Executive legislative relation in ghana

CHAPTER ONE

This chapter gives the background to the study. It is followed by the statement of the

problem, purpose of the study, conceptual framework, hypothesis, the scope of the study,

significance of the study, methodology, and limitations of the study.

1.0 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY.

Ghana has experienced different models of democracy since the attainment of political

independence in 1957. Each model had its peculiar institutional design by which power was

distributed among the three organs of state. By the same institutional logic the framework

of governance was different. While Ghana‟s democracy is often cited as one of the most

functional in Africa, its institutional arrangements continue to be a constraint to democratic

consolidation. (Regina 2007:1). In this regard, this research is aimed at getting fuller

understanding of the Ghanaian Legislature and its relationship with the Executive and

presents the existing institutional deficits and how this has hindered the efficient and

effective performance of Ghana‟s parliament.

The 1992 Constitution of Ghana creates a hybrid political system that combines elements

of presidential and parliamentary systems. This political structure has constrained

parliament‟s potential policy influence by creating an expectation of parliamentary oversight

while simultaneously undermining its independence. In particular, the constitution requires

that the majority of government ministers also be parliamentarians, and has thus partially

fused the executive and legislative branches.

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It is generally recognized that as a consequence of the fusion, majority of the

Parliamentarians often aspire to ministerial and other government appointments. This

expectation constrains them from presenting substantial challenges to presidential policies

for fear of damaging their appointment prospects. Further, it is difficult if not impossible

for a parliamentarian who doubles as a minister of state to perform independent and

unbiased oversight of government.

This partial fusion of the Executive and the Legislature is a key problem in the 1992

Constitution. It undermines official separation of powers and reinforces the negative

pattern of executive dominance in Ghanaian politics. The power and the opportunity

granted to the President under the constitution to appoint Members of Parliament (MPs) to

ministerial positions keeps the MPs beholding to the President.

The requirement that majority of ministers of states be selected from among members of

parliament also has the potential to decimate the institution of parliament and undermine its

bipartisan cohesion as MPs now serving as ministers of state will be distracted from their

legislative duties. This weakens the ability of parliament to countervail executive powers and

further pose a threat to Ghana‟s democratic consolidation process agenda.

(Prempeh 2003:8)

The combination of constitutional constraints and Ghanaian political culture and practice

has also made the laying of Private Member Bill (PMBs) extremely difficult, a situation

exacerbated by the divided loyalty of many MPs between their legislative and executive

duties. In practice, sector minister have laid bills before parliament during the entirety of the

fourth Republic (1992-present), meaning that no legislation has originated in Parliament.

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As a result of the structural impediments and the incentive structure that have been

created, the executive essentially controls both the legislative and public policy agenda.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE LEGISLATURE IN GHANA.

Legislative power was first exercised in the Gold Coast during the reign of Queen Victoria

(1837-1901). During the period of 1850-1865, the Gold Coast had a distinct Legislative

Council consisted of the Governor and at least two other persons designated by Royal

Instructions. Apart from the legislative body, the Gold Coast also had an Executive

Council. The Legislative and Executive Councils were responsible for policy making and

implementation. (Ayensu and Darkwa 1999:16)

Since independence in 1957, Ghana has experimented with various types of governments:

“Westminster” model of parliamentary government (1957-1960 and 1969-1972); one-party

dictatorship (1960-1966); military dictatorship (1966-1969; 1972-1979 and 1981-1993);

United States‟ model of separation of powers (1979-1981) and Fourth Republican

Constitution (1992 to date),which is a combination of Westminster type and the American

Presidential model.

In all these duly elected constitutional governments (1957-1960; 1969-1972; 1979-1981 and

1991-Date) the authority of the state has resided in the National Assembly elected on a

competitive basis. A Prime Minister or President for the Westminster and American models

either headed the government. In the case of the Westminster model both the Prime

Minister and other Ministers were members of parliament whereas in the presidential

system there was a strict separation of powers (at least in terms of personnel) between the

executive and legislature – the President and the ministers are not members of the

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legislative body and do not take part in its proceedings. In contrast, the model adopted in

1992 requires that a specific proportion of ministers were to be appointed from among the

members of the legislative body. The objective was probably to avoid deadlocks that

sometimes develop between the legislature and the executive in the presidential system.

Ghana followed the Westminster type of democracy at independence in 1957 with a liberal

democratic Constitution and all its trappings such as opposition parties, guarantees of civil

liberties and an independent Judiciary. In 1960 the country became a Republic and four

years (1964) later the Constitution of the First Republic was amended and replaced with a

one party state with substantial legislative powers to the President. Although the traditional

legislative and oversight role of the then Parliament was not taken away, it was virtually

ineffective in checking the activities of the executive. While few members of the House

were able to express the concerns of the electorate and made attempts to check the

activities of the executive, the majority of them tended to agree to whatever policies and

programs the executive initiated.

The 1969 Constitution of the Second Republic of Ghana re-introduced multi-party

democracy in Ghana with a more vibrant Parliament. Unfortunately, the Constitution was

overthrown in over two years of its existence. The next constitutional attempt was made in

1979 with late Dr. Hilla Liman as the President. Again, within two and half years of its

existence the Constitution was suspended and parliament dissolved. Thus between 1972

and 1979, Ghana was ruled by a succession of military officers (National Redemption

Council (NRC), Supreme Military Council (SMC) I and II) and in June 1979, by the Armed

Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), headed by Flight Lieutenant J.J Rawlings.

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Between December 1981 and January 6, 1991 the country was again ruled by a military

dictatorship under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC).

The current Parliament of Ghana was established by Article 93 of the 1992 Constitution.

The body is vested with legislative powers of the state, which is exercised in accordance

with the Constitution. The legislative power is exercised by passing of Bills which is later

assented by the President to become laws. The tenure of each Parliament is four years and

there is no restriction on the number of times an individual can seek re-election.

At the apex of the Parliament established by the 1992 Constitution are the Speaker and two

Deputies (first and second Deputy Speaker). The next on the ladder is the Majority Leader

also known as the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs followed by the Minority Leader, the

Whips of the various parties and backbenchers. There are specific rules and procedures

governing the activities of the House. For instance, no debate can take place in the floor of

the house unless a member moves it. The Parliament is a unicameral legislature with at least

140 elected members as stipulated in the Constitution. The first three Parliament of the

Fourth Republic consisted of 200 members elected once every four years, from 200 single-

member constituencies throughout the country. By the Representation of the People

Parliamentary Constituencies Instrument2004, CI 41, the membership of parliament

increased to230 from January 2005.

THE 1992 CONSTITUTION

The architecture of the 1992 constitution is complex. It is based on the principle of

separation of powers, as well as a system of overlapping personnel, functions and powers

resulting in a hybrid of the presidential and parliamentary systems of government.

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In the first instance, state power is shared among its three organs: Article 58 (1) vests

executive power in the president; Article 93 vests legislative power in parliament; and

Article 125(3) vests judicial power in the judiciary. Second, Article 78 (1) provides that

the President shall appoint ministers of state with the prior approval of parliament, and

that the majority of such appointees should be “from among members of parliament.”

The Vice President, Ministers and Deputy Ministers who are not Members of Parliament

can participate in the proceedings of parliament, except that they are not entitled to vote

(Article 111). Third, though the President exercises executive power, including the

enforcement of all the laws of Ghana under Article 58 (2) he or she cannot spend public

moneys without authorization by parliament. Nor can the president make laws. The

power to make laws as well as authorize the use of public funds is vested in parliament;

but it is only the President who can introduce a bill or motion to impose a tax or spend

public money. (Article 108)

The president could refuse to assent a bill passed by parliament even though parliament

could override the President‟s veto by a vote of not less than two-thirds of its members

(Article 106 (9-10). Fourth, Article 81 (1) empowers parliament to initiate proceedings to

impeach or remove from office either a minister or deputy minister, however, clause 5 of

article 82 leaves it to the discretion of the President to revoke the appointment of the

minister or deputy minister concerned.

The strong bond between the president and his party in parliament creates a virtual

monopoly over the decision making apparatus of the state. That is, the president

(together with his cabinet) and the legislature are able to control these two critical

decision-making structures within the state system.

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Though members of parliament could propose an independent members‟ bill, Article

108 of the Constitution vests in the president the sole authority to propose bills that

have financial implications. Essentially the president and his cabinet, all of whom have so

far come from the same political party, exercise exclusive responsibility for development

policy. When a development policy issue gets to parliament for approval the president

uses his party, which is in the majority, to get it approved. The majority party in

parliament tends to be less democratic when major national issues come before

parliament for consideration. It has turned parliamentary deliberation on such issues into

partisan contests for hegemony in the legislature. Such partisanship has often forced the

opposition party or parties to bring the issues outside the domain of parliament in order

to mobilize a wider public to express their viewpoint. But the majority party in

parliament has always had its way on such highly contested policy issues.

