1. Eastern India and the Groundwater Paradox
Aditi Mukherji
Presented at GWP South Asia Workshop, Colombo
February 25, 2011
Based on synthesis of research since 2004

2. The irrigation story of India
Private ownership
40000 Rapid rise
On demand irrigation
35000 in GW
Timeliness
30000 irrigation
Adequacy
25000
Flexibility
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
1951
1953
1955
1957
1959
1961
1963
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
Canals Tanks & other sources Groundwater

3. Rising contribution of groundwater
60
1970-73
% of Agricultural GDP
40
20
BUT, depletion, scarcity
0
1 21 and over-exploitation have
41 61 81 101 121 141 161 181 201 221 241
emerged as serious problems
Districts
60
1990-93
Percentage to Agricultural GDP
40
20
0
1 21 41 61 81 101 121 141 161 181 201 221 241
Districts
% contribution of SWI to Agricultural GDP % contribution of GWI to Agricultural GDP

4. The Problem Statement
Are depletion and scarcity the only reality?
Are there pockets of under-utilization?
Can GW alleviate poverty in
these regions? Indo-Gangetic basin
Eastern
has high
GW potential

5. Concentrated
Rural poverty

6. Leading to economic
scarcity of GW in a land
of abundance
And dieselised
GW economy
“The energy squeeze”

7. Electricity subsidy as percentage of state fiscal deficits
Is low to non-existent in eastern India
Bihar
West Bengal
U.P (Power corp)
Partly due to low
Maharashtra number of electric
Punjab tubewells
Tamil Nadu
Rajasthan (Transco)
But also high
Karnataka tariffs
Andhra Pradesh
Gujarat
Haryana
Madhya Pradesh
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentage
BRISCOE, 2005,

8. Comparison of flat tariff in different states, 2006-07
2500 2160
2000
Rs/HP/Year
1512
1500
1000 850
420
500
0
0
Punjab Haryana Gujarat Uttarakhand West Bengal
States
Flat rate tariff (Rs/HP/year)

9. West Bengal: A state that bucks the trend in
GW and electricity
Punjab, Haryana, Gujarat, West Bengal
Tamil Nadu
Over-exploitation of GW Under- development of GW
(42% development)
> 60-80% electric pumps < 20% electric pumps
Free/very low flat rate Earlier highest flat rate in
India and now high
metered tariff
High fiscal deficits due to Non-existent electricity
electricity subsidy subsidy

10. Why is energy-irrigation nexus so different in
West Bengal?
 Highly restrictive groundwater policies
 The GW Act of 2005 and before that the SWID
regulation of 1999 which stipulates that electricity
connections cannot be given without certification by
SWID
 Almost 50-60% rejection by SWID even in safe blocks
 High cost of pump electrification (USD 2000-
3000) and long waiting period
 Political ecology: government dominated by urban
intelligentsia, strong arsenic lobby and weak
farmers lobby co-opted by the state

11. So what is happening on the agricultural front in
West Bengal?
 Agricultural growth rate of around 1% and stagnation
 High period of agrarian growth in mid 1990s coincided
with high GW use and increase in summer paddy
 The latest MI Census shows an absolute decline in
number of WEMs and reduction in summer paddy (but
the GoWB is changing these numbers, I was told)
 Declining quality of life , peasant unrest and Maoist threat

12. Are there physical constraints to GW development in West Bengal?
Not really. Pre-monsoon
decline in groundwater
table is fully recovered
during post monsoon
season showing high actual
recharge
As per the Ganges Water
Machine Hypothesis,
intensive GW use has
positive externalities
12

13. Testing the Ganges Water Machine hypothesis using panel data
Data
• 16 years of groundwater level data from 403 monitoring wells (1990-1995)
For every one meter of
• Block level rainfall data from 1990-2005
additional drawdown in pre-
• Data on type of aquifer
monsoon season, post-
Regression specificationmonsoon recovery goes up
• Panel data with well level fixed effects
by 0.85 m
• Keeps all time invariant factors (such as nature of aquifer) constant over time
• Exploits within-well variation
recit   i  1 pre _ WDit   2 monsoon _ RFit  3nonmon _ RFit   4 LAG _ reci ,t 1   it
Far from negative “quantity”
externality, there are positive
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
positivere~y | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
externalities in terms of
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
apriltable | .8577282 .0145882 58.80 0.000 .8291239 .8863324
aprnovrain~l | reduction of rejected recharge,
.0003465 .0000814 4.26 0.000 .000187 .000506
decmarchra~l | .0019719 .0005453 3.62 0.000 .0009026 .0030412
lower .1539974 -20.47 cheaper -3.453918 -2.850009
_cons | -3.151964 flood intensity, 0.000
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
alternative to surface storage
sigma_u | 1.7284553
sigma_e | 1.3200953
rho | .63159102 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F test that all u_i=0: F(323, 2913) = 9.86 Prob > F = 0.0000
13

14. Predicted versus actual recovery: Shows good model fit
Predicted recovery against pre-monsoon groundwater table at well-level
20
15
Predicted recovery in post monsoon
season
10
5
0
-5
0 10 20 30
pre_wd
Actual recovery in post monsoon
season
14

