International Social Science Journal, VolXXXVI, n°4, 1984 EPISTEMOLOGY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE The scientific status, values and institutionalisation

2. Published quarterly by Unesco
Vol. X X X V I , N o . 4, 1984
Editor a.i.: AM Kazancigil
Design and layout: Jacques Carrasco
Picture research: Florence Bonjean
Correspondents
Bangkok: Yogesh Atal
Beijing: Li Xuekun
Belgrade: Balsa Spadijer
Buenos Aires: Norberto Rodríguez
Bustamante
Canberra: Geoffrey Caldwell
Cologne: Alphons Silbermann
Delhi: André Béteille
Florence: Francesco Margiotta Broglio
Harare: Chen Chimutengwende
Hong Kong: Peter Chen
London: Cyril S. Smith
Mexico City: Pablo Gonzalez Casanova
Moscow: Marien Gapotchka
Nigeria: Akinsola A k i w o w o
Ottawa: Paul L a m y
Singapore: S. H . Alatas
Tokyo: Hiroshi Ohta
Tunis: A . Bouhdiba
United States: G e n e Lyons
Topics of forthcoming issues:
International comparisons
Food structures
Education
Youth
Cover:
Eye reflecting a theatre, drawing by the French
architect Nicolas Ledoux (1736-1806). Edimcdia '
Right:
The mystery of human mind, drawing from Robert
Fludd, Utriusque Cosmi Historia (1619). Explorer
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3. INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL
SCIENCE JOURNAL
EPISTEMOLOGY
OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
0020 8701
102
Editorial
565
General analyses
Ernest Gellner
T h e scientific status of the social sciences
567
Stefan Nowak
Philosophical schools and scientific working methods
in social science
587
Emérita S. Quito
Value as a factor in social action
603
Claude A k e
Commodification of the social sciences
615
Disciplines
Philippe Braillard
Edmund Burke III
Milton Santos
The social sciences and the study of international
relations
627
The institutionalization of sociology in France:
its social and political significance
643
Geography in the late twentieth century: n e w roles
for a threatened discipline
657
T h e social science sphere
T . V . Sathyamurthy
Development research and the social sciences in India 673
G . B . Benko
Regional science: evolution over thirty years
699
Jacques Lombard
The teaching of anthropology: a comparative study
713
Books received
Recent Unesco publications
' '
-
725
727

4. Editorial
There are ways in which scientific activity
resembles the practice of a sport. A sportsm a n must observe his movements and analyse
them in detail, in order to improve his
performance. Similarly, the researcher should
not overlook professional self-analysis and
reflection about the direction and scope of his
work, finding theoretical and methodological
ways to improve his results and better dominate his subject.
Indeed, this type of analysis cannot be
isolated from research activity itself. This is of
particular importance in the case of the
sciences of m a n and society, where the relations between the researcher and his field of
research present certain special characteristics
different from those prevailing in the sciences
of life and nature. H o w e v e r , the epistemológica! foundations of social science research
are not always explicitly stated; neither are
they analysed as systematically as they should
be. The theory of knowledge provides opportunities for a refreshing look at the social
sciences, provided that the Charybdis of
obsessive preoccupation with epistemology is
avoided as clearly as the Scylla of a narrowminded empiricism.
The articles in this issue are devoted, to
such a self-examination of the social sciences,
and present viewpoints o n certain of their
epistomological, axiological and institutional
aspects. Ernest Gellner raises the question
of ascertaining whether the social sciences
should be admitted into the exclusive club of
the sciences. C a n the social world be studied
scientifically, or should it b e left to the
philosophers and poets? Gellner has no readym a d e answer to offer, but h e eloquently
demonstrates the weakness of attempts to
exclude the social sciences from the scientific
realm. Stefan N o w a k broaches the relations
between the scientific methods used in sociology and various philosophical schools and
shows h o w methodological choices indicate
philosophical and epistemological preferences. Emérita Quito's contribution analyses
the relations between values as an object to
be studied, and values as factors influencing
social science research. Claude A k e offers an
approach that could be called a political
economy of the social sciences, showing that
the latter, operating under the constraints of
market laws and within an environment dominated by exchange value and not use value,
are commodified. T h e last three articles of the
thematic section are epistemological analyses
of specific disciplines in various contexts.
E d m u n d Burke III studies the social and
economic forces that shaped the institutionalization of sociology in France, at the turn of
the century, Philippe Braillard discusses the
case of international relations, and Milton
Santos, that of geography.
The texts that appear in ' T h e Social
Science Sphere' are not foreign to the thematic section: T . V . Sathyamurthy describes
the striking growth of the social sciences in
post-independence India; G . B . B e n k o writes
about regional science, an interdisciplinary
field that has developed over the last few

5. Editorial
56
6
decades; and Jacques Lombard provides a historical account of the teaching of anthropology in Belgium, the Federal Republic of
Germany, France, the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom.
Past issues of the ISSJ devoted to topics
related to the current one include: Vol. X V I ,
N o . 4, 1964; Vol. X X , N o . 2, 1968; Vol.
XXII, N o . 1, 1970; Vol. X X I V , N o . 4, 1972;
and Vol. X X I X , N o . 4, 1977. The complete
list of back issues is provided at the end of this
volume.
W e take this opportunity to inform our
readers of a recent change in the editorial
team. Peter Lengyel, editor of this Journal
since 1963, has left Unesco, which he joined
in 1953. His career in the service of the
Organization, devoted to m a n y aspects of
international co-operation in the social sciences, was characterized above all by his
achievements with the ISSJ.
A.K.
[Translated from French]

6. The scientific status
of the social sciences
Ernest Gellner
The idea of the 'scientific'
could they mislead us in this case, by falsely
identifying the object, or cluster of objects,
with which w e are to b e concerned, namely
T h e problem of whether the social sciences are the social sciences? N o . T h e central object of
our inquiry is precisely the social sciences, as
genuinely scientific immediately raises two
actually practised and identified in contemquestions: W h a t are the social sciences? W h a t
porary societies. Public opinion, however
is it to be scientific?
loosely defined, cannot here mislead us,
T h efirstof these questions raises no deep
because the object that concerns us is, preproblems and can be answered by ostensión
cisely, one defined by reference to current
or by enumeration. T h e social sciences simply
cultural norms. W e m a y
are what social scientists
of course also be inprofessionally
practise.
Ernest Gellner, formerly at the Lonterested in s o m e transThe definition thus condon School of Economics and Polisocial, culturally neutral,
tains a covert (but hardly
tical Science, is n o w Professor of
ideal social science, if
very covert) reference
Anthropology at King's College,
there is such a thing; but
Cambridge, United Kingdom. His
to the consensual or m a - ,
our primary concern is
main publications are Words and
jority or uncontested
Things (1959), Thought and Change
with the concrete pracjudgements prevalent in
(1965), Saints of the Atlas (1969),
tices recognized currently
contemporary
societies
Muslim Society (1981) and Nations
as 'social sciences'.
and Nationalism (1983).
and identifying, by their
But the situation is
tacit or express ranking,
quite different w h e n w e
which universities, proc o m e to the second term,
fessional
associations,
which needs to be deindividuals, are as it were
fined—'scientific'. H e r e ,
norm-setting or paradigostensión or enumeration
matic and, in effect, deare of n o help whatever. W e are not specially
fine, by their o w n attribution of labels, the
interested in the question of what society
nature and range of the social sciences.
happens to call 'scientific', or at any rate, the
This covert reference to public opinion or
actual use of this label by our contemporaries
consensus does not vitiate the definition or
is not conclusive. A s a matter of fact, society is
m a k e it circular. Majorities, consensus, the
disunited on this issue, and there is a lot of very
general cultural 'sense of the meeting'—all
significant pushing and pulling going o n about
these are of course not infallible or stable or
just h o w far the blanket of the 'scientific' is to
unambiguous. There is n o contradiction in the
suggestion that public opinion at a given date reach. B u t w e are not interested in holding a
referendum about this, or in seeing which of
is in error. If such sources can be mistaken,

7. 568
the m a n y warring groups manages to impose
its view at any given time. Instead, w e are
deeply concerned with s o m e normative, genuinely authoritative sense of 'scientific'. W e are
interested in finding out whether the social
sciences are really scientific.
This is in itself an interesting and significant fact. In formulating our question—
A r e the social sciences scientific?—we seem
to employ for our subject a term which is
defined conventionally or by denotation—anything currently in fact called by that n a m e ,
ipso facto falls under it—while our predicate is
Platonistic or normative, and intended not be
be at the mercy of h u m a n w h i m or convention. T h e rules of its application are meant
to be based o n s o m e higher, independent
authority.
O u r sentence thus seems logically a
hybrid—the subject is nominalistic or conventional, the predicate is Platonistic, essentialist
and prescriptive. Is such double-talk permissible? I do not think this situation is actually all that anomalous or unusual. But it is
significant.
If both terms were defined conventionally, by reference to the actual or majority or
agreed use of the term, the question would be
easy to answer and lack any profundity or
importance. All w e should need to do would
be to commission a survey, set up tofindout
whether and to what extent people use one
label ('social sciences') in a manner such that
it falls within the range of use of another and
broader label ('scientific'). But no such survey
would in fact be felt to be relevant, or at any
rate conclusive, to the question which w e are
effectively asking.
,
This 'Platonism of the predicate', which
obliges us to treat the term in question as
though it referred to something constituted
quite independently of our choice and custom,
and endowed with authority over us, is
interesting and significant.
Note that it is an old and pervasive
feature of discussions concerning the delimitations of 'science' or 'meaning'. Those
famous demarcation disputes had all the
passion and intensity of circumscribing the
Ernest Gellner
saved and the damned, of defining the licit
and the illicit, of discovering an important
and given truth, and not of just allocating
labels.
Conventionalism with respect to the delimitation of concepts was only invoked, with
some embarrassment and visible lack of conviction, w h e n the theorist found himself cornered by, for instance, the insistent question
concerning the status of the 'verification
principle' itself. W a s it itself an experiential
report, or a convention determining the limits
of a term?
The pretence was maintained that the
verifiability demarcation of meaning or of
science was merely a convention of ours. But
the real spirit in which this delimitation was
proposed was obviously quite different. It was
propounded as an objective, authoritative,
Platonic norm. It circumscribed cognitive
salvation.
There is not a shadow of doubt that
discussions concerning what is and is not
'scientific' are carried on in this utterly Platonistic, normative and non-conventionalist
spirit. These are debates about whether
something is really, really scientific. T h e
debates seem based on the assumption that
what is at issue is an important conceptual
boundary, in the very nature of things, and
altogether beyond the reach of what w e
choose to call what.
Another explanation is available: w e are
not conceptually rigid because w e are Platonists; w e become Platonists because w e are
conceptually rigid. It is w h e n concepts constrain us, that w e turn Platonist malgré nous.
W e cannot always choose our concepts, and
our concepts do often have authority over us.
M a n can do as he will, but he cannot will as
he will; and he cannot always choose his
concepts at will. Sometimes they have an
authority over us w e cannot resist. A n d w h y
are w e in s o m e cases so conceptually rigid,
and w h y do w e allow ourselves to be bondsm e n to the values and imperatives incapsulated in s o m e ideas?
Generically, one m a y say that this happens because some cluster or syndrome of

