1. EU, NATO, AND THE
POLITICS OF
CONDITIONALITY
Angel Angelov

2. STRUCTURE OF THE LECTURE
 I Introduction to Conditionality
 II Enlargement Conditionality
 III The EU and NATO Enlargement Conditionality

3. I INTRODUCTION TO CONDITIONALITY
I. INTRODUCTION TO CONDITIONALITY
II. Enlargement Conditionality
III. EU and NATO Conditionality
2. Definitions
4. Generations
6. Characteristics

4. 1. DEFINITION I. INTRODUCTION TO CONDITIONALITY
1. Definition
2.Generations of Conditionality
3. Characteristics of Conditionality
 The law of conditionality:
Whatever comes into existence does so in dependence on
conditions, and in the absence of those conditions ceases
to exist.
(Sangharakshita, A Guide to the Buddhist Path)
 A new world order can be created, and development aid,
by its conditionality, is one of the instruments to do so.
(Peter Uvin, ‘Do as I Say, Not as I do’: The Limits of Political Conditionality)

5. 1. DEFINITION I. INTRODUCTION TO CONDITIONALITY
1. Definition
2.Generations of Conditionality
3. Characteristics of Conditionality
 I will provide you with ‘x’ on a condition you do ‘y’
 The idea - old as politics itself
 Recent addition to the lexicon of IR

6. 1. DEFINITION I. INTRODUCTION TO CONDITIONALITY
1. Definition
2.Generations of Conditionality
3. Characteristics of Conditionality
 The use of fulfilment of stipulated political
obligations as a prerequisite for obtaining
 economic aid
 debt relief
 most-favoured nation status
 access to subsidized credit
 membership in desired regional or global
organizations

7. 2. GENERATIONS OF CONDITIONALITY
I. INTRODUCTION TO CONDITIONALITY
1. Definition
2.Generations of Conditionality
3. Characteristics of Conditionality
A. First generation
 Economic conditionality
B. Second generation
 Political conditionality

8. A. First generation of Conditionality
I. INTRODUCTION TO CONDITIONALITY
1. Definition
2.Generations of Conditionality
3. Characteristics of Conditionality
 Late 1970s - economic crisis in the Third World
 Reasons - excessive government spending,
over-valued currencies, etc.
 Prescription - domestic economic reforms
 Economic reforms - condition for assistance

9. B. Second generation of conditionality
I. INTRODUCTION TO CONDITIONALITY
1. Definition
2.Generations of Conditionality
3. Characteristics of Conditionality
 The end of the Cold War
 Democracy and human rights - primary concern in
development
 Free markets and free elections - essence of aid
 Development aid - dependent on political reforms

10. 3. CHARACTERISTICS OF CONDITIONALITY
I. INTRODUCTION TO CONDITIONALITY
1. Definition
2.Generations of Conditionality
3. Characteristics of Conditionality
 Power asymmetry
 Demander’s availability of alternative sources
 Donor’s necessity for interaction with the demander
 Elaboration of the conditions
 Demander’s commitment to reform

11. II ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
I. Introduction to Conditionality
II. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
III. EU and NATO Conditionality
n Enlargement conditionality:
3rd generation of conditionality
n Rational
n Limitations

12. • ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY :
3rd GENERATION OF CONDITIONALITY
II. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
• Enlargement Conditionality: 3rd Generation
• Rational
• Limitations
 Triggering factors:
 Financial crisis in the Third World
 First generation
 End of the Cold War
 Second generation
 NATO and EU post-Cold war enlargements
 Third generation

13. 1. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY AS A
THIRD GENERATION OF CONDITIONALITY
II. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
• Enlargement Conditionality as a 3rd Generation
• Rational
• Limitations
 Focus:
 First generation
 economic conditions
 Second generation
 brought in the human rights consideration
 Third generation
 ‘full package’

14. 1. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY AS A
THIRD GENERATION OF CONDITIONALITY
II. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
• Enlargement conditionality as a 3rd generation
• Rational
• Limitations
 Features of the enlargement conditionality
 1990s - beyond a simple listing of membership criteria
 Complex and elaborated system of conditions
 Extensive and institutionalized monitoring

15. 1. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY AS A
THIRD GENERATION OF CONDITIONALITY
II. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
• Enlargement Conditionality as a 3rd Generation
• Rational
• Limitations
 Goals:
 Previous generations
 more immediate results
 Enlargement conditionality
 longer term perspective and sustainability

16. 1. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY AS A
THIRD GENERATION OF CONDITIONALITY
II. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
• Enlargement Conditionality as a 3rd Generation
• Rational
• Limitations
 Better equipped for bringing and sustaining reforms
 The benefits associated with membership:
sufficiently large as to induce far-reaching concessions

