Abstract Over the last two decades there has been continuous tinkering and wholesale review of the remit, governance and territorial focus of sub-national development in England. There has also been mounting agreement that subsidiarity will produce optimum material outcomes. It is against this background that we provide a critical reading of the UK Coalition government’s 2010 ‘White Paper’ on Local Growth. Revealing the peculiarities of an economic transition plan which dismantled a regional (strategic) framework, we explore the opportunities that cross-boundary Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) may provide. After abandoning regions, LEPs have been promoted as the only possible ‘replacements’ for Regional Development Agencies and, thus, a prime example of new ‘techniques of government’. We probe the potentials and pitfalls from the dash to establish new sub-national techniques of government, and crystallise some key implications that apply beyond the shores of England. Our key contention is that LEPs have designed-in just as many issues as they have designed-out. Pugalis, L. & Townsend, A. R. (2012) 'Rebalancing England: Sub-National Development (Once Again) at the Crossroads', Urban Research & Practice, 5 (1), 159-176.

1. Rebalancing England: Sub-National Development (Once Again) at the
Crossroads
Lee Pugalis1 and Alan R. Townsend
Paper should be cited as:
Pugalis, L. & Townsend, A. R. (2012) 'Rebalancing England: Sub-National Development
(Once Again) at the Crossroads', Urban Research & Practice, 5 (1), 159-176.
Abstract
Over the last two decades there has been continuous tinkering and wholesale review of the
remit, governance and territorial focus of sub-national development in England. There has
also been mounting agreement that subsidiarity will produce optimum material outcomes. It is
against this background that we provide a critical reading of the UK Coalition government’s
2010 ‘White Paper’ on Local Growth. Revealing the peculiarities of an economic transition
plan which dismantled a regional (strategic) framework, we explore the opportunities that
cross-boundary Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) may provide. After abandoning regions,
LEPs have been promoted as the only possible ‘replacements’ for Regional Development
Agencies and, thus, a prime example of new ‘techniques of government’. We probe the
potentials and pitfalls from the dash to establish new sub-national techniques of government,
and crystallise some key implications that apply beyond the shores of England. Our key
contention is that LEPs have designed-in just as many issues as they have designed-out.
Key words: sub-national development; economic governance; Local Enterprise Partnerships;
Regional Development Agencies
1
Corresponding author: lee.pugalis@northumbria.ac.uk
Page 1 of 25

2. Introduction
The rescaling and accompanying institutional reconfigurations of English planning,
regeneration and economic development policy activities (hereafter referred to as sub-
national development) have recently featured prominently in policy circles (see, for example,
Centre for Cities, 2010; Harding, 2010; Mulgan, 2010; NFEA, 2010; Pugalis, 2010, 2011c;
Rigby and Pickard, 2010; Shaw and Greenhalgh, 2010; SQW, 2010; Tyler, 2010). Even
though the election of a UK Conservative-Liberal Democrat ‘Coalition’ government in May,
2010 provided a policy jolt to spatial practice across the sub-national terrain of England, such
breaks and incremental shifts are nothing new (Albrechts et al., 1989; Fothergill, 2005;
Harrison, 2007; Imrie and Raco, 1999; Inch, 2009; Jonas and Ward, 2002; Valler and
Carpenter, 2010). Whilst ruptures can be triggered by a change in ideological outlook or
political meta-narrative, or indeed socio-economic shocks such as the ‘credit crunch’,
incremental shifts tend to be associated with more mundane policy tinkering emanating from
bottom-up or top-down ‘innovations’, or more often a melting pot of multidirectional policy
interactions. Over the past decade or so there have been continuous tinkering and wholesale
review of the governance, institutional structures, responsibilities and territorial focus of sub-
national development in England. Jones attributes the burgeoning development of such ‘a
peculiarly English disease … that of compulsive re-organisation’ to the centralised nature of
government (Jones, 2010, p. 373; see also Porter and Ketels, 2003). Indeed, as Morgan
(2002) has pointed out, England remains the ‘gaping hole in the devolution settlement’.
Whereas the territories of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland achieved significant
devolutionary packages under the UK’s Labour Government (1997-2010), decentralisation in
England was rather more constrained (Goodwin et al., 2005; Lee, 2008). As a result, sub-
national development in England tends to endure politically-induced ruptures (Pugalis,
2011a) more frequently than may be the case in other countries.
In most European countries the middle tiers of government (regions, provinces, etc.) are top-
down devolved units (elected or nominated) which have authority in many sectors at once.
They tend to possess powers that are legally entrenched in federal or other constitutions, and
cannot simply be altered by an incoming government’s administrative decisions. In the UK,
this applies only to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – which all have regular elections
and policy fields in which they enjoy legislative authority. In England the Labour government
was stopped short in its tracks by the negative result of a referendum in one region, the North
Page 2 of 25