8. The scientific status of the social sciences
features, locked in with each other in this or
that concept of a given language or style of
thought, has good reasons, so to speak, for
being locked in with each other in just that
manner, with that particular set of ingredients, and for having some kind of compulsive hold over our thought. Moreover, the
moral charge, positive or negative, with which
such concepts are loaded, cannot be prised
away from them. The reasons that lead to the
crystallization of such concepts binding a
cluster of traits m a y be general or specific;
they m a y be inherent in the h u m a n condition
as such, or they m a y be tied to some definite
social or historic situation. But the overall
formula for this occurrence must be something like this: situations arise (and sometimes persist) which impel a given speech and
conceptual community to think in terms of a
concept T, defined in terms of attributes, a, b,
c, etc. ; moreover it is of great importance for
the community as to whether a given object or
practice does or does not fall under T, is part
and parcel of the very life, use and hence
operational definition of that concept. So is its
moral charge. S o m e conceptual boundaries
have an importance for given societies, which
arises from the very nature of their situation,
and which cannot be abrogated by fiat.
569
mere opinion, and with the even m o r e acute
concern with the identification of the true
faith. In the latter case, w e knew only too well
w h y the notion was so important: personal
salvation and damnation depended on it. But
the demarcation of the scientific, though it
m a y overlap, certainly is not co-extensivè (let
alone co-intensive) with either true knowledge or with the true faith.
If this be granted, then what is it?
Sociologizing science to the
second degree: Popper and Kuhn
T h e 'scientific' has not been a crucial and
authoritative notion in all ages and all societies. In societies in which the institution of
the 'sage' was well established, it was natural
that the preoccupation with the distinction between real and spurious knowledge, genuine
and fraudulent access to recipes for good lifestyles and excellence, should become widespread. It was a kind of consumer protection
service for those w h o entered the marketplace for wisdom and counsellor services
about the 'good life'; and it seemed to provide
the first powerful stimulus for the development of the theory of knowledge. In the days
There is no doubt in m y mind that, in of competing putative messiahs, the criteria
modern society, the concept of the 'scientific' for identifying the true one seemed to b e
is precisely of this kind. W e need it, and it demonstratively spectacular rather than episcannot but be an important and authoritative temological. B y the time Revelation came to
notion. A s so often, w e m a y or m a y not be be monopolized and scripturally codified, the
able to specify precisely what it is that w e central preoccupation became, naturally, the
m e a n by it; what m a y b e called Socrates' identification of the unique or nearly unique
paradox, namely that it is possible to use a point of revelation, and of the authenticity of
notion without being able to define it, does the putatively unique message, messenger, or
apply here, as it does so often. But whatever of the permanent institution or series of
it is that goes into the cluster of traits which personal links between the authentic point of
defines the idea, the idea is indisputably communication and the present. Against the
important, and is so to speak non-optional. background of these various institutional and
W e do not k n o w precisely what it is, but w e doctrinal assumptions, each of these quesdo k n o w that it is important and that w e tions, and no doubt other variants of them,
m a d e sense. Although they do have some
can'not tinker with it at will.
overlap and affinity with the question that
The idea of the 'scientific' is such a concerns us here, obviously they are not
notion. But it has not always been so. N o identical with it.
doubt it has some mild affinity with the old
desire to define true knowledge as against
The main point of overlap is that in all of

9. 570
these questions, m e n were concerned with the
validation or legitimation of more specific
claims, in terms of some more general criteria. W h e n one determines whether or not
something is 'scientific', one is ipso facto
deciding whether or not it has a certain
legitimate claim on our attention, and perhaps
even on our credence. T h e status of being
'scientific' is not necessarily the only or the
dominant way of conferring such authority on
specific claims; but it is most certainly at least
one a m o n g such widely heeded and respected
ways of validation. T i m e was when it was not
even one a m o n g m a n y ; when it was, in fact,
unknown.
This, to m y mind, is a crucial clue. W e
needfirstof all to identify those background
social conditions that have engendered this
particular manner of validation, which bring
forth this n e w and potent notion or 'the
scientific', and e n d o w it with authority.
This automatically pushes our inquiry
into a sociological direction—by obliging it to
be sensitive to and concerned with general
differences in kinds of society. A t the very
least, w e shall need to be concerned with the
difference between the kind of society that
does and the kind that does not engender the
concept in question.
There are at least two ways of approaching the problem of defining 'science': the
philosophical and the sociological. T h e philosophical can be characterized as follows: the
practitioner of this approach works in terms of
s o m e kind of model of discovery or of the
acquisition of knowledge, where the elements
in that model are items drawn from individual
activities, such as having ideas, experiences,
setting up experiments, relating the lessons of
experience or the results of experiments to
generalizations based on the initial ideas, and
so forth. A n extreme individualistic theory of
science would be one that offered a theory
and a demarcation of science without ever
going beyond the bounds of a model constructed in this way. Such a theory might
concede or even stress that, in fact, scientists
are very numerous and that they habitually
co-operate and communicate with each other.
Ernest Gellner
But it would treat this as s o m e h o w contingent
and inessential. A Robinson Crusoe could, for
such a theory, practise science. Given resources, longevity, ingenuity and ability, no
achievement of science as w e k n o w it would,
'in principle', be beyond his powers. Those
w h o hold theories of this kind are not debarred from admitting that, in fact, criticism,
testing and corroboration are, generally
speaking, social activities, and that they depend for their effectiveness on a mathematical, technological and institutional infrastructure, which is far beyond the power of any
individual to establish; but they are, I suppose, committed to holding that whether or
not a social environment makes these preconditions available is, as it were, an external
condition of science, but not in any essential
way part of it.1
There are various ways and degrees of
injecting a sociological element into such an
individualistic vision. Minimally, one might
insist that society constitutes an essential precondition—but only society as such, and not
necessarily this or that kind of society. Emile
Durkheim would be an example of such a
position: he held that thought was impossible
without conceptual compulsion, which in turn
depended on the existence of society and,
above all, on communal ritual. This, if true,
turns society into an essential pre-condition of
science and, indeed, of all thought; a genuinely pre-social individual, however able,
long-lived and well-equipped, could never
rise to the formulation of a general idea.2
A second degree of the sociologizing of
the theory of science involves insisting not
merely o n the presence of a society, but of a
special kind of society. Popper's theory of
science seems to be of this kind: society is not
enough, the w o m b of science requires the
'critical spirit'. Closed societies cannot
engender science but an 'open society' can do
so. A n open society is one in which m e n
subject each other's views to criticism, and
which either possesses institutional underpinning for such a practice, or at least lacks
the institutional means for inhibiting it. Popper's views on this matter have a number of

10. The scientific status of the social sciences
LE PROVOCATEUR DE PLOIE
Promethean Science: the rainmaker, D . R .
571

11. 572
aspects that m a y not be altogether in harmony.
W h e n stressing the continuity of trial and
error as the basis of all cognitive advancement
throughout the history of all life, it would
seem that the core secret of scientific method
is something w e share with all organic life and
never needed to learn. ( W e have only someh o w learnt to do it a bit faster and to show
mercy to carriers of unsuccessful ideas.) N o
special institutions seem to be required. In the
context of turning the tables on relativists w h o
invoke the h u m a n inability to overcome
prejudice and interest, however, Popper
seems prepared to concede that m a n y (perhaps
most?) m e n are unwilling to correct their o w n
views in the light of contrary considerations,
and perhaps even need prejudice to m a k e
discoveries at all; but he insists that science is
the kind of institution that is not at the mercy
of the virtues or vices of the persons w h o m a n
it. Public testing by a diversified and uncontrollable community of scientists ensures the
ultimate elimination of faulty ideas, however
dogmatic and irrational their individual adherents m a y be. In this version, science and
its advancement clearly does depend on the
institutional underpinning of this public and
plural testing. O n the other hand again, in the
context of the discussion of the origin of the
scientific spirit, Popper is inclined to invoke
the figures of heroic, Promethean Ionian
founder-liberators, w h o s o m e h o w overcame
their o w n h u m a n proclivity to dogmatism, and
encouraged their disciples to criticize, thereby
inventing science. T h e Ionian proto-Popper
plays a role in this system, similar to that of
the philosopher in The Republic: he and he
alone, by his somewhat mysterious emergence, can break through the vicious circle, to
which otherwise mankind is in thrall.
Popper's overall philosophy is curious in
that science had to be invented in h u m a n
history, when seen as the great act of liberation from the 'closed society', though it had
not originally needed inventing in the general
history of life, for the amoeba had it as its
birthright. Within nature, organisms eliminated faulty hypotheses by eliminating each
other. Savage, pre-scientific m e n also glee-
Ernest Gellner
fully eliminated each other, but not hypotheses; for s o m e reason they allowed ideas to survive, or rather they uncritically preserved
them, instead of eliminating them. Harsh
with each other, they showed tender solicitude for ideas. Modern scientific m e n eliminate hypotheses, but not each other, at any
rate w h e n on their best behaviour. The curious consequence of Popper's philosophy of
history is that there is a kind of Dark A g e
or Fall, which took place between the, first
emergence of humanity and the beginnings
of science and the open society. The amoeba's
birthright was lost somewhere during the
early tribal, over-collectivistic period of
h u m a n history, and was miraculously, heroically recovered in Ionia. It is interesting
that the Dark A g e theory is shared by
Christianity, Marxism and Popper, though in
different forms.
The second currently most influential
philosopher of science, T h o m a s K u h n , would
also seem to sociologize the subject to the
second degree. Society appears in his view to
be essential for the existence and advancement of science, and not just any society
will do: it has to be one endowed with a paradigm. There appear to be societies not so endowed—for instance, the community of social
scientists.3
A s far as one can m a k e out, the crucial
differentia between science-capable and science-incapable societies in this view is just
this—the absence or presence of a paradigm.
K u h n does not seem to have any views
concerning the difference between scientific
and ««-scientific paradigms; a crucial weakness in his position, to m y mind. Paradigms
seem to be not merely incommensurate, but
also to constitute a curiously undifferentiated
class. T h e prophet of their incommensurability seems to have little sense of h o w very
different in kind they are—that some of them
are more incommensurate than others. But in
so far as the importance of paradigms, and the
fact that they are socially carried, perpetuated
and enforced, leads him openly and avowedly
to turn to sociology, he does lay himself open
to Popper's taunt: Which sociology is the

