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Challenges in implementing and certifying an
online payment application
October 2013

Ana Tudosa
Java Senior Developer
Why Do We Care About Security?

AN INTRODUCTION HERE
HELP!!!! 

Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
How Hard Is It To Compromise?

The majority of the attacks are very easy to
execute

78% of the attacks required Low or Very Low
difficulty to execute

Source: Verizon Data breach investigation report 2013
Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
Some Hacker Profiling

Variety and origin of external attackers

Source: Verizon Data breach investigation report 2013
Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
Some Hacker Profiling

Variety of internal attackers


Hey developers are pretty honest comparing to upper

management and system administrators 

Source: Verizon Data breach investigation report 2013
Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
What is Being Compromised?

Most commonly applications

Source: Post Breach Boom, Ponemon Institute 2013
Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
How Did It Occur?

SQL injection is the most common form of
successful attack

Source: Post Breach Boom, Ponemon Institute 2013
Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
Types of Breaches

In order to protect your application you
need to understand WHO, WHY and HOW
 APT
 Opportunistic breach
 Hacktivist breach
 Self-inflicted breach

Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
Night Dragon

Source: Global energy cyber attacks, “Night Dragon”, McAfee, 2011
Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
The Hacktivist Breach

Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
Cost Of a Data Breach
$395,262.00
$565,020.00

Detection and Escalation
Notification
$3,030,814.00

$1,412,548.00

Ex-Post Response
Lost Business

Source: Cost of A Data Breach: Global Analysis Ponemon Institute 2013
Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
What is PCI-DSS?
Payment Card Industry Data
Security Standard
Enforced by all the credit card
companies around the globe
Created the PCI Council
Its purpose is to protect the
customer’s data
The merchant is most often the
weakest link
Why?
Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
WHO Needs It?

MANUFACTURERS

PCI PTS
PIN Transaction
Security

SOFTWARE
DEVELOPERS

PCI PA-DSS
Payment Application
Vendors

MERCHANT &
PROCESSORS

PCI DSS
Data Security
Standard

PCI SECURITY
STANDARDS
& COMPLIANCE

Ecosystem of payment devices, applications, infrastructure and users

Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
What Does It Mean To Adhere To The Standard
Realize that it refers to the entire organization:









IT infrastructure & management
How you store data (in particular CC data)
Security procedures
How you limit access to CC data
How you log everything
How strong is your application (security wise)
What is the level of physical security
Tons of documents you need to produce

PCI does not allow different styles of compliancy
100% compliant, less is not acceptable
Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
PCI data elements

Cardholder data
 PAN – primary account number

 Expiration date
 Card holder name

Sensitive authentication data
 Track data

 CAV/ CVV /CVC / CID
 PIN
Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
OWASP
Whenever you get some sort of feedback from either
QA or security audit you will be referred to OWASP
Open Web Application Security Project
Not-for-profit organization
Focused on providing application security
Technology agnostic
They produce the “Top ten most critical web
application security risks”
Not the only one, there are others like Microsoft SDL

Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
OWASP top 10
A1: Injection
A2: Broken authentication and session
management
A3: Cross site scripting (XSS)
A4: Insecure direct object references
A5: Security misconfiguration
A6: Sensitive data exposure
A7: Missing function level access control
A8: Cross-site request forgery (CSRF)
A9: Using unknown vulnerable components
A10: Unvalidated redirects and forwards
Source: OWASP TOP 10 , 2013
Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
JSF Components

We implemented our own set of JSF
components

The requirements were :
 Single way to present the UI
 Highly customizable

It came in handy when implementing
protection against top 10 security threats
 Escaping, URL encoding, validation, challenge codes

Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
A2: Broken authentication and session management

Method: Application functions related to
authentication and session management are

often not implemented correctly.
Risk:
 Compromise passwords, keys, session tokens
 Assume other user’s identities
 Unauthorized access to application

Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
A2: Broken authentication and session management

Solution










Session cookies - secured and httponly
No session ID in URLs
Session timeouts and maximum session TTL
Create new session after login
Challenge codes
Use password hashing (with salt)
Use strong encryption algorithms for sensitive data
Login from an encrypted page
Don’t re-invent the wheel (use existing session
management)

Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
A2: Example: Tunisian Arab Spring

Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
A5: Security misconfiguration

Method: Exploit incorrect secure
configuration such as AS/DB servers defaults

Risk:
 Unauthorized access to some system data or
functionality.
 Occasionally, such flaws result in a complete
system compromise.

