SlideShare una empresa de Scribd logo
1 de 31
NETWORK SECURITY A PAPER ON  P ITFALLS AND PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN IP-SPOOFING Arpit Gupta Deepika Chug
Bad Practices Spread It is easy to see the faults of others but not so easy to see one’s own faults If I just open a bunch of ports in the firewall my app will work. I think I will wedge the computer room door open. Much easier. They have blocked my favorite Web site. Lucky I have a modem. I think I will use my first name as a password. Say, we run a network too. How do you configure your firewalls? Why do we need the door locked? Hey, nice modem. What's the number of that line? I can never think of a good password. What do you use?
Understanding The Landscape Author Script-Kiddie Hobbyist Hacker Expert Specialist Vandal Thief Spy Trespasser National Interest Personal Gain Personal Fame Curiosity
An Evolving Threat Hobbyist Hacker Expert Specialist Largest area by volume Largest area by $ lost Script-Kiddie Largest segment by  $ spent on defense Fastest  growing  segment Author Vandal Thief Spy Trespasser National Interest Personal Gain Personal Fame Curiosity
IP  ->  Internet Protocol.. Spoofing  ->  Hiding.. It is a trick played on servers to fool the target computers into thinking that it is receiving data from source other than the trusted host. This Attack is actually a  Trust-Relationship  Exploitation. “ Things are not what they seem and that is why the world gets conned” WHAT IS IP-SPOOFING ???
A B C B  is on line A   disguising his voice,making it sound  more like that of   B If we now,replace the 3 people by computers and change the term “voice” with “IP-Address” then you would know what we mean by  IP-SPOOFING… REAL LIFE EXAMPLE TO EXPLAIN WHAT IS  IP SPOOFING.
HACKER 203.45.98.01 VICTIM 202.14.12.10 FAKE 202.23.45.89 FAKE 202.23.45.89 Remote Host Datagram (Data Packets) Trusted Host Attacking Host  IP  SPOOFING
C B A CLIENT HOST A B C PACKETS DISCRIPTION: SYN =client’s ISN (4894305) ACK= 0 SYN= Host’s ISN (1896955367) ACK= client’s ISN +1 (4894306)  ACK=  Host’s ISN +1 (1896955368) THE 3-WAY HANDSHAKE ..
THE ATTACK IN BRIEF …… ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],-- ON SUCCESS THE ATTACKER ISSUES A SIMPLE  COMMAND TO LEAVE A  BACKDOOR --
THE ATTACK HACKER 203.45.98.01 VICTIM 202.14.12.10 FAKE 202.23.45.89 Remote Host Packets with IP Address  of Trusted Host (FAKE) Attacking Host
THE ATTACK VICTIM 202.14.12.10 FAKE 202.23.45.89 Trusted Host SYN / ACK PACKETS , Remote Host
As soon as we find the  TRUSTED-HOST ( FAKE),our next Step is to disable it.  WHY ???? “ -- FAKE must not at any time respond to the SYN/ACK  packet send by VICTIM -- “  How  to  do  it ???? Use up all the memory of TRUSTED-HOST so  that it will not able to respond to the SYN/ACK  packet sent to it by the VICTIM . So one very easy method of doing so is to Perform the  SYN Flooding Denial of Service Attack TRUSTED HOST DISABLING..
SYN SYN SYN SYN SYN SYN QUEUE FULL There is a upper limit of how many concurrent SYN request TCP can process for a given socket, this limit is called  BACKLOG LIMIT B A C k L O G Q U E U E Backlog limit = length (Queue)  SO what is SYN FLOODing ???
BLIND ATTACK FAKE 202.23.45.89 Trusted Host SYN / ACK PACKETS , VICTIM 202.14.12.10 Remote Host   HACKER 203.45.98.01 Attacking Host
THE ATTACK HACKER 203.45.98.01 VICTIM 202.14.12.10 Remote Host SYN/ACK Packets acknowledging  Trusted  Host  has received  SYN/ACK Packets Attacking Host
Detection ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
1.Packet Filtering   2. Firewall  3.Initial Sequence Number Randomizing Preventive  Measures
Packet Filtering ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Should arriving packet be allowed in? Departing packet let out?
Our network is secure, right? Oh sure, Don’t worry. We have several firewalls
Initial Sequence Number (ISN) Randomizing ISN   Incrementation At every connection --incremented by 64,000 At every sec. – incremented by 128,000 Its value gets wrapped every 9.32hrs. So,it’s easy for any genius to do the guesswork and calculate the correct sequence number
 