This hybrid system has lead to what has become known as executive dominance over

parliament in the Fourth Republic

1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT

The 1992 Constitution shares power among the various arms of government, however, the

legislature in a way has failed to overcome executive dominance and to undertake its

functions effectively within the framework of the 1992 constitution.

What this research therefore seeks to unravel is the ineffectiveness of parliament serving as a

check on the executive.

The fusion of executive and legislative powers in certain respects, and the hybridization of

the parliamentary and presidential system have given the executive a huge and unequivocal

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presence in parliament. First, executive power is exercise in parliament through the

President‟s majority party of which he becomes leader by virtue of his position as President.

On the one hand, this gives the President‟s party in parliament a strong stake in the

President‟s +++policies and programmes that are brought before parliament. Because the

success or failure of the President‟s policies and programmes affect the electoral fortune of

his party, the President‟s parliamentary party collectively and individually becomes a strong

advocate of the President‟s policies and programmes. On the other hand, the President also

sees his party in parliament as an indispensable resource for getting his policies and

programmes through parliament. He accordingly maintains keen interest in the decisions

made by his parliamentary party and closely monitors trends.

The executive again, has a more direct presence in parliament through the ministers

appoint from among members of parliament. The executive is further represented in

parliament through ministers and deputy ministers who are not members of parliament but

can participate in the business of parliament except voting.

The majority party in parliament also ensures that the person appointed as speaker is

favorably disposed to the president. Theoretically the speaker is an independent officer of

the state who has sworn The Speaker‟s Oath to defend the constitution and do right to all

manner of persons in accordance with the constitution of Ghana and the laws and

conventions of parliament. The reality is that the speaker is elected on the strength of the

president‟s party in parliament, which makes the speaker indirectly part of the ensemble of

powers that represent the president in parliament.

It is therefore argue that, the framers of the constitution have subordinated the Legislature

to the Executive (the President) which weakens the strength of parliament.

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As a result, parliament has not been able to effectively perform its oversight functions as

required by the constitution.

Others further argue that, for the constitution to allow majority of ministers to be

appointed from within members of parliament, it weakens the credibility of parliament in

performance of its oversight responsibility.

This means the executive arm is highly influential over parliament. This undermines the

effective constitutional checks and balances and in effect, hinders accountability of the

executive arm of government under the fourth republic. This has therefore come to be

known as the Executive dominance of the Legislature.

1.2 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The research is aimed at critically assessing parliament under the Fourth Republic and

established why the Legislature had failed to perform its oversight responsibilities on the

Executive effectively. Specifically, the study would look into the major factors that

militate against the work of the legislature.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The concepts of separation of powers and checks and balances would be examined in

relation to this work. According to Strong C.F. (1963; 58) cited in Gilbert Keith Bluwey

(2002: 63) “these concepts first appeared in a work by Baron de Montesquieu entitled

Esprit des Lois, published in 1748. Montesquieu held that when the legislative and

executive powers are united in the same person or, body of persons there can be no

liberty because of the danger that the same monarch or senate may enact tyrannical laws

and execute them in a tyrannical manner.”

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He therefore advocated that in order to prevent abuse of power and tyrannical rule, no

two of the three functions of government should be vested in the same hands. These

functions are: law-making, law-executing and the interpretation of the law in the

settlement of disputes.

Another classical interpretation of this concept is given by M.J.C. Vile (1967: 13) cited in

J.C. Johari (1982: 524) “it is essential for the establishment and maintenance of political

liberty that the government be divided into three branches or departments, the

legislature, the executive and judiciary. To each of these branches there is a

corresponding identifiable function of government, legislative, executive or judicial. Each

of these branches must be confined to the exercise of its own functions and not allowed

to encroach upon the functions of other branches. Also, the persons who compose of

these agencies of government must be kept separate and distinct, no individual being

allowed to be at the same time a member of more than one branch. In this way, each of

the branches will be able to control the machinery of the state.”

Separation of powers therefore implies that, there should be three separate organs of

government with their separate set of powers. It also implies that the various arms

should be kept separate in the interest of the individual. This in essence is the division of

powers of government among the various organs in terms of functions and personnel‟s.

Each organ must be confined to the exercise of its own functions and not allowed to

encroach upon the functions of other organs. Also, persons who compose these three

organs must be kept separate and distinct; no individual must be allowed to be a member

of more than one organ.

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Under the concept of separation of powers a member of parliament who is appointed a

minister of state is require to resign as Member of Parliament before the person can

assume the office as a minister of state.

In order to ensure efficiency and accountability of each of the organs in performance of

their constitutional functions, Montesquieu did not only propose a clear and permanent

separation of legislative, executive, and judicial functions. He also advocated that each of

the organs should be made to check one another in order to avoid the abuse of powers

by any of the organs through the concept of checks and balances. Here, each of the

organs is vested with powers to serve as a watchdog on each other.

Montesquieu thus gave to the world the twin concepts of separation of powers and checks

and balances.

Separation of powers would increase the competence of each of the branches while the

checks and balances would prevent abuse of power.

This would promote the autonomy of each of the branches and enable them constitute

themselves and function effectively without undue interference from each other.

1.4. HYPOTHESIS

The entire study is based on the assumptions that:

 The President has being vested with excessive powers over parliament.

 Parliament and parliamentary committees lack office accommodation, which

inhibits their oversight role.

1.5 SCOPE OF THE STUDY.

The research study was carried out within Accra and Kumasi. However, the offices of

parliament, CDD and IDEG were specifically selected within Accra.

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For the purpose of our study, we limited our scope in Kumasi to KNUST campus and

Adum. This has enabled us to minimize cost and elicited the relevant information for the

study.

1.6. JUSTIFICATION

It is the conviction of the researchers that the findings of this study will go a long way to

assist policy makers to be well informed of the extent to which parliament had failed to

effectively perform its oversight function over the executive. The researchers also believe

that, the findings of this research will inform Ghanaians on how the constitution possesses

certain limitations on the work of parliament.

Finally, the study will also be of immense benefit to students and researchers who will carry

out further research in this area.

The constitution reflects a hybrid of the parliamentary and presidential systems which

promotes executive dominance at the expense of parliamentary accountability. The framers

of the constitution have handed us an executive-legislature arrangement that reinforce one of

the negative aspects of our political culture which is excessive presidential powers over

parliament. This affects horizontal accountability between the legislature and the executive.

This means the executive will always dominate parliament so far as the ruling party maintain

majority in parliament and continue to draw majority of ministers from parliament. This can

be a root cause of bad government.

1.6.0 METHODOLOGY

This section deals with the systematic way employed by the researchers to arrive at the

organized data in chapter three in relation to the research objectives. Under this, the

researchers outlined the population under study and the sample size for the study as well as

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the techniques adopted in getting the sample size. The methods adopted in collections of

data, presentation and analyzing of the data are also included under this section.

1.6.1 Population

The population of this study is made up of Ghanaian adults who are between the ages of

eighteen and above. The target population was however categorized into three. They were

made up of the educated elite, civil societies and the mass public. The educated elites

constituted parliamentarians, staffs of parliament and students. CDD and IDEG were the

main civil societies consulted.

1.6.2 Sample size

In order to obtain objective and accurate information on the problem, a sample size of two

hundred respondents was targeted. The targeted population was sampled from each of the

categorized of the population. However, one hundred and twenty respondents were

consulted at the end of the research.

1.6.3 Sample technique

The non-probability sampling technique was used to obtain the sample size. Specifically, the

purposive sampling was used to obtain respondents. This was due to the nature of the study

which requires some level of knowledge about the legislative and executive arms of

government.

1.6.4 Method of data collection

Both primary and secondary data were used. The primary source of data includes

administered questionnaires and discussions. Journals, articles, reports, thesis from

researchers, both published and unpublished and the use of the internet were our secondary

source of information.

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1.6.5 Types of data

Both quantitative and qualitative types of data were collected. The qualitative data included

the comments and suggestions from the respondents. The quantitative date on the other

hand, includes statistical data and values collected from the respondents.

1.6.6 Method of Data Analysis

In analyzing the data obtained, both qualitative and quantitative methods have been used.

Analysis of the research work was in three main processes, which is preparation of coding

scheme, coding data entry, and analysis. Analysis was done by the use of statistical packages

for Social Sciences (SPSS). Furthermore, the data was analyzed by examining the features in

relation to the objectives of the study. Descriptive statistics were employed by the use of pie

chart, and bar graphs.

1.7 Organization of the study

The study has been organized into four chapters. Chapter one constitutes the general

background of the study, problem statement, conceptual framework, hypothesis, scope of

study, objectives, methodology, and relevance of the study. The limitation, delimitations and

budget are also under this chapter. Chapter two consists of literature review where relevant

works relating to this study had been reviewed. The review was captured under the following

sub-headings; Studies on the legislature, Historical overview of the legislature in Ghana,

Parliament of the fourth Republic, Factors that militate against parliament and Review

summary and evaluation. Chapter three contains the demography of the respondent as well

as data presentation and analysis. The final chapter provides a summary of the findings,

conclusion, recommendation and bibliography.

