SlideShare una empresa de Scribd logo
1 de 21
Descargar para leer sin conexión
Volume 1, Number 3




3rd Quarter, 2008


The State of
the Internet

                      PORT
                    RE
Executive Summary

                                                                                                                                     Each quarter, Akamai will be publishing a quarterly “State of the Internet” report. This report
                                                                                                                                     will include data gathered across Akamai’s global server network about attack traffic and
                                                                                                                                     broadband adoption, as well as trends seen in this data over time. It will also aggregate
                                                                                                                                     publicly available news and information about notable events seen throughout the quarter,
                                                                                                                                     including Denial of Service attacks, Web site hacks and network events, including outages and
                                                                                                                                     new connections.


                                                                                                                                     During the third quarter of 2008, Akamai observed attack traffic originating from 179 unique
                                                                                                                                     countries around the world. China and the United States were the two largest attack traffic
                                                                                                                                     sources, accounting for over 45% of observed traffic in total. Akamai observed attack traffic
                                                                                                                                     targeted at nearly 2,400 unique ports, with the top 10 ports seeing over 85% of the observed
                                                                                                                                     attack traffic. Web site and Internet security were regularly in the news during the quarter, as
                                                                                                                                     several proof-of-concept attack vectors were announced, targeting social networking Web
                                                                                                                                     sites, as well as DNS, BGP and TCP, all core underlying Internet protocols.


                                                                                                                                     Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, which made landfall in the United States in September, caused
                                                                                                                                     Internet outages in the states that they swept through. Notable Web site outages in the third
                                                                                                                                     quarter were attributed to increased traffic, human error and power outages.


                                                                                                                                     Global connectivity saw big advances in the third quarter, with various undersea cable projects
                                                                                                                                     getting underway or nearing completion, the commercial launch of WiMAX services in a
                                                                                                                                     number of countries, and the announcement of fiber-to-the-premises services that will bring
                                                                                                                                     gigabit-speed connections to subscribers in Japan, the Ukraine and the Netherlands.


                                                                                                                                     Akamai observed a nearly ten percent increase globally in the number of unique IP addresses
                                                                                                                                     connecting to Akamai’s network, and this increase may be attributable to more people turning
                                                                                                                                     to the World Wide Web for news and video content related to the Beijing Olympic Games,
                                                                                                                                     which took place in August. From a global connection speed perspective, South Korea had
                                                                                                                                     the highest levels of “high broadband” (>5 Mbps) connectivity for the third straight quarter.
                                                                                                                                     In the United States, Delaware also maintained its top position, with 55% of connections
                                                                                                                                     to Akamai occurring at 5 Mbps or greater. Looking at observed “narrowband” (<256 Kbps)
                                                                                                                                     connections, Mayotte and Equatorial Guinea were the “slowest” countries, with 97% and
                                                                                                                                     94% of connections to Akamai, respectively, occurring at speeds below 256 Kbps. In the
                                                                                                                                     United States, the District of Columbia and Washington State continued to have the highest
                                                                                                                                     percentages of observed connections below 256 Kbps. However, these regions also saw a
                                                                                                                                     significant quarter-over-quarter decline in narrowband connection percentages, down 25%
                                                                                                                                     and 46% respectively as compared to the second quarter.




The “spinning globe” featured in the Akamai NOCC represents where Akamai servers are located and how much traffic they are seeing.
Table of Contents                                                           Introduction
    1: IntroductIon                                                        3

    2: SecurIty                                                            4    Akamai’s globally distributed network of servers allows us to gather massive
                                                                                amounts of information on many metrics, including connection speeds, attack
    2.1 Attack Traffic, Top Originating Countries                          4
                                                                                traffic and network connectivity/availability/latency problems, as well as user
    2.2 Attack Traffic, Top Target Ports                                   5
                                                                                behavior and traffic patterns on leading Web sites.
    2.3 Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) Attacks                      6
    2.4 Web Site Hacks & Web-Based Exploits                                8    In the third quarter of 2008, observed Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
    2.5 DNS-Based Attacks                                                  9    attack traffic continued to target a consistent set of ports, likely indicating
                                                                                continued activity by malware targeting exploits that were identified several
    2.6 BGP-Based Attacks                                                  10
                                                                                years ago. Several proof-of-concept attack vectors were announced, targeting
    2.7 TCP-Based Attacks                                                  11
                                                                                social networking Web sites, as well as DNS, BGP and TCP, all core underlying
    3: networkS and web SIteS: ISSueS & ImprovementS                       12   Internet protocols. Exploitation of the vulnerabilities described within these
    3.1 Network Outages                                                    12   announcements could cause significant problems for systems connected to
    3.2 Web Site Outages                                                   14   the Internet.

    3.3 Significant New Connectivity — Undersea Cables                     15
                                                                                Several network outages in the United States, due to hurricanes, were observed
    3.4 Significant New Connectivity — Wireless                            18   in the third quarter, though global connectivity continued to become more
    3.5 Significant New Connectivity — Fixed Broadband                     19   robust, with various undersea cable projects getting underway or nearing
    4: Internet penetratIon                                                20   completion, the commercial launch of WiMAX services in a number of
                                                                                countries, and the announcement of fiber-to-the-premises services bringing
    4.1 Unique IP Addresses Seen By Akamai                                 20
                                                                                gigabit-speed connections to subscribers in several countries.
    4.2 Internet Penetration, Global                                       21
    4.3 Internet Penetration, United States                                22   The percentage of high-speed (>5 Mbps) connections to Akamai continued to
    5: GeoGraphy                                                           23   grow during the third quarter, though growth rates in several countries, as
                                                                                well as the United States, were lower than in the second quarter. Decreases in
    5.1 High Broadband Connectivity: Fastest International Countries       23
                                                                                the percentage of narrowband (<256 Kbps) connections to Akamai were also
    5.2 High Broadband Connectivity: Fastest U.S. States                   25
                                                                                seen both internationally and in the United States, likely due, in part, to the
    5.3 Broadband Connectivity: Fast International Countries               27   growth in availability of, and options for, broadband connectivity.
    5.4 Broadband Connectivity: Fast U.S. States                           28
    5.5 Narrowband Connectivity: Slowest International Countries           30
    5.6 Narrowband Connectivity: Slowest U.S. States                       31

    6: appendIX: Selected InternatIonal data                               33

    7: endnoteS                                                            34




2                   © 2008 Akamai Technologies, Inc. All Rights Reserved                           © 2008 Akamai Technologies, Inc. All Rights Reserved           3
Section 2: Security