3. East, in 2004: by a strong majority, the electorate rejected proposals for an elected Regional
Assembly (RA) (Rallings and Thrasher, 2006; Shaw and Robinson, 2007). Historically the
regions of England existed as statistical and/or administrative units, though having
approximately twice the size of population of the average member of the Committee of the
Regions. It had been partly to meet European Union requirements that the Conservative and
Labour governments of the 1990s standardised and integrated a Government Office (GO) in
each region, with Labour instituting Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) in 1999. It is
important to note that these integrating roles were well staffed and financed, and unelected
RAs continued to develop after the North East referendum result of 2004, for example
through the accretion of the statutory role of strategic spatial planning. However, the tripartite
arrangement of regional organisations was almost entirely dependent on Whitehall funding
and powers.
Enshrined in Labour’s Review of sub-national economic development and regeneration in
2007 (SNR)i (HM Treasury, 2007) and consistent with broader trends at the European scale
(Commission of the European Communities (CEC), 2009), there has been growing policy
agreement that subsidiarity – devolving power and resources to the lowest appropriate spatial
scale – will produce optimum outcomes on the ground (see, for example, Communities and
Local Government (CLG), 2008a). This policy direction has continued under the incumbent
Coalition government by way of their distinctive brand of ‘localism’ (Bishop, 2010;
Conservative Party, 2010; Localis, 2009). Indeed, the pace of change has rapidly accelerated
since the Coalition entered power, although their policy delivery has tended to be haphazard,
reflecting a new ‘permissive’ approach, that is also susceptible to legal challenge (see, for
example, Pugalis and Townsend, 2010) and could be accused of devising ‘policy on the
hoof’.
The focus of this paper is on deciphering the Coalition government’s landmark ‘White Paper’
Local growth: realising every place‟s potential (HM Government, 2010b), published on 28,
October 2010, that sought to provide a road-map for their overriding ambition of rebalancing
the economy. Through the Coalition’s open invitation for local authorities and businesses to
establish cross-boundary Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), a new acronym was instantly
born. Even so, the huge interest surrounding LEPs suggests that they cannot easily be
discounted as merely just another piece of jargon (Hickey, 2010), particularly as they have
‘replaced’ RDAs as the prime governance entities available for sub-national development.
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4. The key contention of this paper is that LEPs, following an extensive line of governing
bodies operating at a ‘larger than local’ spatial scale, have designed-in just as many issues as
they have designed-out. Firstly, through an exegesis of the Coalition’s discourse we analyse
the case for change; revealing that attention has focussed on past failures to provide the
rationale for a new political meta-narrative. Secondly, we provide a critical synopsis of the
White Paper; arguing that the Coalition’s road-map of the future is predicated on dictates of
the market and market logics. Thirdly, we expose the ‘new model’, intended to rebalance
England, for involving at least three dimensions: sectoral, state-community relations and
spatial. Fourthly, we provide a nuanced examination of LEPs. Fifthly, we interrogate the
territorial dimension of sub-national development, before analysing the Coalition’s emerging
laisser-faire approach in the sixth section. We close the paper by confronting the peculiarities
of the Coalition’s economic transition plan for lacking the support of a regional framework,
and draw out some key implications and implicit misconceptions in the concluding section.
Picking up the pieces: the case for change
As the Coalition entered power they mercilessly set about reorganising England’s sub-
national institutional policy architecture (see Figure 1 for a timeline of crucial policy
junctures). But before reconstitution could take place, the case for change needed to be made.
Whilst the administrative regions of England pre-date the election of Tony Blair’s ‘New
Labour’ Party in 1997, their legislation for RDAs to operate in a regional tripartite
relationship with GOs and unelected RAs for each region ensured that institutional-policy
infrastructure inherited by the Coalition was viewed, largely unfavourably, as an unnecessary
legacy of thirteen years of Labour. RDAs, Quasi-Autonomous Non-Government
Organisations or QUANGOs, were in essence the guardians of their respective regional
economies. Each of the nine RDAs was charged with improving economic competitiveness
and also narrowing regional economic disparities with other regions, which demonstrated a
tension transparent in Labour’s policy: marrying the ideals of social inclusion with the
imperatives of economic competitiveness. Responsible to Whitehall and governed by state
appointed private sector-led boards, RDAs were arguably the chief institutional agency under
Labour for promoting spaces of opportunity within the regions. However, their success in
closing the gap in regional economic output and enhancing social inclusion is less clear and
more disputed (EEF, 2007; Larkin, 2010).
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5. Figure 1. Policy development timeline
Even so, RDAs were powerful multi-purpose economic bodies, collectively responsible for
the annual administration of billions of pounds of central government ‘Single Programme’
resources and management of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), on behalf
of the UK Government’s department for Communities and Local Government (CLG).
Alongside their strategy-setting powers, in the form of Regional Economic Strategies (RESs)
and then integrated Regional Strategies (the latter set out in SNR), RDAs were the key public
sector players in sub-national development – wielding significant statutory and financial
influence. They provided a strong link between localities and Whitehall, and therefore
Page 5 of 25