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1.8 Limitation

In the course of the research, the challenges encountered include; getting access to

information from the office of parliament and even members of parliament (MPs). There

were also time constraints and financial set-backs. However, to overcome these challenges

letters were sent to the office of parliament and MP‟s to give them prior notice. Financial

support was also sought from our parents and guidance.

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REFERENCES

1. The 1992 Constitution of Ghana. Accra, Ghana.

2. H. Kwasi Prempeh (2003), Executive Legislature Relationship Under the 1992

Constitution: A Critical Review.CDD Publication Accra, Ghana, September 2003.

Critical Perspective Number 15 (P:8).

3. Ninsin A. Kwame (2005). Executive- Parliament Interface in the Legislative

Process (1993-2006). A Synergy of Power, Institute for Democratic Governance

Publication Accra; Ghana (P:2)

4. Center for Democratic Development Newsletter (2001), Democracy Watch

Volume 2 Number 1. CDD Publication, Accra, Ghana March, 2001.

5. Regina Oforiwa Amanfo (2007), A paper presented on African Legislatures Project

Conference on African Legislature; Integrating Research and Policy (The Case of

Ghanaian Parliament)

6. Center for Democratic Development Publication (2000), Parliament and

Democratic Governance in Ghana’s Fourth Republic. CDD Publication, Accra,

Ghana.

7. K.B. Ayensu and S.N. Darkwa (1999), The Evolution of Parliament in Ghana,

Institute of Economic Affairs Publication, Accra, Ghana.

8. Thomas E. Patterson (2002), the American Democracy (16 Edition), McGraw Hill

Publication. United States of America.

9. Kumekpor Tom K.B (2002), Research Methods, Sonlife Press and Service, Accra,

Ghana.

10. Gilbert Keith Bluwey (2002) Political Science: An Introduction. Legon Center for

International Affairs (LECIA) Publication. Accra, Ghana. (P:63)

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11. J.C Johari (1982) Comparative Politics. Sterling Publishes Limited, New Delhi,

India. (P:524)

12. Shana Warren (2005) Legislative Performance in Ghana: Assessment of the

Third Parliament of the Fourth Republic, 2001-2005. CDD Publication Accra,

Ghana. (P:9)

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CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter deals with the review of some published works relating to the research topic.

A number of studies have gone into the legislatures and parliament in Ghana, however, no

single published work emphasizes on the ineffectiveness of parliament in serving as a check

on the executive. Some of the works however, establish several factors that militate against

the effective performance of parliament. For the purpose of the study, a brief review of

literature is attempted. The review is centered on the following sub-related topics:

1. Studies on the Legislature.

2. Historical Overview of Legislature in Ghana.

3. Parliament of the Fourth Republic.

4. Factors that militate against Parliament of the Fourth Republic.

5. Review Summary and Evaluations.

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In general, a bewildering variety of terms are used to describe the law making organ of

government. It is often referred to as congress in the USA, national assembly in France, and

the House of Representatives or diet in Japan, parliament in Singapore and Ghana, congress

of duties in Spain and so on. Parliament or legislature is derived from the French word

“parler” which meant to speak‟ the Latin origin of parliament is „parliamentum‟.

Legislatures are perceived as “building where representatives meet and discuss the main

affairs of the nation, they pass legislation and they exercise control, or try to exercise it over

government”. (Chapman et al. 1999:99).

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Others contend that legislatures are deliberating bodies of states. Legislature is also perceived

as “Law making assembly of elected members in formally equal relationship to one another”.

(Mclean, 1996:280)

Legislatures occupy a unique position in the machinery of government in every state. Today

every state has a legislative body of some kind. In some states legislatures are powerful

decisions making bodies, while in others they are merely advisory bodies, performing only

as rubber stamp institutions.

The constitutional arrangement of states however, established a relationship between the

executive and legislative arms of government. This mostly depends on the system of

government practiced in that particular country. The most fundamental differences between

the various systems of government therefore lie in the relationship between the executive

and the legislature.

According to Andrew Heywood (2002:313), the executive-legislative a relations in every

state more commonly conform to one of three institutional arrangements: Parliamentary

Presidential, and Hybrid system of government. In an attempt to explain these systems of

government, Heywood explain the parliamentary system as “one in which the government

governs in and through the Assembly or Parliament, thereby fusing the legislative and

executive branches.” He emphasized that the central feature of this system is a fusion of

legislative and executive powers.

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J/C. Johari (2009:494) also shared the same view with Haywood but added that under the

parliamentary system, “parliament has the upper hand because it has the ultimate power:

the ability to remove the government”

The principal alternative to the parliamentary system according to Haywood (ibid, 315) is

the presidential system of government. The presidential system to him is based on the strict

application of the doctrine of separation of powers between the executive and the

legislature. This ensures that the two are formally independent from one another and

separately elected.

J.C. Johari also emphasized that the essential feature of this system is a separation of the

legislature from the executive. To him, this system does not allow the president and his

ministers to become members of the legislature. He maintained that in case the president

appoints someone as a minister who is also a member of the legislature, he will have to

resign his legislative membership before accepting the ministerial assignment.

According to Haywood and Johari, states either adopts the presidential system as practiced

in the United States or the parliamentary system as practiced in Britain. However, others

also practice a mixture of both the presidential and parliamentary systems as it is in France

and Ghana. Here there is an elected president who can appoint some of his ministers from

the legislature without them resigning their legislative membership. This system is mostly

known as the hybrid system.

2.2 STUDIES ON THE LEGISLATURE

A lot of studies have been undertaken on the legislature. A contemporary comparative

politics series edited by Joseph LaPalombara, offer a comparative perspective of legislature

across the globe, the work is fundamentally devoted to what legislatures can do and cannot

do what they can do best and under what conditions these achievements can occur.

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Andrew Heywood explores legislatures from a theoretical point of view. He is of the

considered view that legislators are often treated with special respect and status as the

public and even democratic face of government. He continues with the definitions of the

legislature and identifies some of the functions of the legislature which include; legislation

representation, scrutiny, political recruitment and legitimacy (Heywood 2002: 216-219). He

further discusses the structure of parliament and the committee system. He concluded that,

legislatures seem to be on decline largely because of the emergence of disciplined political

parties, the growth of big government, organizational weaknesses of legislature and the rise

of interest groups and the media power. This study is very instructive as the theoretical

grounding of our study relies extensively on it.

The work of Jackson and Jackson on the legislature was brief but very authoritative. They

affirm the importance of legislature and assert that in democracies, these bodies consist of

representatives who govern on behalf of the people (Jackson and Jackson 1997:243).

Jackson and Jackson identify some functions of legislatures such as law making, the power

to raise taxes, helping to elect a government and teaching and informing the public (Jackson

and Jackson 1997: 244-246).

The study also touched on the organization of legislatures by explaining the two

fundamental houses of legislature and reasons for their adoption. Their study also indicates

that the internal rules for deliberations in legislatures are important in the determination of

member‟s activities and their effectiveness. The study mentions the committee system, the

speaker and other bodies of the house which help the institution to function effectively

(Jackson and Jackson 1997:248-250).

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They conclude, by discussing the relationship between the executive and the legislature

which they believe is very crucial to the way a political system works. They consider two

main opposing schools of thought on this topic. One school of thought has it that

legislatures have declined over time and thus allowed executives to become more powerful

in the policy process. This position is countered by the position that there never was a

period when the legislature dominated executives; legislative institutions have always been

relatively weak.

The relationship between the executive and the legislature is of paramount importance to

our study. The conclusion we draw on this is that this asymmetrical relationship has

undermined the performance of the legislature.

The work of J. Blondel describes the legislature as one institution of governments that

poses the most fascinating problem. Legislatures continue to be the most revered, the most

hoped for and often the least successful institution in contemporary governments. (Blondel

1973: 2). He maintains that legislatures are considered as mere puppets, exercising little

influence over policy-making. He also opines that even though legislatures are expected to

promote liberalism and democracy, they have not been successful in that endeavour.

(Blondel 1973: 3).

Among the other issues dealt with by the study are the constraints of legislature,

constitutional framework of powers and the role of legislature on policies of immediate

importance which relate to the generation of new ideas and the control of output of

administration and government (Blondel 1973:104)

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On the functions of the legislature, Blondel is of the views that, legislatures serve as

intermediaries for demands made by others or may themselves serve as originators of

suggestions. In relation to output of the political system, it will ran from very detailed to

general, they often result from initiatives of members or triggered by constituent and

interests. (Blondel 1973: 16-17).

He concludes that even though there is an exaggerated view of the importance of the

legislature, they still remain very influential in countries where they were originally created

and elsewhere than is usually claimed (Blondel, 1973: 133)

The study offers a general overview of legislature in a comparative basis. It also provides

some useful insights into the functions of legislatures.