CONCLUSION   IP-Spoofing is an exploitation of trust-based relationship and can be curbed effectively if proper measures are used.Understanding how and why spoofing attacks are used , combined with a few simple prevention methods, can help protect networks from these malicious cloaking and cracking techniques.
Make your Network Secure
IP-Spoofing Software In Technical Discussion Client Client Client/Server Target Victim Hacker Part 1 : Target is being attacked  192.168.1.2 192.168.1.20 192.168.1.30 Target is being attacked  With the UDP packets, when No measures were taken UDP 192.168.1.20
IP-Spoofing Software In Technical Discussion Client Client Client/Server Target Victim Hacker Part 2 :  Target is being attacked  but the software is interface to this  192.168.1.2 192.168.1.20 192.168.1.30 The s/w UDP 192.168.1.20 UDP 192.168.1.20
IP-Spoofing Software In technical Discussion Part 3: The s/w Role as an Interface 1)Scans all the Registered IP Addresses for their Authenticity. myip log file (List of registered clients) While scanning these it also resolves  The respective Mac Address at runtime.  2) (Maintains the list of spoofed  Clients) log file
IP-Spoofing Software In technical Discussion Part 3.1: The s/w Role as an Interface 3) Maintains the list of Registered Clients  whenever they communicate. myhost log file (List of registered clients) 4)The unauthorised user is blocked.
 
UDP HEADER 16   32   Source port  Destination port  Length   Checksum  Data
16  32 bits  Source port  Destination port  Sequence number  Acknowledgement number  Offset  Resrvd  U  A  P  R  S  F  Window  Checksum  Urgent pointer  Option + Padding  Data  TCP header structure
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Más contenido relacionado

La actualidad más candente

Ip spoofing attacks
Ip spoofing attacksIp spoofing attacks
Ip spoofing attacksApijay Kumar
 
System hacking
System hackingSystem hacking
System hackingCAS
 
Phishing attacks ppt
Phishing attacks pptPhishing attacks ppt
Phishing attacks pptAryan Ragu
 
Man in the middle attack .pptx
Man in the middle attack .pptxMan in the middle attack .pptx
Man in the middle attack .pptxPradeepKumar728006
 
How to Spot and Combat a Phishing Attack - Cyber Security Webinar | ControlScan
How to Spot and Combat a Phishing Attack - Cyber Security Webinar | ControlScanHow to Spot and Combat a Phishing Attack - Cyber Security Webinar | ControlScan
How to Spot and Combat a Phishing Attack - Cyber Security Webinar | ControlScanControlScan, Inc.
 
Spoofing
SpoofingSpoofing
SpoofingSanjeev
 
Denial of Service Attack
Denial of Service AttackDenial of Service Attack
Denial of Service AttackDhrumil Panchal
 
P H I S H I N G
P H I S H I N GP H I S H I N G
P H I S H I N Gbensonoo
 
Man in The Middle Attack
Man in The Middle AttackMan in The Middle Attack
Man in The Middle AttackDeepak Upadhyay
 
History and future cybercrime
History and future cybercrimeHistory and future cybercrime
History and future cybercrimeOnline
 
Network Attacks and Countermeasures
Network Attacks and CountermeasuresNetwork Attacks and Countermeasures
Network Attacks and Countermeasureskaranwayne
 

La actualidad más candente (20)

Ip spoofing attacks
Ip spoofing attacksIp spoofing attacks
Ip spoofing attacks
 
Ip Spoofing
Ip SpoofingIp Spoofing
Ip Spoofing
 
Presentation1
Presentation1Presentation1
Presentation1
 
System hacking
System hackingSystem hacking
System hacking
 
Cyber attack
Cyber attackCyber attack
Cyber attack
 
Phishing attacks ppt
Phishing attacks pptPhishing attacks ppt
Phishing attacks ppt
 
Man in the middle attack .pptx
Man in the middle attack .pptxMan in the middle attack .pptx
Man in the middle attack .pptx
 