15. 6 arguments as to why arsenic should not be an obstacle to intensive
GW use in Bengal
• Arsenic is a naturally occurring element in lower Ganga Basin. As soon as arsenic bearing layers
are exposed to oxygen, they release arsenic into water. Shortthat
Linking these 6 arguments shows of total ban on groundwater use,
nothing much discouraging GW use is counter-productive
that can be done about it
because in the absence of any other
• But then, GW is the only resource at disposal to farmers that allows them to intensify their
alternative sources of reliable irrigation&
cropping system and make a living out ofthe regionland holdings. Ponds, tanks or canals does not
livelihoods, farmers in stamp size will become
allow for such intensification and are at best supplemental sources of irrigation
nutritionally poorer and even more
susceptible to arsenic poisoning.
• Arsenic is a pre-dominantly drinking water problem and several cost effective solutions to mitigate
this exists.
The best anti-dote to arsenic is overall socio-
economic development. GW offers the best
• Limited and patchy evidence that arsenic is taken up by some leafy vegetables. Create awareness so
hope for rapid agricultural and overall socio-
that farmers do not use arsenic rich water for anything but paddy. Arsenic uptake by paddy grains is
negligible and can be taken care of development in WB
economic by cooking
• Finally, uptake of arsenic in human body is positively linked with poor
nutritional status and providing nutritional supplements like folate is a better
deterrent than blanket ban on groundwater
• High agricultural growth is directly linked to poverty alleviation and better nutrition status. In
Indian context, all states with high agrarian growth are also groundwater dependant
15

16. Hi-Tech Metering Technology
Tamper proof TOD meters
Remotely read
New law against
tampering
Reduces corruption
collusion

17. Findings
Pump owners:
Largely winners
 Same hours of self
pumping – Less
electricity bill
 Less hour of selling
water – Higher or same
revenue
Higher bargaining
power vis-à-vis water
buyers
Win – win situation

18. Findings
Water buyers:
Losers
 Increase in water charges by 30-50%
 Lesser hours sold by pump owners
 Adverse terms & condition of buying water

19. 3 Change in hours of pumping and water sold (2004 and 2010
compared)
Pump owners are pumping less and selling even less
Type of WEM Difference in Difference in Difference
hours Overall contraction in
of hours of self in hours of
pumped irrigation economy of sold
irrigation water
ES (N=41)
West Bengal and it will
-1094.0 (44%) -50.7 -776.9
have negative
EC (N=50) -636.6 (40%) -154.5 -476.0
livelihood implications
DC (N=39) -75.1 (20%) -35.6 -36.4
KC (N=4) -104.3 (23%) -48.7 -56.1
All types of WEM owners are pumping less than before –
the electric tubewell owners more so than the diesel and
kerosene owners. Even more importantly, they are selling
less than before. Overall contraction in pump rental
markets and irrigation economy
ES = Electric submersible; EC= Electric centrifugal, DC= Diesel centrifugal, KC = Kerosene centrifugal
19

20. Findings
Groundwater
use efficiency:
Winner
 Increased adoption of plastic pipes for
conveyance
 Better maintenance of field channels
Construction of underground pipelines
But will it save water? And is it important?

21. Explaining the GW paradox
The political ecology perspective
Agrarian politics GW resources
GW policies

22. Policy recommendation
 Rapid electrification of tubewells to
encourage competitive GW markets (Bihar?)
Relaxation on issuance of SWID certificate
for new TW installation
Give capital cost subsidy for installation of
tube wells – target small & marginal farmers
Panchayat (village council) intervention in
regulating water prices if needed
Pilot a scheme of ICT enabled diesel
subsidy voucher (a la Bangladesh)

23. Thank You

24. References
• Mukherji, A; Villholth, K. G.; Sharma, Bharat R.; Wang, J. (Eds.) 2009. Groundwater
governance in the Indo-Gangetic and Yellow River basins: realities and challenges.
London, UK: CRC Press. Taylor and Francis group. 325p. (IAH Selected Papers on
Hydrogeology 15)
• Mukherji, A., B. Das, N. Majumdar, N.C. Nayak, R.R. Sethi and B.R. Sharma (2009),
Metering of agricultural power supply in West Bengal, India: Who gains and who loses?
Energy Policy: 37 (12): 5530-5539.
• Mukherji, A. (2008), Spatio-temporal analysis of markets for groundwater irrigation
services in India, 1976-77 to 1997-98, Hydrogeology Journal, 16(6): 1077-1087.
Mukherji, A. (2007), „The energy-irrigation nexus and its impact on groundwater
markets in eastern Indo-Gangetic basin: Evidence from West Bengal, India‟, Energy
Policy, Vol. 35(12): 6413-6430.
• Mukherji, A (2007), „Implications of alternative institutional arrangements in
groundwater sharing: Evidence from West Bengal‟, Economic and Political Weekly, 42
(26): 2543-2551
• Mukherji, A. (2006), Political ecology of groundwater: The contrasting case of water
abundant West Bengal and water scarce Gujarat, India, Hydrogeology Journal
14(3):392-406.
• Mukherji, A. & Shah, T. (2005). Groundwater socio-ecology and governance: a review
of institutions and policies in selected countries. Hydrogeology Journal, 13(1): 328–345.
ISI ranked.