The work of Godwin and Wahlke was on forms of government. They specifically discuss

parliamentary and presidential system and also focus on the responsibility and dissolution

of parliament. They dilate on the institutional framework of legislatures like legislative

competence, the number of chambers, rule of procedure, and the authority and leadership

structure. The committee system is also discussed (Godwin and Wahlke 1997: 218-224).

Legislative processes such as initiative, deliberation and enactment are elaborated. One

legislative performance, the study identifies representation as a very crucial function of the

legislature.

They maintain that many people believe that a representative‟s first obligation is to protect

the interests of the home district and to base actions on the opinion of constituents

(Godwin and Wahlke 1997:229). They further mention oversight and control over the

executive, community service, recruitment of political elites some symbolic functions such

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as the oath of office and promising to uphold the constitution and preserve the welfare of

the entire country. (Godwin and Wahlke 1997: 252).

Although the oversight responsibility of the legislature over the executive was not

elaborated much in their work, it is however, crucial to our study.

2.3 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE LEGISLATURE IN GHANA

Legislative power was fist exercised in the Gold Coast during the reign of Queen Victoria

(1837-1901). (Boafo-Arthur 2005:121). During the period of 1850-1865, the Gold Coast

had a district legislative council consisted of the Governor and at least two other persons

designed by royal Instructions. Apart from the legislature body, the Gold Coast also had an

Executive Council. The legislative and Executive council were responsible for policy

making and implementation. (Ayensu and Darkwa 1999:16). To them the legislative council

was specifically required to make all laws, institutions and ordinances as may from time to

time be necessary for the peace, order and good governance in the Gold Coast which was

subjected to rules and regulations made by Order in Council. They maintained that

Ghanaians were under-represented in both the legislative and executive councils. What was

even worse according to Ayensu and Darkwa was that both councils were mere advisory

ones and therefore their decisions were not binding on the Governor of the Gold Coast.

According to Alabi (1998:9), under the British rule the first elections into the legislative

council took place under the 1925 Guggisberg Constitution. Nine out of the thirty members

who constituted the legislative council were Ghanaians. This gave room to the people to

impact on policies and programmes that affected their lives.

24

According to Ayensu and Darkwa “legislative authority of Ghana has been vested in

parliament which has exercised it in varying degree since independence in 1957”. (Ayensu

and Darkwa 1999:122)

Aye is of the View that “Ghana has experimented with various types of governments:

“Westminster” model of parliamentary government (1957-1960 and 1969-1972); one-party

dictatorship (1960-1966); military dictatorship (1966-1969; 1972-1979 and 1981-1993);

United States‟ model of separation of powers (1979-1981) and Fourth Republic constitution

(1992 to date) which is a combination of Westminster type and the American Presidential

model” (Aye 2005:91)

In all these duly elected constitutional governments (1957-1960; 1969-1972; 1979-1981 and

1991-date), Aye maintained that legislative authority of the state has resided in the National

Assembly elected on the competitive basis. A prime minister or President for the

Westminster and American models either headed the government. In the case of the

Westminster model both the Prime Minister and other Ministers were members of

parliament whereas in the presidential system there was a strict separation of powers (at least

in terms of personnel) between the executive and legislature- the president and the ministers

are not members of the legislative body and do not take part in its proceedings.

Ghana followed the Westminster type of democracy at independence in 1957 with a liberal

democratic constitution and all its trappings such as opposition parties, guarantees of civil

liberties and an independent judiciary. In 1960 the country became a Republic and four years

(1964) later the constitution of the First Republic was amended and replaced with a one

party state with substantial legislative powers to the president. Although the traditional

legislative and oversight role of the then parliament was not taken away, it was virtually

ineffective in checking the activities of the executive.

25

While few members of the House were able to express the concerns of the electorate and

made attempts to check the activities of the executive, the majority of them tended to agree

to whatever policies and programs the executive initiated.

The 1969 constitution of the Second Republic of Ghana re-introduced multi-party

democracy in Ghana with a more vibrant Parliament. Unfortunately, the constitution was

overthrown in over two years of its existence. The next constitutional attempt was made in

1979 with late Dr. Hilla Lima as the president. Again, within two and half years of its

existence the constitution was suspended and parliament dissolved. Thus between 1972 and

1979, Ghana was ruled by a succession of military officers National Redemption Council

(NRC), Supreme Military Council (SMC) I and II) and June 1979 by the Arm Forces

Revolutionary Council (AFRC), headed by Flight Lieutenant J.J Rawlings. Between

December, 1981 and January 6, 1991 the country was again ruled by military dictatorship

under the Provisional National Defence council (PNDC)

2.4 PARLIAMENT OF THE FOURTH REPUBLIC

The work of Ayensu and Darkwa offer a panoramic view of the evolution and development

of parliamentary practice in Ghana. They started with the Bond of 1844 and the beginning

of the exercise of legislative authority in the Gold Coast up to the second parliament of the

fourth Republic. Their work was motivated by the fact that the decisions of parliament

affect the lives of everybody in Ghana. It is therefore very important for people and MPs to

appreciate the history and the workings of the institution. While offering the overview of

parliaments in Ghana, they also explained that most of them could not live their

constitutional mandated term, largely because of military adventurism.

26

There is also a discussion of the activities of the big six and the various phases of

constitutional development in the country. Their work highlights the various parliaments

from 1957 through to the fourth republic.

They maintained that the First Parliament of the First Republic (1960-1965) and the first

parliament of the fourth republic (1993-1997) completed their statutory terms of office

(Ayensu and Darkwa 1999: 148). The life of the Independence Parliament of 1957 was cut

short by the nations overwhelming desire to become a republic. The second Parliament of

the first republic and the parliament of the second and third republics had their terms

terminated by military interventions.

In concluding their work Ayensu and Darkwa (1999) shed light on the development of the

committee system, which they maintained has being a common feature of most our

republican parliaments. They explained that the committee system enables parliament to

scrutinize bills brought before them. Their work is very authoritative in that it provides

elaborate information on parliaments in Ghana. This would enable us examine the fourth

republican parliament very effectively.

A Guide to Parliament of Ghana is a handbook prepared by the Parliament of Ghana. The

book has given a brief outlook of the Parliaments of Ghana. It tries to compare the various

parliaments and bring out some peculiar features of each. The work however concentrate on

the fourth republic, pointing out the basic features of these parliaments include, multi-party

system, hybrid system, role in governance, representation, and oversight (Parliament of

Ghana 2004 :14). The book also gives an overview of the evolution of the legislature in

Ghana.

27

The structure of the fourth republican parliament, areas like composition, qualification of

MPs, declaration of vacancy and seating arrangement of parliament had all been examined in

the guide. The Parliamentary Guide also identifies the functions of parliament as legislative,

financial, oversight of the executive, representational and deliberative. It concludes with a

discussion on functionaries and parliamentary service and their role in effectively managing

the affairs of parliament. The oversight role of parliament discussed in the work would be

very helpful because it is very keen in this research.

Boafo-Arthur (2005) takes a view of Ghana‟s parliamentary practices for the past 150 years.

He tackles the struggle of local elites for greater representation and how they are governed.

He also covers the period between 1957 and 1992, where the legislature went through

several mutations. He gave the structure of the fourth republican parliament focusing on the

officers of the house and the composition of parliament from 1993 to 2005.

On the functions of parliament, Boafo-Arthur (2005) states that parliament embodies the

will of the people because parliamentarians who represent 230 constituencies of the country

try to highlight the developmental needs of their constituents. He also identified law making,

control of the public fund, the exercise of oversight over the executive and the vetting of

nominees to fill ministerial and other important positions as other functions of parliament.

He concludes that “a strengthened parliament with functional committee system, to a large

extent, holds the key to national efforts to ensure governmental accountability, transparency

and democratic consolidation”. Boafo-Arthur, 2005:140)

In a presentation by Regina Oforiwaa Amanfo (Program Officer of the Ghana Center for

Democratic Development), on African Legislatures specifically the case of Ghana, she was

28

of the view that, the current Parliament of Ghana was established by Article 93 of the 1992

constitution. The body is vested with legislative powers of the state, which is exercised in

accordance with the constitution. The legislative power is exercised by passing of bills

which is later assented by the president to become laws. The tenure of each parliament is

four years and there is no restriction on the number of times an individual can seek re-

election.

In terms of the structure of parliament, Regina identified that, at the apex of the parliament

established by the 1992 constitution are the speaker and two Deputies (first and second

deputy Speaker). The next on the ladder is the Majority Leader, the Whip of the various

parties and backbenchers. There are specific rules and procedures governing the activities

of the House. For instance, no debate can take place in the floor of the house unless a

member moves it. She added also that, the parliament is a unicameral legislature with at

least 140 elected member as stipulated in the constitution. The first three Parliament of the

fourth republic consisted of 200 members elected once every four years, from 200 single-

member constituencies instrument 2004, CI 41, the membership of parliament increased

to230 from January 2005.