Akamai maintains a distributed set of agents deployed                     2.1 Attack Traffic, Top Originating Countries                        Akamai’s observations are supported by other industry                  For the second quarter in a row, Port 445 (Microsoft-
across the Internet that serve to monitor attack traffic.                 During the third quarter of 2008, Akamai observed                    findings as well. Security service provider SecureWorks                DS) held the first place spot, though with a smaller
Based on the data collected by these agents, Akamai                       attack traffic originating from 179 unique countries                 issued a press release1 on September 22 that listed                    percentage of the overall observed traffic than in the
is able to identify the top countries from which attack                   around the world, up nearly 30% from the second                      the top 10 countries responsible for attacks attempted                 second quarter. Ports 139 and 135 remained in the
traffic originates, as well as the top ports targeted                     quarter count of 139 countries. This quarter, China                  against the company’s clients in 2008. According to the                top three, though they switched places quarter-over-
by these attacks (ports are network layer protocol                        moved back into the first place slot, which it held in the           release, the top 10 countries were the United States,                  quarter. New to the top 10 in the third quarter is port
identifiers). This section, in part, provides insight into                first quarter as well, and the United States maintained              China, Brazil, South Korea, Poland, Japan, Russia, Taiwan,             25 (SMTP) — this may be due to attackers or botnets
Internet attack traffic, as observed and measured by                      its second place position. Japan’s percentage of attack              Germany and Canada. With the exception of Canada,                      scanning for open mail relays through which to send
Akamai, during the third quarter of 2008. While some                      traffic dropped back to first quarter levels, moving them            the other nine countries have appeared in Akamai’s                     spam. Returning to the list are port 80 (WWW) and port
quarter-over-quarter trending may be discussed, it is                     into fifth place this quarter. It’s not clear what drove the         top 10 list at least once during the last three quarters.              4899 (Remote Administrator), which both appeared on
expected that both the top countries and top ports will                   surge in attack traffic that was observed to originate               (Canada is No.11 on the third quarter list, up from                    the list in the first quarter as well. As the name suggests,
change on a quarterly basis.                                              from Japan during the second quarter — continued                     No.16 in the second quarter.)                                          the Remote Administrator service (radmin) listens on
                                                                          observation over time should help determine if it was                                                                                       port 4899, and is used to provide remote access to
This section also includes information on selected DDoS                   an anomaly, or if there are other factors that may have              2.2 Attack Traffic, Top Target Ports                                   Microsoft Windows systems. While there have been no
attacks, Web site hacking attempts, Web-based exploits                    influenced it.                                                       During the third quarter of 2008, Akamai observed                      recently published exploits for radmin, attackers may be
and DNS-, BGP- and TCP-based attacks as published in                                                                                           attack traffic targeted at nearly 2,400 unique ports,                  attempting to find and exploit systems with weak default
the media during the third quarter of 2008. As noted                      The trend in attack traffic distribution continues to be             a nearly six-fold increase from the second quarter.                    passwords, which would provide them the ability to
below, a number of new high-profile attack vectors                        consistent with the previous two quarters, with the top              Consistent with the prior quarter, some of the attack                  remotely monitor, control and transfer files to and from
were discovered or announced during the quarter. Note                     10 countries continuing to be the source for just over               traffic targeted services on well-known ports. While the               the compromised system.
that Akamai does not release information on attacks                       three-quarters of observed attack traffic. However, the              distribution of target ports was very broad, the bulk of
on specific customer sites and that selected published                    list of countries that make up the top 10 continues to be            the traffic was fairly concentrated, as the top 10 targeted            Interestingly, though it didn’t make it into the global top
reports are simply compiled here.                                         dynamic, as expected — France, Poland and the Ukraine                ports saw over 85% of the observed attack traffic, which               10, the top target port seen from China was Port 7212,
                                                                          dropped out of the top 10 quarter-over-quarter, while                is also consistent with second quarter measurements. It                accounting for 16% of the observed attack traffic from
                                                                          Brazil reappears in sixth place, as it did in the first quarter.     is not clear what is driving the rapid quarter-over-quarter            the country. While not previously used to spread malware
                                                                                                                                               increases in target port counts.                                       in the past, it appears that the port is used by a program

                                                                                                                                                                 OTHER                                                  Destination      Port Use               % Traffic   Q2 08 %
                                                                                                                                                                                                  Microsoft-DS          Port
          Country              % Traffic           Q2 08 %                                                                        10                                                                                    445              microsoft-dS            21.12      28.44
      1 china                    26.85                8.90
                                                                                                          4                                         VNC Server
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        139              netbIoS                 21.09      11.55
      2 united States            19.68              21.52                                                                                              Telnet
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        135              microsoft-rpc           10.68      26.43
      3 South korea               9.37                2.25                                        9                                        5          SMTP
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        22               SSh                      9.73       3.87
      4 Sweden                    3.86                0.48                                                                                         Remote                                                               80               www                      9.18       0.91
                                                                                                                                               Administrator
      5 Japan                     3.13              30.07                                                                                                                                                               1433             microsoft SQl Server     3.20       2.95
      6 brazil                    2.64                1.53                   2                                                                   Microsoft
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        4899             remote administrator     2.56       0.89
                                                                                                                                                 SQL Server
      7 taiwan                    2.54                2.21                                                                                 3                                                                            25               Smtp                     2.28       0.70
                                                                                                                                                                                                        NetBIOS
      8 hong kong                 2.26                0.46                                                          1                                    WWW                                                            23               telnet                   2.05       1.23
      9 Germany                   2.20                5.56                           6                                                                                                                                  5900             vnc Server               1.93       2.20
     10 russia                    1.94                1.64                                                                  8          7                                                                                various          other                   16.17          –
                                                                                                                                                                     SSH
      –   other                  25.53                 –                                                                                                                               Microsoft-RPC

Figure 1: Attack Traffic, Top Originating Countries                                                                                            Figure 2: Attack Traffic, Top Target Ports




4                                          © 2008 Akamai Technologies, Inc. All Rights Reserved                                                                                              © 2008 Akamai Technologies, Inc. All Rights Reserved                                     5
Section 2: Security (continued)

called GhostSurf.2 Older versions of the software, when             During the third quarter, Facebook and MySpace users
                                                                                                                                                                                                      90 Day Botnet Size
run, created open proxy relays. A published security                were the target of a newly discovered worm, dubbed
                                                                                                                                                                       600
advisory3 notes “Users may inadvertently be subject to              Net-Worm.Win32.Koobface, according to researchers at
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                botcount




                                                                                                                                     Size (30 day entropy in 1000’s)
                                                                                                                                                                       550
forwarding data for those with malicious intent.”                   Kaspersky Lab.5 The worm e-mails friends of Facebook                                               500
It may be the case that attackers in China are attempt-             and MySpace users, and includes a link to a bogus                                                  450

ing to identify available open proxies that they can relay          YouTube site. If a user attempts to access the link, they                                          400
                                                                                                                                                                       350
malicious traffic through, potentially covering their               are prompted to download and install what claims to
                                                                                                                                                                       300
tracks. In addition, Akamai observed that port 80 (the              be a new version of the Adobe Flash player. Instead,                                               250

default port used for Web servers) was responsible                  the code downloaded is a network worm that recruits                                                200
                                                                                                                                                                       150
for a disproportionately large percentage of detected               victim’s machines into botnets.
                                                                                                                                                                             August                                        September                         October
attack traffic in the United States, Sweden and Russia.                                                                                                                                                         Month
Given the continued growth in SQL injection attacks                 While it is not clear how many machines were recruited
(see below), this traffic may have been, at least                   into botnets by the “Koobface” worm, the number of            Figure 3: Botnet sizes grew significantly during the third quarter of 2008, reaching over a half-million machines during September.
in part, attempts to identify Web servers with SQL                  hijacked systems (“zombies”) that belong to botnets           (Graph courtesy of The Shadowserver Foundation)
injection vulnerabilities.                                          responsible for some DDoS attacks surged over the
                                                                    third quarter. The Shadowserver Foundation6 (a group
2.3 Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attacks                    of security professionals who volunteer their time to         No discussion of DDoS attacks for the third quarter                             Georgian hackers fought back, targeting Web and DNS
While just a proof-of-concept, researchers at the Institute         track and measure botnets to help law enforcement             of 2008 would be complete without looking at those                              servers at the Russian News and Information Agency (RIA
of Computer Science created a Facebook application that             investigations) reported a significant increase, based on     that occurred in July and August, related to the                                Novost) with DDoS attacks. In addition, Estonian officials
can create a botnet capable of launching a DDoS attack              their monitoring, which is likely indicative of the general   Russian-Georgian political conflict. DDoS attacks and                           offered their support to Georgia, noting that the attacks
against a target system.4 This proof-of-concept attack              trend. In June 2008, the Shadowserver Foundation              site defacements targeted the Web sites of Georgia’s                            targeting Georgia were similar to those made against
was created, in part, to expose the risks that the inherent         were aware of about 100,000 machines that were part           President, the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and                         Estonian Web sites in 2007. Specifically, according to the
trust of others plays in a social network. By exploiting the        of a botnet, and by late August this number had more          the Georgian Ministry of Defense. The President’s Web                           Shadowserver Foundation, similar to the attacks against
viral nature of application distribution on the Facebook            than quadrupled to over 450,000 machines. According           site was ultimately moved to a hosting company based                            Estonia, a number of Russian blogs, forums and Web
platform, the researchers demonstrated that a botnet                to “Bot Count” statistics7 on the Shadowserver Web            in Atlanta, Georgia (in the United States), and the                             sites spread a Microsoft Windows batch script that was
with thousands of users could easily be created, flooding           site, this climbed to over 500,000 machines in early          Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs chose to provide                           designed to attack Georgian Web sites by continually
a target with a large number of Web requests, causing               September before beginning to decline to approximately        updates using a site hosted on Google’s Blogger service.9                       sending ICMP traffic via the ‘ping’ command to several
it to become overloaded and ultimately unavailable. It              350,000 by the end of the quarter, as shown in Figure 3.      SQL injection attacks were another attack vector used                           Georgian websites, the vast majority of which are
is important to note that Akamai’s services would help              The growth in the number of infected machines,                against Georgian sites, as it was reported that Russian                         government-related.10
customers mitigate the effects of such an attack, as the            according to the Internet Storm Center,8 could be related     hackers were distributing lists of Georgian Web sites that
requests could be absorbed or deflected by Akamai’s                 to an increase in SQL injection attacks observed during       were vulnerable to SQL injection attacks, enabling site
servers at the edge of the Internet.                                the same time frame.                                          defacement to be automated.