12. 573
The scientific status of the social sciences
philosopher of science to use? Which sociological paradigm m a y he trust, when using
sociology to grapple with the general problem
of the nature of science, so as to illuminate
the standing of all sciences, including sociology itself? B y making all scientific activity
relative to paradigms, and the philosophy of
science dependent on sociology (which is
presumably n o more exempt from paradigmdependence than any other science or inquiry), his position would seem to have an
element of circularity in it.4
W h a t concerns us h e r e is this: both
Popper and K u h n sociologize the philosophy
of science to the second degree, i.e. they
m a k e science dependent not merely on the
sheer existence of society, but on the availability of a special kind of society.
T h e manner in which they do so, h o w ever, is contrasted and indeed diametrically
opposed. For Popper, the only sciencecapable society is one so loosened up in its
social control as to permit criticism even of its
most respected sages (or better still, perhaps,
one endowed with institutional guarantees of:
the possibility or even the encouragement of
such criticism); for K u h n , science is m a d e
possible only by the presence of socialconceptual control sufficiently tight to impose
a paradigm on its m e m b e r s at most (though
not quite all) times, notwithstanding the fact
that paradigms are not logically, so to speak
objectively, binding. They are m a d e binding
by social pressure, which thus makes science
possible. Unless the deep questions are arbitrarily prejudged, science cannot proceed, it
appears. But just as T h o m a s Hobbes insisted
that any sovereign is preferable to anarchy, so
T h o m a s K u h n insists that any paradigm is
preferable to the dreadful freedom of contemporary social scientists, ever questioning and 1
debating fundamentals and for that very
reason, through their great 'openness', inhibiting the emergence of genuine science in
their o w n midst.
It is not necessary here to choose between the near-anarchism of Popper and the
authoritarianism of K u h n , recommending loyalty to paradigms at most times though
evidently retaining the right of occasional
rebellion (during similarly ill-defined, and I
think in principle indefinable, conditions of
'scientific revolution'). W h a t is relevant for
our purpose is to single out an error that they
both share. T o define science, one needs to
sociologize the philosophy of science to the
third, and not merely the second, degree. It is
not sufficient to allow the relevance of society
and to distinguish between science-capable
and science-incapable societies; it is also
necessary to m a k e this distinction in terms of
features of society that do not pertain to their
cognitive activities alone, and to consider
those societies w h e n involved in activities
other than cognition. W e shall need to look at
the impact of cognition on its other activities.
This, in m y terminology, is to sociologize the
subject to the third degree; and it needs to be
done. H o w is it to be done?
Characteristics
of science-capable societies
If w e are to understand w h y the notion of
being scientific is so potent, w h y this accolade
is so very significant, w e must look at what it
is that 'science' does to society, and forget for
a m o m e n t the usual and fascinating question
of h o w it manages to do it. Philosophical
theories of science, such as those that are incorporated in various philosophical attempts
to demarcate science, basically endeavour to
answer the question concerning h o w it is that
science works, h o w it is that the great miracle of scientific progress and consensus is
achieved. But from the viewpoint of identifying what it is that confers such magic and
charm onto science, w e must look not so
m u c h at h o w it is done, but what it is that
is done which is so enchanting. W h y is it
that science makes so m u c h difference to
society, that a special prestige attaches to
any activity that m a y be included within its
charmed circle, and can be withheld from
anything that fails to qualify as 'scientific'?
This contrast, as I formulate it, somewhat
simplifies a m o r e complex reality: philosophers of science are of course also concerned

13. 574
with the features of the output of science,
with the kind of theory it produces. Nevertheless, that tends to be a datum for them: their
problem is—How was it achieved? It is the
sociologist w h o is concerned primarily with
the effects and implications of the kinds of
knowledge that science provides. In the
interest of simplicity of exposition, I shall
pretend that this division of labour is neater
than in fact it is.
This question as posed can best be
answered by offering a highly schematic but
nevertheless relevant sketch history of m a n kind—one that divides this history into three
stages. Trinitarian philosophies of history are
c o m m o n : there is for instance Auguste C o m te's theory of the religious, metaphysical and
positivestages, or Sir James Frazer's doctrine
of the successive dominance of magic, religion
and science, or Karl Polanyi's less intellectualist account of the succession of the
c o m m u n a l , redistributive and market societies. T h e n e w pattern of world history
which is n o w crystallizing in our time and
which constitutes, I believe, the unofficial,
unformulated and sometimes unavowed, but
tacitly pervasive view of history of our age,
is somewhat different. It shares some of the
intellectualism and the high valuation of
science with the Comtist and Frazerian
schemes, though it is m o r e preoccupied than
Frazer at least with the impact of science
on the ordering of society.
T h e crucial stages of h u m a n history are
the following:first,that of hunting and foodgathering; then, that of food production
(agriculture and pastoralism); and, finally,
that based on production, which is linked to
growing scientific knowledge. Theories of historical stages in terms of social organization
do not work: it is the cognitive productive
; base that seems to provide the 'big divide';
and on either side of the big divide w e find a
diversity of social forms. In the present
context, the world of hunters and gatherers
does not greatly concern us. But the difference between the agrarian and the scientific/
industrial world does concern us a very great
deal.
Ernest Gellner
T h e notion of a fully developed agrarian
society includes not merely that of reliance on
food production, but also two other important
features: literacy and political centralization.
Developed agrarian societies are marked by a
fairly complex but relatively stable division of
labour. But it is a mistake to treat the division
of labour as a, so to speak, homogeneous
commodity: its implications for society vary
according to just what it is that is being turned
into a specialism. Literacy and political centralization, the emergence of a clerisy and a
polity, have quite distinctive consequences,
which cannot simply be assimilated to the
minor economic specializations that occur
within the process of production taken on its
own.
Agro-literate polities are not all alike. In
fact, they differ a great deal a m o n g themselves. T h e diversity of agrarian political
regimes is well k n o w n . T h e clerical classes of
agrarian polities also vary a great deal in their
organization, recruitment and ethos. In one
place, they m a y be part of a single, centralized, and jealously monopolistic organization; in another, they m a y be a loose and
open guild, open to all m e n of pious learning. Elsewhere again, they m a y be a closed
but uncentralized caste, or constitute a bureaucracy selected by competitive examination, with an administrative but not a religious monopoly.
Notwithstanding this variety, certain important c o m m o n or generic traits can be observed. Recorded knowledge in such societies
is used for administrative records, notably
those connected with taxation; for communication along a political and religious hierarchy; as parts of ritual and for the codification of religious doctrine, which has a kind
of shadow in the form of word magic, the
compliment paid by manipulative magic to
scriptural religion. Conservation of the written truth, and possibly its implementation, are
central concerns, rather than its expansion in
the form of acquisition of more truth. (Cognitive growth is not yet a plausible ideal.)
Despite inner complexity, sometimes very
considerable, both the status systems and the

14. The scientific status òf the social sciences
'Cognitive despair'. Roger-Viollet.
575

15. 576
cognitive systems within such a society tend to
be fairly stable, and the same tends to be true
of its productive system. T h e normative and
conservative stress, on the written word, in the
keeping of the clerisy, tends to produce a
cultural dualism or pluralism in such a society,
a differentiation between the great (literate)
tradition and little tradition or traditions.
Parts of the written great tradition m a y
contain general ideas of great penetration and
potential, or acute and accurate observations
of reality, or deductive systems of great
rigour; none the less, generically speaking,
one m a y say that a corpus of this kind
s o m e h o w or other had no firm grip on, and
cumulative penetration of, nature. Its main
significance and role, lies rather in social
legitimation, edification, record-keeping and
communication, and not in a genuine cognitive exploration of nature. W h e n it comes to
the manipulation and understanding of things,
the cognitive content of the corpus tends
to be inferior to the skills, such as they are,
of the craftsman or artisan or working practitioner. T h e cognitive despair expressed
with such vigour in the opening speech of
Goethe's Faust is clearly a commentary on
this situation.
With less anguish and perhaps m o r e
indignation, and with a missionary zeal on
behalf of a putative alternative, a similar
sentiment can be found, for instance, in what
might be called the pan-human or carte
blanche populism of Michael Oakeshott. 5
Oakeshott's work enjoyed a considerable
vogue in post-war Britain, and he probably
continues to be the United Kingdom's foremost conservative political philosopher. His
w o r k is highly relevant for the present purpose because, at its base, there is a premiss
that is half-epistemological, half-sociological, and which runs as follows: genuine
knowledge is 'practical', which means that it is
maintained and transmitted by the practice of
a skill, and can be perpetuated only by a living
tradition; and its content can never be adequately seized in written' documents, and
certainly cannot be transmitted from one m a n
to another by writing alone. The illusion that
Ernest Gellner
this can be done, which endows abstract and
written assertions with independent authority,
he names 'rationalism', in a highly pejorative
sense, and he clearly holds it to be the bane of
modern life. Oakeshott's doctrine vacillates
somewhat between, on the one hand, a global
pan-populism, endorsing all traditions, and
damning all their scholasticisms, which they
develop w h e n they adopt writing and printing
and take it too seriously, and, on the other
hand, the endorsement of one specific and
blessed tradition, which, thanks presumably
to an unwritten constitution, c o m m o n law,
and the pragmatic wisdom of W h i g politicians,
has resisted 'rationalism' somewhat better
than others—though about 1945, it did so less
well than it should and aroused his wrath. If it
is the achievement of one distinctive tradition,
can it also be a valid recipe for all of
them—without implicitly contradicting its
o w n central principle, namely the absence of
any abstract and universally valid principles?
T h e reason w h y this Oakeshottian position is highly relevant for our argument is
this: whether or not it provides a good diagnosis of the political predicament of modern
m a n , it does unwittingly provide a very accurate schematic account of the role of abstract
knowledge in the agro-literate polity. It is a
rather good account of the relation between
codified knowledge and practical skills in the
agro-literate polity—but only in the agroliterate polity. T h e scriptures, law codes,
epics, manuals and so forth, in the keeping of
its scribes, jealously preserved and fairly
stable over time, are not superior to the
inarticulate practical wisdom of the life-long
m e m b e r of the clan or guild. They echo,
formalize, distort and travesty that wisdom;
and though, contrary to the anti-'rationalist'
diatribe, reverence for the codified version of
the wisdom m a y on occasion be beneficial—
because, for instance, reverence for the
codified rule makes it less amenable to opportunist manipulation—nevertheless it is true
that the absolute authority claimed for the
writ in the scribe's keeping is not justified.
The written theory is parasitical on the
lived praxis. So be it; or at any rate, so it was,

