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A Pluralist Ethical Decision-Making Procedure
Valentin Muresan
Research Centre in Applied Ethics
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bucharest
Decisions about the moral value of an action, rule or public policy cannot be reduced to
the mere verdict resulting from the application of the traditional “tests” based on the major
ethical theories, despite the fact that handbooks still unanimously support this view. The history
of ethical tests is rather a land of surprises than that of predictability. You would expect, for
instance, that several people which adopt the same moral doctrine do this for seeing the things in
the same way, including the moral assessment of actions. We all believe that just this is the
reason why they embrace the same moral creed. Therefore it seems strange to find that several
Parliament members, which are all active supporters of the Christian morality, assess the
legalization of prostitution in opposite ways. On the other hand, it is also strange that two people
who adopt different ethical theories - precisely because they offer distinct explanations of the
moral phenomena - usually assess actions in the same manner. When you have in front of you a
utilitarian and a Kantian or a follower of the Christian ethics and one of the Muslim ethics, it is
somehow queer to see them judging a situation in the same way in most cases despite the fact
they are declaring themselves as supporters of opposite ethical beliefs. Are they really opposite?
The general statement is this: the use of tests based on distinct, even opposite theories, such as
utilitarianism and Kantianism, results sometimes in distinct assessments, but in most cases in
convergent assessments (Kantian and utilitarian moral duties are, ultimately, the same). On the
other hand, if we adopt dogmatically a single theory and apply the same test repeatedly to the
same action we usually get the same assessments, but also some divergent ones (see the cases of
divergent utilitarian assessments of the same case given as example in the textbooks).
This picture brings with it several lessons: 1) using a single test does not ensure the
uniqueness of the ethical verdict, as is commonly expected, and using several tests does not
entail the verdicts dispersion; 2) we may have (a) two distinct, even opposite, tests (e.g. the
utilitarian and the Kantian) leading to the same verdict, but also (b) two different tests resulting
in two distinct verdicts. 3) As we may have (c) a single test (used at different times or by
different persons) that leads to different verdicts, but also (d) a single test leading to a single
verdict. Given this situation, we have to clarify three questions:
i) In cases (c) and (a), what factors occur during a single test application that split the
verdicts? And, in case we apply two distinct tests, what factors generate the surprising
convergence of verdicts?

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ii) In case (b) we apply distinct tests and obtain provisional distinct verdicts; could we
make these verdicts converge in a non-contingent way? In general, how could we proceed
methodically so that a pluralist group of ethical decision-makers, including experts with
different ethical principles and options, reach the same outcome (a commonly agreed
verdict, even though each of them preserve their initial distinct ethical beliefs). Or, on the
contrary, is a pluralistic group of ethical decision-making doomed to never reach a unique
verdict?
iii) In case (b), suppose we have made the verdicts of the pluralist panel converge; how
do we take the final decision that imposes and puts in a dominant position the new moral
rule? Is the mere verdict of the specialized ethical panel enough or do we need a final
political agreement in the name of society at large?
The first question concerns certain characteristics of the tests themselves or of the mental
processes taking place tacitly during the testing procedure and making us get different verdicts
by applying the same test to the same case, or the same verdict by applying different tests,
respectively. The second question refers to the possibility of supplementing a pluralist test that is
usually expected to give divergent verdicts, with an ingredient that ensures, in a methodic way,
the less dispersion of assessments possible, without making the evaluators change their initially
divergent moral beliefs. And the third question concerns something that happens in the period
after the reach of the technical moral agreement: what should we do for the new rule,
recommended by the ethical experts, be recognized as a moral rule by all those covered by it,
e.g. all employees in a company or the whole society? How can we impose it with the
autonomous consent of those who have to comply with the rule?
Let’s start with the first question. How is it possible that the same test (case c), when
applied by different individuals or by the same individual at different times, lead to different
verdicts? And how is it possible that different tests, based on competing theories, lead to the
same verdict in most cases (case a)? For instance, how is it possible to evaluate the same case by
a consequentialist method and get sometimes a result, sometimes another? Or how is it possible
that a utilitarian and a Kantian, who try to convince us that morality means different things, get
in most cases the same results in the assessment process? Are the ethical decision-making
procedures so week or even simply wrong?
My answer is the following. If ethical decision-making procedures would be algorithms,
they ensured the verdict uniqueness and thus the overall internal consistency of moral
assessments. But there's no algorithmic ethical test. It is acknowledged that ethical decision-
making procedures are not conclusive in the sense that any verdict is merely probable and
therefore revisable. This is so because during the single test procedure a number of factors
undermine the uniqueness of the verdict or, in the event of two tests, generate a spontaneous
convergence of verdicts. Among them we may mention the probable character of the
consequences, the unavoidably subjective selection of the relevant consequences, the subjective
selection of the decision procedure from a class of methods of the same type (e.g. there are
several utilitarian procedures), the fact that the test rely on probabilistic judgments of analogy,
the various weights attributed to different ethical principles by different evaluators, the
subjective meaning of the phrase "to degrade the humanity in man” in Kant’s test etc. Ethical
tests consist less in applying some rigid rules, then in establishing some milestones to guide