6                                    © 2008 Akamai Technologies, Inc. All Rights Reserved                                                                                             © 2008 Akamai Technologies, Inc. All Rights Reserved                                 7
Section 2: Security (continued)

2.4 Web Site Hacks & Web-Based Exploits                             Also in late September, Princeton University researchers     SQL injection attacks continued during the third quarter,        2.5 DNS-Based Attacks
A research report11 published on the “insecurity iceberg”           revealed that a number of popular Web sites, including       and one high-profile site that became infected belonged          In the 2nd Quarter, 2008 State of the Internet report,
analyzed browser type (user-agent) data collected by                those belonging to ING, MetaFilter, YouTube and the          to BusinessWeek. According to a report17 from anti-virus         Akamai noted that Internet security researcher Dan
Google between January 2007 and June 2008 in an                     New York Times, were vulnerable to “cross-site request       firm Sophos, in September, hundreds of pages were                Kaminsky had announced that he had discovered a
effort to measure what the authors termed the “world-               forgery” (CSRF) flaws.13 By exploiting these flaws, an       affected on a section of BusinessWeek’s Web site which           vulnerability in the DNS protocol and urged organizations
wide vulnerable browser population.” After reviewing                attacker can force the user’s browser to request a page      offers information about where MBA students might find           running BIND and many other name servers to upgrade
this user-agent data, the report’s authors concluded,               or action without the user knowing, or the Web site          future employers. In addition, according to an August            immediately to the most recent versions of the software.
“The tip of the Web browser insecurity ice-berg was                 recognizing the request didn’t come from the actual          7 article in The Register,18 a new round of SQL injection        According to multiple published descriptions, exploitation
measured to be 637 million (or 45.2%) Internet users at             legitimate user. The flaw on the ING site would have let     attacks has infected millions of Web pages belonging to          of the vulnerability would allow attackers to “poison”
risk worldwide due to not running the latest, most secure           an attacker move funds from the victim’s account to          businesses and government agencies, including those              DNS caches by maliciously causing DNS servers to cache
browser version. Meanwhile, hidden below the surface,               another account, while the flaws on the Metafilter and       that belong to the National Institute of Health and              incorrect information. If this were to occur, users could be
the iceberg extends further, encompassing users that rely           YouTube sites would have let the attacker essentially        Department of Education in the United States, as well            sent, unbeknownst to them, to fake Web sites controlled
on outdated vulnerable browser plug-ins.” Ultimately,               take over a victim’s account. The flaw on the New York       as UK Trade & Investment. A search highlighted in the            by an attacker, where usernames, passwords and other
these findings indicate that targeted exploitation of a             Times site let an attacker grab e-mail addresses of users    article noted that at least 1.45 million Web pages had           personally identifiable information could potentially
known security problem in an older version of a Web                 registered on the site and use them for spamming or          been infected as part of this new round of attacks. A            be stolen. In addition to simply sending users to fake
browser could ultimately impact millions of Internet                other malicious purposes. As of October 1, all of these      post19 on SecureComputing’s TrustedSourceTM blog on              Web sites, other targets could include FTP services, mail
users, resulting in potential compromise of end-user                sites had addressed their CSRF vulnerabilities.14            August 10th also reported the appearance of a new SQL            servers, spam filters and SSL, which is used to make
systems, or the creation of a so-called botnet used to                                                                           injection attack; noting that it was targeting machines          Web-based transactions more secure.
implement large-scale DDoS or SQL injection attacks,                System “clipboards” were also getting hijacked by an         running Microsoft SQL Server, and possibly also Web
such as those described in Akamai’s 1st Quarter, 2008               attack discovered in August. According to a post15           servers with Sybase database backends, as they use a             Described in Kaminsky’s presentation21 to the Black Hat
and 2nd Quarter, 2008 State of the Internet reports.                on ZDNet’s Zero Day security blog, “In the Web attacks,      similar SQL syntax and table structure to Microsoft’s SQL        conference in August, as well as in multiple published
                                                                    which target Mac, Windows and Linux users running            Server. The post’s authors also stated that infected Web         reports related to Kaminsky’s findings, the vulnerabilities
In late September, word began to spread about a new                 Firefox, IE and Safari, hackers are seizing control of the   pages were found on government sites, sales sites, real          in DNS that he found concerned two key points:
Web-based attack vector known as “clickjacking” that                machine’s clipboard and using a hard-to-delete URL           estate sites and financial information sites.                    1. Randomized DNS request transaction IDs — if the pool
affects all the major desktop platforms, including                  that points to a fake anti-virus program. According to                                                                           of random numbers used for transaction IDs is smaller
Microsoft Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Apple Safari,         victims on several Web forums, the attack is coming          In addition to the Russian/Georgian aggression that                 than is defined in the DNS protocol specification, or
Opera and Adobe Flash. Published descriptions12 of                  from Adobe Flash-based advertising on legitimate sites       resulted in DDoS attacks on Georgian Web sites and                  transaction IDs are insufficiently random (and thus,
clickjacking note, “With this exploit, once you’re on the           — including Newsweek, Digg and MSNBC.com.”                   Georgian network infrastructure, Russian hackers also               more easily predictable), it becomes significantly easier
malicious web page, the bad guy can make you click on               According to a September 19 post16 on the same blog,         targeted Lithuanian Web sites. According to the Web                 for an attacker to return a forged reply to a query
any link, any button, or anything on the page without               Adobe will mitigate these attacks in the final version       Host Industry News,20 the 300 affected Web sites were               before the genuine reply arrives.
you even seeing it happening.” Browser vendors                      of the upcoming release of Flash Player 10 by demanding      hosted at Hostex, and the sites were defaced with
                                                                                                                                                                                                  2. Source port randomization — some DNS server
including Microsoft and Mozilla “concur independently               user interaction when a Shockwave (.swf) file attempts       recently banned Soviet symbols and profane messages.
                                                                                                                                                                                                     implementations use a fixed port for all outgoing
that this is a tough problem with no easy solution at the           to set data on a user’s clipboard.                           It is believed that the Web site defacements may have
                                                                                                                                                                                                     queries, or insufficiently randomize the source port
moment,” according to one of the researchers that                                                                                been a precursor to a planned DDoS attack against sites
                                                                                                                                                                                                     used. This too makes it easier for an attacker to inject
discovered the exploit.                                                                                                          in Latvia, Ukraine, Lithuania and Estonia, according to a
                                                                                                                                                                                                     a fraudulent reply that is accepted by the resolving
                                                                                                                                 report from an Estonian television network.
                                                                                                                                                                                                     nameserver as legitimate.




