected areas (up to 100 km from
Chernobyl) were needlessly included in post-Chernobyl
legislation and paid regular benefits.
Results / Comments on effectiveness
• Exposure of these people did not exceed the natural
background levels of many inhabited regions around
the world. These millions of people were falsely
identified as the major victims of the catastrophe.
• However, paid benefits could have allowed them to
improve their nutrition (Filyshkin 1996).

38. Management steps taken on food security after
the Chernobyl disaster
• Almost no attempts were made to promote food
processing (both industrial and during home
cooking), which can decrease incorporation of
radionuclides (Nesterenko, Nesterenko 2009).
• Generally, food security measures taken lacked
consistency, well-balanced approach, proper
public awareness building, effectiveness
(removing contaminated products and bringing
safe products to people rather than relocating
one million people).

39. Risk communication
on food safety and food choices
• Some limited data on high contamination of dairy
products, mushrooms and wild berries appeared in the
Ukrainian mass media only about a month after the
disaster.
• Still there was lack of complex well-grounded
educational programs to answer all public questions.
• This created anxiety and distrust among population.
• This was also due to cognitive dissonance in the
messages.
• Furthermore, some mass media reported scientifically
absurd facts of mutations in cattle. This increased
public fears and mistrust to both government and the
mass media.

40. Changes in perceptions, behavior of population and its
exposure to radioactive food after Chernobyl
Perception of population and its specific groups on food safety
The most affected groups are:
• People who were first resettled from 30 km zone and
returned back, though it was not officially allowed at the
beginning (samosely);
• professional fishermen;
• local residents whose diet depend on fish or wild
berries/mushrooms or local dairy products and meat;
• farmers dealing with irrigated agricultural products (or dairy)
and consuming them themselves;
• clean-up workers;
• pregnant women; children.

41. Changes in perceptions, behavior of population
and its exposure to radioactive food after
Chernobyl
Severe problems are faced by the illegal residents
(self-settlers or samosely) – those who were
evcauated of the 30 kilometer zone, but tried to
return to their homes in the zone despite that it
was considered legal:
• These people have had difficulties with access to
food and safe shelter.
• Confrontation with police.
• No access to utilities, medical and other basic
services etc.

42. Changes in perceptions, behavior of population
and its exposure to radioactive food
after Chernobyl
•Most of the affected population was
evacuated and resettled in Ukraine.
•Some residents remained or illegally
returned to the Chernobyl exclusion zone
ignoring health risks.
•Majority is elderly people.
•The government failed to support them.
Furthermore, there was a forced attempt to
resettle the returned people in 1989 by
police.
•Community resilience.

43. Changes in perceptions, behavior of population
and its exposure to radioactive food
after Chernobyl
•In 1993, the government and local
authorities changed their attitudes
towards self-settlers and informally
recognized their presence in this zone.
•The self-settlers received at least some
attention and the shops on the wheels
started bringing bread and some other
limited food items to their area once a
week.
•This group had problems with adequate
information, food choices, adequacy of
compensations.
•Most of them have never had a
nutrition consultation with an expert and
some even cannot consult a doctor.
Food accessibility remained at almost
survival level. All food was grown and
processed locally. Some self-settlers
were starving. Police started providing
the hot meals for elderly self-settlers in
the police cafeterias in these remote
areas.

44. Changes in perceptions, behavior of population
and its exposure to radioactive food
after Chernobyl
• The scientists (Onishi at al. 2007, 269-270) estimated that the
professional fishermen would receive the highest dose,
including from radioactive sediments in the river system and
the Kyiv reservoir.
• Neither fishermen, nor other vulnerable groups were
properly informed on risks. Their risk perceptions ranged
from ignorance to panic.
• Immediately after the disaster there were rumors that red
wine helps decrease exposure (it does truly to some small
degree if consumed immediately after exposure). Thus, there
were cases when children were taken to hospitals drunk or
even poisoned after parents gave them wine.
• The behavior of people also was very different – from
ignorance to avoiding meat/ dairy/berries/mushrooms and to
fleeing from the area.

45. Changes in perceptions, behavior of population
and its exposure to radioactive food
after Chernobyl
• A special group is cleanup workers.
• The Minister of Health said about the Chernobyl emergency workers,
"no one has ever defined the value of a human (life) here" (Petryna
2002, 3). Furthermore, many cleanup workers report being treated not
as human employees, but as "biological resources to be used and
thrown out. … *S+lated for biorobotic death" (Petryna 30).
• Even after robots become available, they were often out of service. And
cleanup workers replaced robots all the time.
• Medical staff was prohibited from mentioning any connections between
illness of the cleanup workers with their stay in the Chernobyl zone.
• This group was also not properly informed on risks and did not receive
risk reducing food.
• The monetary compensation they receive was delayed, not adequate in
terms of health consequences and a special diet they needed.