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deliberation. They provide an explicit map for the detailed analysis of a case and not a final
conclusion.
To give some concrete examples. Kant's test may result, whether applied by different
persons, in a variety of verdicts regarding the establishment of a new duty primarily because it is
based on analogies, so on probable reasoning, which opens the door to different assessments
made by different evaluators. Second, the test result depends on the criterion: do not destroy or
degrade the humanity in man; or, by "humanity" we mean the rational being of man, and by
"destruction" the killing of man but also some medical experiments aimed to alter his
consciousness etc.; the "degradation" is also reached through lies, censorship, flattery etc. The
empirical identification of all these very different situations in a given case is always undermined
by the evaluator’s subjectivity, it is not a process governed by fixed rules. This is the reason why
D. Ross proposed the test of humanity should be finally supplimented by intuition. Moreover,
Kant himself is aware that the application of his test requires a certain capacity of moral
judgment that may be improved and has to be “sharpened by experience" (G.Pref.8).
As regards the principle of utility, one is aware that it is not an algorithm. Only in the
most elementary cases we may speak of the "deduction" of a certain particular case from a
universal principle. For example, if we have the moral rule "Lying is morally prohibited" and we
have data that the minor premise “Salaries will increase by 100% is a lie” is certainly true, then
the conclusion which necessarily follows is: “The promise salaries will increase by 100% is
morally prohibited". But only in few occasions we may be sure that the minor premise is true. If
I say, for example, "The promise to increase the salaries is a lie” I cannot be sure of its truth
because this is a vague promise and there are some chances the politicians keep their promise.
Most cases are of this latter kind. But the conclusion is only probable and it depends on how the
assessor approximates the chances of the minor premise. Here there is enough room for
variation. But what should we do when we have to prove the major premise without being able to
deduce it from another similar premise? In this case we have no other way than to appeal to the
principle of utility itself. But applying this first principle is not an algorithmic procedure either, it
is only an rough assessment guide which is influenced by many subjective factors: the criterion
of morality is the maximization of good, but “good” may be understood in different ways
(pleasure, preference satisfaction, etc.); the idea of maximization may also be understood
differently (total amount, balance, mean etc.); we can calculate the value of actual consequences
or that of the foreseeable ones and in each case the assessment usually differ; we commonly
calculate the probability of consequences and this is an amount very much relative to the
evaluator’s cognitive limits; the selection of the relevant consequences is relative to our
epistemic limits as well as to our ideological, political and religious commitments1
. Assessments
also vary because different people attach different amounts of value to the same consequences
depending on their various background beliefs. And we know that the agreement on the kind of
"punishment" proper to various moral rules is not mainly a question of the amount of good
produced by observing the rule, but of the qualitative assessment of the social importance
(“weight”) of the utilities covered by the rule in the broad axiological context of that society –
and that is a historical variable. Decision for all these variables is not based on fixed rules, but on
the "practical wisdom” which is agent-relative.
1 For a doctor which is a non-believer the consequence of making a blod transfusion is something good, i.e. to
save a life; for the pacient, which is a Iehova Witness member, the same transfusion is an evil because it is
prohibited by his God.

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As for the ethical matrix it was recognized from the very beginning that, by itself, it does
not lead to any result but only helps us to do that. To reach the decision, its creator Ben Mepham
says, it must be complemented with a balancing of the "weight" attached by various stakeholders
to the ethical impact the observance/breach of some ethical principles, identifying areas of
disagreement and insisting on their resolution, using as a guide a numerical scale concerning the
"perceived ethical impact" inside an ethics committee; in addition, he points out that the matrix is
"only one" of the possible ingredients of the moral assessment process and suggests the search of
some other instruments of this kind.2
Since the use of a single test or test-type does not ensure the uniqueness of the ethical
verdict and therefore the coherency of the moral judgment, my suggestion is that the use of
several tests is the only and the most desirable solution. The ethical pluralism seems to be the
single viable strategy of moral evaluation. It is a doctrine which claims that "there are several
explanations of morality, not one, and that they may be in a state of conflict. [...] Each of them
also gives a partial truth of the matter and each approach also provides a check on the other. We
do not look at the conflicts between these branches as bad, at least not always. [...] Chance to
discover the mistakes sooner is enhanced when each branch is critically scrutinizing the other.
[...] Ethical pluralism has as a model a healthy government in which diversity, disagreement,
compromise and consensus are signs of vitality."3
Here are some additional reasons for
suggesting that a kind of methodological pluralism is preferable in ethics. First, there are several
evaluation frameworks and to choose but one means to open the way to those who accuse the
choice of being arbitrary. Secondly, an attempt to reduce the multiplicity of tests to one by
unifying the background theories (e.g. R. M. Hare's unification project) proved to be a failure as
long as the new unified theory is only one of several attempts to theoretical unification. Thirdly,
the general strategy currently embraced nowadays to forget the great theories and create
pragmatic “assessment frameworks”, based on the "common morality" did not ensure the
desired methodological unity because these "frames" (e.g. ethical matrix, principlism, moral
casuistry, etc.) became more and more numerous, even more numerous than the theories.
Finally, even if, by an act of magic, we may remain with a single ethical theory and a single test,
and they were unanimously accepted, this ideal methodological monism, as we have seen, does
not assure the assessment coherency in applied ethics. The methodological pluralism seems to be
unavoidable in a world in which it is not possible to have a single ethical method.
Therefore, to the question "What ethical decision-framework could choose a student who
writes an essay on the moral evaluation of pornography so that he is not immediately challenged
from a different theoretical or methodological position ... as good as the first?" the most
plausible answer is that there is no such a framework. In the field of morality there is not an
impersonal, “objective point of view” except, perhaps, the point of view of "God's eye", but this
is not accessible to us. We live in a society which is characterized not only by the pluralism of
moral values but also by the pluralism of doctrines and assessment methods and we must
accommodate to the reality of such an irreducible pluralism. Moreover, we must use this
situation, which defines the democratic societies, to find a way to ensure a maximum of
2 Ben Mepham, „A Framework for the Ethical Analysis of Novel Food: the ethical matrix”, Journal of
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, (12), 2000, p. 175.
3 I. Hinman, Contemporary Moral Issues, Prentice-Hall, 1999.