8                                    © 2008 Akamai Technologies, Inc. All Rights Reserved                                                                                © 2008 Akamai Technologies, Inc. All Rights Reserved                                   9
Section 2: Security (continued)

In each case, the attacker’s reply then pollutes the cache           While the patches issued by software vendors addressed          routing table. The described attack exploits BGP to                of the authentication solution, as described above,
of the resolving nameserver. Notably, just one type of               the immediate issue, longer-term fixes are required,            fool routers into re-directing data to an eavesdropper’s           would require the use of Secure BGP, developed by
forged reply can cause all future DNS queries to be                  and one technology that will help drive such longer-            network, allowing the attacker to intercept data                   Kent and colleagues at BBN Technologies. Unfortunately,
directed to the attacker’s nameservers so that it is not             term fixes is known as DNSSEC. DNSSEC is short for              headed to a target IP address or group of addresses.               many current routers lack the memory and processing
necessary to continually compromise the resolver’s                   DNS Security Extensions which, as the name suggests,            The innovation in this attack, as noted on Wired’s                 power to generate and validate signatures. In addition,
cache for other names in the target domain. For instance,            are a set of extensions used to add an additional layer         “Threat Level” security blog,32 is that the intercepted            router vendors have resisted upgrading the hardware
an attacker could poison www.google.com, and give                    of security to the Domain Name System by providing              data is silently forwarded to the actual destination,              because their customers (ISPs) haven’t demanded it,
the “false” record a time-to-live (TTL) value lasting several        a form of cryptographically signed verification for DNS         so that no outage occurs.                                          due to the cost and effort involved in replacing existing
years, so the resolving nameserver effectively never                 information, which is intended to assure the authenticity                                                                          deployed routers. (While Secure BGP would fix the
needs to ask Google again for the “real” IP address.                 of DNS responses.27 .ORG and .GOV are the first generic         Ultimately, the issue highlighted by Pilosov and Kapela            problem, it is not the only possible solution.)
                                                                     top level domains to take steps toward implementing             exists because the underlying architecture of BGP is
According to CNET,22 Kaminsky first warned security                  DNSSEC. According to a July 22 press release28 from             based on trust — that is, when a router says that it is the        2.7 TCP-Based Attacks
software vendors about the problem in March, so they                 the Public Interest Registry, “A request by .ORG, The           best path to a given destination network, BGP assumes              In late September, Outpost24, a Swedish vulnerability
could start writing patches to address the problem. In               Public Interest Registry to bolster Internet security via the   that it is telling the truth. A rogue router could advertise       firm, publicized an attack framework developed by their
an unprecedented, synchronized multivendor effort,                   implementation of Domain Name Security Extensions               a more specific path to a destination network, and other           researchers that exploits several fundamental issues with
many leading vendors of DNS server software and other                (DNSSEC) was unanimously approved by the board of the           routers, as directed by BGP, would begin directing traffic         TCP (Transmission Control Protocol — one of the key
Internet infrastructure components all released patches              Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers             through that rogue router, where it could be intercepted,          foundational protocols of the Internet) to cause denials of
on July 8. Exploit code for the Metasploit Framework                 (ICANN) at the recent Paris meeting.” Similarly, according      or in the case of the Pakistan Telecom/YouTube incident            service and resource consumption on virtually any remote
(a development platform for creating security tools and              to an August 22 memorandum29 from the Office of                 described in the 1st Quarter, 2008 State of the Internet           machine that has a TCP service listening for remote
exploits) became available in late July,23 and security firm         Management and Budget in the Executive Office of the            report, simply black-holed.                                        connections.34 According to the researchers, the problem
MessageLabs recorded a 52 percent increase in suspicious             President, “The Federal Government will deploy DNSSEC                                                                              stems from issues in the way that Internet-connected
DNS traffic between July and August.24 Akamai                        to the top level .gov domain by January 2009. The top           Several recognized Internet security experts, including            devices (routers, computers, etc.) handle TCP connection
advised customers that our Enhanced DNS and Global                   level .gov domain includes the registrar, registry and DNS      Peiter “Mudge” Zatko and Stephen Kent, both                        requests from unknown, remote systems. While the
Traffic Management services were not affected by the                 server operations. This policy requires that the top level      currently with BBN Technologies, noted that they                   underlying issues with TCP are well known within the
vulnerabilities described by Kaminsky.                               .gov domain will be DNSSEC signed and processes to              had described similar attack models for United States              networking and security community, the development of
                                                                     enable secure delegated sub-domains will be developed.”         government agencies a number of years ago. Solutions               the attack framework received publicity, as expected, on
Enterprises and Internet Service Providers scrambled                 Country domains for the United Kingdom (.UK), Sweden            to the problem, as described33 by Kapela, Kent and                 industry Web sites and blogs.
to patch their DNS servers, while many end user systems              (.SE), Brazil (.BR) and Bulgaria (.BG) have already             others, include:
were patched automatically. An article published on                  adopted DNSSEC, according to Internet infrastructure            •	 ISPs	aggressively	filtering	to	allow	only	authorized	            The attack framework developed by the researchers,
InternetNews.com25 noted, “Based on data from a                      news site CircleID.30                                              peers to draw traffic from their routers, and only for           called “Sockstress”, enabled them to produce DoS
tool that Kaminsky posted on July 8th, when the first                                                                                   specific IP prefixes                                             attacks on target systems, exploiting these flaws
patches for the DNS server were made available,                      2.6 BGP-Based Attacks                                           •	 Implementation	of	processes	to	authenticate	                     in TCP. One of the researchers noted that the attack,
86 percent of people that came to his site were vulner-              A presentation31 by Alex Pilosov and Tony Kapela at                ownership of IP blocks, and validation of the advertise-         which can be carried out in less than five minutes,
able. As of July 24th that number had dropped down                   Defcon 16 in August was titled “Stealing the Internet:             ments that ASes send to routers so they don’t just               takes advantage of the way resources are allocated
to 52 percent.” Based on data from Kaminsky’s                        An Internet-Scale Man In The Middle Attack”, and                   send traffic to whomever requests the traffic                    immediately after a successful three-way handshake,
research, Clarified Networks developed a “DNS Repair                 illustrated the exploitation of a design vulnerability in                                                                           making it possible to claim so many resources that
                                                                                                                                     However, it is likely that it will take some time for any
Visualization”26 video that illustrated where patches                BGP that has existed since the protocol’s inception: if not                                                                         the compromised system crashes as a result. The
                                                                                                                                     true solution to be implemented. Filtering, as described
were being applied over time.                                        properly filtered by its service provider, a customer can                                                                           researchers noted that this makes conventional measures
                                                                                                                                     above, is labor intensive, and if just one ISP decides not to
                                                                     inject whatever routes it wishes into the global Internet                                                                           to counteract DoS attacks ineffective.35
                                                                                                                                     filter, then the system breaks down. One implementation



10                                    © 2008 Akamai Technologies, Inc. All Rights Reserved                                                                                     © 2008 Akamai Technologies, Inc. All Rights Reserved                             11
Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q3 2008
Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q3 2008
Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q3 2008
Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q3 2008
Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q3 2008
Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q3 2008
Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q3 2008
Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q3 2008
Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q3 2008
Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q3 2008
Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q3 2008
Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q3 2008
Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q3 2008
Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q3 2008