46. Changes in perceptions, behavior of population
and its exposure to radioactive food
after the Chernobyl
• The least investigated group includes pregnant women.
• Many pregnant women in Ukraine (and even Europe-wide) were very
strongly advised to have abortion without explanation of all risks.
• Their nutritional needs were also ignored. Some scientists
speculated about the World Health Organization estimation that
250,000 couples across Europe selected to have an abortion in the
decade following Chernobyl (Baker, 2001; Peterka at al. 2004).
• According to the Ukrainian governmental reports, thirty percent of
Ukrainian children born since Chernobyl are with physical or mental
defects. 24 women in 100,000 died during delivery, and 70 percent
of women experience difficulties during childbirth.
• The country’s birth rate decreased from 691,000 in 1989 down to
385,000 in 2000. About 12 out of every 1,000 newborns die
(Editorial, 2002).
• However, there is an ongoing discussion about evaluation of
stochastic and non-stochastic consequences of the catastrophe.

47. What are the lessons learned
from Chernobyl?
• Gould (1990) came to the conclusion that after
governments took advice of nuclear industry,
there was usually manipulation and suppression
of information and it affected all related
decisions and research, including food security
studies.
• There are similar cases of officials’ opposition to
independent investigation in many states.
• Polish and even Swedish scientists were
experiencing problems because of political
sensitivity of research on Chernobyl.

48. What are the lessons learned
from Chernobyl?
• Gould studied the relationship between the European
countries dependence on nuclear energy and degree
of information manipulation or suppression about
Chernobyl in these countries (in %).
• The Gould findings show that Denmark, Portugal,
Norway, Austria and Eire do not have the described
relationship, while Soviet Union comes with 10.3%,
Belgium - 59.8% and France - 64.8% (Gould, 1990, 115).
• Such high percentage raises the question how
authorities and press of some countries would react
to the Chernobyl-like crisis, if it had happened not in
the USSR, but at home.

49. What are the lessons learned
from Chernobyl?
• Gould believes that the inadequate „reactions are not
confined to the Soviet bureaucracy; they are the natural
reaction of any bureaucracy to smother „unfortunate
news“. The suppression of information is the arrogant and
endemic curse of all modern bureaucracies, a curse that is
constituted of what they are” (Gould, 1990, 22).
• The information about a similar fire in graphite reactor at
the Windscale (UK) in 1957 was suppressed and made
public only after three days – the situation similar to the
Chernobyl case (Gould, 1990, 17).
• Furthermore, after the British data about „high levels of
cesium were found in the pastures around the nuclear
reprocessing plant, the government claimed that it was due
to Chernobyl fallout“(Gould, 1990, 17).

50. What are the lessons learned
from Chernobyl?
Gould analyzed seven ways how bureaucrats
respond to a nuclear crisis.
The discovered tactics across Europe show the
following trends:
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
„suppression or covering up;
defining the problem away;
authoritative belittling;
arithmetic obfuscation;
public relations;
creative deception;
and information reduction” (Gould, 1990, 113).

51. Lessons after Chernobyl on Food
Security
• Management steps on food security lacked
consistency, proper education/risk
communication, were not timely, did not
account for most vulnerable groups.
• What could have worked better:
- State wide information campaign
- Bringing safe food from other regions
- Promoting radioactive-wise food processing (like
discarding meat broth)

52. Research needs
• Iouli Andreev who ran the Soviet Spetsatom
agency:
"After Chernobyl, all the force of the nuclear
industry was directed to hide this event, for
not creating damage to their reputation. The
Chernobyl experience was not studied
properly because who has money for
studying? Only industry. But industry doesn't
like it“ (Shields, 2011).

53. What are the lessons learned
from Chernobyl?
• The United States government rewrites its plans for
responding to radiation contamination focusing on long-term
cleanup instead of emergency response.
• Food Guidance: Planners are referred to current guidance on
radioactive contamination in food from the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA)
PAG Manual. Protective Action Guides And Planning Guidance For Radiological
Incidents. U.S Environmental Protection Agency Draft for Interim Use and
Public Comment March 2013
http://www.epa.gov/radiation/docs/er/pag-manual-interim-public-comment-4-22013.pdf
http://www.epa.gov/radiation/rert/pags.html
U.S. Rethinks How to Respond to Nuclear Disaster:
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/15/science/earth/new-rules-for-us-nucleardisaster-response.html?_r=0

54. Overview of Fukushima disaster
• Animated map showing the plume as it expands
across the Pacific:
http://cerea.enpc.fr/HomePages/bocquet/Doc/fukushi
ma-Cs137-wide.swf
• Japanese corporations already have history of the
cover-up after nuclear accidents
• “Falsification of inspection records regarding
cracks at three nuclear power plants by Tokyo
Electric Power Co. (TEPCO)” (Tsuchiya, 2003) long
before the disaster in 2011.