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objectivity, convergence and rational grounding to our ethical assessments. The methodological
pluralism does not exclude convergence of results. Let’s stop for a moment to this latter aspect.
At a first glance, things seem to stay the other way round. The plurality of methods is
supposed to induce such a dispersion of verdicts that pluralism seems to be disqualified as a
possible method of ethical decision-making. The methodological monism looks as a more fitted
approach to provide coherent verdicts. My main question is: could we proceed in such a way
that different verdicts, based on different ethical tests, are however made to converge (case b)? In
other words, how can we set up a pluralistic group of ethical decision-making, in which each
member uses distinct moral principles and distinct assessment procedures but reach in the last
instance a single common verdict? Obviously, we are not interested here in a spontaneous
convergence of opinions, but in one which is methodically guided by a given procedure that
becomes part of the test.
In a study devoted to the analysis of the status of applied ethics today, Alasdair
MacIntyre tackles the assessments convergence problem starting from the obviousness of the
"disagreement" in fact between the moral philosophers as concerns the genuine moral theory;
this contrasts with the hope in a universal rational agreement nurtured by all supporters of what
he calls "the dominant conception of morality" (Kantianism, utilitarianism, contractarianism and
their various combinations).4
This irreducible pluralism of moral theories, views and methods
has poor chances to be eliminated. Contrary to the view that the plurality of methods entails the
plurality of assessments, it is proved that people having distinct ethical views may easily reach
the same solution when they are put together to solve a practical problem. MacIntyre gives as an
example the story of The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioural Research which proved that the disagreement in principles (in the
theories or ethical views adopted by the members of the team), instead of generating a similar
disagreement in assessment, is compatible to a practical agreement which was quite easily
reached. The Belmont Commission is a good example of a pluralistic group of ethical decision-
making, including people with various ethical involvments which, instead of spending their time
in an unended dispute around the good moral theory, rapidly arrived at a convergence of their
viewpoints and to the agreement of a common report. How could we explain this surprise?
MacIntyre sees three possible explanations of the commissioners easy agreement. The
first is that the adoption of rival moral principles may, surprisingly, lead to the same assessments
in the field of applied ethics. I see nothing new in this statement; the question is how such a thing
is possible? We could use this occasion to wonder whether the so called gap between the
traditional rival theories (and the distinct explanations they give to the moral phenomenon) is so
big as one says, since their assessment outcomes are rather similar than conflicting. The second
explanation is that the members of the above mentioned assessment group did not actually apply
thereown principles (or theories, or ethical views): as a matter of fact they did not judge
following the principles they claimed to adopt, but had in view typical cases – without being
aware of this change. They were casuists without knowing this. The implicit use of the same
4 A. MacIntyre, „Does Applied Ethics Rest on a Mistake?” in A. Cortina et alia (eds.), Public Reason and Applied
Ethics, Ashgate, 2008. The „dominant conception of morality” is the view that the rules of morality are such as
every rational agent would accept them. In this sense, „applied ethics” is concerned with the application of
these universal principles to concrete cases that belong to particular social spheres, the usual expectation
being that the disagreements between principles automatically mirror in the disagreements between the
verdicts of applied ethics assessments (p. 50).

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method explains the convergence of results. Finally, the third explanation, to which the author
subscribes, is that the works of the commission were presented in a false light by claiming that
the deliberation process was completely rational; in fact, all deliberation and decision making
inside the commission were „a social non-rational agreement”. The irrational ingredient enter
the scene in the following manner: the ethical principles are „indeterminate” in the sense that
they cannot take into account all the circumstances in which they may be applied; this fact opens
the way to new circumstances in the future that are different or even opposed to the previous
ones, and which obligate us to take a decision only after we weighted these new circumstances;
but weighting the circumstances and reasons is only a „metaphor” for which there are not any
rules. Therefore, the assessment process is not a (completely) rational one.5
The convergent final
verdict is the consequence of these reciprocal psychological influences.
The first is not an explanation, but a finding: we know that competing ethical principles
can sometimes give birth to identical assessments. The second explanation is not very strong: the
uniqueness of the method does not entail the uniqueness of assessments. The third explanation
seems to explain better the first two cases: ethical assessment is not an entirely rational process.
The explanations and the example given by MacIntyre rather suggest a situation where the
assessments convergence is something that occurs spontaneously or quasi-spontaneously
(question (i)).
But we would like to know how is it possible to methodically determine such a kind of
convergence inside a pluralist assessment committee. The most plausible answer would probably
be that the members of the committee have to use their practical wisdom, their ability to discuss
and negotiate, various forms of irrational persuasion to convince their interlocutors, to refine the
methods used and adopt new methods, to use various forms of “qualitative judgment”, to
“weight the reasons” and to use tactics of "mutual psychological influence" for finally reaching a
partial agreement. And all these things after the strictly technical ethical tests were applied by
each evaluator and some provisional verdicts were obtained. The testing process would,
therefore, include several stages. The fronetic elements above must fill the procedural gap
between the plurality of tests applied by the team and the single verdict reached at the end. To
introduce these fronetic elements – which are not guided by rules – means to try to reduce the
verdicts dispersion caused by our independent evaluators who use different methods. It is natural
to consider this fronetic supplementary element as a part of the pluralist test and not a mere
adjuvant used occasionally. I shall propose in the following pages to fill the procedural gap by
using a tool which makes opinions cohere, and which was initially a non-ethical one, the Delphi
method.
It will be of course, a modified “ethical Delphi”. In its standard form6
the test does not
include any moral theory or method. In our case it is just a methodological ethical Delphi, the
members of the panel are all of them experts in ethical decision-making procedures. In the
standard ethical Delphi “it is not possible to directly deduce from the data analysis the ethical
acceptability, or otherwise, of any proposed biotechnology” (Ethical Delphi Manual, p. 10),
while in our case the purpose is just the ethical assessment of a decision or policy. It is not a
5 A. MacIntyre, „Does Applied Ethics...”, p. 51-2, 59.
6 See Ethical Tools website.