6. performed at a key nexus of power. This was reiterated in SNR and the subsequent Local
Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 – but complicated by a
superfluity of sub-regional economic partnerships and other loose arrangements of economic
governance interests, such as City Regions and cross-boundary Multi-Area Agreements
(MAAs).
In the run up to the general election and beyond, Coalition ministers contended that it was
counterproductive to attempt to ‘rebalance economies as diverse as those of Leeds, Liverpool
and Tees Valley from [their] offices in Whitehall’ (Pickles and Cable, 2010). The centralised-
regional system was criticised for its elite approach and bureaucratic-planning view, which
tried to ‘both determine where growth should happen and stimulate that growth’(HM
Government, 2010b, p. 7). The Coalition declared that Labour’s approach failed because it
stifled ‘healthy competition’ by working against the grain of economic markets (HM
Government, 2010b, p. 7). Against this background, the dismantling of regional institutional
architecture was based on three intertwining policy issues, concerning democratic
accountability, size in terms of relevance to functional economic area, and effectiveness of
existing economic governance arrangements.
Firstly, regional spatial planning and economic development were deemed to lack political
oversight and thus created a democratic deficit (see, for example, Prisk, 2010). Operating as
they did as arms of central government, Pickles maintained that RDAs ‘gave local authorities
little reason to engage creatively with economic issues’ (cited in Communities and Local
Government (CLG), 2010b). Such rhetorical claims about the ‘democratic deficit’ of
devolution are a well-used discursive ploy (Morgan, 2002). The crucial flaw with Labour’s
decentralisation agenda was the failure to follow up the establishment of RDAs with elected
RAs. Secondly, the narrative goes that regions were ‘too large’ to enable managerial-
governance entities to operate effectively. As a consequence Coalition ministers’ claimed that
regions grouped together far-flung local authorities. The implication was that regions were
ill-suited to work with the spatial dynamism of ‘functional economic areas’ or ‘natural
economic geographies’. Thirdly, the Coalition asserted that the imposition of (almost)
anything regional added a bureaucratic layer, which had resulted in needless overlap (Pearce
and Ayres, 2007). This was part of a wider ideological reaction against the ‘big state’ and
Labour’s state-mode of production, but was accentuated by lower political identification in
Coalition held areas of local government, particularly pronounced in the south of England,
Page 6 of 25

7. and the greater size of English regions compared with those of EU member states (Townsend
and Pugalis, 2011).
Whereas both governments emphasised subsidiarity in their respective policy-reviews
(Communities and Local Government (CLG), 2008b; Communities and Local Government
(CLG) and Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR), 2007; HM Government,
2010b; HM Treasury, 2007), there were also notable ideological differences in their
interpretations. Labour, for example, aimed to narrow the growth rates between regions
through centrally controlled target-setting and policy prescriptions from Whitehall. State-
centrism was supported by a strong regional framework and a plethora of more fuzzy spaces
of economic governance (Haughton and Allmendinger, 2008; Haughton et al., 2009), such as
MAAs. In contrast, the Coalition contested that Labour’s regions were ‘an artificial
representation of functional economies’, noting that labour markets ‘do not exist at a regional
level, except in London’ (HM Government, 2010b, p. 7), and asserted that regional housing
targets and allocations had actually impeded growth. In the next section we decipher the
Coalition government’s White Paper, which entirely replaced Labour’s foremost scalar
modes of policy-management.
A road-map of the future?
Making the case for change through a new approach, the Coalition Government outlined in
their Local Growth White Paper that they would:
shift power to local communities and business, enabling places to tailor their approach
to local circumstances
promote efficient and dynamic markets, in particular in the supply of land, and
provide real and significant incentives for places that go for growth
support investment in places and people to tackle the barriers to growth
(HM Government, 2010b, p. 5).
The shift in approach positions businesses at the helm of partnerships, covering areas which
reflect ‘real’ economic geographies. This is aligned with the Coalition concept of the ‘Big
Page 7 of 25

8. Society’ (closely identified with localism), which places distinctiveness and subsidiarity at its
heart by ‘recognising that where the drivers of growth are local, decisions should be made
locally’ (HM Government, 2010b, p. 8).
The White Paper was intended to set out a new direction for sub-national development under
Coalition national leadership and also spell out ‘what it means in practice’ (Prisk, 2010). Yet,
the White Paper is not so much a strategy for action or a cohesive whole, but more of an
outline of a series of distinct (and sometimes disjointed) sectoral and spatial aspirations that
the Coalition intend to implement over the coming years. It is difficult to neatly summarise as
it covers so much ground, including reference to planning, economic development and
enterprise, transport, tourism, innovation, supply chain development and housing, in fewer
than 60 pages. Nevertheless, to help paint a picture of the path of change, including what
functions may be localised as others are centralised, Table 1 helps distil some of the more
notable policy pronouncements in terms of potential – not mandatory - sub-regional (LEP)
functions and those to be ‘led’ nationally.
The table clearly shows the scope and extent to which LEPs may perform a role in sub-
national development in relation to central government. Having 33 state-sanctioned sub-
regional LEPs covering approximately 93 per cent of England’s population (at the end of
April, 2011) is preferable for undertaking some strategic activities to a situation where each
of the 292 lower-tier local authorities of England is solely responsible for delivery of these
policy areas. Without sub-national governance arrangements, the likelihood of local authority
competition would intensify. Also, it is widely recognised that business interactions do not
respect or even reflect local administrative boundaries. Therefore, it is valuable to have a
governance forum at the sub-regional level where cross-boundary issues and disputes can be
prioritised and hopefully reconciled. Yet, there were some transport, infrastructure and
innovation questions which were valuably conducted at the regional level that may prove
more problematic to address at the sub-regional scale. There are crucially many functions of
previous regional organisations that will remain only at theLocal Authority level, including
formal legal responsibility for planning frameworks and planning application case decisions.
And on the other hand, a number of crucial issues have been recentralised in London,
including business advice, innovation and inward investment, while the actual funding and
management of employment and training matters remain under the direct control of national
government departments and QUANGOs.
Page 8 of 25