16. The scientific status of the social sciences
577
once, in the agro-literate polity. It is so no label. I believe this kind of 'continuity thesis'
to be mistaken.)
longer.
This, as it were, external, sociological
But it is conspicuously untrue of modern
science and the society based on it. A s a social account of science, described from the viewp h e n o m e n o n , modern natural science has a point of what it does to the cognitive m a p and
productive processes of society (leaving aside
number of conspicuous features:
1. Though not completely consensual, it is the question of its inner mechanics, the secret
of its success), m a y of course be challenged. It
consensual to an astonishing degree.
2. It is intercultural. Though it flourishes m a y be denied that science constitutes the
m o r e in some countries than in others, it victory of trans-social, explicit, formalized
appears capable of persisting in a wide and abstract knowledge, over privately, inefvariety of cultural and political climes, and fably communicated insights or skills or sensitivities. It m a y be asserted that the goldento be largely independent of them.
3. It is cumulative. Its growth rate is astonish- egg-laying goose is not, after all, radically
ing. This is also, a m o n g cognitive systems distinct from the old practical skills. The
perception and understanding of a scientific
in general, unique.
4. Though it can evidently be taught to m e n problem, the capacity to propound and test a
originating in any cultural background, it solution, 'requires—it can be argued—some
requires arduous and prolonged training, in flair or spirit or 'personal knowledge' which is
thought styles and techniques that are in no beyond the reach of words or script, and
w a y continuous with those of daily life, and which cannot be formalized. Fingerspitzengefuehl (adroitness) is alive and well, and, more
are often highly counter-intuitive.
important, remains indispensable. Michael
5. T h e continuously growing technology it
Polanyi was only one adherent, though possengenders is immeasurably superior to,
ibly the best k n o w n one, of such a view. 7
and qualitatively distinct from, the practical skills of the craftsmen of agrarian
It is difficult to say h o w one could
society.
evaluate this claim. It is sometimes supported
It is these features, or others closely related to by arguments such as the infinite regress of
them, which have engendered the persistent formalization, which can never catch up with
8
and haunting question—what is science? T h e itself; whatever is asserted is only a case of
question is no longer—what is truth, wisdom 'knowing that', and presupposes further pracor genuine knowledge? M e n possessed by the tical 'knowing h o w ' to apply it—and if that in
haunting question concerning the nature of turn is articulated and m a d e explicit, the
science do not necessarily deny that knowl- initial argument applies once again, and so on
edge or truth also exist outside science; they for ever. O r it can be supported by the widely
do not all say, as an anti-scientistic book once held and plausible view that while there can
ironically put it, 'extra scientiam nulla salus'.6 be a logic of testing, there is no logic of
But they are generally imbued with the sense discovery—only free-floating, uncontrollable
of the distinctiveness of this kind of k n o w - inspiration, which comes or does not c o m e as
ing, and wish to locate its source. They do not it wills, but appears to be m o r e willing to
want to kill the goose that lays the golden descend upon well-sustained, but elusive and
eggs, they only wish to identify it, so as to use indefinable, research traditions.
it to the full, and perhaps to guide it to n e w
But even if all this is admitted, what
fields. (Some do wish to equate knowledge matters from the social viewpoint is that the
with scientific knowledge, not because they ratio, the entire balance, between ineffable
despise and abjure pre-scientific cognitive practical skill or flair on the one hand, and
styles, but because they consider them to be explicit formal knowledge, is transformed out
basically similar to science, being merely of all recognition in a science-using, industrial
earlier and feebler, and to deserve the same society. E v e n if an element of flair or tra-

17. 578
dition, which is beyond words, is crucial
for the occasional outstanding great n e w discovery, or, in small regular doses, for the sustaining of a vigorous research tradition, yet
the enormous mass of ordinary research and
technological activity works quite differently:
it rather resembles the old explicit scholasticisms of agro-literate society, except in one
crucial way—it works. Scholasticism, for all
its ineffectiveness, seems to have been a
good preparation of genuinely productive
vigour. Talmudic societies take to science
with alacrity. .
Its general implications for the society
which uses science are also fairly obvious. A
society endowed with a powerful and continuously growing technology lives by innovation, and its occupational role structure is
perpetually in flux. This leads to a fair amount
of occupational mobility and hence to a
measure of equality, which, though not sufficient to satisfy out-and-out egalitarians, is
nevertheless far greater than that of most
agrarian societies. It is egalitarian because it is
mobile, not mobile because it is egalitarian.
Mobility, frequent abstract transmission of
ideas, and the need for universal literacy, i.e.
fairly context-free communication, also lead
to a completely n e w role of culture in society:
culture is linked to school rather than h o m e
and needs to be fairly homogeneous over the
entire catchment area of an educational system. A t long last, 'great traditions' really
dominate, and to a large extent supplant,
'little traditions'. So the state, which once m a y
have been the defender of the faith, n o w
becomes in effect the protector of a culture.
In other words, the m o d e r n national state,
(based on the principle—one state, one culture) becomes the n o r m , and irredentist
nationalisms emerge where this norm fails to
be satisfied. T h e unprecedented.potential for
growth leads to cornucopianism, the attempt
to b u y off discontent and to smooth over
social conflict..by incremental Danegeld all
round—and this in turn, as w e n o w k n o w only
too well, becomes a dreadful trap w h e n , the
incremental Danegeld having become an engrained, as-of-right expectation, the cornu-
Ernest Cellner
copia temporarily dries up or even just slows
d o w n , as from time to time in the nature of
things it must.
These seem to be the generic traits of science-using society. They differentiate it profoundly from most or all agrarian societies,
which are Malthusian rather than growth
oriented, cognitively and productively stable
rather than growing (innovations when they
occur involve changes of degree rather than
kind, and in any case come as single spies, not
in battalions). Theories of historical stages or
epochs in terms of social organization (capitalism/socialism is the most popular) seem to
have failed, in as far as science-using (i.e.
industrial) society appears to be compatible
with diverse forms of organization, within the
limits of their shared generic traits; but those
traits, in turn distinguish it from all its predecessors. T h e question about the nature of
science is in effect the issue of the nature of
this distinctive style of cognition, which in
turn defines an entire stage in the history of
mankind.
S o m e main philosophical
theories of science
Philosophical theories of science, as here
defined, do not define science, as was done
above, in the sociological manner, in terms of
what it does to society. They tend to ignore
that. Instead, they try to identify the secret
that enables it to do it.
It is impossible to list here all the contending theories in thisfield,and even if w e
listed them, w e would have no w a y of deciding between them. There is no consensus
in this area. Science m a y be consensual; the
theory of science is not.
But it is worthwhile, for our purpose, to
list some of the main contenders:
1. Ultra-empiricist: stick to observable facts.
Accumulate them, and only go beyond
them w h e n the accumulated data strongly
point in.some one direction. A b o v e all, do
not trespass into the transcendent! This
cautious version of empiricism, associated

18. The scientific status of the social sciences
2.
3.
4.
5.
with B a c o n or H u m e , and surviving in
m o d e r n behaviourism, has been m u c h decried of late. Its detractors d o not always
fully appreciate the fact that the interdict
o n cognitive trespass once had a great
value. T h e belief systems of agrarian societies were often so constructed as to b e
cunningly self-maintaining in a circular
w a y , and the 'interdict o n trespass' w a s the
best w a y of eliminating these.
T h e Kantian diagnosis, which is a mixture
of the 'interdict on trespass' with reco m m e n d e d daring within proper bounds,
and within the conceptual limits allegedly
imposed by the structure of the h u m a n
mind.
Collective self-propulsion by the resolution
of internal contradictions, with deference
to privileged praxis—the praxis of the
privileged class is a privileged praxis—and
to the direction of a prescribed social
development. This is the nearest I can get
to formulating o n e of the theories of
knowledge c o m m o n l y associated with
Marxism.
M a x i m u m daring of hypothesis within the
limits of testability, the Popperian theory.
Obedience to a given background picture
(thus eliminating the chaos characteristic of
unscientific subjects, and ensuring c o m parable w o r k and thus cumulation) except
at rare, 'revolutionary' occasions, which
cannot b e generically characterized nor
presumably predicted, and which then
lead to a progressive replacement of o n e
background picture b y another. Within
the limits of this theory, which declares
these successive background pictures to be
incommensurate, there cannot however
be any rational w a y of showing that the
post-revolutionary picture is superior to
the one it replaced. T h o u g h the idea of
scientific progress is presupposed, a n d
indeed sets the problem, it cannot coherently b e asserted, for it would require
the comparison of successive 'paradigms',
which are said to b e incommensurate,
by comparing them to s o m e meta-paradigm, which ex hypothesi w e do not and
59
7
cannot possess. This is the much-discussed theory propounded b y T h o m a s
Kuhn.9
6. T h e successive improvement of collectives
of propositions with a view to enhancing
both external predictions and manipulation
and internal coherence and elegance, b y
m e t h o d s asserted to b e continuous with
those which governed biological evolution.
This is pragmatism, ably represented in our
time by W . v a n O . Q u i n e . 1 0 In his version, it asserted the 'continuity thesis' m o r e
coherently than is the case in the w o r k of
P o p p e r (where it clashes with the discontinuity between 'open and closed' thought).
If a major break in the cognitive history of
life occurred at all, in this logical-pragmatist version, it arose at the point where
abstract entities c a m e to b e used and in a
w a y acquired reality, thus permitting the
dramatic growth of mathematics.
This is not the place to debate the merits of
these theories. N o doubt there are others. But
w e shall need to refer to the themes that occur
in them—such as accurate observation,
testing, mathematicization, shared conceptual currency, and the abstention from transcendence or circularity.
M y argument has been that b y 'science' is
m e a n t a type of cognition which has radically,
qualitatively transformed m a n ' s relation to
things: nature has ceased to b e a d a t u m and
b e c o m e eligible for genuine comprehension
and manipulation. Science is a distinctive
cognitive system with s o m e mysterious builtin m e c h a n i s m ensuring sustained a n d perpetual growth—which has been profoundly
beneficial for h u m a n productive systems, and
corrosive for our systems of social legitimation. W e d o not really k n o w h o w this
sustained and consensual growth is achieved,
but w e d o k n o w that it is achieved, and
'science', is the n a m e for the m a n n e r in which
it is d o n e , whatever it m a y b e . H e n c e the
question concerning whether social studies are
or are not to b e properly included within the
limits of science is b y n o m e a n s merely
terminological: W e are asking whether the