55. Overview of Fukushima disaster
There are many similarities in transparency issues
after the Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters.
• According to Jun Shigemura, the National
Defense Medical College in Saitama, near Tokyo:
“a combination of poor public communication by
the authorities and Tepco over radiation levels
and the danger they present to health, coupled
with widespread uncertainty over the future, had
created a "mental health crisis" among
Fukushima residents” (McCurry, 2013, p.791).

56. Overview of Fukushima disaster
• The Japanese government made many positive
statements following the disaster on one site and
still told the affecting people not to eat the
contaminated food.
• According to experts, “restrictions on
consumption of food (excluding water) were
enforced only in Fukushima Prefecture.
Distribution restrictions were enforced in
Fukushima, Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, Chiba and
Kanagawa Prefectures” (Hamada, Ogino, 2012,
p.89).

57. Overview of Fukushima disaster
• Japanese scientists are optimistic about their findings and
radioactivity measurements performed by local
government.
• Only 3% of the agricultural products “samples investigated
contained >500 Bq/kg, whereas the remaining 97%
contained less than the provisional regulation level of 500
Bq/kg in 2011” (Nihei, 2013, p.73).
• The WHO experts confirm many findings, but are
concerned with the limited sources. “Although the
assessment was intended to be realistic, given the limited
information available to the Dose Expert Panel during its
period of work, some conservative assumptions were
adopted to avoid any underestimation of doses” (WHO
2013, p.38).

58. Overview of Fukushima disaster
• Iida Tetsunari criticized the nuclear industry culture.
• During his meeting in Toronto, he compared it “to the
culture surrounding the creation and ultimate
destruction of the famous Japanese Battleship, the
Yamato.
• A myth surrounded the great battleship: that it was
infallible and unsinkable – a lasting image that led to the
idolization of the Yamato as a beacon of Japan’s success
in its endeavors. Similarly, myths cloud the truths about
nuclear future – the industry continues to insist that it
is not only safe and economical, but also integral to
Japan’s energy system and economy” (Tetsunari, 2013).

59. Overview of Fukushima disaster
• Iida Tetsunari analyzed lack of basic information
about Fukushima disaster comparing it to the
Chernobyl tragedy in his presentation.
• The Japanese government failed to provide the
clear boundaries for a monitoring zone and a
zone with right to evacuate.
• The requirements for a forced evacuation zone
are 4 times greater as they were after the
Chernobyl disaster.
• These data raise concern about proper
management.

60. Overview of Fukushima disaster
(Tetsunari, 2013)

61. Overview of Fukushima disaster
• Finally, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe confirmed in
October 2013 that his country is in need of global aid:
• "We are wide open to receive the most advanced
knowledge from overseas to contain the problem (…)
My country needs your knowledge and expertise”
(Smith, 2013).
• It is better late than never, but international experts
need more access to the data.
• A source review for food security policies and responses
after Fukushima disaster still gives limited information.
• Furthermore, a concern remains about corporate
culture avoiding failure that limits an access to
information. More transparency and further research is
needed.

62. Conclusions and recommendations
The conducted critical review of literature and personal data
confirm that:
• Many food products were contaminated (meat, dairy,
mushrooms, berries, vegetables) and contributed to
internal exposure dose in Ukraine.
• Policies and management steps taken by the Ukrainian
government after the disaster were of efficiency in terms of
food security of affected people. These steps lacked
consistency, proper risk communication, and combined
approach. They were often very expensive and at the same
time not very effective (as with relocation of people),
simpler steps like bringing people adequate food from
other areas could have been more effective.

63. Conclusions and recommendations
• Lack of social justice was demonstrated in
governmental dealing with samosely, who still suffer
from food insecurity (lack of food access, consumption
of primarily self-produced contaminated food, lack of
nutrition consultations, etc).
• Lack of proper information created fears, distrust and
such extremes in behavior as total avoidance of dairy
products, giving wine to children etc.
• The Japanese government does not apply many lessons
learned from Chernobyl dealing with the Fukushima
tragedy.

64. Feedback from participants

65. Future cooperation
Looking for joint research opportunities
Web-site:
http://fromchernobyltofukushima.com
E-Mail:
belyakov@ryerson.ca

66. Dr. Alexander Belyakov
Ryerson University
Toronto, Canada
Belyakov@ryerson.ca
http://fromchernobyltofukushima.com
All Chernobyl photos taken by the author
Full bibliography available on request