9. Table 1. The primary role(s) of LEPs in relation to national responsibilities
Central government
Policy area Potential role(s) of LEPs
responsibilities
Oversight and consultee
National policy in the form of a
Later potential for legislation to take
National Planning Framework
on statutory planning functions,
Planning including determination of
Determination of infrastructure and
planning decisions of national
applications for strategic
importance
development and infrastructure
Strategy formulation and engagement
with local transport authorities on
their local transport plans Delivery of strategic transport
Cross-boundary co-ordination of bids infrastructure
Infrastructure to the Local Sustainable Transport Digital connectivity led by
Fund Broadband Delivery UK
Support the delivery of national
initiatives
Brokerage and advocacy
Take actions on issues such as
promoting an entrepreneurial culture,
encouraging and supporting business
Business and National website and call centre
start-ups, helping existing businesses
enterprise to survive and grow, encouraging
networks and mentoring
Direct delivery support and grants
will be subject to local funding
Advocacy role largely, but some Delivered through the Technology
LEPs may continue the development Strategy Board and an ‘elite network’
Innovation and promotion of innovation of Technology and Innovation
infrastructure Centres
Leadership on sectors of national
Provide information on local niche importance and the development of
sectors low carbon supply chain
Sectors Feeding in local issues to any opportunities
national policies Support national Manufacturing
Advisory Service
Inward
Provide information on local offer Led by UK Trade & Investment
investment
Advocacy role in terms of skills
development
Work with providers to influence the Led by Skills Funding Agency
Employment
delivery of Work Programme at local Led by Department of Work &
and skills level Pensions and Jobcentre Plus
Contribution to handling major
redundancies
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10. Rebalancing England: a new model
The UK was fully involved in the global economic upheavals emerging in 2007. Therefore,
as the economic rule book was being rewritten, when the Coalition entered power they
proposed a ‘new model’ to rebalance the economy of England. We identify three dimensions
of rebalancing to this model – sectoral, state-community relations and spatial – that are both
explicit and implicit in the White Paper.
Through the Chancellor’s ‘Emergency’ Budget (HM Treasury, 2010a), which was promptly
followed by a Comprehensive Spending Review (HM Treasury, 2010b), the scale of the
Coalition’s fiscal retrenchment policy became widely known, where they proposed the first
rebalancing dimension. Firstly, the Coalition considered that England had become over-
reliant on financial services and a rebalancing was required in terms of other sectors, such as
advanced-manufacturing, to help support an export-led recovery (HM Treasury and Business
Innovation and Skills (BIS), 2010). Consequently, central government will ‘provide national
leadership on framing policies towards sectors of national importance’ (HM Government,
2010b, p. 43), such as the low and ultra low carbon vehicle sectoral market. The Coalition
also considered that the public-private split of economic activity was in need of rebalancing
in favour of the private sector, arguing that: ‘Too many parts of the country became over-
dependent on the public sector’ (HM Government, 2010b, p. 6). Related to the sectoral
rebalancing dimension was the matter of rebalancing state-community relations (small state
and Big Society). It is the third dimension of the Coalition’s rebalancing rhetoric that
concerns spatial implications, ‘so that new economic opportunities spread across the country’
(Pickles cited in Communities and Local Government (CLG), 2010a). Recognising that it is
potentially economically unsustainable and certainly socio-environmentally regressive to rely
on London and the South East as the disproportionate generators of national prosperity,
therefore, to ‘succeed’, requires a ‘need to rebalance the economy and allow other regions to
catch up with the South East, boosting the capability and productivity of every area’ (Prisk,
2010).
Reshuffling the pack but now with less high value cards
It may now be commonly accepted in many disciplines that places are connected in diverse,
diffuse and complex ways (Massey, 2005), yet this view is not yet fully accepted in practice.
Page 10 of 25