19. 580
same kind of thing is happening in our
understanding and manipulation of society.
But this w a y of presenting the issue
contains one important simplification. It
suggests that the evaluative charge contained
in the appelation 'science', because of its
implied promise of understanding and control, is entirely, wholly and unambiguously
positive. This is by no means so. Though there
exists one major academic industry of producing books telling social scientists what science
really is and h o w they can turn themselves
into genuine scientists, there also exists
another, with at least asflourishingan output,
putatively establishing that the study of m a n
and society cannot be scientific, or, alternatively, if the positively loaded term 'scientific'
is to be retained, that they are scientific, but
in a sense radically different from that which
applies in natural science. The idea that the
methods of natural and social science are
basically identical, is nowadays almost a
definition of 'positivism', and positivism is a
term which in recent years has more often
than not been used pejoratively. This is
significant: originally, the central theme of
positivism was the interdict on transcendence.
M o d e r n anti-positivism seeks to escape from
the weaknesses that flesh and fact are heir to
(notably contingency and corrigibility), no
longer to some transcendent realm of pure
and certain truths such as were fashionable in
agrarian days, but to the social and h u m a n
realm; and to do so, it must insist that the
h u m a n or cultural is radically distinct
from nature. O n e also sometimes has the impression that a 'positivist' is anyone w h o
subjects a favoured theory to the indignity of
testing by mere fact.
T h e arguments purporting to prove that
the study of m a n and society cannot be
scientific (variant reading: can only be scientific in a sense radically different from that
applicable to the. study of nature) can also be
catalogued. Authors upholding this view of
course often combine or conflate these various points. N o n e the less, it is useful to list
them separately.
1. T h e argument from idiography. H u m a n ,
Ernest Gellner
social or historical phenomena either are
inherently individual; or our concern is
with their individual and idiosyncratic
aspects; or, of course, both.
2. T h e argument from holism. Society is a
unity; the 'principle of internal relations',
which insists that everything is what it is in
virtue of its relationships to everything else
within the same system, applies to it. If the
main device of old metaphysics was the
reality of abstract objects, then this idea, in
various terminologies, is the central device
of modern socio-metaphysics. Empirical
inquiry, however, can ex hypothesi deal
only with isolated facts, and it cannot seize
any totality. Hence empirical inquiry essentially distorts and misrepresents social reality. This doctrine can be combined with
the view that it is the actual function,
conscious or latent, of empirical factual
inquiry to hide social reality and distort our
perception of it, in the service of the
established order, which has cause to fear
clear-sighted perception of social reality on
the part of the less privileged members of
society. This view can also naturally be
fused with a special dispensation for the
propounder himself and those like-minded,
w h o possess some means of privileged
cognitive access to the real nature of
society, insights that are beyond the reach
of mere atomic empirical facts, garnered by
the ideological watch-dogs of the established order. 11
3. T h e argument from the complexity of
social p h e n o m e n a can be used to reinforce
the preceding two arguments.
4. T h e argument from meaning. H u m a n
actions and institutions are identified not
by some shared physical traits, but in terms
of what they m e a n to the participants. This
fact (if such it is) can be held, wholly or
partly, to entail the exemption of h u m a n or
social phenomena either from causation or
from external and comparative empirical
investigation, or of course from both. The
argument can be put thus: the nexus that
exists between natural phenomena or
classes of events is independent of any one

20. The scientific status of the social sciences
581
'The Pirandello effect', a w a y of breaking d o w n the neat distinction between actors and spectators of a
play. A scene from Pirandello's Six Characters in Search of an Author. A 1936 performance by the Pitoeff
C o m p a n y in Paris. Rogcr-vioiict.
society, c o m m o n to t h e m all, and blind to
the meanings prevailing in any o n e of
t h e m . B u t actions are identified b y w h a t
they m e a n to the participants, a n d the
m e a n i n g s that identify t h e m are d r a w n
from the, as it w e r e , semantic pool of a
given culture, w h i c h n e e d not b e , a n d
perhaps never is, identified with the reservoir of meanings used b y another culture.
H e n c e there cannot b e a valid causal
generalization in which o n e of the links is a
class of actions, i.e. events b o u n d together
only b y the so-to-speak collectively private
m e a n i n g s that h a p p e n to b e in use in a
given culture, for these d o not overlap with
any so-to-speak natural kind or category.
Nature could not recognize a n d identify
t h e m a n d thus cannot apply a n y causal
lever to t h e m . A s for the links obtaining b e t w e e n t w o or m o r e such socially

21. 582
Ernest Gellner
meaningful categories, they are themselves
criticism). This movement stands to the
established in virtue of the semantics of the
'social construction of reality' as Fichte did
culture in question, and can only be appreto Hegel; the ego rolls its o w n world,
hended by penetrating, learning that sysinstead of the world rolling itself in a kind
tem, and not by external investigation.
of collective effort. But the temporal order
Comparative intersocial research and genseems reversed this time round, for Fichte
eralizations are absurd and impossible, in
preceded Hegel. This view combines idealso far as the systems of meanings of diverse
ism with idiographism.
cultures are not comparable or overlap- 7. The Pirandello effect. The allusion is to the
ping, or only contingently and partially
device most powerfully developed by Luigi
so. 12 A historical c o m m e n t one m a y allow
Pirandello for breaking d o w n the neat
oneself on this position is that idealism is
distinction between characters, actors, proalive and well, and operates under the n a m e
ducers, authors and spectators of a play.
of hermeneutics. T h e views that had once
His plays, in which characters discuss the
been articulated with the help of terms
further development of the plot with each
such as Geist or spirit n o w see the light of
other and, seemingly, the author or m e m day in terms of 'meaning' or 'culture'.
bers of the audience, are of course meant
to induce bewilderment in the audience by
5. 'The social construction of reality'.13 This
undermining the comfortable separation
argument clearly overlaps with the precedof stage and auditorium, by compelling
ing one; perhaps it is identical with it,
involvement by the spectator. T h e play,
differing only in the style of presentation
he seems to say, is not a spectacle but
and in its philosophical ancestry. T h e
a predicament. So in observation of
preceding formulation is rooted above all
social reality—and this, it is claimed, disin the work of L . Wittgenstein, whereas
tinguishes it from nature. O n e charge
this one springs from the ideas of E . H u s which has been m a d e against empiricist or
serl and A . Schutz.
scientistic social research (though it has not
6. T h e so-called 'individual construction of
as yet been m a d e in these words) is that it
reality'. This slogan, though not as far as I
pretends that a society can be a spectacle,
k n o w actually used by the movement in
and not a predicament, for the investiquestion, could be used to characterize the
gator. This pretence, the critics insist, is
approach of a recently fashionable school
false. It constitutes deception of others
k n o w n as 'Ethno-methodology' and associ14
and, if sincere, constitutes self-deception
ated with the n a m e of Garfinkel. T h e
into the bargain. W e m a k e a commitment
central doctrine of this m o v e m e n t appears
in our choice of ideas or problems or
to be that of our ability to describe (make
interpretations, and the choice is not or
'accountable') events is something w e indicannot be impartial or guided by logical
vidually achieve, and that consequently the
criteria alone, or perhaps at all. Thus, the
only scientific understanding available is
inescapable involvement of the investigator
the description (?) or highlighting (?) or
in his subject-matter makes any pretence at
exemplification of the very acts of indivi'scientific objectivity' spurious. In actual predual accountability-creation. T h e m o v e sentation, this argument is generally fused
ment is not marked either by lucidity of
with several others in the preceding list.
expression or by willingness to indulge in
rational discussion (a reluctance that can in 8. Special cognitive status for the inquiry into
turn be rationalized in terms of its central
m a n or society can also be claimed not so
insight, which would preclude the testing of
m u c h in virtue of general considerations,
interpersonal generalization, there not besuch as those listed so far, but in virtue of
ing any such; but which also conveniently
alleged special substantive characteristics
places the m o v e m e n t out of reach of
of the specific object or style of inquiry.