How to Spot and Combat a Phishing Attack - Cyber Security Webinar | ControlScan
How to Spot and Combat a Phishing Attack - Cyber Security Webinar | ControlScanHow to Spot and Combat a Phishing Attack - Cyber Security Webinar | ControlScan
How to Spot and Combat a Phishing Attack - Cyber Security Webinar | ControlScan
 
Phishing ppt
Phishing pptPhishing ppt
Phishing ppt
 
Denial of service
Denial of serviceDenial of service
Denial of service
 
Spoofing
SpoofingSpoofing
Spoofing
 
Phishing
PhishingPhishing
Phishing
 
Denial of Service Attack
Denial of Service AttackDenial of Service Attack
Denial of Service Attack
 
Ip Spoofing
Ip SpoofingIp Spoofing
Ip Spoofing
 
P H I S H I N G
P H I S H I N GP H I S H I N G
P H I S H I N G
 
Man in The Middle Attack
Man in The Middle AttackMan in The Middle Attack
Man in The Middle Attack
 
History and future cybercrime
History and future cybercrimeHistory and future cybercrime
History and future cybercrime
 
Cyber attacks
Cyber attacks Cyber attacks
Cyber attacks
 
Network Attacks and Countermeasures
Network Attacks and CountermeasuresNetwork Attacks and Countermeasures
Network Attacks and Countermeasures
 
Types of cyber attacks
Types of cyber attacksTypes of cyber attacks
Types of cyber attacks
 

Similar a Ip Spoofing

Detection and analysis_of_syn_flood_ddos
Detection and analysis_of_syn_flood_ddosDetection and analysis_of_syn_flood_ddos
Detection and analysis_of_syn_flood_ddosOleh Stupak
 
CEHv7 Question Collection
CEHv7 Question CollectionCEHv7 Question Collection
CEHv7 Question CollectionManish Luintel
 
Networkin new
Networkin newNetworkin new
Networkin newrajujast
 
Cyber security and ethical hacking 3
Cyber security and ethical hacking 3Cyber security and ethical hacking 3
Cyber security and ethical hacking 3Mehedi Hasan
 
Attacks and their mitigations
Attacks and their mitigationsAttacks and their mitigations
Attacks and their mitigationsMukesh Chaudhari
 
Exploiting Network Protocols To Exhaust Bandwidth Links 2008 Final
Exploiting Network Protocols To Exhaust Bandwidth Links 2008 FinalExploiting Network Protocols To Exhaust Bandwidth Links 2008 Final
Exploiting Network Protocols To Exhaust Bandwidth Links 2008 Finalmasoodnt10
 
DDOS Mitigation Experience from IP ServerOne by CL Lee
DDOS Mitigation Experience from IP ServerOne by CL LeeDDOS Mitigation Experience from IP ServerOne by CL Lee
DDOS Mitigation Experience from IP ServerOne by CL LeeMyNOG
 
3.7.10 Lab Use Wireshark to View Network Traffic
3.7.10 Lab Use Wireshark to View Network Traffic3.7.10 Lab Use Wireshark to View Network Traffic
3.7.10 Lab Use Wireshark to View Network TrafficRio Ap
 

Similar a Ip Spoofing (20)

ip spoofing
ip spoofingip spoofing
ip spoofing
 
Hacking Cisco
Hacking CiscoHacking Cisco
Hacking Cisco
 
Sudheer tech seminor
Sudheer tech seminorSudheer tech seminor
Sudheer tech seminor
 
My ppt..priya
My ppt..priyaMy ppt..priya
My ppt..priya
 
Detection and analysis_of_syn_flood_ddos
Detection and analysis_of_syn_flood_ddosDetection and analysis_of_syn_flood_ddos
Detection and analysis_of_syn_flood_ddos
 
Hacking tutorial
Hacking tutorialHacking tutorial
Hacking tutorial
 
Hacking In Detail
Hacking In DetailHacking In Detail
Hacking In Detail
 
Internet Security
Internet SecurityInternet Security
Internet Security
 
R bernardino hand_in_assignment_week_1
R bernardino hand_in_assignment_week_1R bernardino hand_in_assignment_week_1
R bernardino hand_in_assignment_week_1
 