17. 2. RATIONAL
II. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
• Enlargement Conditionality as a 3rd Generation
• Rational
• Limitations
 Justifying rejection
 Ensuring the contribution potential of the newcomers
 Protection of the club’s basic values and interests
 Motivating particular set of reforms in the candidates

18. 3. LIMITATIONS
II. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
• Enlargement Conditionality as a 3rd Generation
• Rational
• Limitations
 Geographical limitation
 Temporal limitation

19. III EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT
CONDITIONALITY
I. Introduction to Conditionality
II. Enlargement Conditionality
III. EU and NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
n Membership conditionality
n Characteristics
n Rational
n Limitations

20. 1. MEMBERSHIP CONDITIONALITY
III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
• Membership Conditionality
• Rational
• Characteristics
A. EU membership conditionality
B. NATO membership conditionality

21. A. EU membership conditionality
III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
• Membership Conditionality
• Rational
• Characteristics
• Limitations
 Copenhagen conditions:
 democracy and protection of human and minority
rights
 a functioning market economy
 implementation of the acqui
 Fourth basic condition:
 ‘good neighbourliness’ (Agenda 2000 )

22. B. NATO membership conditionality
III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
• Membership Conditionality
• Characteristics
• Rational
• Limitations
 ‘Study on NATO Enlargement’
 Functioning democratic political system
 Market economy
 Democratic civil-military relations
 Minority protection
 Good-neighbourliness
 Ability to provide a military contribution and achieve
interoperability

23. 2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EU AND NATO
ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
• Membership Conditionality
• Characteristics
• Rational
• Limitations
 Power asymmetry
 Is there a power asymmetry between EU/NATO and the applicants?
 Demander’s availability of alternative sources
 Are there available alternatives to the EU/NATO membership?
 Donor’s necessity for a particular interaction with the ‘demander
 Is there a lack of an urgent need for EU/NATO to enlarge?
 Elaboration of the conditions
 Are EU and NATO imposing conditions unilaterally?
 Demander’s commitment to reform
 Could the applicants have undertaken the required reforms if EU/NATO
membership was not conditioned on them?

24. Is there a power asymmetry?
III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
• Membership Conditionality
• Characteristics
• Rational
• Limitations
 ‘Carrot and stick’ approach
 Carrot - positive conditionality
 If you do ‘x’ we provide you with ‘y’
 membership - encourages a peaceful transformation of the
social, political and military systems
 Stick - negative conditionality
 If you do not do ‘x’ we will not provide you with ‘y’
 denial of membership
 “Carrot and stick” approach = significant power asymmetry

25. Are there available alternatives to the
membership in EU/NATO?
III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
• Membership Conditionality
• Characteristics
• Rational
• Limitations
 Membership affiliations during and after the Cold War
 In economic terms - EU membership is the most attractive option
 A dangerous security vacuum
 Russia - not in a position, nor requested to assist
 Neutrality is not an option
 Membership in NATO – the most reliable option

26. Is there a lack of an urgent need for
EU/NATO to enlarge?
III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
• Membership Conditionality
• Characteristics
• Rational
• Limitations
 No enthusiasm for ‘big bang’ enlargement
 Significant mismatch between demand and supply

27. Are EU and NATO imposing conditions
unilaterally? III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
• Membership Conditionality
• Characteristics
• Rational
• Limitations
 NATO alone sets the conditions and the timetable for the
accession
 The applicants – excluded from the decision-making
 Partnership for Peace / Stability Pact for SEE
 ‘Take it or leave it’

28. Could the applicants have undertaken the reforms
if membership was not conditioned on them?
III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
• Membership Conditionality
• Characteristics
• Rational
• Limitations
 At its best- form of paternalism
 At its worst - imposes an alien agenda
 Problem of timing

29. 3. RATIONAL OF THE NATO
ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
• Membership Conditionality
• Characteristics
• Rational
• Limitations
 Justifying rejection
- keep the unwanted applicants away
 Ensuring contribution potential of the newcomers
- sensibility on the inclusion of ‘free riders’

30. 3. RATIONAL OF THE NATO
ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
• Membership Conditionality
• Characteristics
• Rational
• Limitations
 Protection of the club’s basic values and interests
- widening should not obstruct deepening
 Motivating particular set of reforms
- enlargement is one the most influential foreign
policy instruments

31. 3. LIMITATIONS TO THE NATO
ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
• Membership Conditionality
• Characteristics
• Rational
• Limitations
 Geographical limitation
 limited to the North-Atlantic area
 Temporal limitation
 limited to the awarding of membership

32. CONCLUSION
I. Introduction to Conditionality
II. Enlargement Conditionality
III. EU and NATO Enlargement conditionality
 Effective environment shaping instrument
 Reasons:
 functions in an environment of power asymmetry
 has no viable alternative
 the demand of membership exceeds the supply
 many reforms are triggered by EU’s and NATO’s
carrot and stick approach