 Very generic, it can be anything

Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
A5: Security misconfiguration

Solution:
 AS hardening

 Implementing new AS services for extended
cryptographic capabilities
 Keep dependencies up to date
 Periodic scans/audits
 A strong application architecture - tokenization

Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
A5: Application Architecture : Tokenization
1001101010

Facade

Tokenization Module

Facade

Tokenization
1001101010

Encryption Engine

Clearing
Datasets in Memory

Connectors

Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
A5: Application Architecture
Un-Trusted Users

Application Server
Payment Application (core)

Un-Trusted
Web Server
Payment Application (web)

Firewall
App Tier
DMZ

DB Tier

Database

Internal Network

Users
Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
A6: Sensitive data exposure

Method: Exploit poorly protected sensitive
data
This used to be old A7&A9
 A7: Insecure Cryptographic Storage
 A9: Insufficient Transport Layer Protection

Risk:
 Information Leakage
 Unauthorized access to sensitive data in transit
 Network sniffing
Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
A6: Sensitive data exposure

Solution:
 Use existing strong encryption algorithms
 Generate keys offline and store private keys with
extreme care
 Ensure that properly secured
 Always use SSL 3.0/TLS 1.2 for sensitive data in
transit
 Protect communication between web servers and
data bases
 Use certificates where applicable even in internal
networks

Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
And The Result

https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/appro
ved_companies_providers/validated_payme

nt_applications.php?agree=true

Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
Please fill in the evaluation form
Contact: ana.tudosa@mindcti.com
Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application

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Iasi code camp 12 october 2013 ana tudosa - challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application