11. For this reason, over the past five years or so, think-tanks and policy-driven research projects
have been constantly banging the drum that the economic footprints of cities stretch beyond
their administrative boundaries (see, for example, Centre for Cities, 2010, p. 2). Taking
forward the policy direction set out in Labour’s SNR, the Coalition have continued to
embrace the recent policy logic for the need to operate across ‘real’ geographies rather than
administrative constructs, of which regions were very large examples. It is this view that
helps underpin the Coalition government’s rather radical plans and subsequent action to
‘replace’ the RDAs with a plethora of (sub-regional) LEPs. They are intended to perform a
crucial role: operating at a scale to help negotiate central-local relations. Originally set out in
the Conservative’s local government Green Paper: Control shift: returning power to local
communities (Conservative Party, 2009), then confirmed as a key policy by the Coalition
(HM Government, 2010a), the intent was for LEPs to be joint local authority-business bodies
that would promote local growth. The 2010 Budget Report stated that the Ggovernment will
‘support the creation of strong local enterprise partnerships, particularly those based around
England’s major cities and other natural economic areas, to enable improved coordination of
public and private investment in transport, housing, skills, regeneration and other areas of
economic development’ (HM Treasury, 2010a, p. 31).
LEPs, viewed as new ‘techniques of government’ (Foucault, 1991 [1978], p. 101), constitute
the institutional interface between individual localities (in terms of local authorities, selective
business interests and other economic stakeholders) and the UK government, or more
accurately particular ministerial departments. Yet, at the closing date for LEP proposals from
individual areas, no policy guidance had been issued by government to inform the
development of LEP proposals beyond a few paragraphs set out in the letter of invitation by
the responsible ministers; Cable and Pickles (see Pugalis, 2010). It was not until the
September deadline had lapsed, and over 60 bids had been made, that the Coalition published
the Local Growth White Paper (HM Government, 2010b). Perhaps most significant in the
pattern of delay was the longstanding rivalry between the two ministerial departments –
Communities and Local Government (CLG) and Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) – and
their respective predecessors (Pugalis, 2011a, c). When the personalities and ideologies of
their respective cabinet ministers – Messrs Pickles and Cable – were added to the mix it is
probable that a cohesive government view on the form of LEPs could not be reached. Indeed,
Pickles, rooted in the local council lobby, is ‘rabidly anti-regional’ whereas Cable, an
economist, sees the value of retaining some regional structures and was amenable to retaining
Page 11 of 25