22. 583
The scientific status of the social sciences
For instance, in the lively debate concerning the scientific status of psycho-analysis,
the claim is sometimes m a d e (in defence of
the legitimacy of this technique) that the
eccentric methods employed in it (by the
standards prevailing in other inquiries) are
justified by the very peculiar nature of the
object investigated, i.e. the unconscious.
Its cunning and deviousness in the face of
inquiry, which it tries to evade and deceive,
justify cognitive emergency measures,
which would be held illicit by the rules
of evidence prevailing in the normal courtrooms of science. Faced with so ruthless an
e n e m y , the investigating magistrate is
granted special powers and dispensed
from the normal restrictions on methods
of inquisition. T h e unconscious cannot be
apprehended in any other way, and the
difficulty and urgency of the task justifies
extreme methods. (Whether these really
serve to outwit the quarry, or merely protect the reputation of the hunter, by ensuring that he is never convicted of fundamental error, is another question.)
There is no space here to attempt any kind of
thorough evaluation of all these negative
arguments. Suffice it to say that none of them
seem to m e remotely cogent. Take for instance the one which m a y seem most powerful, namely the one to the effect that the
categories of actions or events in a given
culture are defined in terms of the meanings
current within that culture, which are so to
speak private to that culture, and not coextensive with 'natural kinds'. This, though true as
far as it goes, in no w a y precludes even a
physical determinism for the events within the
culture in question. It merely precludes the
identification of the determined events (if
such they are) in terms of the meanings current in the culture. T h e determining forces,
so to speak, will select the events they
bring out in terms of s o m e characteristics that
only accidentally and contingently overlap
with the meanings that accompany and seem
to guide the events. For instance, w h e n w e
watch afilm,w e k n o w full well that what will
happen is already determined; and it is deter-
mined by the pattern found on the reels which
is being transmitted from the projection room.
T h e meaningful connections which interest us
and which appear to guide and give sense to
the series of events observed in the story on
the screen are really quite epiphenomenal and
powerless. W e do not actually k n o w that our
life is like that, and most of us hope that
indeed it is not; but the argument from the
meaningfulness of social life, alas, in no way
establishes that it cannot be so.
If on the one hand the arguments purporting to establish that h u m a n and social
life cannot be subject to scientific explanation
are invalid, then, on the other hand, any
inspection of the lively and vigorous discussions in the field of the philosophy of
science indisputably reveal one thing—that
the issue of the nature of science, of the
identification of that secret which has m a d e
possible the unprecedented, totally unique
rate of cognitive growth since the seventeenth
century, remains unsolved. W e have some
very impressive candidates for the solution,
powerfully and elegantly presented. But to
have an impressive short list is one thing, and
to have a firmly identified, recognized, acclaimed winner is quite another. A n d that
w e do not have. T h e situation simply is that
science is consensual, and the philosophy of
science is not.
T h e two contentions which have been
affirmed—the putative demonstrations of the
impossibility of science in social spheres are
invalid, and the absence of an agreed account
of w h y and h o w science works in thefieldsin
which plainly it does work—will be crucial in
answering the question to which this essay is
devoted, namely whether or not the social ~
sciences are indeed scientific.
Conclusion
The question n o w in effect answers itself—
once w e have broken it up into its constituent,
normally conflated subquestions or variant
interpretations.
W e canfirstof all check the activités of

23. 584
social sciences for the presence or absence of
the various traits that figure prominently in
diverse theories of science. Those traits are:
T h e presence of Well-articulated hypotheses
and their systematic testing.
Precise quantitative measurement, and the
operationalization of concepts.
Careful observation b y publicly checkable
methods.
Sophisticated and rigorous conceptual structures, and great insights.
Shared paradigms, at any rate over sizeable
communitites of scholars, and persisting
over prolonged periods.
There can be no serious doubt that all these
traits, often in combination, can be found in
diverse social sciences. M a n for m a n , or
community for community, it is doubtful
whether social scientists are inferior, in intellectual daring and ingenuity, in formal rigour,
in precision of observation, to the practitioners of disciplines whose scientific status
is not normally doubted. A s a distinguished
philosopher of science, Hilary Putnam, ironically and compassionately observed, 'the poor
dears try so m u c h harder'. 15 A s indicated, w e
do not k n o w the secret of science; w e do not
k n o w just which of the m a n y blazing beacons
w e are being offered really is the 'sacred fire'.
W e do k n o w that m a n y beacons are ablaze,
and given the short-list supplied to us by the
philosophers of science, w e rather think that
one of them (or perhaps a number of them
jointly) is it. But which one?
M o r e concretely, w e do k n o w that m a n y
of the indisputable characteristics of science
are often present in social research. T h e
aspects of social life that are inherently
quantitative or observable with precision (e.g.
in fields such as demography or social geography) are indeed investigated. with precision and sophisticated techniques; w e k n o w
on the other hand that sophisticated and elaborate abstract models are developed in various areas and serve as shared paradigms to
extensive communities of scholars (e.g. economists); and on the other hand, in spheres
where the conceptual apparatus is not so very
far removed from the ideas of c o m m o n sense,
Ernest Gellner
w e nevertheless k n o w that a well-trained
practitioner of the subject possesses understanding and information simply not available
prior to the development of the subject. In all
these senses, social studies are indeed scientific. Large areas of them do satisfy one or
another of the m a n y available, and convincing, theories of the sacred fire. A n d our
collective life would be m u c h poorer without
them.
So m u c h for the satisfaction of the
hallmarks of science, as they are specified by
the philosophy of science. But w e obtain a
different picture if w e look at it from the
viewpoint, not of methods employed, but of
the impact o n our cognitive world: if w e ask
whether there is a generally overall consensual cognitive activity, radically discontinuous
from the insights and techniques of ordinary
thought, and unambiguously cumulative at
an astonishing and unmistakable rate. T h e
answer is obvious. In this crucial sense, in
terms of their impact on our social order,
social studies are not scientific—much as they
m a y rightly claim to be so by the previous
criterion or criteria. They claim to have stolen
the sacred fire. Does anyone pay them the
compliment of wishing to steal it from them?
W e can try to break up this failure into its
constituent parts. The quantitatively accurate
descriptive techniques are not accompanied
by correspondingly convincing theory of similarly accurate prediction. T h e sophisticated
abstract models do not firmly mesh in with
empirical material. The powerful insights are
not consensual. Paradigms exist and prevail,
but only in subcommunities; and when they
succeed each other the situation is quite
different from that which prevails in natural
science. In natural science, w e are generally
sure that there is progress, but have great
difficulty in explaining h o w it is possible that
w e can k n o w that this is so, given that there is
no c o m m o n measure for comparing successive
visions. In the social sciences w e are spared
this worry. W e need not puzzle about h o w it is
that w e can k n o w that w e are progressing,
because w e are not so very sure that w e have
indeed progressed. T h e partisans of a n e w

24. 585
The scientific status of the social sciences
paradigm m a y , of course, b y sure concerning
their o w n particular leap (they usually are);
but they are seldom sure about the w h o l e
series of leaps that constitute the history of
their subject. O n the contrary, their o w n leap
is very often a reverse leap, a return to an
earlier m o d e l .
If I a m right about the logical inadequacy
of the alleged proofs of the ineligibility of the
social world for science, w e need not despairingly conclude (or confidently h o p e , as the
case m a y b e ) that this will always continue to
be so. If indeed the sacred fire of science has
not yet b e e n identified, w e d o not k n o w h o w
to r e m e d y this situation. T h e question remains o p e n . B u t I suspect w e shall k n o w that
the social sciences h a v e b e c o m e scientific,
w h e n their practitioners n o longer claim that
they have at long last stolen the fire, b u t
w h e n others try to steal it from t h e m ; w h e n
the philosophy of social science b e c o m e s a
search for an ex-post explanation of a cognitive scientific miracle, rather than for a recipe
or promise for bringing it about.
Notes
1. Sir Karl Popper has
propounded the much-discussed
doctrine of methdological
individualism, which requires all
explanations in the social
sciences to be, ultimately, in
terms of the aims and beliefs of
individuals, and which precludes
the invocation of holistic social
entities, other than as a kind of
shorthand (see for instance,
Karl Popper, The Open Society
and Its Enemies, Princeton
N . J . , Princeton University
Press, 1966). At the same time,
Popper has more recently
argued in favour of a 'World
Three' (see Karl Popper,
Objective Knowledge, Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1972), a realm
of objects of thought, in
addition to the relatively wellestablished Cartesian worlds of
external objects and internal
experiences. It is interesting that
some of the arguments invoked
in support of this doctrine—the
incorporation in a social
tradition and its equipment of a
wealth of ideas never accessible
to any one man—are precisely
those which led some others to
be tempted by social holism. Is
there m u c h gained by option for
an essentialist rather than holist
terminology for indicating the
same facts? I suppose it depends
on whether all such cultural
worlds are simply parts of one
and the same third world, or
whether they are allowed, each
of them, to m a k e its o w n
world, which need not be
commensurate or compatible
with others. In the former case,
a Platonic language for
describing this would seem more
appropriate; in the latter, a
sociological-holistic one. It
should be added that his
individualism does not oblige
him to see science as only
contingently social; on the
contrary, in the appropriate
sense, he sees it as essentially
social. This is discussed later in
this essay.
2. Émile Durkheim, Elementary
Forms of Religious Life, tr.
Joseph W . Swain, Free Press,
' 1954. T h e main contrast
between the two great
sociologists, Durkheim and
Weber, is precisely in their
attitude to rational thought:
:
Durkheim sees this as a
characteristic of any society and
correlative with social life as
such, whereas M a x W e b e r is
preoccupied with it as a
differential trait, present in o n e
tradition far more prominently
than in all others. So one sees
rationality as ever-present, and
its explanation is ipso facto the
explanation of society: there w a s
indeed a social contract, but it
had the form of ritual, not of a
compact. The other sees it as
present in an uneven m a n n e r ,
and its explanation coextensive
not with society as such, but of
the emergence and distinctive
nature of one kind of society,
namely that which concerns us
most, our o w n .
3. T h o m a s K u h n , The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd
ed., Chicago, 111., University of
Chicago Press, 1970.
4. Ibid., pp. vii-viii.
5. Michael Oakeshott,
Rationalism in Politics and Other
Essays, London, Methuen
& Co., 1962.
6. Paul Feyerabend, Against
Method, N . L . B . , 1975.