To her, the parliament of Ghana like any other parliament of the world over, performs

three important functions namely representation, legislation and oversight. She maintained

that parliament‟s representative mandate involves identifying the needs of its constituent,

the citizens of Ghana, and reflecting them their needs in its deliberation, legislative and

oversight roles. She added that parliament is responsible for the oversight of the executive,

its actions and spending. She maintains that, parliament needs constant access to

information on the activities of the executive branch. She is also of the view that parliament

29

fulfills its legislative functions through the creation and passage of bills, and scrutinizing

existing statutory instruments and evaluating when and how they should be applied.

To effectively exercise these functions, the institution of parliament is composed of 230

elected members and is headed by a speaker on the first day of the life of each parliament

according to Regina. She added that the speaker is assisted by two deputy speakers who by

practice and convention are expected to come from a different political parties for the sake

of preserving a balance of power within parliament.

The work by Aye is a reflection on government, politics and development of Ghana in

fifty years of independence. He generally examined the atmosphere of governance after

independence and the development that have taken place in Ghana as an independent

state. Looking at government specifically on the role of the legislature, Aye maintained

that, generally the legislature performs a number of functions and this may include;

representative role. He is of the view that the legislatures represent the interest of at least

some or all social class in the state. Aye believe that, although the legislature performs

other functions such as law making, vetting and approving government nominees and so

on, crucial to these is to keep the bridle on king, which is to limit abuse of power by the

executive. He added that the “legislature both in parliamentary and presidential systems

have power to keep tabs on the executive branch and its agencies” (Aye 2007:89) this to

him is normally done through the use of „question time‟, the power to impeach the

president for gross misconduct and other act which have the tendency of bringing the

office of the president into disrepute and the power of the purse.

30

2.4 FACTORS THAT MILITATE AGAINST PARLIAMENT OF THE FOURTH

REPUBLIC

A number of studies have being conducted on parliament of Ghana especially under the

Fourth Republic. However, three major works would be reviewed. One of such works is by

H. Kwasi Prempeh. His work is a review of the relationship that exists between parliament

and the executive under the 1992 Constitution. He maintained that “the legislature has failed

to overcome executive dominance and to undertake its functions effectively within the

framework of the 1992 Constitution” (Prempeh 2003:4). According to him, of the three

arms of government, parliament has had the most discontinuous and punctuated existence in

Ghana‟s history. Unlike the judiciary and the administrative machinery of the state that have

always survived the forced overthrow of constituted authority in Ghana, there was no

parliament to speak of 1966 to 1969, 1972 and 1979, and 1982 to 1993. To him, this

institutional discontinuity has retarded the smooth and consistent development of a

parliamentary tradition in Ghana. Consequently, the parliament of the fourth Republic

started the ongoing transition to constitutional democracy with the most institutional deficit

of all the three branches of government.

He added that, the parliament of the fourth republic started its life facing a crisis of

legitimacy. The fist parliament was a de facto one party parliament since the opposition party

boycotted the parliamentary election. All the candidates put forth by the National

Democratic Congress (NDC) won by default.

Prempeh focus specifically on Articles 78 and 108 of the 1992 Constitution which require

the President to appoint majority of ministers from among MPs and where parliament is

forbidden from proceeding on bills or motions regarding taxation, payment or withdrawal

from the consolidated fund that does not come from the President respectively.

31

To him, “given the superior attractiveness of ministerial positions, Article 78 helps to divert

the interest and ambitions of MPs away from their role as legislators and towards the

Executive. Election as a Member of Parliament has become for many MPs, merely a way of

enhancing their chances of making into the President pool of ministers. And once their

ministerial ambitions have been satisfied, MPs generally pay little attention to their role as

legislators” (ibid: 9).

He added that what make article 78 more problematic is the absence of ceiling on the

president‟s ministerial appointment. To him this does not promote effective checks and

balances and horizontal accountability to ensure good governance. He also believes that

Article 108 essentially reduces parliament to a law passing instead of law making. Second, it

denies parliament institutional autonomy in determining the level of funding that it needs to

carry on with its work. Parliament budget is subject to item by item control by the ministry

of Finance.

He added that, it is not surprising that parliament has persistently lacked the resources and

capacity to perform its work. Partisanship is also another factor indicated by Prempeh as

contributing to parliamentary ineffectiveness. He thinks parliament of the fourth republic

has failed to speak with a collective voice and to take resolute action to stem abuse,

corruption, inefficiency and waste in the public half of the national economy. Prempeh

however, hold the view that parliament‟s ineffectiveness cannot all be blamed on the

constitution or partisanship. In certain instances, legislative lethargy appears to be more

appropriate culprit. He thinks although parliamentarians have the constitutional mandate to

introduce a “private member bill”, yet for the past years parliament has not enacted such

legislations require by the constitution.

32

The standing orders of parliament according to Prempeh also hamper its institutional

effectiveness. Parliament‟s standing orders give little initiative or scope to parliamentary

committee, caucuses, or individuals members to trigger investigations or inquire into matters

of public concern. Only the full house can initiate committee investigations, this means that

the party with majority in parliament can always veto any attempt to initiate investigation

into allegation into of scandal and other cases of executive malfeasances.

Parliamentary committee system was also examined in his work and maintained that

effective parliamentary committees promote good governance in many respects. He added

that, if parliament appears to be weak vis-á-vis the executive it because it was designed

constitutionally to be so. He therefore concluded that, indeed requiring, the president to use

his patronage power to co-opt MPs to the executive side of government only serve to

emasculate parliament thereby entrenches the culture of executive hegemony in Ghana. The

relationship between the executive and parliament to him is however crucial to enhance

good governance and consolidate democracy.

Another important work on the Fourth Republic parliament is “Refection on the

effectiveness of the parliament of the fourth republic of Ghana by Peter Ala-Adjettey. He

began his work by examining the legislative council under colonial rule through to

independence. He continued with parliament from the independent constitution to the

fourth republic. To him “legislative competence of the Parliament of Ghana since 1969 has

been subject to limitation imposed by the constitution themselves” (Ala-Adjettey 2006: 16).

Focusing his work on the Fourth Republic parliament, as a former speaker of parliament he

shared the same view with Kwasi Prempeh. He however added that article 108 of the

constitution “by one stroke of pen has taken away from parliament one of its most

important weapon or tool for securing control over or compliance by the executive, namely

33

what has been described as „the power of the purse‟. (Ala-Adjettey 2006:17). By prohibiting

parliament from debating matters involving the raising of taxation or increases in the rate of

taxation or increase in the level of expenditure, parliament has been denied the use of

weapon which can bring a recalcitrant executive to heel.” To him the people‟s

representatives are effectively prevented from having their way in matters that vitality affects

the people. He however concluded his work that, looking at the constitutional history of this

country parliamentary supremacy can be dangerous tool in the hands of supine parliament

and a determined president. However, parliament should be clothed with sufficient

independence to enable it exercise oversight control of the executive.

The work Staffan I. Lindberg examines the rise and decline of Parliament of Ghana. He

agreed with Prempeh that parliament of the fourth republic started its life facing the crisis of

legitimacy. The opposition NPP boycotted the parliamentary election nationwide after their

complaints of voting rigging in the 1992 presidential ballot. As a result, the first parliament

of the fourth republic was a defacto one party parliament, as nearly all the candidate put

forth by the NDC won the seats by default. Out of the 200 seats contested the NDC won

189 representing 94.5% National Convention Party had 8 representing 4.0%, Eagle Party

pulled 1 representing 0.5% and 2 seats representing 1.0% going to independent and

candidates shared the 11 remaining seats representing 5.5%. The NPP which was the

strongest opposition party had no seat in parliament. This outcome weakened the

representativeness and the credibility of parliament during the first four years of the fourth

republic.

To him the second parliament of the fourth Republic presented amore balance situation as

the opposition parties contested the elections and posed some impressive results.

34

For Staffan, although the first parliament (1993-1997) was often seen as a “rubber stamp

parliament”, MPs made significant impact on many of the bills introduced by President

Rawlings government. Despite being essentially one-party parliament, the first parliament

nevertheless managed to have four out of 88 bills (4.5 percent) withdrawn by the executive.

(Staffan 2003:8). Staffan also maintains that, in the second parliament, influence over

legislation was further pronounced with 14bills out of a total of 78 (18 percent) withdrawn.

Notwithstanding the impressive performance put forth by the Fourth Republic Parliament in

the area of legislation, parliaments under the fourth republic are still coupled with a lot of

challenges. Staffan agreed with both Prempeh and Ala-Adjettey on the constitutional

provision that allows MPs to double as ministers as one of the major challenges of

parliament. To him, the effect of this is felt directly in parliament as those MPs who double

as ministers spend less time in the legislature.

