Isaf State Of The Insurgency 231000 Dec
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MG Michael Flynn Director of Intelligence International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan U.S. Forces, Afghanistan AS OF: 22 DEC, 2009
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Isaf State Of The Insurgency 231000 Dec
- 1. State of the Insurgency Trends, Intentions and Objectives MG Michael Flynn Director of Intelligence International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan U.S. Forces, Afghanistan AS OF: 22 DEC, 2009 UNCLASSIFIED Classification of this briefing: UNCLASSIFIED
- 2. Purpose Provide an overview of the current capacity, capabilities and intentions of the insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan UNCLASSIFIED
- 9. 2003 – 2006 Predominantly Military Ordnance Casualties: (04 – 16), (05 – 279), (06 – 1473) * No IED related casualty data available for 2003 UNCLASSIFIED IED Evolution in Afghanistan 2007 – 2009 Increasing use of Homemade Explosives (HME) (80 to 90 percent from Ammonium Nitrate) Casualties: (07 – 2293), (08 – 3308) Kinetic Events 01 Jan 09 – 15 Dec 09 1922 (2006) 2718 (2007) 4169 (2008) 831 (2005) 326 (2004) Events: 81 (2003)* Events: 7228 Casualties: 6037 (2009) Kinetic Events 01 Jan 05 – 15 Dec 05
- 20. Questions / Discussion UNCLASSIFED
- 22. Materials / IED Components The Improvised Explosive Device (IED) (The insurgent’s choice of a weapon and a tactic Insurgent Networks The Population is the Center of Gravity – not the IED Location Event Propaganda Casualties IED
- 23. How Do We Solve the Problem? IED Secure the Population Governance Development Afghan Population Training Material Organization Information Ops Ultimately, We Win by Doing COIN Better
Notas del editor
- How we did this: rigorous multi-disciplinary assessment my unprejudiced best military advice of what is required to succeed my personal experience and core beliefs. respect the environment in which we operate lesson learned from my experience in conventional and special operations the mission is inseparable from the situation derived from my own sense of the situation 02/08/10
- improve confidence in GIROA population-centric counterinsurgency campaign risks no matter what we do not executing this strategy carries much more risk tweaking the status quo will only postpone failure unique moment in time time is of the essence believe that we can succeed must fundamentally change the culture change will be the crux – harder than the resources 02/08/10
- The Afghan insurgency is comprised of multiple groups pursuing various short and longer term goals. The three major groups include the Taliban, Hezb-e Islami-Gulbuddin, and the Haqqani network. These groups cooperate and coordinate at times. Their area of operations tends to be geographically and demographically determined. They operate mainly in the Pashtun-majority areas of Afghanistan, in the south and east and in Pashtun pockets in the north. The common goals of these groups is to expel foreign forces from Afghanistan (although not foreign fighters allied with them or al-Qaeda) and to undermine the central government. Al-Qaida relies on insurgents for facilitation and safehavens. The insurgents cooperates at the tactical level—local commanders—to conduct attacks. The identities of insurgents groups are blurred. None of the organizations has a hierarchically, formal command structure comparable to Western military organizations. Commanders and fighters have, do, and will continue to shift loyalties from one insurgent group to another. The availability of logistics and resources often overlap. 02/08/10
- 02/08/10
- Ammonium Nitrate Ammonium Nitrate is quoted as containing 34% Nitrogen – it does exist in lower concentrations which are less easy to weaponise but is just a matter of filtering off impurities. Unknown statistics on legitimate use of black market fertiliser. Banning of AN fertilizer would probably not impact on economy of fertiliser plants. There is a Fertiliser plant in MES – if that could be upscaled to supply all Afg fertiliser requirement the need to import (open to abuse) fertilised would be diminished. Ammonium Nitrate as an explosive Ammonium Nitrate and Aluminium powder (ANAL) s the most often seen explosive – has a rough 1:1 equivalency of TNT. It is mixed in the proportions of 11 Kg AN to 1 KG Aluminium powder (from metallic paint). AN and diesel is also explosive – similar power to ANAL. AN can be turned into a powerful with the addition of any fuel (e.g. sugar, sawdust etc…) With a sufficiently large booster, AN can be made to detonate in it’s pure form. 02/08/10
- The trend for smaller main charges (less than 100lbs) is that the main charge size is increasing. There is no trend for large, armor defeating main charges (250 Lbs +). The use of large main charges is not new, and has been seen as far back as 2006. However, there has been an increase in the use of large main charge command wires in RC E and S. 02/08/10