25. Ernest Gellner
586
7. Michael Polanyi, Personal
Knowledge: Toward a Post
Critical Philosophy, Chicago,
111., University of Chicago Press,
1974.
8. Gilbert Ryle, 'Knowing H o w
and Knowing That' Presidential
Address, Aristotelian Society,
Proceedings, Vol. X L V I ,
1945/46, pp. 1-16; Lewis
Carroll, 'Achilles and the
Tortoise' in The Complete
Works of Lewis Carroll,
N e w York, Random House,
1939.
9. Kuhn, op. cit.
10. Willard van O r m a n Quine,
From a Logical Point of View:
Nine Lógico—Philosophical
Essays, 2nd. rev. ed.,
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard
University Press, 1961.
11. Theodor Adorno et al.,
'Sociology and Empirical
Research' in Theodor Adorno et
al. (eds.), The Positivist
Dispute in German Sociology,
pp. 68-86, London,
Heinemann, 1976.
12. A n argument of this kind is
found in: Peter Winch, The Idea
of a Social Science and its
Relation to Philosophy,
Humanities Press, 1970. A n
even more extreme formulation
of this position, combined with
an ideographiom à outrance, is
found in: A . R . Louch,
Explanation and Human Action,
Oxford, Blackwell, 1966. This
position has been frequently
criticized; see, for instance,
Robin Horton's 'Professor
Winch on Safari' in Archives
européennes de sociologie,
Vol. X V I I , N o . 1, 1976; or
Percy Cohen, 'The Very Idea of
a Social Science', in I. Lakatos
and A . Musgrave (eds.),
Problems in the Philosophy of
Science, North Holland Press,
1968. Or m y own 'The N e w
Idealism', in I. C . Jarvie and
J. Agassi (eds.), Cause and
Meaning in the Social Sciences:
London, Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1973.
13. Peter L . Berger and
Thomas Luckman, The Social
Construction of Reality: A
Treatise on the Sociology of
Knowledge, Irvington Press,
1980.
14. See Harold Garfinkel,
Studies in Ethnomethodology,
Englewood Cliffs,
N.J., Prentice Hall, 1967. For
critical comments, see a very
witty article by A . R . Louch,
'Against Theorizing',
Philosophy of the Social
Sciences. Vol. V , 1975,
pp. 481-7, or m y o w n ,
'Ethnomethodology: the R e enchantment, Industry or the
Californian W a y of Subjectivity',
Spectacles and Predicaments,
Cambridge, Univeristy Press,
1979.
15. Bryan Magee (ed.), Men of
Ideas, p. 233, Viking Press,
1979.

26. Philosophical schools
and scientific working
methods in social science
Stefan Nowak
Philosophical orientations
in empirical social science
B y philosophical schools, from the point
of view of sociology, w e understand here
different metasociological orientations. T h e
editors of a volume of metasociological
studies characterize this term in the following
way:
T h e title of this article announces an analysis
of relations between the 'working methods' of
the social sciences o n the one hand and
'philosophical schools' o n the other. A m o n g
'Metasociology', a term popularized by Paul
the different 'philosophical schools' w e will
Furley in The Scope and Method of Sociology: A
discuss only those that are (or are believed to Metasociological Treatise, refers to that branch
be)
relevant for the
of sociology concerned
with investigating the
social sciences, and esStefan N o w a k holds the chair of
assumptions and value
pecially for ways of
methodology of sociological investijudgements underlying the
conducting sociological
gations at the Institute of Sociology,
theories and methods e m studies. T h e term 'workUniversity of Warsaw. A m o n g his
ployed by sociologists.
ing methods'- denotes for
principal publications are: Methodology of Sociological Research (1977) Such assumptions and
us here: (a) the different
and Sociology: The State of Art (1982, value judgements often
ways (standardized patbegin with the assertion
co-editor).
terns) of asking questhat sociology is a science
tions about social reality;
and proceed to incor(b) the different stanporate the various theodardized ways of delivretical (ontological) and
methodological (epistemoering answers to these
logical) choices
made
questions, meaning both
daily. Needless to say,
the logical structure of
such assumptive choices dipropositions which m a y
rectly affect the very content of sociology,
constitute such answers and the ways of
thereby making metasociology an enormously
substantiation of these propositions—both
important and far-reaching area of inquiry.
deductively and inductively; and (c) finally,
In m a n y ways, metasociology represents' a
the different standardized ways of organizing
mechanism for mapping the discipline of socithe whole sets of these propositions into m o r e
ology. . . . In doing so, discussions underlying
comprehensive and (in different meanings of assumptions remain analytically distinct from
the term), m o r e coherent descriptive or those of substantive sociology.1
theoretical pictures of that reality concerning
which the initial questions have been adThis passage stresses that the analysis of
dressed.
assumptions (at least s o m e of which are

27. 588
ontological) and of value judgements belong
to sociology. I agree that it is correct that
these assumptions are often used for mapping
different 'theoretical approaches' to the study
of social p h e n o m e n a .
But w h e n used for mapping different
approaches and theories, they are usually
regarded as essential components. T o quote
J. H . Turner:
M u c h of what is labelled sociological theory is,
in reality, only a loose clustering of implicit
assumptions, inadequately defined concepts, and
1
a few vague and logically disconnected propositions. Sometimes assumptions are stated
explicitly, and serve to inspire abstract theoretical statements containing well-defined concepts, but most of sociological theory constitutes
a verbal 'image of society', rather than a rigorously constructed set of theoretical statements
organized into logically coherent format. Thus
a great deal of so-called theory is rather a
general 'perspective' or 'orientation' for looking at various features of the process of institutionalization which, if all goes well, can be
eventually translated into true scientific theory.
T h e fact that there are m a n y such perspectives in sociology poses problems of exposition;
and these problems in turn, are compounded by
the fact that the perspectives blend into one
another, sometimes redering it difficult to analyze them separately.2
For these reasons, it seems m o r e fruitful not
to analyse here all 'theoretical-philosophical
approaches' to the study of society, but rather
particular assumptions that underlie, or m a y
underlie, m o r e than one such school. Fortunately, these assumptions have been the subject of analysis and discussion for m a n y
years, both in the philosophy of science and of
social science. T h e latter have led to the crystallization of a certain n u m b e r of generally
formulated questions, the answers to which
m a y be regarded as equivalent to those assumptions mentioned above. A n y fairly c o m prehensive monograph in the philosophy of
the social sciences3 usually presents a longer
or shorter catalogue of such 'problem dimensions' and defines a certain n u m b e r of possible positions on each. Let us mention here
s o m e of those most frequently discussed.
Stefan Nowak
1. A t one extreme of the first problem dimension w e locate those w h o believe that m a n
is a thinking and feeling being and whose
patterned feelings and ways of thinking
about the world, society and himself constitute such essential components of social
reality that without proper 'understanding'
(Verstehen) of these p h e n o m e n a in the w a y
Dilthey, W e b e r or Znaniecki wanted us to
understand them, any attempt to study
social p h e n o m e n a is fruitless. A t the other
extreme w e usually locate behaviourists
with Skinner in thefirstplace and those
theoreticians of early positivist sociology
(like D o d d or Lundberg) w h o believed that
the study of society and of nature have one
most important feature in c o m m o n — b o t h
should be based only upon the observation
of reality and any other method, like
Verstehen, is n o more than pre-scientific
mysticism.4
2. T h e second frequent problem dimension
deals with the question of whether groups
are real, or whether the attribute of real
existence should be reserved for h u m a n
individuals only. Sometimes this question
refers not to groups or other collectivities
but to their properties. Here w e observe
the clash between holists (sometimes called
'realists') and methodological individualists (or in other discussion contexts—
'nominalists').5
3. T h e third problem dimension—often discussed jointly with the second—is to what
degree the different propositions, and
especially various generalizations and laws
about h u m a n aggregates and social systems
can be explained by the propositions and
laws about 'lower level units' and especially
by the psychological laws of h u m a n behaviour. Here again the reductionists disagree with the emergentists, i.e. those w h o
believe that, at each level of analysis, n e w
regularities and properties m a y emerge,
basically irreducible to the properties and
mechanisms of the lower level.0
4. Then w e have the old dispute between
determinists and indeterminists about the
applicability of the notion of causality to

28. Philosophical schools and scientific working methods in social science
589
thoroughly by M a r x , Simmel, Coser, Dahrthe world in general, and to social life in
endorf and contemporary Neo-Marxists,
particular. T h e applicability of causal
that internal conflict and dysfunction are
thinking to social life in particular. T h e
the essential features of any social system,
applicability of causal thinking to social
at both the macro and the micro levels.
phenomena can be rejected either in principle ('man has free will') or on more 7. If w e look at theories that deal with social
practical grounds—by demonstrating that
behaviour and man's ways of thinking and
causality implies a both exceptionless (i.e.
feeling about himself and the external
general) and spatio-temporally unlimited
social world, w e m a y also find a number of
(i.e. universal) character for the discovered
polarized dimensions along which apregularities, whereas in the social sciences
proaches and theories can be located. For
w e usually discover regularities which are
example, w e m a y believe (with Skinner and
both statistical and 'historical', i.e. limited
some radical behaviourists) that h u m a n
to some spatio-temporal area. In other
nature is basically reactive, that people
words, philosophers of science (and socioreact to external stimuli, and that the patlogists themselves) differ in their opinion as
terns of rewards and punishments shaping
to the degree to which the model of
the learned patterns of behaviour in
universal causal theories, so successful in
society m a y be apprehended in a w a y
certain natural sciences, is applicable to the
similar to the study of rats in an experimenworld of h u m a n thinking and actions and to
tal maze. But w e can also believe with
the functioning and change of the social
'humanistic psychologists', that h u m a n
systems.7
nature has a creative potential and that
aiming towards self-realization is more im5. A t a slightly lower level of abstraction of
portant than reaction to the m a z e of conphilosophical discourse w e find the polarity
straints imposed by the social structure,
of two approaches to the study of a
and the need to exchange rewards and punmultiplicity of people. O n e (called 'pluralishments with others according to certain
8
istic behaviourism' by D o n Martindale )
rules of distributive justice.
assumes more or less consciously that
society is something of an aggregate of hu- 8. Quite another aspect of h u m a n behaviour
m a n individuals, each of w h o m can be exis usually analysed along the dimension
plained by their o w n 'background charac'rational-irrational'. Here w e m a y believe,
teristics' taken in isolation from the
following m a n y 'purposeful action theorcharacteristics and behaviour of other
ists' from W e b e r to Parsons and contempeople—as w e do in analysis of survey
porary proponents of the application of
data. T h e other approach assumes that
normative models of mathematical desociety or social groups and institutions
cision-theory to the explanation of real
constitute a system of interdependent elh u m a n actions, that looking into conscious
ements; the nature of the elements can
h u m a n motives of behaviour interpreted in
properly be understood only by taking
terms of rationally oriented goals—means
into account their systemic contexts.9
relations m a y give us the proper insight.
But w e m a y also follow the line of Freud
6. Even w h e n scientists agree that a systemic
and Pareto and assume that what people
perspective is essential, some of them are
perceive as the motives of their actions are
more inclined to believe (following Spenusually by w a y of being rationalizations
cer, Durkheim, Malinowski or Parsons in
(derivations) from actions not themselves
this belief) that the dominant internal
necessarily guided by principles of rationrelations are those that guarantee the
ality. A n d even if there is agreement that
system its harmonious functioning and
the knowledge of conscious motives is
homeostatic balance, while others have
necessary for the proper explanation of
more sympathy for the idea stressed so