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method used to discover in facts the supposed ethical difficulties raised by a novel
biotechnology, but one focused on a pluralist and professional assessment of the moral
acceptability of an already formulated public policy.
Finally, there is a third situation on which I would still insist. Suppose we succeeded in
assessing a policy by using several ethical tests and making the evaluators’ opinions convergent.
Now, how should we proceed to socially impose the new policy? Is its social recognition and
acceptance determined only by the rational criteria included in the ethical tests or shall we add
something more? My suggestion is that the social imposition of a new moral rule, with all the
force of a prescription that is "dominant" in comparison with other types of prescriptions, is done
following a further assessment process on multiple criteria (not only on moral criteria), e.g.
political, economic, religious, strategic etc. The decision to adopt a complex policy having a
moral content is never merely ethical and the extra-ethical criteria can often prevail. Moral
decision does not come to an end with the implementation of the ethical tests developed by the
moral philosophers (and taught in seminars) - even if we add the fronetic supplement suggested
above to fill the gap between the pluralist test and the unique final verdict - but also needs a
political supplement. For actual moral decisions do not take place in an ideal, purified, social
space, in which the moral rules should not be influenced by any political, economic, geostrategic
interests etc.; this simplifying mentality is specific to the academic practice regarding the ethical
decision making. But the real ethical decisions are taken inside the society, which is an area
where there is a competition between various interests, major or minor, some of them local or
selfish, some others more basic and covering the whole of humanity. Moral rules protect certain
broad fundamental interests - having a historical variability - and restrict our behavior so as to
ensure the interests satisfaction of all those concerned in a neutral and impartial way. In these
circumstances, it is impossible to adopt a new moral rule (e.g. the ethical principles of
biomedical research, a new European policy, a new code of ethics) which is not dependent, more
or less, on the economic, legal, political, religious interests of that social community. Moral rules
exist in a social context and depend on it. My suggestion is that, beyond the technical moral
decision (based on the standard ethical methods and on practical wisdom - which remains the
basic decision and gives the "official" reason to the final verdict), the final verdict itself is a
"political" one (i.e. a multicriterial and only partially rational one).
This hypothesis appears to be consistent with the facts. For example, let us remember that
the Belmont Report was a political initiative and its elaboration was an institutionalized process
that lasted four years. To apply the principle of utility (or any other traditional ethical test) you
do not need four years! What has happened during all that time? A pluralistic and
interdisciplinary committee has held numerous discussions on the text, attended public hearings,
and has made constant efforts to achieve consistency with other similar reports or the legislation
already existing. The adoption of the final formula was based not only on ethical reasons but also
on grounds of taste ("it’s too philosophical"), of practicality or for personal, irrational reasons
(“let’s not take all these from the beginning"). All committee members remember the influence
of the political climate of the times upon them (the civil rights movement, the public scandals
concerning the bio-medical research that pressed the policymakers to develop for the first time a

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system of moral rules for this professional field etc.). For example, T. Beauchamp remembers the
influence the idea of individualism, central to the American politics, had in the adoption of the
principle of autonomy; therefore the committee worked "in context", it was "part of the
American culture" with its dominant values. The appointment of a Catholic as the head of the
committee was suspected by some other members as a political maneuver to impose conservative
solutions to the issues raised (such as the human status of fetuses); this entails that the political
and ideological pressures on the committee decisions actually existed. Therefore, the
establishment of the new moral rule was ultimately a political decision determined by rational
arguments - ethical and non-ethical - and irrational factors related to personal feelings or random
"humane" reactions. These elements must be included too in the general scheme of an ethical
decision making process.
But before doing that, I shall highlight a commonly overlooked idea: simple ethical
issues are solved easily and usually they do not form the subject of public controversy, nor are
they given as examples in applied ethics courses. Undisputable moral facts (e.g. an action which
observes a moral norm) and those that are obviously immoral (because they breach the norm) do
not excite the public curiosity. Most part of the moral judgments are of this kind. Instead,
undecided problems, the complex, unusual or dilemmatic ones, provoke scandal and lead to
discussions that take time, exciting our passions and moral imagination. They are more
provoking and usually involve the team work, combined with an institutional organization of
ethical decision making. Ethics committees are the most adequate framework for discussing and
rediscussing the ethical rules once adopted. This process is endless. However, there is a strong
tendency in the juridical and political community to only mention the ethical standards but to
ignore them in fact, as in the case of Parliaments, where the professional ethical assessment (that
is a necessary condition for adopting a law) is usually lacking or is only simulated using criteria
of the common morality.
Moreover, despite the skepticism expressed by some philosophers, we must recognize
that applied ethics in recent decades has taken the path of institutionalization outside the borders
of academic philosophy. In the past, teachers and students in applied ethics used to assess as
seminar topics certain typical examples of actions and rules, often super simplified, a virtual
procedure that does not entail any moral responsibility in relation to actual institutions or socio-
professional groups. It's a kind of intellectual cabinet game, which is not representative for what
moral decision really means in the real social life. However, even in this case the teamwork is
preferable, at least for the chance given to the critical debate of all points of view. What to say of
the situations where the ethical decisions we have to take are very important in terms of their
social impact, such as the large scale acceptability of the use of a biotechnology obtained from
genetically modified organisms which allegedly may have harmful effects on the health of
millions of people. In this case, to play the academic game is risky. What are the moral
philosophers ready to propose us to be able to face this political challenge?
I shall start to shape a new pluralistic procedure of ethical decision-making from the
analysis of the case of the setting up by UNESCO, at the global level, of a public policy having a
substantial ethical content, trying to capture the actual structure of the process of ethical decision
making (which may be transferred afterwards at the level of firms or other kind of institutions).