CEHv7 Question Collection
CEHv7 Question CollectionCEHv7 Question Collection
CEHv7 Question Collection
 
Network security
Network securityNetwork security
Network security
 
3.Network
3.Network3.Network
3.Network
 
Networkin new
Networkin newNetworkin new
Networkin new
 
Cyber security and ethical hacking 3
Cyber security and ethical hacking 3Cyber security and ethical hacking 3
Cyber security and ethical hacking 3
 
Hacking
HackingHacking
Hacking
 
Attacks and their mitigations
Attacks and their mitigationsAttacks and their mitigations
Attacks and their mitigations
 
Exploiting Network Protocols To Exhaust Bandwidth Links 2008 Final
Exploiting Network Protocols To Exhaust Bandwidth Links 2008 FinalExploiting Network Protocols To Exhaust Bandwidth Links 2008 Final
Exploiting Network Protocols To Exhaust Bandwidth Links 2008 Final
 
DDOS Mitigation Experience from IP ServerOne by CL Lee
DDOS Mitigation Experience from IP ServerOne by CL LeeDDOS Mitigation Experience from IP ServerOne by CL Lee
DDOS Mitigation Experience from IP ServerOne by CL Lee
 
3.7.10 Lab Use Wireshark to View Network Traffic
3.7.10 Lab Use Wireshark to View Network Traffic3.7.10 Lab Use Wireshark to View Network Traffic
3.7.10 Lab Use Wireshark to View Network Traffic
 
Hacking
HackingHacking
Hacking
 

Último

A Journey Into the Emotions of Software Developers
A Journey Into the Emotions of Software DevelopersA Journey Into the Emotions of Software Developers
A Journey Into the Emotions of Software DevelopersNicole Novielli
 
So einfach geht modernes Roaming fuer Notes und Nomad.pdf
So einfach geht modernes Roaming fuer Notes und Nomad.pdfSo einfach geht modernes Roaming fuer Notes und Nomad.pdf
So einfach geht modernes Roaming fuer Notes und Nomad.pdfpanagenda
 
The Future Roadmap for the Composable Data Stack - Wes McKinney - Data Counci...
The Future Roadmap for the Composable Data Stack - Wes McKinney - Data Counci...The Future Roadmap for the Composable Data Stack - Wes McKinney - Data Counci...
The Future Roadmap for the Composable Data Stack - Wes McKinney - Data Counci...Wes McKinney
 
MuleSoft Online Meetup Group - B2B Crash Course: Release SparkNotes
MuleSoft Online Meetup Group - B2B Crash Course: Release SparkNotesMuleSoft Online Meetup Group - B2B Crash Course: Release SparkNotes
MuleSoft Online Meetup Group - B2B Crash Course: Release SparkNotesManik S Magar
 
Genislab builds better products and faster go-to-market with Lean project man...
Genislab builds better products and faster go-to-market with Lean project man...Genislab builds better products and faster go-to-market with Lean project man...
Genislab builds better products and faster go-to-market with Lean project man...Farhan Tariq
 
QCon London: Mastering long-running processes in modern architectures
QCon London: Mastering long-running processes in modern architecturesQCon London: Mastering long-running processes in modern architectures
QCon London: Mastering long-running processes in modern architecturesBernd Ruecker
 
Potential of AI (Generative AI) in Business: Learnings and Insights
Potential of AI (Generative AI) in Business: Learnings and InsightsPotential of AI (Generative AI) in Business: Learnings and Insights
Potential of AI (Generative AI) in Business: Learnings and InsightsRavi Sanghani
 
Merck Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Merck Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxMerck Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Merck Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxLoriGlavin3
 
Top 10 Hubspot Development Companies in 2024
Top 10 Hubspot Development Companies in 2024Top 10 Hubspot Development Companies in 2024
Top 10 Hubspot Development Companies in 2024TopCSSGallery
 
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024BookNet Canada
 
Unleashing Real-time Insights with ClickHouse_ Navigating the Landscape in 20...
Unleashing Real-time Insights with ClickHouse_ Navigating the Landscape in 20...Unleashing Real-time Insights with ClickHouse_ Navigating the Landscape in 20...
Unleashing Real-time Insights with ClickHouse_ Navigating the Landscape in 20...Alkin Tezuysal
 
Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pdf
Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pdfMoving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pdf
Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pdfLoriGlavin3
 
React Native vs Ionic - The Best Mobile App Framework
React Native vs Ionic - The Best Mobile App FrameworkReact Native vs Ionic - The Best Mobile App Framework
React Native vs Ionic - The Best Mobile App FrameworkPixlogix Infotech
 
Glenn Lazarus- Why Your Observability Strategy Needs Security Observability
Glenn Lazarus- Why Your Observability Strategy Needs Security ObservabilityGlenn Lazarus- Why Your Observability Strategy Needs Security Observability
Glenn Lazarus- Why Your Observability Strategy Needs Security Observabilityitnewsafrica
 
The Role of FIDO in a Cyber Secure Netherlands: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
The Role of FIDO in a Cyber Secure Netherlands: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxThe Role of FIDO in a Cyber Secure Netherlands: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
The Role of FIDO in a Cyber Secure Netherlands: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxLoriGlavin3
 
Abdul Kader Baba- Managing Cybersecurity Risks and Compliance Requirements i...
Abdul Kader Baba- Managing Cybersecurity Risks  and Compliance Requirements i...Abdul Kader Baba- Managing Cybersecurity Risks  and Compliance Requirements i...
Abdul Kader Baba- Managing Cybersecurity Risks and Compliance Requirements i...itnewsafrica
 
A Deep Dive on Passkeys: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
A Deep Dive on Passkeys: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxA Deep Dive on Passkeys: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
A Deep Dive on Passkeys: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxLoriGlavin3
 
[Webinar] SpiraTest - Setting New Standards in Quality Assurance
[Webinar] SpiraTest - Setting New Standards in Quality Assurance[Webinar] SpiraTest - Setting New Standards in Quality Assurance
[Webinar] SpiraTest - Setting New Standards in Quality AssuranceInflectra
 
2024 April Patch Tuesday
2024 April Patch Tuesday2024 April Patch Tuesday
2024 April Patch TuesdayIvanti
 
Digital Identity is Under Attack: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Digital Identity is Under Attack: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxDigital Identity is Under Attack: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Digital Identity is Under Attack: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxLoriGlavin3
 

Último (20)

A Journey Into the Emotions of Software Developers
A Journey Into the Emotions of Software DevelopersA Journey Into the Emotions of Software Developers
A Journey Into the Emotions of Software Developers
 
So einfach geht modernes Roaming fuer Notes und Nomad.pdf
So einfach geht modernes Roaming fuer Notes und Nomad.pdfSo einfach geht modernes Roaming fuer Notes und Nomad.pdf
So einfach geht modernes Roaming fuer Notes und Nomad.pdf
 
The Future Roadmap for the Composable Data Stack - Wes McKinney - Data Counci...
The Future Roadmap for the Composable Data Stack - Wes McKinney - Data Counci...The Future Roadmap for the Composable Data Stack - Wes McKinney - Data Counci...
The Future Roadmap for the Composable Data Stack - Wes McKinney - Data Counci...
 
MuleSoft Online Meetup Group - B2B Crash Course: Release SparkNotes
MuleSoft Online Meetup Group - B2B Crash Course: Release SparkNotesMuleSoft Online Meetup Group - B2B Crash Course: Release SparkNotes
MuleSoft Online Meetup Group - B2B Crash Course: Release SparkNotes
 
Genislab builds better products and faster go-to-market with Lean project man...
Genislab builds better products and faster go-to-market with Lean project man...Genislab builds better products and faster go-to-market with Lean project man...
Genislab builds better products and faster go-to-market with Lean project man...
 
QCon London: Mastering long-running processes in modern architectures
QCon London: Mastering long-running processes in modern architecturesQCon London: Mastering long-running processes in modern architectures
QCon London: Mastering long-running processes in modern architectures
 
Potential of AI (Generative AI) in Business: Learnings and Insights
Potential of AI (Generative AI) in Business: Learnings and InsightsPotential of AI (Generative AI) in Business: Learnings and Insights
Potential of AI (Generative AI) in Business: Learnings and Insights
 
Merck Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Merck Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxMerck Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Merck Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
 
Top 10 Hubspot Development Companies in 2024
Top 10 Hubspot Development Companies in 2024Top 10 Hubspot Development Companies in 2024
Top 10 Hubspot Development Companies in 2024
 
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024
 
Unleashing Real-time Insights with ClickHouse_ Navigating the Landscape in 20...
Unleashing Real-time Insights with ClickHouse_ Navigating the Landscape in 20...Unleashing Real-time Insights with ClickHouse_ Navigating the Landscape in 20...
Unleashing Real-time Insights with ClickHouse_ Navigating the Landscape in 20...
 
Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pdf
Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pdfMoving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pdf
Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pdf
 
React Native vs Ionic - The Best Mobile App Framework
React Native vs Ionic - The Best Mobile App FrameworkReact Native vs Ionic - The Best Mobile App Framework
React Native vs Ionic - The Best Mobile App Framework
 
Glenn Lazarus- Why Your Observability Strategy Needs Security Observability
Glenn Lazarus- Why Your Observability Strategy Needs Security ObservabilityGlenn Lazarus- Why Your Observability Strategy Needs Security Observability
Glenn Lazarus- Why Your Observability Strategy Needs Security Observability
 
The Role of FIDO in a Cyber Secure Netherlands: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
The Role of FIDO in a Cyber Secure Netherlands: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxThe Role of FIDO in a Cyber Secure Netherlands: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
The Role of FIDO in a Cyber Secure Netherlands: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
 
Abdul Kader Baba- Managing Cybersecurity Risks and Compliance Requirements i...
Abdul Kader Baba- Managing Cybersecurity Risks  and Compliance Requirements i...Abdul Kader Baba- Managing Cybersecurity Risks  and Compliance Requirements i...
Abdul Kader Baba- Managing Cybersecurity Risks and Compliance Requirements i...
 
A Deep Dive on Passkeys: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
A Deep Dive on Passkeys: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxA Deep Dive on Passkeys: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
A Deep Dive on Passkeys: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
 
[Webinar] SpiraTest - Setting New Standards in Quality Assurance
[Webinar] SpiraTest - Setting New Standards in Quality Assurance[Webinar] SpiraTest - Setting New Standards in Quality Assurance
[Webinar] SpiraTest - Setting New Standards in Quality Assurance
 
2024 April Patch Tuesday
2024 April Patch Tuesday2024 April Patch Tuesday
2024 April Patch Tuesday
 
Digital Identity is Under Attack: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Digital Identity is Under Attack: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxDigital Identity is Under Attack: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Digital Identity is Under Attack: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
 