He also believed that parliament power to obstruct-cum-control the president‟s political

agenda is circumvented by Article 108 preventing parliament from proceeding on any

legislative initiative that would incur budget or tax increase unless such initiative comes from

the executive.

2.5. REVIEW SUMMARY AND EVALUATIONS.

From the above literature review it is very clear that, of all the formal institutions of

government, the legislature plays a very important role in promoting checks and balances in

any political system. In Ghana for instance, unlike the judiciary that must wait for aggrieved

plaintiffs to bring justifiable cases before it, parliament can act on its own initiative to

investigate any issue of public interest imaginable issues like corruption, mismanagement of

state enterprises, ministerial abuse of power, and government profligacy.

35

The review above has looked at the various views hold by different authorities on the

legislature in Ghana and legislatures in general. They content that, legislature are of vital

importance in democracies because it is through the legislature that citizens are represented.

Many of the authors were of the view that, legislatures are sometimes faced with some

challenges in the performance of their constitutional duties. In the case of Ghana, the

authors were of the view that, there are certain constitutional provisions that militate against

the work of the legislature. Others believe that instead of parliament to use its institutional

powers to check the executive, parliament has stood by like a spectator while report upon

report has carried stories and anecdotal evidence of waste, corruption, self-dealing and ultra

vires transaction at a number of taxpayer-funded entities. Some authors contend that

parliament of Ghana has failed to show bold and timely initiatives in its quest to serve as a

check on the executive under this fourth republic.

Based on this theoretical analysis about the Ghanaian Legislature, what is left now is actually

to examine the situation on the ground. This is the purpose of the research work.

36

REFERENCES

1. Andrew Haywood (2002) Politics, Second Edition. Macmillan Publication: London

(Pp:216-219,313,315)

2. Alabi Niyi (1998) Parliamentary Democracy in West Africa. Friedrich Ebert

Foundation: Accra. Ghana.(p:9)

3. J.C Johari (1982) Comparative Politics. Sterling Publishes Limited, New Delhi

India.(P:494)

4. Jackson Robert and Doreen Jackson (1997) A comparative Introduced to Political

Science. Prentice Hall Publication: New Jersey. (244-246,248-250)

5. Blondel J. (1973) Comparative Legislature. Prentice Hall Publication: New Jersey.

(Pp:2,3,16-17,133)

6. Godwin Kenneth and Walhlke (1997) Introduction to Political Science. Harcourt

Brace: New York. (Pp 218,224,29)

7. K.B. Ayensu and S.N Darkwa (199), Evolution of Parliament in Ghana. Institute

of Economic Affairs Publication. Accra: Ghana. (Pp.160, 148)

37

8. Ghana Parliament (2004) A Guide to the Parliament of Ghana. Parliament of

Ghana Publication. Accra. (P;14)

9. Boafa-Arthur K. (2005) “Longitudinal View on Ghana’s Parliamentary

Practices” in Salih Mohammed M.A (Ed), African Parliaments between

Governance and Government. Palgrave Macmillan Publication. New York. (P:140)

10. H. Kwasi Prempeh (2003), Executive Legislature Relationship Under the 1992

Constitution: A Critical Review. CDD Publication Accra, Ghana, September 2003.

Critical Perspective number 15. (Pp:4,5)

11. Peter Ala-Adjettey (2006). Reflection on the Effectiveness of the Parliament of

the Fourth Republic of Ghana. CDD Publication, Accra: Ghana. (Pp.16,17)

12. Staffan I. Linberg (2003). The Rise and Decline of Parliament of Ghana. Center

for Africa Studies. University of Florida. (P:8)

13. Ayee R.A.Joseph (2007), Ghana at 50: Government, Politics and Development.

University of Ghana Publication, (Legon), Accra, Ghana (77,88)

14. Regina Oforiwa Amanfo (2007) A paper presented on Africa Legislatures

Project conference o Africa Legislature; Integrating Research and Policy (the

case of Ghanaian Parliament) CDD Publication, Accra: Ghana (P:2)

15. Bealey F. Chapman and R.A. Sheehan (1999), Element in Political Science.

Edinburgh University Press; Edinburgh (P:99)

16. Mclean Latin (1996), Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics. Oxford University

Press;(P; 280)

38

CHAPTER THREE

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

3.1 INTRODUCTION.

This chapter deals with the presentation and analysis of data collected on the study.

Questionnaire was the main technique employed in collecting data. The questionnaires were

personally administered to the respondents by researchers.

As mentioned in the chapter one, bar charts and pie charts have been used in presenting and

analyzing the data, through the use of the Statistical Package for Social Science.

3.2 .0 SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS.

3.2.1 Respondents’ Gender

In order to ensure a fair gender representation, both males and females were consciously

selected as respondents. Out of the one hundred and twenty respondents selected, 75 were

males representing 62.5% and the remaining 45 were females representing 37.5%.

39

This is illustrated in the figure below.

37.5%
62.5%

3.2.2 Category of Age Groups of Respondents.

For purposes of effective data collection, the research defined three ranges of age groups.

Respondents ageing from 18-30years constituted 46.7%. Those from 31- 45years also

constituted 34.2% the respondents. The remaining 19.1% was composed of those ageing

from 46years and above.

The above statistics indicates clearly that majority of the respondents fall within the ages of

18-30years.

40

46.7%

34.2%

19.1%

3.2.3 Educational level of Respondents.

All the one hundred and twenty respondents selected had attained formal education. Out of

that 7.5% had basic education and 29.2% also had secondary education. The remaining

63.3% were those who had either completed their tertiary education or were still at tertiary

institutions.

41

63.3%

29.2%

7.5%

3.2.4 Respondents Occupation

The occupation of respondents is categorized into four sectors after coding. 34.2 percent

were made up of public servants who composed of Members of Parliament and Staffs of

Parliament who were purposively selected. 22.5 percent made up of civil servants, Students

were made up of 20.8 percent and 15.0percent were also self employed. 7.5 percent were

unemployed.

42

20.8%

34.2%
7.5%

15.0%
22.5%

ANALYSIS OF FIELD INFORMATION

3.3 General Performance of Parliament.

This section of the research sought to assess the general performance of Parliament. The

overall performance is perceived to have improved steadily. Responding to the general

performance of Parliament, the elite respondents rated Parliament very high. However, they

were of the view that there is more room for improvement. 69.2 percent of the respondents

perceived the general performance of Parliament to be good. 18.3 percent of this segment of

respondents felt satisfied with Parliament general performance and rated parliament very

good. The general performance of Parliament was rated poor by 12.5 percent of the

respondents who were mostly composed of the mass respondents.

43

69.2%

18.3%
12.5%

3.4 Parliament Serving as a Check on the Executive.

In assessing Parliament on its role of serving as a check on the executive, many of

respondent believed parliament had not perform to their satisfaction. 60.8 percent of the

respondent were of the view that parliament is ineffective in the area of its oversight role on

the executive. However, 39.2 percent of the respondents were also of a different view that

parliament is effective in that regard.

44

39.2%

60.8%

3.5 Ensuring Financial Accountability of the Executive by Parliament.

Of prime importance in democratic governance is promotion of executive accountability.

Parliament serves a vital link in the chain of accontability between government and the

citizens. On effecctiveness of Parliament in this area, majority respondents of 50.0 percent

rated parliament poor. Majority of the elite respondents were diassastisfied in this regard.

On the contrary, 25.8 percent of the respondents were satified with the work of parliament.

20.0 percent of this segment of respondent rated parliament good whilst the remaining 5.8

percent also rated the work of parliament in this regard very good. A good number of

24.2% of the respondents rated the work of parliament in ensuring financial accountability

of the executive very poor. To them the high incidence of corruption allegations against

former ministers is an indication of parliament‟s ineffectiveness of ensuring financial

accountability. They added that parliament had allow the Excutive to spend state funds for

their own private gains without any proper checks by parliament. A study by CDD also

revealed that, the overall performance of parliament in this area is less than satisfactory.
45

Many Ghanaians believe parliament is not doing any good job in the area of ensuring

financial accountability of the executive.

50.0%

24.2%

20.0%

5.8%

3.6 Facilities at Office of Parliament.

For parliament to function effectively as an institution there is the need for adequate

facilities for both MPs and Parliamentary Staffs‟ In responds to indicate a simple Yes ∕No

whether the office of parliament had been well equipped for effective performance, 43.3 %

of the respondents indicated Yes whilst the remaining 56.7% were for No. Many of the

respondents at the office of parliament responded no to this question. A chart with some of

the staff at parliament revealed that, most of them are accommodated in small shells which

46

are mostly overcrowded due to their number. This to them, affect effective discharge of

their duties

56.7% 43.3%

3.6 Assessment of Office Facilities for MPs and Select Committees of Parliament.

In assessing office facilities for MPs and Select Committees of Parliament, 28.3 percent of

the respondents indicated adequate whilst the remaining 71.7 percent also indicated

inadequate. A visit to parliament by researchers attested to the fact that only the leadership

of both the majority and the minority has offices to operate. Reactions from some MPs to

this question also revealed that most of the Parliamentary Select Committees attend their

meetings in the conference rooms of some ministries outside parliament. This results to the

lateness of some MPs to parliamentary proceedings. Others may even stay out of parliament

for committee work. Other committee meetings which are organized within parliament are

mostly done in the open. As a result certain issues are not objectively discussed by

47

committee members due to the presence of the press. Others also shared the view that,

parliament‟s power is mainly derived from the formal provisions of the constitution without

the political and material means for actualizing it.

