Basic Civil Engineering first year Notes- Chapter 4 Building.pptx
Ltte presentation by R M DILAWAR
1.
2. RANA MUHAMMAD DILAWAR
HIRA ZAIB
HAIDER ALI SIAL
ANUM FAROOQ
3. Sri Lanka, officially the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka is an island surrounded by the Indian ocean, the gulf of Myanamar and the Palk
Strait, and lies in the vicinity of India and the Maldives
The country is famous for the production and export of tea, coffee, coconuts, rubber
and cinnamon, the last of which is native to the country.]
The natural beauty of Sri Lanka has led to the title The Pearl of the Indian Ocean The island is
laden with lush tropical forests, white beaches and diverse landscapes with rich biodiversity.
As of 2010, Sri Lanka was one of the fastest growing economies of the world. Its stock
exchange was Asia's best performing stock market during 2009 and 2010.
Administrative Divisions of Sri Lanka
Area
Province Capital Area (km²) Population
(sq mi)
Central Kandy 5,674 2,191 2,423,966
Eastern Trincomalee 9,996 3,859 1,460,939
North Central Anuradhapura 10,714 4,137 1,104,664
Northern Jaffna 8,884 3,430 1,311,776
North Western Kurunegala 7,812 3,016 2,169,892
Sabaragamuwa Ratnapura 4,902 1,893 1,801,331
Southern Galle 5,559 2,146 2,278,271
Uva Badulla 8,488 3,277 1,177,358
Western Colombo 3,709 1,432 5,361,200
4. The LTTE (Liberation Tiger Of Tamil Eelam), a separatist militant organization formally based in North Sri lanka.
Founded in may 1976 by Vellupillai Prabhakaran doomed to failure because of several factor in terms of
revolutionary warfare. This campaign evolved into Sri lankan civil war which ran from 1983-2009.At the height
of there power they posed a well developed militia and carried out high profile attack. More than 60,000 people
have died since the conflict began in 1972. Prior to LTTE defeat Sri Lankan government is spending 40% of their
buget in war against LTTE. Only terrorist organization to kill two world leaders
Sri lankan president Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993
Former Indian P.M Rajiv Gandhi in 1991
5. Time period ; july 23,1983-may18,2009
Location ; Sri lanka
Area ; North-East Sri lanka
Annual Revenue ; $200-300 million USD, prior to the military defeat
Area under control ; Tamil Tigers, with control of 15,000 km2
Troops ; LTTE has 3 brigades ( 4000) and some auxillary forces. Total strength
may be around 15,000 -18,000. But battle-worth number may be around 6,000.
Means Of Revenue ; Donations from expatriate Tamils, Extortion, Shipping,
Sales of weapons,Taxes under LTTE controlled areas.
Current status ; Inactive. Militarily defeated in May 2009. Proscribed as a
terrorist organization by 32 countries.
6.
7. Issues such as
national self determination
university admission
equity in land settlement
quest for the safety in an independent state. Thousand of people joined this movement
Objectives
•The LTTE aimed to create a separate homeland for the Tamils known as the
Tamil Eelam (State) in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka
•The Tigers control most of the areas in the Northern Province but also
conduct operations throughout the island.
8. The powerful presence of an international link was
a major morale boost for the Tamil insurgents in
Sri Lanka. It was a form of recognition of their
struggle both domestically and internationally.
The international component enhances domestic
survival and contributes to the resilience of an
organization. The TULF and several other Tamil
political and insurgent groups kept the campaign
alive by bringing back bitter memories. The
incessant waves of riots that destroyed lives and
property of the Tamils were highlighted. Sinhala
Sri, Sinhala Only Act, Sinhala colonization and
standardization of education that had antagonized
the Tamils formed the basis of the conflict.
9. The LTTE leadership was organized along a two-tier structure:
(1 )A Military wing (2) A Subordinate political wing.
Overseeing both was a central governing committee, headed by the LTTE chief, Velupillai
Prabhakaran. This body had the responsibility for directing and controlling several specific
subdivisions, including,
An Amphibious group (the Sea Tigers headed by Soosai),
An Airborne group (the Air Tigers led by Prabhakaran’s Son Charles Anthony),
an elite fighting wing (known as the Charles Anthony Regiment
Prabhakaran headed the LTTE power structure, as chairman of its central governing
committee and ‘commander-in-chief’ of its Army. He was assisted by B. Nadesan, his
political advisor, and his intelligence Chief Pottu Amman.