29. 590
behaviour, there m a y b e disagreement
about the methodological scheme of such
explanations. S o m e insist that w e must apply certain 'covering laws' in the scheme of
deductive-nomological explanations, while
others stress the non-nomological character of 'understanding explanations'.11
All these assumptions (and m a n y others) deal
with the nature of reality as applied to social
studies. But w e also find differences of approach to sociology rooted in the differences
of opinion about what should be the sociologist's attitude towards his o w n studies, or
opinions about h o w these studies can or
should be conducted. H e r e w e c o m e across
the old issue of 'objectivity' of social studies
with s o m e w h o believe that studies can be
value-free while others stress that it is impossible to get rid of one's values; therefore the
best thing a social scientist can do is initially to
declare his value preferences continuing to
express them both in his problem-formulation
and in the conduct and findings of his study.
All those w h o recall the disputes around this
problem in the late 1960s k n o w h o w m a n y
different meanings were attached to each.
possible attitude along this dimension. 12 This
applies not only to this particular problem
dimension in the philosophy of social sciences
but to most of them, because not only can
different attitudes be taken along each but
also the dimensions themselves can be, and
were understood in different ways.
U n d e r such circumstances, any attempt
to discuss the relevance of such assumptions
to the whole process of development of
research methodology would probably require
at least a whole volume. H e r e , w e intend to
look only into s o m e m o r e general problems of
relations between the assumptions underlying
sociological studies and the ways these studies
are or should be conducted.
The validity of philosophical
arguments for research
methodology in sociology
W h y should these assumptions play any role
Stefan Nowak
at all? That most philosophers and, m o r e
reflective sociologists believe in their importance does not constitute sufficient proof of
relevance, especially as there are some w h o
are inclined to reject the whole matter c o m pletely. T h u s , Barry Hindess says:
I propose no methodology or epistemology to
the positions criticized here. O n the contrary, I
argue that the problems which these disciplines
pose are false problems and they arise only as a
function of a conception of knowledge which can
be shown to be fundamentally and inescapably
incoherent. Epistemology and such derivative
doctrines as methodology and philosophy of
science have no rational and coherent foundation. In particular there can be no rational
or coherent prescriptive methodology. 13
Methodology, stresses Hindess, tries to prescribe those procedures supposed to be useful
either for generating or for testing n e w
propositions, and tries to validate them on the
basis of philosophical argument. These procedures define what is, and what is not a
science:14
Scientific knowledge is thought to be valid only if
it conforms to the prescribed procedures: it
follows that the prescriptions of methodology
cannot be validated by scientific knowledge. . . .
Methodology lays down procedural rules for
scientific practice which it derives by means of a
'knowledge' provided by philosophy. Methodology is the product of philosophy and the
sciences are a realization of their methodology.14
W e r e this the only possible pattern of relations between science and its methodology
on the one hand and metascientific assumptions on the other, I would agree with Hindess
that this would constitute either a case of
nice tautological circularity or, even worse,
a situation in which the whole of scientific thinking constitutes nothing more than
carrying out the orders of a dogmatic dictatorship of philosophers. Fortunately, this is
not the case, for several reasons.

30. Philosophical schools and scientific working methods in social science
A n allegory of logic, seventeenth-century etching. Explorer.
591

31. 592
The empirical, normative and
analytical premises of problem
formulations and research
methods in sciences
Before w e look at these reasons, let us first
remind ourselves here of the role of less
questionable assumptions in the research process.15 Every empirical study begins (or at
least it should begin) with a set of questions, to which it is supposed to deliver the
answers. 16 A s is well k n o w n , the formulation
of each question logically presupposes that
certain assumptions about the studied objects
or p h e n o m e n a are accepted as valid. If—as
is often the case—these assumptions are not
explicitly formulated, it is because they m a y
seem so obvious that no one cares to recall
them. They would become more obvious if
one were to undertake a study of problems
based on obviously false assumptions. Should
one propose to study the attitudes of the
representatives of the Hispanic minority in
Poland towards the country's political system,
one would be reminded that the question is
'wrong' because it is based upon the obviously
false assumption that a Hispanic minority
exists. O n the other hand, for the undertaking
of a similar study in N e w York, the assumption would be taken for granted. A question is
only applicable to the object or objects that
satisfy its assumptions. But the assumption
does not prescribe any specific answer to the
question. O u r assumptions only classify reality into two subsets: one—in which it
'makes sense' to ask questions, and the other
one—to which the questions do not apply.
T h e same applies to theoretical questions. If one proposes to study in a n e w
experimental project what kind of people are
more likely to 'reduce cognitive dissonance'
than others, one starts from the (explicit or
implicit) assumption that 'cognitive dissonance' exists and that one wants to develop a
more detailed theory describing the conditions
under which this phenomenon is likely to
occur. If a study starts from a set of valid assumptions, it does not matter whether they
Stefan Nowak
have been stated explicitly or only implicitly,
but if a study is begun from a wrong set of
assumptions, one discovers pretty soon
that the questions do not apply to the selected objects and phenomena since one obtains
answers that reject the initial assumptions.
The validity of the assumptions implies
only that w e m a y ask the questions with
respect to a given object or class of objects.
Whether w e ask or not depends additionally
upon our values. Only they can provide the
motivation to undertake a study seeking
answers to given problem formulation.
Whether w e specify our values (curiosity
being definitely one of them) explicitly or
take them for granted does not matter.
Similarly for the assumptions underlying
the use of a certain research method. T h e
formulation and use of m a n y research
methods is based upon certain identical or
descriptive propositions necessary for their
validity. W e m a y recall h o w m u c h theoretical
physics and engineering science underlies the
availability of such 'research tolls' as the
cyclotron, electron microscope, or Wilson
chamber for elementary particles. T h e situation in the social sciences is similar. Thousands of studies have proved that 'projection'
as described by Freud really exists. Hence w e
n o w use 'projective tests' if w e suspect that
subjects m a y have difficulties in revealing
their needs, motives or aspirations. Again, w e
use information about the m a k e of a respondent's car, or visible level of consumption
as 'indirect indicators' of income, because the
correlation between income and levels of
living has been well established.
W h a t these propositions usually imply is
that w e are free to use a given method for a
given cognitive purpose. Whether w e do use
any particular method often depends also
upon certain normative premises (value
assumptions), e.g. the degree of accuracy
yielded by different methods, possible margins of error connected with their use, combined with the costs of applications of each.
Sometimes methodological decisions involve
strictly ethical premises like those which
exclude the application of certain (otherwise

32. Philosophical schools and scientific working methods in social science
efficient) methods for the study of h u m a n
subjects. T h efinalmethodological design of
any study arises from interaction of empirical
considerations relating to accuracy, with certain normative, axiological premises.
Another kind of premise—the analytically valid theorems ('laws') of formal logic or
mathematics—is used in the process of reasoning, in the transformation of the logical
or mathematical implications of one body of
information into another in deductions, in
deriving fresh propositions from those that
have already been tested, etc. Sometimes
these laws or theorems of logical thinking are
so simple (or w e are so used to applying them)
that w e are unaware of using them at all. In
other cases they are so complex that w e
employ the most powerful computers to follow correctly (and with sufficient speed) the
prescribed paths of formal reasoning which
have their source in certain tautologies of
logic and mathematics.
'Visions' of social reality
as sources of philosophical
assumptions
W h a t has been said so far proves only that
sciences do indeed develop in a cumulative
manner, n e w research problems arising from
the state of knowledge in different disciplines
and n e w methodologies attempting to apply
positive knowledge about reality to devise
more efficient research tools. It does not
prove that philosophy—ontology or epistemology—are enlisted for such purposes.
But the body of existing knowledge only
delivers the premises for n e w questions, if
these are not dramatically n e w , or in other
words, that the process of development is
what K u h n calls 'normal science'. The development of 'normal science' is safe enough,
because it occurs within the existing and accepted paradigms; n e w questions m a y therefore be based upon well-tested empirical
assumptions. If the questions are so new that
the answers- might constitute a 'scientific
revolution', then the corresponding assump-
593
tions can usually not be found in the tested
body of existing scientific knowledge. O n e
must go beyond this knowledge and risk some
bold, more or less hypothetical guesses about
the nature of reality.
W h e r e d o such guesses belong at the
m o m e n t w h e n they are formulated, thus
opening the w a y to basically n e w scientific
questions? O n e might say that they are no
more than bold scientific hypotheses at the
highest level of generality, from which the
formulation of lower-level hypotheses were
stimulated. But if w e look closely at the
history of science in its relation with the
history of philosophy, it seems more reasonable to say that m a n y such assumptions were
merely taken from philosophy or could be
classified with it. 'Visions' of society as an
organism go far back in our history,., but
anthropology as a science had to wait for
Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown to use such
ideas as starting-points for explanatory principles in empirical studies. There is no doubt
that the idea of Verstehen as formulated by
Dilthey belonged to philosophy, but all its
subsequent uses to explain concrete social
phenomena and for the development of corresponding methodologies belong to social
sciences. It is extremely difficult to point to
the border-line between philosophy and 'positive' empirical theory in Karl Marx's thinking, but there is no doubt that Hegelian
dialectics, transformed by M a r x into ' m a terialistic dialectics', played an important role
in his empirical thinking about society, guiding it in the formulation of testable hypotheses about the relationships between class
structure, class conflict, and other aspects of
social p h e n o m e n a .
W h a t happens when the theory or research generated from such philosophical assumptions actually works? It implies that assumptions can also be regarded as indirectly,
and partly, i.e. only inductively, confirmed
by the empirical findings, thus confirming the
theory. T h e validity of initial philosophical
assumptions is then proven at least for those
areas of reality where a theory works. But this
applies only to such philosophical prop-