  • 1. Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application October 2013 Ana Tudosa Java Senior Developer
  • 2. Why Do We Care About Security? AN INTRODUCTION HERE HELP!!!!  Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
  • 3. How Hard Is It To Compromise? The majority of the attacks are very easy to execute 78% of the attacks required Low or Very Low difficulty to execute Source: Verizon Data breach investigation report 2013 Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
  • 4. Some Hacker Profiling Variety and origin of external attackers Source: Verizon Data breach investigation report 2013 Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
  • 5. Some Hacker Profiling Variety of internal attackers  Hey developers are pretty honest comparing to upper management and system administrators  Source: Verizon Data breach investigation report 2013 Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
  • 6. What is Being Compromised? Most commonly applications Source: Post Breach Boom, Ponemon Institute 2013 Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
  • 7. How Did It Occur? SQL injection is the most common form of successful attack Source: Post Breach Boom, Ponemon Institute 2013 Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
  • 8. Types of Breaches In order to protect your application you need to understand WHO, WHY and HOW  APT  Opportunistic breach  Hacktivist breach  Self-inflicted breach Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
  • 9. Night Dragon Source: Global energy cyber attacks, “Night Dragon”, McAfee, 2011 Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
  • 10. The Hacktivist Breach Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
  • 11. Cost Of a Data Breach $395,262.00 $565,020.00 Detection and Escalation Notification $3,030,814.00 $1,412,548.00 Ex-Post Response Lost Business Source: Cost of A Data Breach: Global Analysis Ponemon Institute 2013 Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
  • 12. What is PCI-DSS? Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Enforced by all the credit card companies around the globe Created the PCI Council Its purpose is to protect the customer’s data The merchant is most often the weakest link Why? Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
  • 13. WHO Needs It? MANUFACTURERS PCI PTS PIN Transaction Security SOFTWARE DEVELOPERS PCI PA-DSS Payment Application Vendors MERCHANT & PROCESSORS PCI DSS Data Security Standard PCI SECURITY STANDARDS & COMPLIANCE Ecosystem of payment devices, applications, infrastructure and users Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
  • 14. What Does It Mean To Adhere To The Standard Realize that it refers to the entire organization:         IT infrastructure & management How you store data (in particular CC data) Security procedures How you limit access to CC data How you log everything How strong is your application (security wise) What is the level of physical security Tons of documents you need to produce PCI does not allow different styles of compliancy 100% compliant, less is not acceptable Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
  • 15. PCI data elements Cardholder data  PAN – primary account number  Expiration date  Card holder name Sensitive authentication data  Track data  CAV/ CVV /CVC / CID  PIN Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
  • 16. OWASP Whenever you get some sort of feedback from either QA or security audit you will be referred to OWASP Open Web Application Security Project Not-for-profit organization Focused on providing application security Technology agnostic They produce the “Top ten most critical web application security risks” Not the only one, there are others like Microsoft SDL Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
  • 17. OWASP top 10 A1: Injection A2: Broken authentication and session management A3: Cross site scripting (XSS) A4: Insecure direct object references A5: Security misconfiguration A6: Sensitive data exposure A7: Missing function level access control A8: Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) A9: Using unknown vulnerable components A10: Unvalidated redirects and forwards Source: OWASP TOP 10 , 2013 Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
  • 18. JSF Components We implemented our own set of JSF components The requirements were :  Single way to present the UI  Highly customizable It came in handy when implementing protection against top 10 security threats  Escaping, URL encoding, validation, challenge codes Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
  • 19. A2: Broken authentication and session management Method: Application functions related to authentication and session management are often not implemented correctly. Risk:  Compromise passwords, keys, session tokens  Assume other user’s identities  Unauthorized access to application Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
  • 20. A2: Broken authentication and session management Solution          Session cookies - secured and httponly No session ID in URLs Session timeouts and maximum session TTL Create new session after login Challenge codes Use password hashing (with salt) Use strong encryption algorithms for sensitive data Login from an encrypted page Don’t re-invent the wheel (use existing session management) Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
  • 21. A2: Example: Tunisian Arab Spring Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
  • 22. A5: Security misconfiguration Method: Exploit incorrect secure configuration such as AS/DB servers defaults Risk:  Unauthorized access to some system data or functionality.  Occasionally, such flaws result in a complete system compromise.  Very generic, it can be anything Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
  • 23. A5: Security misconfiguration Solution:  AS hardening  Implementing new AS services for extended cryptographic capabilities  Keep dependencies up to date  Periodic scans/audits  A strong application architecture - tokenization Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
  • 24. A5: Application Architecture : Tokenization 1001101010 Facade Tokenization Module Facade Tokenization 1001101010 Encryption Engine Clearing Datasets in Memory Connectors Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
  • 25. A5: Application Architecture Un-Trusted Users Application Server Payment Application (core) Un-Trusted Web Server Payment Application (web) Firewall App Tier DMZ DB Tier Database Internal Network Users Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
  • 26. A6: Sensitive data exposure Method: Exploit poorly protected sensitive data This used to be old A7&A9  A7: Insecure Cryptographic Storage  A9: Insufficient Transport Layer Protection Risk:  Information Leakage  Unauthorized access to sensitive data in transit  Network sniffing Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
  • 27. A6: Sensitive data exposure Solution:  Use existing strong encryption algorithms  Generate keys offline and store private keys with extreme care  Ensure that properly secured  Always use SSL 3.0/TLS 1.2 for sensitive data in transit  Protect communication between web servers and data bases  Use certificates where applicable even in internal networks Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application
  • 29. Please fill in the evaluation form Contact: ana.tudosa@mindcti.com Challenges in implementing and certifying an online payment application