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The specific example is the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data - a new moral
regulation pretending a universal (planetary) validity. The scheme synthesized from this example
can also be found in the adoption of other public policies, national or international.
The beginning of the setting up of this new moral rule is marked by the presence of a
widespread feeling of insecurity and uncertainty concerning the protection of some fundamental
human interests - such as the violation of human rights and freedoms, and ultimately of human
dignity – by the morally misuse of human genetic data. Therefore, a new need is perceived at
the level of almost all the countries in the world: to have a new rule on this issue which is able to
block the potential abuses and to "protect human dignity" before the possible aggressions coming
from an immoral use of genetic technologies, i.e. from an improper handling of the human
genome that could endanger the identity and the physical integrity of present and future
generations. Everyone accepts that this is a case of moral regulation, but nobody knows what
form should it take to be able to serve the divergent interests of the citizens of all states, those of
scientists and physicians, the religious organizations or the NGOs in a manner consistent with
other related regulations that have already been adopted.
The initiative to launch an international project to regulate the use of genetic data
belonged to the UNESCO Director General. He required in May 2001 the International Bioethics
Committee (IBC) to draft the new regulation. The document was finalized three years later, in
May 2003, when some voices claimed that the process was a little bit too fast.
IBC set up a “drafting group” composed of experts; this was an interdisciplinary and
pluralist group. It deserves to be noted that the organizers believe that the best place to take
ethical decisions is an ethical committees which is “independent, multidisciplinary and pluralist”
(Art. 6)7
. In this case, the panel of experts was formed by 4 law experts, 3 in genetics, 3 in
bioethics 2 in moral philosophy, 1 in anthropology and 1 in chemistry. The group moderators
were N. Questiaux and P. Robinson of France and Jamaica, respectively. All logistical support
was of course granted. The panel first established the moral foundations of the new regulation
(the principle of dignity, which is fundamental; then the principles of equality, solidarity and
responsibility, as well as some form of welfare, precautionary and vulnerability principles.) (See
the Preamble to the Declaration). The group worked in a typical principlist manner (see Art.1),
the criterion of moral acceptability being the "internal consistency" with the moral principles
accepted and the "external consistency" with other moral rules concerning human rights. It was
also steadily pursued the consistency with the international and national law, by broadening
sometimes the meaning of confidentiality and consent so that they cannot be imposed unless the
legislation of the countries allows it etc.8
The experts group proposed a number of general
philosophical options concerning the human nature, freedom, responsibility (opposed to the
biologist reductionism, for example) in the light of which the document was conceived. The first
draft of the document issued in November 2002 and it was sent to IBC to be analyzed. Overall,
there were seven meetings of the experts group. But the experts group had not the last word. The
7 International Declaration on Human Genetic Data, UNESCO, 16 October 2003.
8 Meeting of Government Experts Responsible for Finalizing the Draft International Declaration on Human
Genetic DAta, Final Report, 21 July 2003.

10. 10
last word in the social and political approval of the Declaration belong to a political group that
represented all stakeholders.
To capture the positions of all parties in the document, the draft was submitted to a
public debate. The public character of a moral regulation and the requirement of being accepted
by society at large (not to be imposed in a paternalistic way) seem to be – in the eyes of those
who organized the decision process – a necessary condition of its morality. This reminds us of
Kant. The document stresses that: "States should endeavour to involve society at large in the
decision-making process concerning broad policies for the collection, processing, use and
storage of human genetic data." (Article 6). In this way, through a public debate, it was possible
to evince and eventually to capture in the document the variety of interests, from the level of
states to that of individual researchers or NGOs. The pluralism of this approach was also
underlined: “This decision-making process, which may benefit from international experience,
should ensure the free expression of various viewpoints” (Art. 6). The steps of this exercise of
democratic transparency were completed by an international consultation through questionnaire,
plus a special meeting; a public hearing in which a variety of organizations and individual
people were free to express their views as well as an assessment of the UNESCO Executive
Board followed; during all these meetings the “weight” of the document was established: it will
be a “declaration", so it has no legal force but only a moral influence; then the document has
been reviewed by a "working group" of the UNESCO Commission.
Finally, after going through all these filters in the process of social approval, the adoption
by the UNESCO General Conference followed, in October 16, 2003. It was essentially a political
decision, i.e. one that acknowledged that - in addition to the ethical requirements - the new rule
must "meet the needs and interests of the states" which are not only moral but also "economic
and commercial" (Preamble), bio-medical and legal. The Conference has shown "a spirit of
tolerance" and get a unanimous approval of the “declaration” by applause. Being a moral rule, it
has to be sanctioned by our feeling of remorse or by the attitudes of the public in case of
disobedience. These motivational feelings must be educated in the future – an objective that the
Declaration provides in art. 24 as a further task of all Member States.
What is now the general scheme of the process of ethical decision-making suggested by
this example? Suppose, in principle, that we are confronting not a normal situation, but an
"extraordinary" one, i.e. we want to introduce a new rule in a code of conduct (a rule that is
disputed by others), or we want to resolve a moral dilemma which raises questions to the
members of a corporation, or we want to adopt a new public policy on a controversial issue
starting from several public concerns and complaints. The deployment diagram of the process of
moral decision-making seems to have the following plausible form. First, because this is a
sensible social issue the moral acceptability of which should be judged, there will be an
applicant institution (S), e.g. the government, the parliament, a university, a company etc. that
asks the assessment. It is natural that this requirement is done on a contractual basis. The
applicant claims a mature and responsible answer to the question: is it morally acceptable or not
a particular public policy designed to address the issue of the e.g. genetic data that caused
frustration in our society? To this end, S has to appoint, first, an interdisciplinary group of
specialists representing the interests of the applicant, which are well aware of the issue under

11. 11
discussion and can identify the moral problem within facts. This drafting group (GR) will
propose the first draft (P1) of the new public policy. This draft is then subjected to an extensive
and lengthy process of public debate (PD). It's not just a democratic exercise, but a necessary
condition for the moral acceptability of the project which has to meet two requirements: i) the
requirement of publicity (the new moral policy must be public) and ii) the requirement of
autonomy (the new moral regulation has to be self-imposed by the subjects, not imposed from
outside). Both are conditions inspired by the Kantian theory of morality. The suggestions for
improving the text which were collected from the general public are then selectively inserted in
the text by GR. What this group has also to do is to check the compatibility (CV) of the new
regulation with the laws or public policies already adopted. The condition of consistency with the
existing moral values is another necessary requirement imposed on the project to be morally
acceptable. The outcome of this process is an improved version of the draft (P2). Only under this
improved form (P2) it is natural to deliver the project text to a pluralistic group of ethical
decision-making (GPDE), a group designed to give a moral verdict about P2, included in a moral
evaluation report (RM) which will finally be sent to the applicant. At this level, other
independent assessments (OA) may take place: economic, medical, etc. by expert teams. It is a
nonsense to give GPDE a raw version of the project because this is not a group that make
amendments to the draft, but a group that assesses the project. Either the evaluation report is
negative or positive, S is the only one who decides whether the process goes on or not. For
instance, we may have a moral assessment rejecting the legalization of prostitution, but the
applicant decides however to continue the debate of the law in the Parliament and there - on
other criteria: economic, political, etc. - one may decide the adoption of the law. To “go on”
means that P2 (together with RM) is transferred to a group of political decision (GDP), a group
meant to represent the whole society (or the whole organization) and which is able to give a final
verdict. This group, composed of politicians or other public representatives, will inevitably judge
by multiple criteria (moral, economic, religious, political, strategic, etc.), rational or irrational,
and will accept or reject P2 together with the RM. It will also establish the weight of this new
regulation (is it a law or only a political directive?) - what kind of penalties shall we associate to
the new rule and what educational plan shall we adopt to internalize the new regulation (ethics
training programs). The final rejection of the project (which may occur also on extra-moral
reasons) means to delay its implementation by S. Schematically, things look like this:
compatibility
improve the project Yes
S GR P1 DP VC P2 GPDE RM GDP
negative/positive ethical verdict. S decides to go on No
rejected project: delay
OA