Más contenido relacionado

La actualidad más candente

Delivering Critical Information and Services [JavaScript & Friends 2021]
Delivering Critical Information and Services [JavaScript & Friends 2021]Delivering Critical Information and Services [JavaScript & Friends 2021]
Delivering Critical Information and Services [JavaScript & Friends 2021]Aaron Gustafson
 
Internet Filtering in the Middle East and North Africa
Internet Filtering in the Middle East and North AfricaInternet Filtering in the Middle East and North Africa
Internet Filtering in the Middle East and North AfricaUnited Interactive™
 
Akamai State of the Internet Report, Q3 2012
Akamai State of the Internet Report, Q3 2012Akamai State of the Internet Report, Q3 2012
Akamai State of the Internet Report, Q3 2012Akamai Technologies
 
Media, Techology, and Education Final
Media, Techology, and Education FinalMedia, Techology, and Education Final
Media, Techology, and Education Finalrorymallette
 
Akamai Q1 2012 State of the Internet Report
Akamai Q1 2012 State of the Internet ReportAkamai Q1 2012 State of the Internet Report
Akamai Q1 2012 State of the Internet ReportDavid Belson
 
Internet Basics
Internet BasicsInternet Basics
Internet BasicsAnn Treacy
 
Akamai State of the Internet Report, Q2 2012
Akamai State of the Internet Report, Q2 2012Akamai State of the Internet Report, Q2 2012
Akamai State of the Internet Report, Q2 2012Akamai Technologies
 
IJSRED-V2I3P37
IJSRED-V2I3P37IJSRED-V2I3P37
IJSRED-V2I3P37IJSRED
 
SAMENA Response to Iraq CMC fixed wireless consultation
SAMENA Response to Iraq CMC fixed wireless consultationSAMENA Response to Iraq CMC fixed wireless consultation
SAMENA Response to Iraq CMC fixed wireless consultationroberto ercole
 

La actualidad más candente (10)

Delivering Critical Information and Services [JavaScript & Friends 2021]
Delivering Critical Information and Services [JavaScript & Friends 2021]Delivering Critical Information and Services [JavaScript & Friends 2021]
Delivering Critical Information and Services [JavaScript & Friends 2021]
 
Internet Filtering in the Middle East and North Africa
Internet Filtering in the Middle East and North AfricaInternet Filtering in the Middle East and North Africa
Internet Filtering in the Middle East and North Africa
 
Akamai State of the Internet Report, Q3 2012
Akamai State of the Internet Report, Q3 2012Akamai State of the Internet Report, Q3 2012
Akamai State of the Internet Report, Q3 2012
 
Media, Techology, and Education Final
Media, Techology, and Education FinalMedia, Techology, and Education Final
Media, Techology, and Education Final
 
Akamai Q1 2012 State of the Internet Report
Akamai Q1 2012 State of the Internet ReportAkamai Q1 2012 State of the Internet Report
Akamai Q1 2012 State of the Internet Report
 
Hawaii - Governor David Ige - Weathering Stormy Seas - Leadership
Hawaii - Governor David Ige - Weathering Stormy Seas - LeadershipHawaii - Governor David Ige - Weathering Stormy Seas - Leadership
Hawaii - Governor David Ige - Weathering Stormy Seas - Leadership
 
Internet Basics
Internet BasicsInternet Basics
Internet Basics
 
Akamai State of the Internet Report, Q2 2012
Akamai State of the Internet Report, Q2 2012Akamai State of the Internet Report, Q2 2012
Akamai State of the Internet Report, Q2 2012
 
IJSRED-V2I3P37
IJSRED-V2I3P37IJSRED-V2I3P37
IJSRED-V2I3P37
 
SAMENA Response to Iraq CMC fixed wireless consultation
SAMENA Response to Iraq CMC fixed wireless consultationSAMENA Response to Iraq CMC fixed wireless consultation
SAMENA Response to Iraq CMC fixed wireless consultation
 

Destacado

Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q1 2008
Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q1 2008Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q1 2008
Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q1 2008guest1d6dd0
 
Final osteoporosis powerpoint
Final osteoporosis powerpointFinal osteoporosis powerpoint
Final osteoporosis powerpointthornhill_s
 
Must Have Apps for Windows 10
Must Have Apps for Windows 10Must Have Apps for Windows 10
Must Have Apps for Windows 10Wiley
 
My personal Growth Hacking Challenge
My personal Growth Hacking ChallengeMy personal Growth Hacking Challenge
My personal Growth Hacking ChallengeHENDRIKLENNARZ.COM
 
Rethinking Website Design: Creating a Peak-Performing Website with Less Risk ...
Rethinking Website Design: Creating a Peak-Performing Website with Less Risk ...Rethinking Website Design: Creating a Peak-Performing Website with Less Risk ...
Rethinking Website Design: Creating a Peak-Performing Website with Less Risk ...HubSpot
 

Destacado (6)

Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q1 2008
Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q1 2008Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q1 2008
Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q1 2008
 
Final osteoporosis powerpoint
Final osteoporosis powerpointFinal osteoporosis powerpoint
Final osteoporosis powerpoint
 
[INFOGRAPHIC] 2015 State of Social Business
[INFOGRAPHIC] 2015 State of Social Business[INFOGRAPHIC] 2015 State of Social Business
[INFOGRAPHIC] 2015 State of Social Business
 
Must Have Apps for Windows 10
Must Have Apps for Windows 10Must Have Apps for Windows 10
Must Have Apps for Windows 10
 
My personal Growth Hacking Challenge
My personal Growth Hacking ChallengeMy personal Growth Hacking Challenge
My personal Growth Hacking Challenge
 
Rethinking Website Design: Creating a Peak-Performing Website with Less Risk ...
Rethinking Website Design: Creating a Peak-Performing Website with Less Risk ...Rethinking Website Design: Creating a Peak-Performing Website with Less Risk ...
Rethinking Website Design: Creating a Peak-Performing Website with Less Risk ...
 

Similar a Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q3 2008

Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q2 2008
Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q2 2008Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q2 2008
Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q2 2008guest190b7a
 
Akamai - State of the Internet (Q4 2009)
Akamai - State of the Internet (Q4 2009)Akamai - State of the Internet (Q4 2009)
Akamai - State of the Internet (Q4 2009)Constantin Cocioaba
 
Http Www.Akamai.Com Dl Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q2 2008.Pdf...
Http   Www.Akamai.Com Dl Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q2 2008.Pdf...Http   Www.Akamai.Com Dl Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q2 2008.Pdf...
Http Www.Akamai.Com Dl Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q2 2008.Pdf...jash222
 
Akamai state of_the_internet_q1_2008
Akamai state of_the_internet_q1_2008Akamai state of_the_internet_q1_2008
Akamai state of_the_internet_q1_2008JOSÉ RAMON CARIAS
 
Akamai - State of the internet (Q2 2010)
Akamai - State of the internet (Q2 2010)Akamai - State of the internet (Q2 2010)
Akamai - State of the internet (Q2 2010)Constantin Cocioaba
 
"The State of the Internet". Primer trimestre de 2011 (Akamai) - AG11
"The State of the Internet". Primer trimestre de 2011 (Akamai) - AG11"The State of the Internet". Primer trimestre de 2011 (Akamai) - AG11
"The State of the Internet". Primer trimestre de 2011 (Akamai) - AG11Retelur Marketing
 
Akamai´s State of the Internet
Akamai´s State of the Internet Akamai´s State of the Internet
Akamai´s State of the Internet Carlos Diaz Warns
 