The LTTE cadre strength dwindled since the Government’s onslaught in July 2006 and
there was no specific information about its cadre strength. On December 29, 2007, the Sri
Lankan Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka had said that the LTTE is left with
only 3,000 cadres. The General then on January 11, 2008 speculated the total cadre
strength to be about 4,500. At its peak, the organisation has cadre strength of about 18,000
areas under its controls to fill its dwindling ranks, and an estimated 1600 children were in
LTTE rank.
While the Vituthalai Pulikal Makalir Munani (Women's Front of the Liberation Tigers
headed by Col. Vithusha) was formed in 1983, women began combat training in 1985. In
October 1987, Prabhakaran set up the first training camp exclusively for women in Jaffna
for the second and successive batches..
Children featured prominently in the LTTE's protracted guerilla and terrorist campaigns,
and assessments by the Sri Lankan Directorate of Military Intelligence have estimated that
as much as 60 per cent of the LTTE's fighters were below 18 exercise.
11. “Parbhakaran was one of the most effective guerrilla leaders in modern warfare –
displaying the tactical prowess of Afghanistan's Ahmad Shah Masoud , the
ruthlessness of Osama bin Laden and the conviction of Latin American
revolutionary Che Guevara.“ Straits Times
Prabhakaran never developed a systematic philosophy, but did declare that his goal was
'Revolutionary socialism and the creation of an egalitarian society'. He joined the Tamil
nationalist movement in his youth and quickly established himself as a strong
willed militant leader by founding the LTTE. His rare interviews, his annual Tamil Eelam
Heroes Day speeches and the policies and actions of the LTTE can be taken as indicators of
Prabhakaran’s philosophy and ideology. The following are important areas when
considering philosophy and ideology of Prabhakaran.
Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism
Prabhakaran’s source of inspiration and direction was Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism , His
stated and ultimate ideal was to get Tamil Eelam , recognised as a nation ,as per the U.N.
Charter that guarantees the right of a people to political independence. The LTTE also
proposed the formation of an Interim Self Governing Authority ,during Peace Negotiations
in 2003. Former Tamil guerrilla and politician Dharmalingam Sithadthan has remarked
that Prabhakaran's "dedication to the cause of the Tamil Eelam was unquestionable, he was
the only man in Sri Lanka who could decide if there should be war or peace." Prabhakaran
was also called "Karikalan" for his bravery and his administration (Karikalan refers to a
famous Chola king who ruled around 270 CE.
12. Suicide bombing
The tamil tigers are best known for thier suicide bombings,which are
carried out by squad elites. They have commited 200 attacks so far.
2009 February 09 - LTTE continues targeting Tamil civilians: suicide
bomb attack at IDP rescue centre - Kilinochchi
13. A surface-to-air missile (SAM) or ground-to-air missile (GTAM) is a missile designed
to be launched from the ground to destroy aircraft or other missiles. It is one type of
anti aircraft system; in modern armed forces missiles have replaced most other forms
of dedicated anti-aircraft weaponry, with the anti aircraft cannon pushed into niche
roles.
14. A rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) is a shoulder fired, anti tank weapon
system which fires rockets equipped with an explosive warhead. These
warheads are affixed to a rocket motor and stabilized in flight with fins.
15. Guerrilla warfare is a form of irregular warefare and refers to conflicts in which a small group of
combatants including, but not limited to, armed civilians (or "irregulars") use military tactics, such
as ambushes, sabotage, raids, the element of surprise, and extraordinary mobility to harass a larger
and less-mobile traditional army, or strike a vulnerable target, and withdraw almost immediately.
Surprise and intelligence:
For successful operations, surprise must be achieved by the guerrillas. If the operation has been
betrayed or compromised it is usually called off immediately. Intelligence is also extremely
important, and detailed knowledge of the target's dispositions, weaponry and morale is gathered
before any attack. Intelligence can be harvested in several ways.
Relationship with civil population:
Relationships with civilian populations are influenced by whether the guerrillas operate among a
hostile or friendly population. A friendly population is of immense importance to guerrilla
fighters, providing shelter, supplies, financing, intelligence and recruits. The "base of the people" is
thus the key lifeline of the guerrilla movement. In the early stages of the Vietnam War, American
officials "discovered that several thousand supposedly government-controlled 'fortified hamlets'
were in fact controlled by Viet Cong guerrillas, who 'often used them for supply and rest havens'.