12. the more favourably viewed RDAs, such as those in the North (Bailey, 2010; Bentley et al.,
2010). Indeed, his department, BIS, has more recently decided to reintroduce state regional
offices in all but name through the introduction of six ‘BIS Local’ headquarters in order to
provide the department with a ‘policy presence outside of Whitehall’.
There is merit in distilling the guidance issued on LEPs both prior to and post LEP
submission (see Table 2), where subtle differences in pre and post submission guidance are
detectable. In terms of LEPs, the White Paper mentioned ‘lots of ‘coulds’ and ‘shoulds’ but
nothing definitive’ (Dickinson, 2011). The lack of crucial details and clarity that many
stakeholders desired left a large question over whether LEPs would be equipped to deliver
their goal of enabling local growth.
Table 2. LEP guidance
Pre-submission guidance Post-submission guidance
Role and Provide strategic leadership Provide the clear vision and strategic
functions Set out local economic priorities and a leadership, developing a strategy for growth, to
clear vision drive sustainable private sector-led
Help rebalance the economy towards the development and job creation in their area
private sector Government particularly encourage
Create the right environment for business partnerships working in respect to transport,
and growth housing and planning as part of an integrated
Tackle issues such as planning and approach to growth and infrastructure delivery
housing, local transport and infrastructure Could take on a diverse range of roles, such as:
priorities, employment and enterprise, the working with Government to set out
transition to the low carbon economy and key investment priorities
in some areas tourism supporting high growth businesses
Support small business start-ups promoting an entrepreneurial culture,
Work closely with universities and further encouraging and supporting business
education colleges start ups, helping existing businesses
to survive and grow, encouraging
networks and mentoring
working with Government in
developing sector policies
strategic planning role, including the
production of strategic planning
frameworks, making representation on
the development of national planning
policy and ensuring business is
involved in the development and
consideration of strategic planning
applications
strategic housing delivery
collaborating with local skills
networks to agree skills priorities and
to access funding through the Skills
Funding Agency
working with local partners to help
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13. local workless people into jobs
coordinating proposals or bidding
directly for the Regional Growth Fund
and coordinating approaches to
leveraging funding from the private
sector
providing information on the local
offer in respect of inward investment
becoming involved in delivery of
national priorities such as digital
infrastructure and bidding to become a
delivery agent for nationally
commissioned activities
Size Better reflect the natural economic Bodies that represent real economic
geography; covering the real functional geographies or reasonable natural economic
economic and travel to work areas geography, whether the geography is supported
Expect partnerships would include groups by business and is sufficiently strategic
of upper tier authorities, which would not
preclude that which matches existing
regional boundaries
Governance Collaboration between business and civic Putting local business leadership at the helm, it
and leaders, normally including equal is vital that business and civic leaders work
representation on the boards of these together
constitution partnerships The Government will normally expect to see
A prominent business leader should chair business representatives form half the board,
the board, but Government are willing to with a prominent business leader in the chair
consider variants Partnerships will want to work closely with
Sufficiently robust governance structures universities, further education colleges and
Proper accountability for delivery by other key economic stakeholders. This includes
partnerships social and community enterprises
The Government does not intend to define local
enterprise partnerships in legislation
The constitution and legal status of each
partnership will be a matter for the partners,
informed by the activities that they wish to
pursue
Added Partnerships that will create the right
value/impact environment for business and growth, over and
above that which would otherwise occur
The geography of LEPs: new territories but the same old politics
LEPs are a mechanism for enabling collaboration across traditional boundaries; be they
administrative, political, cultural, geographical or sectoral. Industry, academic and media
attention has focused on the scope, role, priorities, resourcing and powers of LEPs, but
‘especially what areas they will cover’ (Finch, 2010). With the potential to steer the broad
complex of spatial interactions, including transport connectivity, housing provision,
economic development and skills, geography is an important dimension in the territorial
focus of LEPs (Centre for Cities, 2010; Marlow, 2010; Pugalis and Townsend, 2010).
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14. Initially it was made clear that LEPs could take the territorial form of RDAs in areas where
they proved popular, such as Northern England and the Midlands. However, the anti-regional
discourse coming from Whitehall, no more so than from the Communities Secretary, Eric
Pickles, weakened rapidly the likelihood of regional LEPs (or new generation RDAs)
becoming acceptable. Indeed, once it was made known that LEPs were to be self-financing –
receiving no national government support towards running costs – and that the strategic
physical and business assets accumulated by RDAs over the best part of a decade would not
be transferred to them, any hope of the formation of a new generation of streamlined, more
‘business friendly’ RDAs quickly dissipated.
It is well recognised that administrative areas, including those formed by local authority
boundaries, do not reflect the spatial logic of contemporary society or functional economic
flows. However, it is not the case that the groupings of local authorities formed under the
umbrella of a LEP can necessarily do so either. Specific economic, social, cultural or
environmental interaction will determine the ‘natural’ boundary (to invoke the Coalition’s
discourse), catchment or scale that one should work with. So, for example, it would be
extremely unlikely for the geography of a LEP to adequately reflect both business supply
chains and travel to work areas. Consequently, as the bids have demonstrated, most
propositions were based on a limited range of economic flows and interactions in deciding
their geography (see Figure 2 for an overview of the range of LEP applications).
Figure 2. The range of applications for Local Enterprise Partnership status
Size (Largest employed population): Kent-Essex (1.494 million), Leeds City Region,
Greater Manchester, East Anglia
Size (from the smallest employed population): South Somerset & East Devon (123,000),
Fylde & Blackpool, Hereford, Shropshire & Telford, South Tyneside &
Sunderland, Newcastle-Gateshead
Self-containment: Cumbria (95.5%), Leeds City Region, West of England (former Avon),
East Anglia
(Proportion of 2001 Census employed population working within the overall boundaries)
Self-containment (from the least self-contained): Bexley, Dartford & Gravesham (53.8%),
Surrey, Fleet, Hook & Camberley, Northumberland & North Tyneside, Buckinghamshire.
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15. Analysing the initial LEP propositions in comparison with Travel-to-Work self-containment,
as a proxy measure for ‘natural’ economic market areas, demonstrated that there was a close
correlation between those areas displaying 75 percent and greater self-containment and the
first wave of 24 approved LEPs. Derived from this analysis, it is reasonable to infer that the
complexity and multiplicity of functional economic geographies have been curtailed in the
Travel-to-Work simplification. Worse still, in fashioning the geographic patch of many initial
LEP proposals, political horse-trading has often overridden what shaky evidence existed on
functional economic market areas. In these instances, deals were made less on trust and
perhaps more on the basis of less suspicion than of ‘them lot over there’. Examples of this
type of politicised deal-making and parochial mentality were apparent across the North East
(excluding Tees Valley) and Lancashire, in particular. More positively, there were some
initial LEP propositions that openly recognised the limitations of local authority
administrative building-blocks and therefore opted to have overlapping boundaries.
Consequently, some councils are members of more than one LEP (for example, the major ex-
mining borough of Barnsley that is a member of both Leeds City Region and Sheffield City
Region LEPs). Other overlapping geographies that emerged from LEP bids, however, were
less a reflection of the complexity of spatial dynamics and multidirectional economic flows,
but rather more preoccupied with territorial disputes or ‘place wars’.
There is arguably a range of functions which is best performed at the level of ‘real’ or
functional economic areas, such as employability skills. However, it is less likely that other
complex issues, including transport, will neatly correlate with the new quasi-functional-
institutional boundaries relating to LEPs. From this perspective, the new ‘spatial fix’ is just as
likely to generate as many issues as the regional spatial fix which LEPs replace. By
derogating the regional policy-architecture – not to mention pan-regional initiatives such as
the Northern Way – accumulated under Labour, the Coalition has opened up a major vacuum
between the localities and Whitehall.
The emerging laisser-faire approach
The Coalition’s approach to unravelling the policy knot associated with abandoning regions
in favour of localism has been quixotic. The chaotic transitional period had created little
scope or opportunity for staff to transfer between the bodies. The disastrous outcome was a
Page 15 of 25