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 4 4TH QUARTER, 2013 REPORT The State of the Internet
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 4 4TH QUARTER, 2013 REPORT The State of the InternetVOLUME 6, NUMBER 4 4TH QUARTER, 2013 REPORT The State of the Internet
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 4 4TH QUARTER, 2013 REPORT The State of the InternetAkamai Technologies
 
Akamai State of the Internet Report, Q1 2012
Akamai State of the Internet Report, Q1 2012Akamai State of the Internet Report, Q1 2012
Akamai State of the Internet Report, Q1 2012Akamai Technologies
 
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 3 3RD QUARTER, 2013 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The State of the Internet
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 3 3RD QUARTER, 2013 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The State of the InternetVOLUME 6, NUMBER 3 3RD QUARTER, 2013 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The State of the Internet
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 3 3RD QUARTER, 2013 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The State of the InternetAkamai Technologies
 
Akamai's State of the Internet Q1 2014 Report | Volume 7 Number 1
Akamai's State of the Internet Q1 2014 Report | Volume 7 Number 1Akamai's State of the Internet Q1 2014 Report | Volume 7 Number 1
Akamai's State of the Internet Q1 2014 Report | Volume 7 Number 1Akamai Technologies
 
Akamai's State of the Internet
Akamai's State of the InternetAkamai's State of the Internet
Akamai's State of the InternetAlvaro Quesada
 
Akamai - State of Internet Raporu 2014 1. Çeyrek
Akamai - State of Internet Raporu 2014 1. ÇeyrekAkamai - State of Internet Raporu 2014 1. Çeyrek
Akamai - State of Internet Raporu 2014 1. ÇeyrekWebrazzi
 
Reference: Akamai State of the Internet Q4 2012
Reference: Akamai State of the Internet Q4 2012Reference: Akamai State of the Internet Q4 2012
Reference: Akamai State of the Internet Q4 2012C. Keiko Funahashi
 
State of the Internet Report: Q4 2012
State of the Internet Report: Q4 2012State of the Internet Report: Q4 2012
State of the Internet Report: Q4 2012Akamai Technologies
 
Akamai soti q213_exec_summary
Akamai soti q213_exec_summaryAkamai soti q213_exec_summary
Akamai soti q213_exec_summaryMiguel Angel
 
The State of the Internet, 2nd Quarter, 2013 Executive Summary
The State of the Internet, 2nd Quarter, 2013 Executive SummaryThe State of the Internet, 2nd Quarter, 2013 Executive Summary
The State of the Internet, 2nd Quarter, 2013 Executive SummaryAkamai Technologies
 
SeGW Whitepaper from Radisys
SeGW Whitepaper from RadisysSeGW Whitepaper from Radisys
SeGW Whitepaper from RadisysShah Sheikh
 
Akamai State of the Internet
Akamai State of the InternetAkamai State of the Internet
Akamai State of the InternetÉdgar Medina
 

Similar a Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q3 2008 (20)

Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q2 2008
Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q2 2008Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q2 2008
Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q2 2008
 
Akamai - State of the Internet (Q4 2009)
Akamai - State of the Internet (Q4 2009)Akamai - State of the Internet (Q4 2009)
Akamai - State of the Internet (Q4 2009)
 
Http Www.Akamai.Com Dl Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q2 2008.Pdf...
Http   Www.Akamai.Com Dl Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q2 2008.Pdf...Http   Www.Akamai.Com Dl Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q2 2008.Pdf...
Http Www.Akamai.Com Dl Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q2 2008.Pdf...
 
Akamai state of_the_internet_q1_2008
Akamai state of_the_internet_q1_2008Akamai state of_the_internet_q1_2008
Akamai state of_the_internet_q1_2008
 
Akamai - State of the internet (Q2 2010)
Akamai - State of the internet (Q2 2010)Akamai - State of the internet (Q2 2010)
Akamai - State of the internet (Q2 2010)
 
"The State of the Internet". Primer trimestre de 2011 (Akamai) - AG11
"The State of the Internet". Primer trimestre de 2011 (Akamai) - AG11"The State of the Internet". Primer trimestre de 2011 (Akamai) - AG11
"The State of the Internet". Primer trimestre de 2011 (Akamai) - AG11
 
Akamai´s State of the Internet
Akamai´s State of the Internet Akamai´s State of the Internet
Akamai´s State of the Internet
 
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 4 4TH QUARTER, 2013 REPORT The State of the Internet
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 4 4TH QUARTER, 2013 REPORT The State of the InternetVOLUME 6, NUMBER 4 4TH QUARTER, 2013 REPORT The State of the Internet
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 4 4TH QUARTER, 2013 REPORT The State of the Internet
 
Akamai State of the Internet Report, Q1 2012
Akamai State of the Internet Report, Q1 2012Akamai State of the Internet Report, Q1 2012
Akamai State of the Internet Report, Q1 2012
 
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 3 3RD QUARTER, 2013 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The State of the Internet
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 3 3RD QUARTER, 2013 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The State of the InternetVOLUME 6, NUMBER 3 3RD QUARTER, 2013 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The State of the Internet
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 3 3RD QUARTER, 2013 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The State of the Internet
 
Akamai's State of the Internet Q1 2014 Report | Volume 7 Number 1
Akamai's State of the Internet Q1 2014 Report | Volume 7 Number 1Akamai's State of the Internet Q1 2014 Report | Volume 7 Number 1
Akamai's State of the Internet Q1 2014 Report | Volume 7 Number 1
 
Akamai's State of the Internet
Akamai's State of the InternetAkamai's State of the Internet
Akamai's State of the Internet
 
Akamai - State of Internet Raporu 2014 1. Çeyrek
Akamai - State of Internet Raporu 2014 1. ÇeyrekAkamai - State of Internet Raporu 2014 1. Çeyrek
Akamai - State of Internet Raporu 2014 1. Çeyrek
 
Reference: Akamai State of the Internet Q4 2012
Reference: Akamai State of the Internet Q4 2012Reference: Akamai State of the Internet Q4 2012
Reference: Akamai State of the Internet Q4 2012
 
State of the Internet Report: Q4 2012
State of the Internet Report: Q4 2012State of the Internet Report: Q4 2012
State of the Internet Report: Q4 2012
 
Akamai soti q213_exec_summary
Akamai soti q213_exec_summaryAkamai soti q213_exec_summary
Akamai soti q213_exec_summary
 
The State of the Internet, 2nd Quarter, 2013 Executive Summary
The State of the Internet, 2nd Quarter, 2013 Executive SummaryThe State of the Internet, 2nd Quarter, 2013 Executive Summary
The State of the Internet, 2nd Quarter, 2013 Executive Summary
 
Akamai q111
Akamai q111Akamai q111
Akamai q111
 
SeGW Whitepaper from Radisys
SeGW Whitepaper from RadisysSeGW Whitepaper from Radisys
SeGW Whitepaper from Radisys
 
Akamai State of the Internet
Akamai State of the InternetAkamai State of the Internet
Akamai State of the Internet
 

Último

TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024
TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024
TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024Lonnie McRorey
 
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):comworks
 
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platforms
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platformsDevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platforms
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platformsSergiu Bodiu
 
Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)
Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)
Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)Mark Simos
 
Advanced Computer Architecture – An Introduction
Advanced Computer Architecture – An IntroductionAdvanced Computer Architecture – An Introduction
Advanced Computer Architecture – An IntroductionDilum Bandara
 
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .Alan Dix
 
How AI, OpenAI, and ChatGPT impact business and software.
How AI, OpenAI, and ChatGPT impact business and software.How AI, OpenAI, and ChatGPT impact business and software.
How AI, OpenAI, and ChatGPT impact business and software.Curtis Poe
 
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdf
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdfSearch Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdf
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdfRankYa
 
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptx
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptxSAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptx
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptxNavinnSomaal
 