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In contrast to the UNESCO procedure described above, this scheme distinguishes
between GR and GPDE (groups with different functions and powers), the kernel of the pluralistic
decision procedure being represented by GPDE (which does not exist in the procedure used by
UNESCO). But GPDE is not a provider of final moral verdicts. Its activity aims at applying
some moral tests to a given case. Its main objectives are to identify the divergence and
convergence of several expert moral assessments and identify the roots of their incoherency; to
provide a professional basis for the final ethical decision-making which is a “political” one; to
provide a map of the moral problem under discussion for the use of the laymen and politicians
who will take the final decision; in general, to encourage sistematic and professional ethical
thinking in the moral assessment of our main practical issues.
One may object that the presence of GDP suggests that, in my view, whether a rule is
moral or not depends on its approval or rejection by society and not by an objective ethical test.
Or, this means to fall into the vulnerable doctrine of cultural relativism: all moral rules are
dependent on the social context in which they are established. In reality, both things happen: the
moral character of a new rule is established by GPDE, not by GDP. And the members of GPDE
may use universal principles (I find it is an error to ignore the universal moral principles in the
building process of ethical codes - as usually happens). GDP does not establish the morality of
the new rule, but only decides whether the society recognizes as such the moral regulation
established by the GPDE experts. This suggests that a new moral rule or policy acquires its
authority ultimately from a kind of social consensus (agreement) and not only from technical
ethical reasons e.g. the “maximization of utility” or/and the “respect for human dignity” etc.
Does this scheme contain a mix of ethical and non-ethical procedures, the latter risking
to alter the moral substance of the project? Let’s see. Despite what appears to be the case, the
first phases of the project (that may be considered as non-ethical) have an obvious connection
with ethics: identifying and formulating a moral problem, establishing the conditions of publicity
and autonomy in the adoption of a new rule, the promotion of the condition of coherency with
the previously adopted moral rules. Then, what follows is also an ethical step: the application of
some typical ethical tests (GPDE) and the writing of a moral report (RM) which gives a
resolution on the moral acceptability of the new rule or policy. Finally, at the level of GDP a new
evaluation occurs, using ethical and non-ethical criteria, but the presence of the non-ethical
criteria does not affect the moral nature of P2. To an analogy: in the research field of the so
called “policy of science” or “finalization of science” we may decide the future way of the
scientific research using not only epistemic, but also moral, religious, military or political criteria
without making the research less scientific thereby. This means that GDP should not be seen as a
group of ethical assessment, but as a group meant to socially approve and impose a new moral
rule, being guided by moral and non-moral criteria. I conclude by saying that the specificity of
the adoption of a new ethical code or of a new moral public policy (but not of its moral
assessment) is that it is always done on non-moral criteria too.
It may also be objected that the procedure is too complicated. In fact, it's not more
complicated than the procedure used for the adoption of any important juridical law. And I think
the ethical decision-making procedures need to be detached from their handbook simplicity if we
believe in their social utility. In nowadays circumstances, when the usefulneess of applied ethics

13. 13
is often denied, it seems to me essential to enhance its credibility by a mature development of its
procedures as that described above.
The procedure of methodological pluralism that I am proposing here asks us to recognize
all the tests derived from the great theories and all decision-making methods independent of
theories and give them an equal chance in the evaluation process, i.e. use them inside a
pluralistic ethical decision-making group (GPDE) composed of experts who know well the
investigated field and are also able to handle a moral decision method or know how to apply a
general ethical doctrine, a moral gestalt (e.g. the Christian one). So an important step in such a
process is the formation of a panel of experts which know well the facts and are able to apply
one of the following ethical decision-making methods:
- Hare's utilitarian method (or other utilitarian procedures);
-the principlist method;
-the ethical matrix;
-moral casuistry;
-the Christian ethics;
-other ethical decision-making methods (the Kantian one, the ethics of care, the virtue
ethics etc.).
In each exercise of this kind it is necessary to have a monitor or coordinator with
experience and moral insight, and a meta-procedure at the level of the panel such as that
described by the ethical Delphi. This involves to coordinate the activities of the experts panel so
that each solution is adjusted to be consistent with that of the others and finally allow the monitor
to reach a synthesis of the views expressed in the group under the form of a conclusive statistical
judgment. Crucial at this stage is the capacity of assessors to obtain information about the
preferences of all "stakeholders", about the estimates regarding the consequences of the action
assessed. The interaction of the panelists will seek the clarification of their philosophical,
religious or political commitments, so that all evaluators will judge the same facts, as far as
possible. At this stage no uniformity of method and opinion is desirable. Rather, the moral
pluralism should be encouraged. The moral verdict (RM), even if provisionally, has to be
prepared by the monitor M, which relies on the outcome of the panel (the statistical trend of
opinions in the panel), on other moral considerations, on his own moral flair, on his power of
persuasion etc. Here the fronetic supplement in evaluation is obvious. It explains why the
members of the group can reach a common result although they remain supporters of their initial
divergent moral beliefs and principles.
How could we systematically coordinate such a heterogeneous decision group
characterized by divergent ethical views? Some would probably say that this process takes place
spontaneously, as the case of the Belmont Committee shows. But none of us is sure of that,
therefore it may be preferable to control the process. We can do this by making the assessment
team work under the procedure called the ethical Delphi - a method that helps the group
members to reduce the dispersion of their assessments and ultimately to propose a final
(provisional) solution. It would be useful to briefly say what is this method (see its manual on the
Ethical Tools website). It is an "iterative participatory process between experts for exchanging
views and arguments on ethical issues. The method is structured around the notion of a virtual
committee where the exchange of ideas is conducted remotely through a series of opinion