71.7%

28.3%

48

3.7 Opinion on whether lack of Offices for MPs Affect the work of Parliament.

Having identified lack of offices for MPs as one of the major challenges of Parliament, a

different stage was then set to find out if that contribute to the inefficiency of Parliament.

Responding to a Yes and No question, 60.8 percent of the one hundred and twenty

respondents admitted that lack of offices for MPS also contribute to the administrative

inefficiency of Parliament, as against 13.3 percent who said No. However, 5.9 percent of the

respondents left the question unanswered. A further probing into this question from the

MPs themselves revealed that most of them operate from their car boots where all relevant

documents are kept. To them this does not ensure effective performance as

parliamentarians. Although, they have research assistance to assist them in their work, they

lack the facilities to enable them do their work effectively.

5.9%

33.3%

60.8%

49

3.8 Assessment of Presidential Powers over Parliament.

Another key area that has raised concerns on the ineffective of the Ghanaian Parliament is

the excessive powers of the President over Parliament. When respondents were asked

whether the office of the President has being vested with excessive powers over Parliament.

An overwhelming majority of 79.2 percent responded yes to the question as against 20.8

percent who indicated no. This result validate the notion that the 1992 Constitution grants

more powers to the President then to Parliament which constitute the representatives of

Ghanaians.

20.8%

79.2%

3.9 Opinion on whether the Excessive Powers of the President weakens Parliament.

A follow up question was asked as to whether parliament is affected by the excessive powers

of the President. Although responses were different among respondents, those who

responded yes maintained an overwhelming majority of 79.2 percent as against 13.3 percent

of those who answered no. However, 7.5 percent recorded was unanswered. This result

authenticates the notion of executive control of parliament.

50

79.2%

13.3%
7.5%

3.10 How the Excessive Powers of the President weakens Parliament.

Respondents were asked to identify ways by which parliament is affected by the Powers of

the President. With this, responses of respondents were centered on four key areas after

their answers have been coded. 25.8 percent of the respondents indicated that parliament has

been reduced to a rubber stamp with the kind of majoritarian parliamentary system practice

in Ghana. To them because majority takes all when it comes to voting on the floor of

parliament, whenever the ruling party controls majority in parliament the President is able to

push certain policies through parliament without any proper scrutiny by Parliament. 12.5

percent of the respondents also indicated that parliamentary independence is affected by the

powers of the President.

51

fvcvmAmong the elite respondents some quoted Article 78 of the Constitution that allows

the President to appoint majority of MPs as ministers as militating against parliamentary

independence. To them this provision of the constitution is one of the means the executive

uses to dominate parliament. Some of them cited the case of the recent appointment of the

entire leadership of the majority NDC Party in Parliament as ministers as a clear indication

of parliament being weaken by presidential powers. 39.2 percent were also of the view that

the excessive powers of the president weaken parliament oversight powers on the executive.

To them majority party in parliament for the past have always toe the line of the president

because most of the MPs within the majority always aspire to be appointed by the President

as ministers. They therefore find it extremely difficult to come out objectively to criticize the

actions and policies of the President. Some MPs attested to this and added that parliament is

mandated to approve ministerial appointments through the activities of the Appointment

Committee of Parliament, however, when it comes to firing or reshuffling ministers‟

parliament is not consulted. Some further added that, although, the Public Accounts

Committee of Parliament has the powers of a high court to prosecute public officials who

are found guilty of corruption, the committee in practice had failed to exercise such powers

over the years. The remaining 22.5 percent of the respondents were of the view that the

excessive powers of the president limit parliament‟s legislative powers. Although several

reasons were given to support their view, majority of them especially the elite respondent

were of the view that because the President can refuse to assent to bills passed by Parliament

to become laws, parliament had in a way been limited in its legislative powers. To them

whether a bill would become law or not, it lies in the hands of the President not Parliament.

These responses affirm how parliament had been weakened by executive powers over the

years.

52

39.2%

25.8%

22.5%

12.5%

3.11. Why Parliament is Unable to perform its Oversight Role on the Executive

Effectively.

One of the key responsibilities of parliament in every state is to serve as a watchdog on the

actions and policies of the President and the entire executive arm of government. However,

this seems to be ineffective in the case of the Ghanaian Parliament. This question therefore

sought to know the views of respondents as to why parliament is unable to perform such a

task effectively over the years. 52.5 percent of the respondents endorsed the fact that the

executive specifically the President wields too much power over parliament and has

53

therefore cripple parliament in that regard. However, most of them explained with the same

reasons as provided in figure 3.12. 24.2 percent were of the view that parliament is

ineffective in this regard because MPs double as ministers. They buttressed their view with

the fact that the moment someone is appointed as a ministers such a person is accountable

to the President. Therefore, the moment an MP is appointed a minister automatically the

person become accountable to the president. It now becomes extremely difficult if not

impossible for an MP who doubles as a minister to check someone he or she is accountable

to. MPs that double as ministers always toe the line of the President when an issue comes to

the floor of parliament. A staff of Parliament affirmed that the situation is even worse if an

MP is appointed as a cabinet minister. Another important issue raised by 19.2 percent of the

respondent is lack of office accommodation for MPs and Select Committees. This segment

of respondents were of the view that much of the oversight role of parliament is done at the

committee level but sadly enough these committees are not well resourced in terms of

facilities and finance.

Victimization of MPs by the Executive was also recorded by 4.2 percent of the respondents.

Among the mass public many were of the view that MPs are given certain packages to toe

the line of the executive. However, if a Member of Parliament comes out public to reveal

such an act he or she is victimized. This has keep some of the MPs mute even when they

know clearly that a decision being taken is not in the interest of the country. Some of them

cited the case of the Member of Parliament for Odobeng Brakwa; Hon. P.C Appiah Ofori.

These are clear indications that Parliament as one of the key institutions of the country exist

with challenges which need greater attention of Ghanaians in order to consolidate our

democracy effectively.

54

52.5%

24.2%
19.2%

4.2%

3.12 How Parliament can be Strengthen to perform its oversight role.

Having established these challenges and how disastrous they could be to our democracy in

terms of horizontal accountability between parliament and the executive, it was prudent to

solicit for the views of respondents on how best parliament can be made to perform its

oversight responsibilities effectively. Among the several options provided by respondents,

Parliamentary independence recorded 51.7%. The mass publics were of the view that the

hybrid system being practiced does not ensure horizontal accountability. Ministers of State

must therefore be selected from outside parliament. Secret balloting doing parliamentary

proceedings was also identified by 12.5 percent of respondents. To them voting by head

count as done during parliamentary proceedings does not allow for objectivity on the part of

MPs. Some are influenced by the actions of their chief whips.

55

18.3 percent were of the opinion that parliament should be well resourced in order to ensure

effectiveness. They believed parliament should be financially autonomous for it to be able to

carry out their oversight responsibility effectively. Some Members of Parliament were of the

view that, financial autonomy of the legislature is guarantee by Article 179(2) of the

constitution and Act 460 of 1993 providing that the administrative and operational expenses

of the Parliamentary Service are neither subject to budgetary review or control by the

Ministry of Finance, but this autonomy has been compromised and parliamentary budgets

have being subjected to scrutiny by the Finance Ministry. 12.5 percent also believed the

partisan attitude of parliamentarians must also be avoided in order to ensure objective and

effective oversight. A study also by CDD suggested that one crucial means to enable

parliament to effectively serve as a check on the executive is to get enough information

about the activities of the executive. To them information is an important lubricant for every

institution, and more important for an institution charged with the responsibility of

lawmaking and policy deliberation.

56

51.7%

17.5% 18.3%
12.5%

57

CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND

CONCLUTION

4.0 RESEARCHERS MAIN FINDINGS.

After we have been to the field to carry out the research, the following are our main findings.

There is poor public awareness of what parliament does as an institution of the

state. Some people do not even know the kind of relationship that exists between

parliament and the executive.

The overall performance of parliament had improved. Many Ghanaians think

parliament is performing better today in its legislative functions then some year

back. However, many are of the view that, the performance of parliament in

terms of the effectiveness with which it carries out its oversight role on the

executive has been low.

The rationale for the provision that majority of ministers be picked from

parliament was intended for them to inform parliament on its deliberation.