Use of terror:
In some cases, the use of terrorism can be an aspect of guerrilla warfare. Terrorism is used to focus
international attention on the guerrilla cause, kill opposition leaders, extort money from targets,
intimidate the general population, create economic losses, and keep followers and potential
defectors in line. As well, the use of terrorism can provoke the greater power to launch a
disproportionate response, thus alienating a civilian population which might be sympathetic to the
terrorist's cause.
16. Withdrawal
Guerrillas must plan carefully for withdrawal once an operation has been
completed, or if it is going badly.
Innovative method:
Logistics:
Guerrillas typically operate with a smaller logistical footprint compared to
conventional formations; nevertheless, their logistical activities can be
elaborately organized. A primary consideration is to avoid dependence on fixed
bases and depots which are comparatively easy for conventional units to locate
and destroy.
Foreign support and sancturies:
Foreign support in the form of soldiers, weapons, sanctuary, or statements of
sympathy for the guerrillas is not strictly necessary, but it can greatly increase
the chances of an insurgent victory.
17. The UK Net
The UK has always been the heart of LTTE overseas political activity. Since the riots of
July 1983, the LTTE has expanded into Europe from London. To make its position
secure, the LTTE has either established, absorbed, or infiltrated a number of LTTE, LTTE
front or pro-LTTE organizations in the UK
Government Response during war with LTTE
At a military level, the government forces continue to fight an unconventional war,
in a conventional mode. The need to transform the national security doctrine,
training and weaponry to meet the growing internal threat has been long felt. But,
to date a bulk of Sri Lankan troops are being trained to fight across clear battle
lines. The pace at which, the counter insurgency component is being developed, is
slow and inadequate to meet the growing threat.
18. By mid 1987, over 20,000 Sri Lankan Tamil insurgents had been provided sanctuary, finance,
training and weapons either by the central government, state government of Tamil Nadu or by
the insurgent groups themselves. While most of the initial training was confined to Indian
military and paramilitary camps in Uttara Pradesh, specialized training were imparted by the
Indian instructors attached to RAW to Sri Lankan insurgents in New Delhi, Bombay and
Vishakhapatnam . With the Indo-Lanka Accord of July 1987, RAW assistance culminated. Rajiv
Gandhi ordered the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to fight the LTTE.
19. The Split
The LTTE, however, faced a vertical split in the organisation when it’s Eastern ‘Commander’ ‘Colonel’
Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan aka Karuna Amman broke-away from the parent organisation and
formed his own group – a military wing known as Tamil National Front and a Political wing called the
Tamileela Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP) in alliance with the Eelam National Democratic Liberation
Front (ENDLF) - in March 2004. Karuna later joined the Government. Karuna’s deputy in TMVP,
Chandrakanthan alias Pillayan, now heads TMVP and is also the Chief Monster of the Eastern
Province.
20. The LTTE, which, at one time, controlled over 15,000 square kilometres or
nearly one-fourth of the 65,332 square kilometres territory of the island nation,
was finally decimated with the killing of Prabhakaran on May 18, 2009 and the
Government officially declaring the need of Eelam War IV on May 20.
Colombo is now pursuing several Governments to dismantle three broad groups
that are now assumed to be controlling the remaining pro-LTTE international
factions: the US group is said to be headed by V. Rudrakumaran, the UK group
by Aruththanthai Emmanuel of the World Tamil Forum (WTF) and the
Norway group by Nediyavan.
21. 1. LTTE failure or rejection to sit at the negotiation table with firm
commitments and sincerity is the gravest mistake the LTTE has
ever made. Consequently, it has been paying the price for its failed
militaristic approach towards the conflict.
2. The most significant dynamic in shaping the affairs of the LTTE is
the adoption of one-man rule, which may also be the reason for the
LTTE’s dramatic failure. Interestingly, the dictatorship of
Vellupillai Prabhakaran has prevented the LTTE from
transforming itself into a more practical organization that could
correspond effectively with the rapidly changing local and global
environment
3. In fact, the concentration of resources around one man is a
strategic failure of the LTTE. Evidently, the LTTE’s inability to
address this fundamental weakness has made it difficult to
institutionalize conceptual, organizational, and operational
adjustments across a diverse political and security environment.
Thus, the LTTE’s resiliency, given the recent military defeats, has
been greatly reduced
22. To counter these LTTE activities, the government needs to create a strong
network of institutions and a monitoring mechanism. Specifically, an
institution comprising military and civilian organizations should be
established to respond to any LTTE attack and monitor military aspects
of the "new LTTE," as well as to counter the LTTE propaganda,
fundraising, and other activities
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