14. 14
exchanges” (Manual of Ethical Delphi) . What this method can provide is a map of the opinions
the experts have on the ethical dimension of the use of a new biotechnology, for example, but it
cannot provide definitive judgments. More specifically, it helps to identify convergences and
divergences in the experts points of view, encourage ethical reflection and provide a rational
basis for making ethical decisions. Practically, the pluralistic group of ethical decision-making
could be structured by this procedure as a virtual group, having a latent existence and becoming
functional on demand.
The essence of this technique (which has no intrinsic moral content) consists in sending
by e-mail a series of questionnaires to a preselected group of anonymous experts, questionnaires
that require a step by step resolution of a complex ethical issue. Sending questionnaires step by
step will enable participants to know the answers of others and adjust their own responses, not
necessarily to reach a consensus. The method allows the convergence of the outcomes resulted
from the application of several distinct ethical decision-making methods, based on distinct
philosophies of morals, without putting the experts under the influence of external power
relations and personal influences that may interfere in the discussion. The experts are anonymous
and do not work in the same place. The steps for applying this technique – to the problem of the
moral acceptability of a new biotechnology, for instance - are the following:
1) The setting up of a small "monitoring team" (1-2 persons) for the application
of the Delphi method to a moral problem. It will direct the whole evaluation
process. It is preferable to use for this task persons having experience in the
field.
2) Selection of a virtual “panel of experts" (4-8 persons), independent and
anonymous, which have a good knowledge of the field but mainly a good
mastering of some methods of moral decision-making (principlism,
utilitarianism, Christian morality, Kantianism, ethical matrix etc.). The
plurality of the ethical approaches will be assured.
3) The first Delphi questionnaire is sent to the panel of experts (for testing the
terminology, eliminating ambiguities, establishing the stakeholders, choosing
the relevant ethical principles).
4) Analysis of the first round of answers and reciprocal adjustment of the experts’
opinions (the answers of the first round are synthesized by the monitoring team
and are then returned to the panel members who are required to give them the
final shape).
5) Proposal and testing of the second questionnaire (e.g. the consequences of
adopting/not adopting the new biotechnology). Some other specialists in the
field may be consulted.
6) Analysis of the second round of answers and their adjustment.
7) Proposal and testing of a third questionnaire (e.g. the moral assessment of the
case using the method proper to each member of the panel of experts).
8) Evaluation of answers and mutual adjustments.
9) Preparation of a preliminary report by the monitoring team (or a special review
team) to present the findings of the exercise.

15. 15
10) The experts will receive the preliminary form of the final report and will
submit it to their own judgment. The report will receive its final form.
The various methods of ethical decision-making mentioned above provide a
strictly moral evaluation of the new rule or policy, regarded from different moral
perspectives. None of them is conclusive. To reach a consensus does not mean to reach
the correct result. This method which is meant to generate the convergence of opinions,
in conjunction with the set of moral tests, only helps us to assure a clearer structure of the
debate and to offer the political team a solid ground for discussion. It identifies those
topics that the group of "experts" consider important for the subject examined. The
results of a Delphi procedure may support the policy makers to enhance their moral
creativity and capacity for ethical decision-making when faced with complex moral
issues in situations of incomplete or disputed information. This evaluation process of the
same act using several methods produces a strictly ethical verdict signed by the
monitoring group; this moral decision also based on the team members’ practical
wisdom, being finalized in a report submitted to those who commissioned the evaluation.
This report is most often decisive for the final choice. If the result of the report is
negative, it is unlikely that we will be tempted to continue the assessment process: we
reject that rule or public policy. But this kind of reaction is never entirely certain! It is the
prerogative of the applicant (S). He can decide to continue the process even if the
technical ethical verdict is negative. It is known, in this respect, that the prostitution is
rejected by Kant's tests, as by the utilitarian ones; however, the prostitution is legally
permitted in many countries (given some other reasons). By invoking distinct reasons
and, on this basis, furthering the evaluation process, one may arrive at a result that is the
opposite of that given by the purely ethical test.
Moreover, a moral rule is a rule imposed by society (pace Mill); however not
imposed from outside, but self-imposed (pace Kant). To be self-imposed it must be
known and publicly discussed. An earlier step in the decision process is just this public
debate. It can be done through conferences, press releases, manuals, consensus
conferences etc. The democratic accreditation of the new rule is not a political fad, but a
necessary condition of its morality. Moral rules are public rules and a necessary condition
of the existence of an ethical code is to be public. Therefore, to complete an ethical
decision-making process we need to set up a second group, often consisting (not of
experts, but) of politicians, representatives of the public opinion, laymen etc.; this second
group is meant to take the final decision concerning the assessed issue. It will consider
first of all the ethical decision of the expert panel, but will judge following other criteria
too: political, economic, legal, psychological, etc. The strictly ethical (technical) verdict
is only one element of the broader political decision (which we might call broad ethical
decision), the latter being taken by means of a multicriteria analysis. Ultimately, the
responsibility for the final decision belongs to the group of policy makers and
commoners - at the limit, the whole community concerned must emanate the new moral
rules they will obey in the future. This is part of the modern conception of morality.

