1. AHWR300-LEU
Lowering threats
in sustainable
development
using nuclear
energy
Anil Kakodkar

2. Per capita
el.
consumption
kWh
(HDI)
Goa 2263
(0.792)
HDI unaffected by change
in electricity use Bihar 122
(0.542)
All India 779
HDI strongly (0.605)
dependent on
electricity
use

3. World OECD World-OECD
Population
(billions) 6.7 1.18 5.52
Annual
Electricity
Generation 18.8 10.6 8.2
(trillion kWh)
Carbon-di-oxide
Emission 30 13 17
(billion tons/yr)
Annual
av. per capita ~2800 ~9000 ~1500
Electricity (kWh)
Additional annual electricity generation needed just to reach
5000kWh average per-capita electricity (necessary for a reasonable
standard of living) in non-OECD countries would amount to ~20
trillion kWh that is roughly equal to present total generation.

4. THE CRUCIAL ENERGY
CHALLENGE
World electricity supply would need to nearly
double (around 3000 GWe additional electric
generation capacity) just to support a reasonable
standard of living for all
Timely ability to cater to this need in a
sustainable manner(or at least reserve equitable
resources for the purpose) is in my view a
prerequisite for long term peace and stability
On the other hand the threat of climate change
requires reduction in use of fossil energy
Clearly business as usual approach will not do
and nuclear energy has to play much greater role

5. A much Experience has
IS THERE ENOUGH URANIUM ? talked
about view
shown that
investment in
Cumulative uranium low proj-3.4 million tons exploration is
driven by
demand by 2050 middle proj-5.4 million tons demand and
(Analysis of uranium supply high proj-7.6 million tons prices. No
to 2050-IAEA publication) shortage is
foreseen
Jan2009 estimate of uranium at 6.3 million tons
(includes U up to $ 260/Kg). Should last a 100 years
at 2008 consumption rate Cases with use of 5.469 million tonne natural uranium
metal (Identified resources)* in LWR (OT) and LWR-MOX
8000
IAEA INPRO GAINS High target
(both Pu-U and Pu-Th)
Cumulative capacity (OT) *:Total resources (Identified + Undiscovered) are 15.969
7000 Cumulative capacity (LWR-LWR (Pu-U MOX)) million tonnes
Cumulative capacity (LWR-LWR(Pu-Th MOX))
Ref: Uranium 2007: Resources, Production and
Installed Capacity (GWe)
6000
Demand-The joint report by OECD Nuclear Energy
5000
Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency
Demand profile as per (RED Book 2008)
4000 IAEA INPRO GAINS (High) Uranium in open cycle is unsustainable
By adding undiscovered if nuclear energy is to meet a
3000
uranium resources, this reasonable fraction of carbon free
point merely shifts to 2050 electricity requirements.
2000
1000 Recycle of nuclear fuel in breeder
reactors has to be brought in soon
0 enough
1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
Year 5

6. Recycle of nuclear fuel is also necessary to resolve the
issue of permanent disposal of spent fuel
 There is already a large used uranium fuel inventory (~270,000 tons as
per WNA estimate). Its permanent disposal has remained an
unresolved issue which in my view is unlikely to be resolved.
 While the spent fuel would be a sufficiently large energy resource if
recycled, its permanent disposal ( if resorted to ) is in my view an
unacceptable security and safety risk (plutonium mine?)
 We need to adopt ways to liquidate the spent fuel inventory through
recycle
 While direct disposal of spent fuel is a long term risk, universal
adoption of recycle is not likely to gain ground on account of nuclear
security concerns

7. Risk
Nuclear Security Climate Change
#Diversion of nuclear materials for # Difficult to predict global
weapons purposes – Could cause consequences – Could well be much
threat any where larger that what can be caused by
WMDs
#Threat to nuclear facility can cause
public trauma– Threat primarily in # Development deficit and varying
the neighborhood of the facility energy security challenges
Minimisation of risk to humanity would necessitate rapid growth of
nuclear power.
Security measures alone, though necessary, are unlikely to be
sufficient. Sovereignty of nations, varying degree of security deficit,
responsible behaviour & trust deficit, managing non-state actors etc.
are likely to remain difficult challenges.
Technology measures that provide inherent proliferation resistance
and security strength must be quickly brought in to replace fossil
energy.

8. Thorium, a one stop solution to safety, sustainability
and proliferation resistance
Options for plutonium disposition
80 – Uranium-based fuel: Neutron
Initial fuel absorption in 238U generates
additional plutonium.
Fissile plutonium content
60
in the fuel (kg/te)
– Inert matrix fuel (non-fertile metal
40 alloys containing Pu): Degraded
reactor kinetics - only a part of the
20 core can be loaded with such a
Discharge fuel fuel, reducing the plutonium
0
0 20 40 60 80 100
disposition rate.
Discharge burnup (GWd/te) – Thorium: Enables more effective
Plutonium destruction in thorium- utilisation of Pu, added initially,
plutonium fuel in PHWR while maintaining acceptable
performance characteristics.