16. huge loss of human capital and all the associated tacit and institutional knowledge. There was
also uncertainty over the disposal of the RDAs’ numerous business and physical assets, with
BIS responsible for the former and CLG the latter. This process was further complicated,
particularly in the case of many site acquisitions, which had often been obtained as but one
piece in the strategic regeneration jigsaw. Thus, with substantial public sector resources
already ‘sunk’ into them and ongoing financial obligations, it may be more appropriate to
consider some of these so-called assets as short-term liabilities or money pits. There was also
uncertainty as to whether the LEPs of a former region were indeed encouraged to work
together, as Coalition ideology tends to prefer competition, perhaps even at the expense of
weaker areas. Following the abandonment of a longstanding system of regional grants to
industry, there was uncertainty as to the eligibility criteria of the new Regional Growth Fund
(RGF). However, ‘growth’ became a keyword in the spring of 2011 as the initial policy
disposition of the Coalition met a negative set of economic indicators.
The first results of the RGF allocation were emphasised and a set of 21 ‘Enterprise Zones’
(EZs) were announced in the 2011 Budget (HM Treasury, 2011), these being areas with tax
incentives and simplified planning rules (refashioning a policy of the 1980s Conservative
government). With the first 11 EZs supposedly spatially targeted ‘on city regions and those
areas that have missed out in the last ten years’ (Communities and Local Government (CLG),
2011, p. 3), they ‘amount to the first real test for the new LEPs ... By discouraging LEPs from
dividing up EZs, each expected to be 50 to 150 hectares, the government is obliging councils
to focus on what will best achieve growth for the wider area’ (Bounds and Tighe, 2011, P. 4).
However, it remains to be seen whether limitations of the original EZs, including business
displacement, sustainability and market distortion, have been designed out of this new
generation, which government claim is ‘[a] modern day approach’ (Communities and Local
Government (CLG), 2011, p. 3).
In terms of new arrangements for running LEPs, there was no funding, except for the
opportunity to bid for a small Capacity Fund to support intelligence gathering and board
development, which is little more than a fig leaf for budget cuts. The lack of funding could
prompt one to ask, what indeed would be the purpose of securing recognition for LEP status?
The answer is simply that the LEP would be the official sub-national development conduit for
representations, which presumably would be listened to by Whitehall. Judging by recent
history, LEPs will have to negotiate with individual government departments and their
Page 16 of 25

17. respective QUANGOs rather than liaising with a single point of contact across Whitehall,
such as a ‘champion’ for a particular LEP. However, national government has a habit of
directly creating or inviting proposals for the formation of sub-national development
governing entities that begin as streamlined bodies with a focussed remit, only for them to
subsequently act as a convenient peg to hang numerous other policy hats. It is such state-
induced mission creep that was a decisive factor that undermined the role of RDAs (Pugalis,
2011c).
LEPs may find themselves in the unenviable position of staying true to their locally-rooted
priorities and ambitions (that is likely to leverage minimal national government resources) or
reacting to national priorities (that may include some financial incentives). And increasingly
it appeared that the functions of LEPs were confined to visioning and setting strategic
direction rather than decision-making, delivery or commissioning bodies. As a result, since
the concept of LEPs emerged onto the scene in 2010, all manner of businesses and their
representative organisations, together with other interest groups, have expressed repeated
fears of them becoming ‘Local Authority-dominated talking shops’. Protracted arrangements
to establish new governance arrangements also sparked concerns that business interest would
wane without some ‘quick wins’.
Among the many topics in their purview, one, that of skills, is seen as critical by business
members, while that of town planning is highlighted as significant to developers and others,
both with previous precedents. Skills were the subject of previous business-led committees
prior to RDAs, in the shape of Training and Enterprise Councils established in the early
1990s by a Conservative government (Bennett et al., 1994). Skills remain a great concern at
the present juncture of ’rebalancing’ the economy amid high youth unemployment and
redundancies, and are a leading item in the thoughts of business in many LEPs. Yet, Higher
and Further Education Colleges remain under separate departmental control, and there are
considerable problems in aligning educational courses with those sectors and occupations
where short and likely longer-term demand exists. At the same time, the Department for
Work and Pensions, responsible for the (national) Work Programme – the new set of
measures to induce the unemployed to return to work – and working age benefits, remains
resolutely opposed to co-ordinating much local activity with bodies such as LEPs.
Page 17 of 25

18. In terms of town planning, the relevant department, CLG, published a Localism Bill in
December, 2010, which, once enacted, would radically rescale planning: removing the
regional tier and implementing a new neighbourhood tier below the level of the 292 lower-
tier Local Authorities across England. Yet, the government response to the House of
Commons, Business, Innovation and Skills Committee inquiry into LEPs merely states that
‘Where local enterprise partnerships are interested in strategic planning the Government will
encourage the constituent local planning authorities to work with them’ (HM Government,
2011, p. 22). As a result, the majority of LEPs only appear to be interested in an ‘informal’ or
‘loose’ style of planning. Such a fluid form of planning is advocated by some, such as
Richard Rogers (2011), from a purist perspective of shaping places, yet many business
interests, such as the Chamber of Commerce, regard statutory planning as providing legal
certainty for investment activity. However, if LEPs are to take on a more formal role in the
statutory planning process, it is probable that significant tension will arise between the needs
of business and of democratic accountability. How will different communities needs fare in
such a radically reconstituted system is a crucial question, yet to be adequately addressed.
Closing remarks
State-led restructuring of sub-national development activities in England has (once again)
been drastically reorganised. In the context of global policy convergence (González, 2011),
this potentially poses some key implications that apply beyond the shores of England as
messages transmute as they journey through different policy communities. Through this
paper we have examined how the institutional-policy terrain has recently met significant
volatility and a (potentially) radical review. In addition, we have drawn attention to the
ideological undercurrents not always noticeable at the policy surface. Through an exegesis of
the Coalition’s discourse we have revealed how attention has been directed towards the past
failures of Labour’s regional bureaucratic machinery, in order to provide the rationale for a
new political meta-narrative of permissive localism. The Coalition’s intent to rebalance the
economy – predicated on private enterprise enablement, public spending sector cuts, radical
reform to the planning system and institutional reconfigurations – was sketched out in a series
of pamphlets, including their respective election manifestoes (Conservative Party, 2009;
Liberal Democrats, 2010). This intent was confirmed in their Programme for Government
(HM Government, 2010a) and was enshrined in the Local Growth White Paper (HM
Government, 2010b). Nevertheless, whilst the White Paper went some way in presenting an
Page 18 of 25