However, the reality on the ground is different because those ministers see

themselves more as members of the executive than as MPs and therefore

compromising their independence.

Both qualitative and quantitative data suggest that parliament had failed to

overcome executive dominance and to undertake its oversight responsibilities on

the executive effectively. Many of our respondents were of the view that because

MPs double as ministers they are unable to be independent in order to exercise a

check on the executive as parliamentarians.

58

The current Ghanaians political dispensation creates the attitude of partisanship

in MPs who hope to be offered ministerial appointment.

The excessive power of the President over Parliament is seen as one of the main

source of parliamentary weakness

Lack of offices for MPs also affects the performance of parliamentarians.

There are constitutional constraints that also militate against parliament in its

oversight role on the executive.

4.1 RECOMMENDATIONS.

The research findings reveal clearly that there are still more to be done for parliament to be

able to exercise its constitutional checks effectively on the executive in order to achieve

horizontal accountability between the legislature and the executive arms of government. A

number of recommendations result from the study conducted. The implementation of these

recommendations would help strengthen the capacity of parliament to perform its oversight

role effectively on the executive.

There should be effective public education on the work of parliament so that people

can understand how parliament works and what they should expect from it.

Ghanaians should be educated to understand how they are governed.

Good governance practices that promote complementary rather than partisan and

conflicting relationship between the three main institutions of government in the

performance of their functions should be adopted

Institutional network that promote greater interaction, collaboration, communication

and consensus building between the organs of government on: setting national

59

priorities, determining resource allocation and regular appraisal based on agree

indicators should be established

Infrastructural and resources capacity of parliament must be improved

Voting by head count in parliament must be replaced by secret balloting in order to

enhance independence of voting and thereby reduce partisan approach to the

business of parliament

The need to strengthen the committee system. In order to reduce the executive

dominance of parliament and to strengthen the oversight functions of the legislature,

members other than from the ruling party should chair committees of parliament.

In order to make parliament more relevant and eradicate the perception of

parliament as a mere approving body, a mechanism should be put in place to involve

parliament in the process of policy initiation at very early stages to enable it prioritize

and influence allocation of resources and not just wait to be given completed policies

that require ordinary approval.

Parliament should be strengthened to have necessary independence to do its work.

This will require the development of a national vision and strategic plan for

parliament as an institution; identification and adoption of best practice norms to

foster the insulation of key national issue from excessive partisanship and the

development of consensus based decision making in parliament.

In order for parliament to effectively carry out its oversight functions effectively it is

important for parliament to keep the executive at arm length so that it can more

effectively perform the oversight function.

60

4.2 CONCLUSION

It is a little disappointing that one of Africa‟s most successful cases of democratization has a

parliament that does not seem as potent as a democratic institution as the country deserves

looking at the overall situation for democracy. It is not unique, however, that a young

democracy experience a period of executive dominance. Executive branches of government

after all generally seek to extend their influence beyond their bounds not only in emerging

democracies but also in established ones. Known in Latin American politics as the lack of

strong horizontal accountability (O‟ Donnell 1998), this phenomenon is expressing itself in

various ways in Africa.

The Parliament of Ghana since its inception in has not been able to enjoy all the necessary

organizational resources that will enable it perform it oversight, representation and legislative

functions. The history of Parliament in Ghana has been tumultuous; but, the overall

performance of the Ghanaian Parliament has been better than before. However, quantitative

data suggest that parliament has failed to overcome executive dominance and to undertake

its functions effectively within the framework of the 1992 Constitution.

The major challenges that weaken Parliament in the Fourth Republic include; domination of

parliament by the executive in the current political environment, the constitutionally

mandated selection of Ministers of State from among MPs, frequent voting by head count

rather than by secret balloting, weak infrastructural and resource base and the excessive

powers of the president over parliament. The organizational resources are necessary for the

effective performance of parliament, and therefore Parliament must exert itself to ensure it is

guaranteed financial autonomy and the resource to carry out all its activities. MPs should

61

have well equipped offices both in Parliament and their various constituencies, capable,

competent and professional staff to assist MPs and Parliament in their assigned roles. The

Parliamentary Committees should also have well equipped meeting rooms to facilitate their

investigative and oversight roles.

However, improved infrastructural and resource base of parliament is not enough to alter

the situation. There would still be significant obstacles to the ideal operation of the

Ghanaian Parliament even if these constraints are removed. For parliament to fulfill its

duties, a very fundamental issue must be resolved, namely the constitutional right of the

President to appoint a large number of appointees of the executive wing of government

from parliament so as to achieve an effective separation of power between Parliament and

the Executive. More so the present state of affairs where parliament has to depend almost

entirely on the executive for funds to provide its functioning and the constitutional right of

the president to determine the salaries and other allowances of Members of Parliament. All

these constraints tend to derogate substantially from the effectiveness of Parliament.

For the Parliament of Ghana to be truly independent and function well as an autonomous

arm of government, Ghana must re-evaluate the 1992 Constitution which shapes Parliament

as an institution.

62

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 Alibi Niyi (1998) Parliamentary Democracy in West Africa. Friedrich Ebert

Foundation: Accra. Ghana

 Andrew Heywood (200) Politics, second Edition. Macmillan Publication: London.

 Ayee R.A. Joseph (2007). Ghana at 50: Government, Politics and Development.

University of Ghana Publication, (Legon), Accra, Ghana.

 Bealey F. Chapman and R.A. Sheenhan (1999), Elements in Political Science.

Edinburgh University Press; Edinburgh.

63

 Boafo-Arthur K.(2005) “Longitudinal View on Ghana’s Parliament Practices”

in Salih Mohammed M.A. (Ed), Africa Parliaments Between Governance and

Government. Palgrave Macmillan Publication. New York.

 Blondel J. (1973) Comparative Legislature. Prentice Hall Publication: New Jersey.

 Center for Democratic Development Newsletter (2001) Democracy Watch

Volume 2 Number 1. CDD Publication, Accra, Ghana March, 2001.

 Center for Democratic Development Publication (2002), Parliament and Democratic

Governance in Ghana’s Fourth Republic. CDD Publication, Accra, Ghana

Publication. Accra.

 Gilbert Keith Bluwey (2002) Political Science: An Introduction. Legon Center for

International Affairs (LECIA) Publication. Accra, Ghana.

 Godwin Kenneth and Wahlke (1997) Introduction to Political Science. Harcourt

Brace: New York.

 H. Kwasi Prempeh (2003)|, Executive Legislature Relationship under the 1992

Constitution: A Critical Review. CDD Publication Accra, Ghana, September 2003

Critical Perspective Number 15.

64

 Jackson Robert and Doreen Jackson (1997) A Comparative Introduction to

Political Science. Prentice Hall Publication: New Jersey.

 J.C Johari (1982) Comparative Politics. Sterling Publishes Limited, New Delhi,

India.

 K.B. Ayensu and S.N Darkwa (1999), The Evolution of Parliament in Ghana,

Institution of Economic Affairs Publication, Accra, Ghana

 Kumekpor Tom K.B (2002), Research Methods, Sonlife Press and Services, Accra,

Ghana.

 Mclean Lain (1996). Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics. Oxford University

Press; Oxford.

 Ninsin A. Kwame (2005). Executive-Parliament Interface in the Legislative

Process (1993-2006). A Synergy of Power, Institute for Democratic Governance

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the Fourth Republic of Ghana CDD Publication, Accra: Ghana.

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 Regina Oforiwa Amanfo (2007), A paper presented on Africa Legislatures Project

Conference on Africa Legislature: Integrating Research and Policy (the case of

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66

APPENDIX A

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FINDINGS.

Figure 3.1: Respondents' Gender

Cumulative

Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent

Valid Male 75 62.5 62.5 62.5

Female 45 37.5 37.5 100.0

Total 120 100.0 100.0

Figure 3.2: Respondents' Age

67

Cumulative


Valid 18-30 years 56 46.7 46.7 46.7

31-45 years 41 34.2 34.2 80.8

46 years and above 23 19.2 19.2 100.0

Total 120 100.0 100.0

Figure 3.3 Respondents' educational level

Cumulative


Valid Basic 9 7.5 7.5 7.5

Secondary 35 29.2 29.2 36.7

Tertiary 76 63.3 63.3 100.0

Total 120 100.0 100.0

Figure 3.4 Respondents' occupation

Cumulative


Valid Public Servant 41 34.2 34.2 34.2

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Civil servant 27 22.5 22.5 56.7

Self-employed 18 15.0 15.0 71.7

Unemployed 9 7.5 7.5 79.2

Students 25 20.8 20.8 100.0

Total 120 100.0 100.0

Figure 3.5 Assessment of parliament's general performance

Cumulative


Valid Very good 22 18.3 18.3 18.3

Good 83 69.2 69.2 87.5

Poor 15 12.5 12.5 100.0

Total 120 100.0 100.0

Figure 3.6: Parliamentary role of serving as a check on the

executive

Cumulative


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