9. Detectability of 233U (contaminated with 232U) for
all the cases, is unquestionable
16
6000 6000 1000
233
U 14 Exposure
U
5000 5000
12 time for U
232
332
4000 232
U 10 4000 lethal dose 100
3000 8 3000
6
2000 2000 10
4
1000 2 1000
0 0
no t art nec n32c U
0 1
f D 0a
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
gk 4 8 r o m1 t 5
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
) MHf o gk/ g(
m p n no t art nec n32c U
3o
m p n no t art nec n32c U
eri uqc a o )r h( e m er us opx E
L
Burnup GWd/te Burnup GWd/te
2o
2o
i
.
it
i
i
Case of Pu-RG+Thoria in AHWR
p i
p i
t

10. The Indian Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR), a
quicker proliferation resistant solution for the energy hungry
world
AHWR is a 300 MWe vertical pressure tube type, boiling light water cooled and heavy water moderated
reactor (An innovative configuration that can provide low risk nuclear energy using available
technologies)
Major design objectives
 Significant fraction of Energy from
Thorium Top Tie Plate
Displacer
Water Rod
 Several passive features Tube
 3 days grace period Fuel
Pin
 No radiological impact
AHWR can be
configured to accept a  Passive shutdown system to
range of fuel types address insider threat scenarios.
including LEU, U-
Pu , Th-Pu , LEU-Th  Design life of 100 years.
and 233U-Th in full Bottom Tie Plate
core  Easily replaceable coolant channels.
AHWR Fuel assembly

11. AHWR 300-LEU is a simple 300 MWe system fuelled
with LEU-Thorium fuel, has advanced passive safety
features, high degree of operator forgiving
characteristics, no adverse impact in public domain,
high proliferation resistance and inherent security
strength.
Peak clad
temperature hardly
rises even in the
extreme condition
of complete station
blackout and
failure of primary
and secondary
systems.
Reactor Block Components
AHWR300-LEU provides a robust design against
external as well as internal threats, including insider
malevolent acts. This feature contributes to strong
security of the reactor through implementation of
technological solutions.

12. Presence of 232U in uranium from spent fuel
The
232
U
233
U composition
234
U
235
U of the fresh (LEU
236
U in Thorium)
238
U
as well as the
MODERN AHWR300-LEU
spent fuel of
LWR
U 0.02 % AHWR300-LEU
232
U 0.00 % 232
233
U 0.00 % 233
U 6.51 % makes the
234
U 0.00 % 234
U 1.24 %
fuel cycle
235
U 0.82 % 235
U 1.62 %
236
U 0.59 % 236
U 3.27 % inherently
238
U 98.59 % 238
U 87.35 %
proliferation
Uranium in the spent fuel contains about 8% fissile isotopes, resistant.
and hence is suitable to be reused in other reactors. Further, it
is also possible to reuse the Plutonium from spent fuel in fast
reactors.

13. Reduced Plutonium generation High 238Pu fraction and low fissile content of
Plutonium
238
Pu
239
Pu
240
Pu
241
Pu
242
Pu
MODERN AHWR300-LEU
LWR
238
Pu 3.50 % 238
Pu 9.54 %
239
Pu 51.87 % 239
Pu 41.65 %
240
Pu 23.81 % 240
Pu 21.14 %
241
Pu 12.91 % 241
Pu 13.96 %
242
Pu 7.91 % 242
Pu 13.70 %
The French N4 PWR is considered as representative of a modern LWR.. The reactor has been referred from “Accelerator-driven Systems
(ADS) and Fast Reactor (FR) in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles”, OECD (2002)
STRONGER PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE
WITH AHWR 300-LEU
MUCH LOWER PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION
Much Higher 238Pu & Lower Fissile Plutonium

14. AHWR300-LEU
provides a better
utilisation of
natural uranium,
as a result of
a significant
fraction of the
energy is extracted
by fission of 233U,
converted in-situ
from the thorium
fertile host.
With high burn up possible today,
LEU-Thorium fuel can lead to better/comparable
utilisation of mined Uranium

15. Thorium thus offers the potential
for a wider deployment of nuclear
power with reduced threats ( both
nuclear as well as those related
to climate change )

16. “IAEA is not concerned with the tenth or the
thousandth nuclear device of a country. IAEA is only
concened with the first.
- And that will certainly not be based on a thorium
fuel cycle”
- ---------Bruno
-Bruno Pellaud, Former Deputy Director General,IAEA
16

17. While greater geographical spread of nuclear
energy with minimised risk can be realised by
Thorium-LEU fuel, there would still be a
question of meeting energy needs beyond
what can be supported by thermal reactors
Fast breeder reactors would thus be
necessary for growth in nuclear power
capacity beyond thermal reactor potential
Fast reactors as well as uranium fuel
enrichment and recycle would however need
to be kept within a more “responsible”
domain

18. Present deployment MO Thorium
X
Of nuclear power
Reprocess
Thermal Spent Fuel Fast
Enrichment reactors Reactor
Uranium LEU
Plant
For growth in
nuclear
LEU Thorium Recycle
Thorium generation
fuel
beyond thermal
reactor potential U
233
Thorium
LEU-
Nuclear power with
Thorium greater proliferation
resistance
Safe & Thorium
Secure
Reactors Reactors
For ex. AHWR Recycle For ex. Acc.
Driven MSR
Thorium

19. Thank
you