"LLMs for Python Engineers: Advanced Data Analysis and Semantic Kernel",Oleks...
"LLMs for Python Engineers: Advanced Data Analysis and Semantic Kernel",Oleks..."LLMs for Python Engineers: Advanced Data Analysis and Semantic Kernel",Oleks...
"LLMs for Python Engineers: Advanced Data Analysis and Semantic Kernel",Oleks...Fwdays
 
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024BookNet Canada
 
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024Lorenzo Miniero
 
Dev Dives: Streamline document processing with UiPath Studio Web
Dev Dives: Streamline document processing with UiPath Studio WebDev Dives: Streamline document processing with UiPath Studio Web
Dev Dives: Streamline document processing with UiPath Studio WebUiPathCommunity
 
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024BookNet Canada
 
Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!
Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!
Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!Commit University
 
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and Cons
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and ConsThe Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and Cons
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and ConsPixlogix Infotech
 
How to write a Business Continuity Plan
How to write a Business Continuity PlanHow to write a Business Continuity Plan
How to write a Business Continuity PlanDatabarracks
 
Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!
Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!
Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!Manik S Magar
 

Último (20)

TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024
TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024
TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024
 
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
 
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platforms
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platformsDevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platforms
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platforms
 
Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)
Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)
Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)
 
Advanced Computer Architecture – An Introduction
Advanced Computer Architecture – An IntroductionAdvanced Computer Architecture – An Introduction
Advanced Computer Architecture – An Introduction
 
DMCC Future of Trade Web3 - Special Edition
DMCC Future of Trade Web3 - Special EditionDMCC Future of Trade Web3 - Special Edition
DMCC Future of Trade Web3 - Special Edition
 
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
 
How AI, OpenAI, and ChatGPT impact business and software.
How AI, OpenAI, and ChatGPT impact business and software.How AI, OpenAI, and ChatGPT impact business and software.
How AI, OpenAI, and ChatGPT impact business and software.
 
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdf
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdfSearch Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdf
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdf
 
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptx
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptxSAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptx
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptx
 
"LLMs for Python Engineers: Advanced Data Analysis and Semantic Kernel",Oleks...
"LLMs for Python Engineers: Advanced Data Analysis and Semantic Kernel",Oleks..."LLMs for Python Engineers: Advanced Data Analysis and Semantic Kernel",Oleks...
"LLMs for Python Engineers: Advanced Data Analysis and Semantic Kernel",Oleks...
 
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
 
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
 
Dev Dives: Streamline document processing with UiPath Studio Web
Dev Dives: Streamline document processing with UiPath Studio WebDev Dives: Streamline document processing with UiPath Studio Web
Dev Dives: Streamline document processing with UiPath Studio Web
 
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
 
E-Vehicle_Hacking_by_Parul Sharma_null_owasp.pptx
E-Vehicle_Hacking_by_Parul Sharma_null_owasp.pptxE-Vehicle_Hacking_by_Parul Sharma_null_owasp.pptx
E-Vehicle_Hacking_by_Parul Sharma_null_owasp.pptx
 
Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!
Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!
Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!
 
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and Cons
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and ConsThe Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and Cons
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and Cons
 
How to write a Business Continuity Plan
How to write a Business Continuity PlanHow to write a Business Continuity Plan
How to write a Business Continuity Plan
 
Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!
Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!
Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!
 