Ip Spoofing

  • 1. NETWORK SECURITY A PAPER ON P ITFALLS AND PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN IP-SPOOFING Arpit Gupta Deepika Chug
  • 2. Bad Practices Spread It is easy to see the faults of others but not so easy to see one’s own faults If I just open a bunch of ports in the firewall my app will work. I think I will wedge the computer room door open. Much easier. They have blocked my favorite Web site. Lucky I have a modem. I think I will use my first name as a password. Say, we run a network too. How do you configure your firewalls? Why do we need the door locked? Hey, nice modem. What's the number of that line? I can never think of a good password. What do you use?
  • 3. Understanding The Landscape Author Script-Kiddie Hobbyist Hacker Expert Specialist Vandal Thief Spy Trespasser National Interest Personal Gain Personal Fame Curiosity
  • 4. An Evolving Threat Hobbyist Hacker Expert Specialist Largest area by volume Largest area by $ lost Script-Kiddie Largest segment by $ spent on defense Fastest growing segment Author Vandal Thief Spy Trespasser National Interest Personal Gain Personal Fame Curiosity
  • 5. IP -> Internet Protocol.. Spoofing -> Hiding.. It is a trick played on servers to fool the target computers into thinking that it is receiving data from source other than the trusted host. This Attack is actually a Trust-Relationship Exploitation. “ Things are not what they seem and that is why the world gets conned” WHAT IS IP-SPOOFING ???
  • 6. A B C B is on line A disguising his voice,making it sound more like that of B If we now,replace the 3 people by computers and change the term “voice” with “IP-Address” then you would know what we mean by IP-SPOOFING… REAL LIFE EXAMPLE TO EXPLAIN WHAT IS IP SPOOFING.
  • 7. HACKER 203.45.98.01 VICTIM 202.14.12.10 FAKE 202.23.45.89 FAKE 202.23.45.89 Remote Host Datagram (Data Packets) Trusted Host Attacking Host IP SPOOFING
  • 8. C B A CLIENT HOST A B C PACKETS DISCRIPTION: SYN =client’s ISN (4894305) ACK= 0 SYN= Host’s ISN (1896955367) ACK= client’s ISN +1 (4894306) ACK= Host’s ISN +1 (1896955368) THE 3-WAY HANDSHAKE ..
  • 9.
  • 10. THE ATTACK HACKER 203.45.98.01 VICTIM 202.14.12.10 FAKE 202.23.45.89 Remote Host Packets with IP Address of Trusted Host (FAKE) Attacking Host
  • 11. THE ATTACK VICTIM 202.14.12.10 FAKE 202.23.45.89 Trusted Host SYN / ACK PACKETS , Remote Host
  • 12. As soon as we find the TRUSTED-HOST ( FAKE),our next Step is to disable it. WHY ???? “ -- FAKE must not at any time respond to the SYN/ACK packet send by VICTIM -- “ How to do it ???? Use up all the memory of TRUSTED-HOST so that it will not able to respond to the SYN/ACK packet sent to it by the VICTIM . So one very easy method of doing so is to Perform the SYN Flooding Denial of Service Attack TRUSTED HOST DISABLING..
  • 13. SYN SYN SYN SYN SYN SYN QUEUE FULL There is a upper limit of how many concurrent SYN request TCP can process for a given socket, this limit is called BACKLOG LIMIT B A C k L O G Q U E U E Backlog limit = length (Queue) SO what is SYN FLOODing ???
  • 14. BLIND ATTACK FAKE 202.23.45.89 Trusted Host SYN / ACK PACKETS , VICTIM 202.14.12.10 Remote Host HACKER 203.45.98.01 Attacking Host
  • 15. THE ATTACK HACKER 203.45.98.01 VICTIM 202.14.12.10 Remote Host SYN/ACK Packets acknowledging Trusted Host has received SYN/ACK Packets Attacking Host
  • 16.
  • 17. 1.Packet Filtering 2. Firewall 3.Initial Sequence Number Randomizing Preventive Measures
  • 18.
  • 19. Our network is secure, right? Oh sure, Don’t worry. We have several firewalls
  • 20. Initial Sequence Number (ISN) Randomizing ISN Incrementation At every connection --incremented by 64,000 At every sec. – incremented by 128,000 Its value gets wrapped every 9.32hrs. So,it’s easy for any genius to do the guesswork and calculate the correct sequence number
  • 21.  
  • 22. CONCLUSION IP-Spoofing is an exploitation of trust-based relationship and can be curbed effectively if proper measures are used.Understanding how and why spoofing attacks are used , combined with a few simple prevention methods, can help protect networks from these malicious cloaking and cracking techniques.
  • 24. IP-Spoofing Software In Technical Discussion Client Client Client/Server Target Victim Hacker Part 1 : Target is being attacked 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.20 192.168.1.30 Target is being attacked With the UDP packets, when No measures were taken UDP 192.168.1.20
  • 25. IP-Spoofing Software In Technical Discussion Client Client Client/Server Target Victim Hacker Part 2 : Target is being attacked but the software is interface to this 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.20 192.168.1.30 The s/w UDP 192.168.1.20 UDP 192.168.1.20
  • 26. IP-Spoofing Software In technical Discussion Part 3: The s/w Role as an Interface 1)Scans all the Registered IP Addresses for their Authenticity. myip log file (List of registered clients) While scanning these it also resolves The respective Mac Address at runtime. 2) (Maintains the list of spoofed Clients) log file
  • 27. IP-Spoofing Software In technical Discussion Part 3.1: The s/w Role as an Interface 3) Maintains the list of Registered Clients whenever they communicate. myhost log file (List of registered clients) 4)The unauthorised user is blocked.
  • 28.  
  • 29. UDP HEADER 16 32 Source port Destination port Length Checksum Data
  • 30. 16 32 bits Source port Destination port Sequence number Acknowledgement number Offset Resrvd U A P R S F Window Checksum Urgent pointer Option + Padding Data TCP header structure
  • 31.