19. overarching roadmap of their economic transition plan it did not necessarily set out a
coherent strategy. Together with sketching out what the Coalition’s national and sub-national
development philosophy is, it was also a reflection of their permissive approach: covering a
lot of ground in a relatively loose framework, and less concerned with the practical details of
implementation. Consequently, the lack of detail, together with the ambiguity and velocity of
changes has generated substantial uncertainty, scepticism and apprehension.
Rescaling is being utilised to help manage the class relations and tensions of economic
regulation (Gough, 2003), perhaps part of the attempt to divert some attention away from the
significant cuts to public sector budgets. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the White Paper rarely
mentioned ‘regeneration’, which is in stark contrast to the political attention that regeneration
as a policy field received under Labour (Pugalis, 2011b). With widespread evidence that
many councils had announced redundancies across the sector within weeks of the
Comprehensive Spending Review (see, for example, Willis, 2010), local authority officers –
and planners in particular – may struggle to efficiently handle simultaneous upward and
downward rescaling responsibilities.
There is a strong policy case to be made that places have different roles to play and functions
to fulfil, whether in terms of regional development, economic growth, urban renaissance,
sustainable communities, rural development or any other policy terms coined to refer to the
process of spatial reordering. LEPs might, in theory, meet this aim more accurately and/or
efficiently than regional entities, such as RDAs. However, we caution against positing LEPs
– composed of groupings of local authorities – as a panacea or spatio-institutional fix.
Viewing LEPs as the latest in a long line of ‘techniques of government’ (Foucault, 1991
[1978], p. 101), brings to the fore new issues which are silently designed-in to their
constitutional web just as others are more vociferously designed-out. The discussion on LEPs
is rapidly evolving and doing so at different paces across the country, with some places left
LEP-less, at the time of writing. Yet, interest generated has been substantial, demonstrated by
62 LEP propositions developed and submitted to government within a short space of time.
This has prompted a considerable amount of discussion, debate and debacle, not least as a
result of the so-called ‘permissive’ approach that the Coalition is taking; which we are
concerned is often reminiscent of an ‘act now, think later’ policy.
Page 19 of 25

20. The Coalition’s ideologically-infused policy story goes that regions are ‘too large’ and local
authority administrative boundaries ‘too small’ to enable economic managerial and
governance entities to operate effectively. But whilst sub-regional LEPs may better reflect so-
called ‘natural economic areas’ in some cases, we contend that many are in danger of merely
establishing new administrative constructs, constraints and bureaucratic building blocks.
Further, it is a myth that functional economic areas can be neatly demarcated. Setting any
precise boundary can only arbitrarily self-contain a ‘local’ economy that is globally
connected. We therefore end with a call for the merits of ‘porous’ partnerships to be
adequately considered and the prospect of ‘fuzzy’ boundaries to be engaged.
With public sector cuts beginning to bite deep from April 2011 and other mainstream
regeneration funding quickly evaporating, local government will struggle to financially back
LEPs. The Coalition’s philosophy is predominantly concerned with reducing the budget
deficit and in turn rolling-back the state by enabling private enterprise and business to
flourish. As this is the case, LEPs will need to quickly recognise that they are not mini-
RDAs, but economic leadership groupings operating at sub-regional geographies. Their
greatest success may lie in arbitrating spatial competition between neighbouring localities;
promoting the merits of cooperative advantage. Maintaining the momentum of private sector
engagement has proved too difficult for many of the sub-national techniques of government
that have gone before. Considering that LEPs will have limited, if any, direct resources at
their disposal, when the time arrives, as it surely will, to implement a new replacement
technique of government, it is hoped that the majority of LEPs will not be remembered as
‘toothless tigers’.
Whilst rearranging the deckchairs is to be expected from an incoming government,it is hoped
that the Coalition’s single-minded pursuit of rebalancing the economy in abandoning regions
does not abandon the many sub-national places already largely bypassed by Labour’s spaces
of competiveness. Labour’s failure to narrow the gap between the ‘have-lots’ and the ‘have-
nots’ (Dorling, 2006, 2010b), may be accelerated and injustices deepened under a Coalition
that looks to be pursuing a neoliberal revanchist urban policy (Smith, 1996) against the
‘undeserving’ workless populace (Dorling, 2010a). Whilst we duly recognise that ‘[LEPs],
like their predecessors, are only a means to an end’ (Centre for Cities, 2010, p. 17),
expectations for these new governance innovations are heightened in terms of overcoming the
strategic policy vacuum and enabling a spatially just rebalancing of the economy.
Page 20 of 25

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i
SNR had four major objectives: empowering local authorities in the promotion of economic development and
regeneration, promoting cooperation between local authorities, streamlining regional policy-making and
improving accountability, and reforming government relations with regions and localities. In essence it was a
compromise between devolving powers and responsibilities on the one hand and retaining central Whitehall
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Page 25 of 25