16. 16
As a matter of fact, it is easy to see that the broad ethical decision, which we have
called the social approval of the new moral rule, is not done only by calculating the
balance of consequences or the impact of the new biotechnologies on the stakeholders,
but it requires a public debate, using various perspectives and ideological commitments
regarding (for the case of the biotechnology) the environmental protection, the animal
rights, the general ideal of life, the future of industrial agriculture, the political and
ideological choices of the evaluators. This multidimensional social approval process
occurs either spontaneously and quietly (this is the way various moral "habits" were
traditionally approved in history) or it may be organized by institutions, under the form
of the public debates, citizen juries or consensus conferences9
. In any case, the
community must feel that the new moral rule is her rule. From this perspective, it is
increasingly held that one of the defining characteristics distinguishing moral rules is that
they acquire authority ultimately by a kind of "social consensus" (T. Beauchamp) by the
community’s agreement that they are the best means to achieve the objectives of
morality, i.e. to provide the "flourishing" of human beings and opposing those factors
which could harm us and affect the quality of our life10
. To subscribe to a new moral rule
or to a new ethical code is to recognize that it is a social code, that it must be imposed by
society at large, generally respected, and culturally transmitted.
Therefore, to have a moral character the process of imposing a new policy ought
to be autonomous: that is, it should not come from outside (e.g. from “rulers” or the staff
of a company), but from inside (e.g. from the will of all the members of the
organization). A code of ethics is morally imposed not by a paternalistic procedure, but
by one which is assumed freely and autonomously. This reminds us Kant11
: the typical
moral sanction is the internal sanction. All these things remind us another important
point: that an ethical code should be public.
The moral evaluation issues should therefore be moved from the narrow circle of
experts to the public arena; they have to be debated in a transparent manner with those
commoners which are affected by them. In a well done democracy the citizens’ attitudes
have to be known by the rulers and the ruler’s intentions have to be known by the
governed (the principle of transparency or publicity). This process may be left in the
hands of hazard or it may be rationally organized.
To conclude, an ethical pluralistic method of decision-making has two components: the
first - i.e. the strictly ethical test - determines whether a class of actions satisfy or not an
integrated battery of ethical tests (e.g. the principle of utility, the ethical matrix, the principles of
Christian ethics, the Kantian tests, etc.). Therefore, we shall not apply only the principle of utility
or only the ethical matrix, but an integrated battery of tests: their integration is assured by the
Delphi method. This first component consists in testing that class of actions by each member of
the Delphi panel; it is followed by a synthesis of the outcomes done by the monitor who also
9 V.Beekman, F. Brom, „Ethical tools to support systematic public deliberation about the ethical aspects of
agricultural biotechnologies”, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, (20), 2007.
10 B. Shoene-Seifert, „Danger and Merits of Principlism” in C. Rehmann-Sutter et al. (eds.), Bioethics in Cultural
Contexts, Springer, 2000, p. 117.
11 J. L’Etang, „A Kantian approach to codes of ethics”, Journal of Business Ethics, (10,11), 1992.

17. 17
makes the ethical assessment report. Obviously, each member of the Delphi panel may remain a
partisan of his theory or method, but this meta-procedure allows the assessments convergence
and the formulation of a (provisional) verdict. This procedure should be considered as part of
the test.
The second component is that of the social approval. Some parts of this process take
place before the GPDE starts its activity, some other parts follow it. This does not mean that the
group of policy makers will review and modify the “moral report”; they will only recognize it
and (if positive) will require to check whether it may be socially approved on the basis of some
broader criteria. Such a social approval process involves first of all to inform the public about
the result of the test and to organize a public debate with as many people as possible. This
moment of “publicity” and “autonomous” approval is meant to take into consideration the
interests of all stakeholders.
Moreover, after the experts’ moral report (RM) was completed, the political group
assesses the “weight" of the new policy – therefore the degree of its "overridingness", having in
view the social importance of the values protected it (we may live in a society that considers
important or not such values as dignity, equality, justice etc.). Depending on the assessment and
negotiation of the overridingness degree, sanctions will be associated to the new policy (some
typically moral ones, such as educating the individual moral sense and the public attitudes; some
other legal). Finally, the group of political decision-making checks for the last time the
coherency of the new regulation with the already existent moral and non-moral rules, the
amount of available resources (which guarantees its applicability), the degree it satisfies some
other criteria related to the political, economic, religious or philosophic beliefs of the members of
that society. For example, an ethical decision regarding abortion or the status of human embryos
will be influenced by the religious or political beliefs of the decision-maker, by the pressures of
the public opinion, by certain specific emotional episodes etc. Or, a strictly technical ethical
decision requiring the isolation in hospitals of some dangerous mentally ill persons, if taken
during the Cold War period, may have been suspended for reasons of political and geostrategic
expediency that are considered more important than the ethical ones in that context (i.e. a dispute
took place around the incarceration of anticommunist political dissidents in psychiatric
hospitals). All this set of factors influence the final verdict. They probably will not change the
expert’s moral assessment (the politicians will not say that to free those dangerous mentally ill
persons and therefore to risk the security of the rest of the population is a moral action) but
postpone the approval of the new rule requiring the isolation on reasons of political expediency:
although we could accept, as rational persons, that the isolation of some mentally ill persons in
hospitals is a moral act, it is not expedient yet for political and geostrategic reasons. To facilitate
these choices, the Council of Europe agreed that ethical issues in general have precedence over
those of expediency or financial convenience, asking at the same time that a new scientific
research or technology be assessed having also in view the long-term potential consequences,
even if uncertain in the light of the current science (the “precautionary principle”).
Another general lesson follows: that it is appropriate to abandon the simplistic habit to
consider only the Christian moral pattern when we assess a moral case. There are many other
moral perspectives that deserve to be taken into consideration in a democratic society that admits
the axiological pluralism. They are as respectable as the Christian ethics and even better
equipped from the methodological point of view. Only a pluralistic ethical test is compatible
with a pluralistic society.

18. 18
It is also necessary to work in the direction of creating a variety of ethical tools if we
want ethics be taken seriously. This means, among others, to train expert-groups able to
coordinate a moral assessment using the Ethical Delphi or to set up consensus conferences.
These groups should become active on demand.
The poor idea that CSR is the genuine master of all the ethical issues in an organization –
a view that is officially encouraged by the EU policies in the field – should also be abandoned. If
carefully analyzed, CSR as actually practiced has nothing to do with ethics. It only blocks the
spread of the “ethics management” ideas which are really focused on the moral content of an
organization. The creation of new ethical decision-making tools (such as the pluralistic one
proposed above) is part of an ethics management program and has no relation to CSR.
As concerns the moral assessment of actions, the most objective human point of view is
not that of a certain moral theory or method, but the combined points of view of several theories
or methods used in the benefit and with the democratic participation of a large number of people.