- improve confidence in GIROA population-centric counterinsurgency campaign risks no matter what we do not executing this strategy carries much more risk tweaking the status quo will only postpone failure unique moment in time time is of the essence believe that we can succeed must fundamentally change the culture change will be the crux – harder than the resources 02/08/10
- improve confidence in GIROA population-centric counterinsurgency campaign risks no matter what we do not executing this strategy carries much more risk tweaking the status quo will only postpone failure unique moment in time time is of the essence believe that we can succeed must fundamentally change the culture change will be the crux – harder than the resources 02/08/10
- dramatic change in how we operate. focus on the people as the center of gravity Change culture -- bring security and normalcy to the people shield them from insurgent violence, corruption and coercion. truly comprehensive partnership more integrated at every level. accelerate the rate of ANSF development build flexibility to grow the ANSF improving governance at all levels more discerning in partnering modify organizational structures operational-level headquarters new plan for civilian-military integration none of these are new change how we think the SOP is not sacred 02/08/10
- 02/08/10
- (-) Success targeting of senior leadership and constant leadership changes has disrupted efforts to control and coordinate operations, especially in the South (-) Hekmatyar’s reported willingness to reconcile with the Afghan government causes concern that others may follow (+) Portrayed as increasingly capable and resilient, due to aggressive propaganda, and a steady increase in high-profile attacks each year (+) Maintain a robust access to funding sources, and safe-haven in Pakistan used for training and staging 02/08/10
- How we did this: rigorous multi-disciplinary assessment my unprejudiced best military advice of what is required to succeed my personal experience and core beliefs. respect the environment in which we operate lesson learned from my experience in conventional and special operations the mission is inseparable from the situation derived from my own sense of the situation 02/08/10
- [Anchor Slide: Defines problem and validates the problem as most see it - let’s them know that you understand. Follow on slides leads the viewer to the bigger picture and more comprehensive solution] This is the problem as we all tend to see it. An IED is an explosive event at a location. Its components consist of an insurgent network – made up of such entities as bomb makers, logisticians, lookouts, and emplacers; and materials – explosives, casings, wiring and initiative devices. When this network and the materials combine, the resultant effect produces casualties and propaganda. The difficulties in defeating the this threat cannot be understated. The IED – in many ways – IS the war. The IED is a tool of the Insurgent Network that exists in a complex social environment. Put another way, the IED is to Coalition Forces in Afghanistan what the submarine, machinegun, and tank was to military forces in WWI – a game changer. And yet despite the importance of this threat, the takeaway from this slide rests with the Insurgent Network – which exists within the complex social environment that is the population of Afghanistan. A population that actively or passively permits this network to exist and allows it the freedom to make and emplace IEDs. Therefore I have concluded that the IED is NOT the Center of Gravity; the population of Afghanistan is.
- With our evolved understanding of what IEDs are we have made great steps in mitigating the threat. We are using everything at our disposal to defeat the network and protect lives. Our Counter IED efforts mitigate the problem, using Information Operations to shape an environment that is not conducive to IEDs; Materials such as MRAPs, FMV(ISR), and ECM; Training in country and at home station to identify and remove IEDs; and the creation of new and agile Organizations such as JIEDDO, Paladin, Focused Targeting Forces (FTF), Counter IED Platoons (CIAP), and Intelligence architectures that were unthinkable only a few years ago. But no amount MRAPs, FMV, training, or intelligence will solve the IED problem. They can’t. Because the problem is not the IED – or even the network. The problem, as alluded to on the first slide, is that the Afghan population actively or passively allows that IED to be emplaced. So the focus must be on getting the population to support GIRoA and deny the Insurgent Network the freedom to emplace the IED. The solution, therefore, is about securing the Afghan population, enabling good governance by the GIRoA, and supporting development projects that can provide sustainable jobs and a healthy economy. Attacking the IED network and mitigating its effects simply buys us time and space to create the conditions for a stabile Afghanistan. And that in turn produces a populace that is non-permissive to the IED network; a population that actively rejects those who assemble and emplace IEDs. Ultimately, the solution is found by doing better COIN.