Whitepapers Akamai State Of The Internet Q3 2008

  • 1. Volume 1, Number 3 3rd Quarter, 2008 The State of the Internet PORT RE
  • 2. Executive Summary Each quarter, Akamai will be publishing a quarterly “State of the Internet” report. This report will include data gathered across Akamai’s global server network about attack traffic and broadband adoption, as well as trends seen in this data over time. It will also aggregate publicly available news and information about notable events seen throughout the quarter, including Denial of Service attacks, Web site hacks and network events, including outages and new connections. During the third quarter of 2008, Akamai observed attack traffic originating from 179 unique countries around the world. China and the United States were the two largest attack traffic sources, accounting for over 45% of observed traffic in total. Akamai observed attack traffic targeted at nearly 2,400 unique ports, with the top 10 ports seeing over 85% of the observed attack traffic. Web site and Internet security were regularly in the news during the quarter, as several proof-of-concept attack vectors were announced, targeting social networking Web sites, as well as DNS, BGP and TCP, all core underlying Internet protocols. Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, which made landfall in the United States in September, caused Internet outages in the states that they swept through. Notable Web site outages in the third quarter were attributed to increased traffic, human error and power outages. Global connectivity saw big advances in the third quarter, with various undersea cable projects getting underway or nearing completion, the commercial launch of WiMAX services in a number of countries, and the announcement of fiber-to-the-premises services that will bring gigabit-speed connections to subscribers in Japan, the Ukraine and the Netherlands. Akamai observed a nearly ten percent increase globally in the number of unique IP addresses connecting to Akamai’s network, and this increase may be attributable to more people turning to the World Wide Web for news and video content related to the Beijing Olympic Games, which took place in August. From a global connection speed perspective, South Korea had the highest levels of “high broadband” (>5 Mbps) connectivity for the third straight quarter. In the United States, Delaware also maintained its top position, with 55% of connections to Akamai occurring at 5 Mbps or greater. Looking at observed “narrowband” (<256 Kbps) connections, Mayotte and Equatorial Guinea were the “slowest” countries, with 97% and 94% of connections to Akamai, respectively, occurring at speeds below 256 Kbps. In the United States, the District of Columbia and Washington State continued to have the highest percentages of observed connections below 256 Kbps. However, these regions also saw a significant quarter-over-quarter decline in narrowband connection percentages, down 25% and 46% respectively as compared to the second quarter. The “spinning globe” featured in the Akamai NOCC represents where Akamai servers are located and how much traffic they are seeing.
  • 3. Table of Contents Introduction 1: IntroductIon 3 2: SecurIty 4 Akamai’s globally distributed network of servers allows us to gather massive amounts of information on many metrics, including connection speeds, attack 2.1 Attack Traffic, Top Originating Countries 4 traffic and network connectivity/availability/latency problems, as well as user 2.2 Attack Traffic, Top Target Ports 5 behavior and traffic patterns on leading Web sites. 2.3 Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) Attacks 6 2.4 Web Site Hacks & Web-Based Exploits 8 In the third quarter of 2008, observed Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 2.5 DNS-Based Attacks 9 attack traffic continued to target a consistent set of ports, likely indicating continued activity by malware targeting exploits that were identified several 2.6 BGP-Based Attacks 10 years ago. Several proof-of-concept attack vectors were announced, targeting 2.7 TCP-Based Attacks 11 social networking Web sites, as well as DNS, BGP and TCP, all core underlying 3: networkS and web SIteS: ISSueS & ImprovementS 12 Internet protocols. Exploitation of the vulnerabilities described within these 3.1 Network Outages 12 announcements could cause significant problems for systems connected to 3.2 Web Site Outages 14 the Internet. 3.3 Significant New Connectivity — Undersea Cables 15 Several network outages in the United States, due to hurricanes, were observed 3.4 Significant New Connectivity — Wireless 18 in the third quarter, though global connectivity continued to become more 3.5 Significant New Connectivity — Fixed Broadband 19 robust, with various undersea cable projects getting underway or nearing 4: Internet penetratIon 20 completion, the commercial launch of WiMAX services in a number of countries, and the announcement of fiber-to-the-premises services bringing 4.1 Unique IP Addresses Seen By Akamai 20 gigabit-speed connections to subscribers in several countries. 4.2 Internet Penetration, Global 21 4.3 Internet Penetration, United States 22 The percentage of high-speed (>5 Mbps) connections to Akamai continued to 5: GeoGraphy 23 grow during the third quarter, though growth rates in several countries, as well as the United States, were lower than in the second quarter. Decreases in 5.1 High Broadband Connectivity: Fastest International Countries 23 the percentage of narrowband (<256 Kbps) connections to Akamai were also 5.2 High Broadband Connectivity: Fastest U.S. States 25 seen both internationally and in the United States, likely due, in part, to the 5.3 Broadband Connectivity: Fast International Countries 27 growth in availability of, and options for, broadband connectivity. 5.4 Broadband Connectivity: Fast U.S. States 28 5.5 Narrowband Connectivity: Slowest International Countries 30 5.6 Narrowband Connectivity: Slowest U.S. States 31 6: appendIX: Selected InternatIonal data 33 7: endnoteS 34 2 © 2008 Akamai Technologies, Inc. All Rights Reserved © 2008 Akamai Technologies, Inc. All Rights Reserved 3
  • 4. Section 2: Security Akamai maintains a distributed set of agents deployed 2.1 Attack Traffic, Top Originating Countries Akamai’s observations are supported by other industry For the second quarter in a row, Port 445 (Microsoft- across the Internet that serve to monitor attack traffic. During the third quarter of 2008, Akamai observed findings as well. Security service provider SecureWorks DS) held the first place spot, though with a smaller Based on the data collected by these agents, Akamai attack traffic originating from 179 unique countries issued a press release1 on September 22 that listed percentage of the overall observed traffic than in the is able to identify the top countries from which attack around the world, up nearly 30% from the second the top 10 countries responsible for attacks attempted second quarter. Ports 139 and 135 remained in the traffic originates, as well as the top ports targeted quarter count of 139 countries. This quarter, China against the company’s clients in 2008. According to the top three, though they switched places quarter-over- by these attacks (ports are network layer protocol moved back into the first place slot, which it held in the release, the top 10 countries were the United States, quarter. New to the top 10 in the third quarter is port identifiers). This section, in part, provides insight into first quarter as well, and the United States maintained China, Brazil, South Korea, Poland, Japan, Russia, Taiwan, 25 (SMTP) — this may be due to attackers or botnets Internet attack traffic, as observed and measured by its second place position. Japan’s percentage of attack Germany and Canada. With the exception of Canada, scanning for open mail relays through which to send Akamai, during the third quarter of 2008. While some traffic dropped back to first quarter levels, moving them the other nine countries have appeared in Akamai’s spam. Returning to the list are port 80 (WWW) and port quarter-over-quarter trending may be discussed, it is into fifth place this quarter. It’s not clear what drove the top 10 list at least once during the last three quarters. 4899 (Remote Administrator), which both appeared on expected that both the top countries and top ports will surge in attack traffic that was observed to originate (Canada is No.11 on the third quarter list, up from the list in the first quarter as well. As the name suggests, change on a quarterly basis. from Japan during the second quarter — continued No.16 in the second quarter.) the Remote Administrator service (radmin) listens on observation over time should help determine if it was port 4899, and is used to provide remote access to This section also includes information on selected DDoS an anomaly, or if there are other factors that may have 2.2 Attack Traffic, Top Target Ports Microsoft Windows systems. While there have been no attacks, Web site hacking attempts, Web-based exploits influenced it. During the third quarter of 2008, Akamai observed recently published exploits for radmin, attackers may be and DNS-, BGP- and TCP-based attacks as published in attack traffic targeted at nearly 2,400 unique ports, attempting to find and exploit systems with weak default the media during the third quarter of 2008. As noted The trend in attack traffic distribution continues to be a nearly six-fold increase from the second quarter. passwords, which would provide them the ability to below, a number of new high-profile attack vectors consistent with the previous two quarters, with the top Consistent with the prior quarter, some of the attack remotely monitor, control and transfer files to and from were discovered or announced during the quarter. Note 10 countries continuing to be the source for just over traffic targeted services on well-known ports. While the the compromised system. that Akamai does not release information on attacks three-quarters of observed attack traffic. However, the distribution of target ports was very broad, the bulk of on specific customer sites and that selected published list of countries that make up the top 10 continues to be the traffic was fairly concentrated, as the top 10 targeted Interestingly, though it didn’t make it into the global top reports are simply compiled here. dynamic, as expected — France, Poland and the Ukraine ports saw over 85% of the observed attack traffic, which 10, the top target port seen from China was Port 7212, dropped out of the top 10 quarter-over-quarter, while is also consistent with second quarter measurements. It accounting for 16% of the observed attack traffic from Brazil reappears in sixth place, as it did in the first quarter. is not clear what is driving the rapid quarter-over-quarter the country. While not previously used to spread malware increases in target port counts. in the past, it appears that the port is used by a program OTHER Destination Port Use % Traffic Q2 08 % Microsoft-DS Port Country % Traffic Q2 08 % 10 445 microsoft-dS 21.12 28.44 1 china 26.85 8.90 4 VNC Server 139 netbIoS 21.09 11.55 2 united States 19.68 21.52 Telnet 135 microsoft-rpc 10.68 26.43 3 South korea 9.37 2.25 9 5 SMTP 22 SSh 9.73 3.87 4 Sweden 3.86 0.48 Remote 80 www 9.18 0.91 Administrator 5 Japan 3.13 30.07 1433 microsoft SQl Server 3.20 2.95 6 brazil 2.64 1.53 2 Microsoft 4899 remote administrator 2.56 0.89 SQL Server 7 taiwan 2.54 2.21 3 25 Smtp 2.28 0.70 NetBIOS 8 hong kong 2.26 0.46 1 WWW 23 telnet 2.05 1.23 9 Germany 2.20 5.56 6 5900 vnc Server 1.93 2.20 10 russia 1.94 1.64 8 7 various other 16.17 – SSH – other 25.53 – Microsoft-RPC Figure 1: Attack Traffic, Top Originating Countries Figure 2: Attack Traffic, Top Target Ports 4 © 2008 Akamai Technologies, Inc. All Rights Reserved © 2008 Akamai Technologies, Inc. All Rights Reserved 5
  • 5. Section 2: Security (continued) called GhostSurf.2 Older versions of the software, when During the third quarter, Facebook and MySpace users 90 Day Botnet Size run, created open proxy relays. A published security were the target of a newly discovered worm, dubbed 600 advisory3 notes “Users may inadvertently be subject to Net-Worm.Win32.Koobface, according to researchers at botcount Size (30 day entropy in 1000’s) 550 forwarding data for those with malicious intent.” Kaspersky Lab.5 The worm e-mails friends of Facebook 500 It may be the case that attackers in China are attempt- and MySpace users, and includes a link to a bogus 450 ing to identify available open proxies that they can relay YouTube site. If a user attempts to access the link, they 400 350 malicious traffic through, potentially covering their are prompted to download and install what claims to 300 tracks. In addition, Akamai observed that port 80 (the be a new version of the Adobe Flash player. Instead, 250 default port used for Web servers) was responsible the code downloaded is a network worm that recruits 200 150 for a disproportionately large percentage of detected victim’s machines into botnets. August September October attack traffic in the United States, Sweden and Russia. Month Given the continued growth in SQL injection attacks While it is not clear how many machines were recruited (see below), this traffic may have been, at least into botnets by the “Koobface” worm, the number of Figure 3: Botnet sizes grew significantly during the third quarter of 2008, reaching over a half-million machines during September. in part, attempts to identify Web servers with SQL hijacked systems (“zombies”) that belong to botnets (Graph courtesy of The Shadowserver Foundation) injection vulnerabilities. responsible for some DDoS attacks surged over the third quarter. The Shadowserver Foundation6 (a group 2.3 Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attacks of security professionals who volunteer their time to No discussion of DDoS attacks for the third quarter Georgian hackers fought back, targeting Web and DNS While just a proof-of-concept, researchers at the Institute track and measure botnets to help law enforcement of 2008 would be complete without looking at those servers at the Russian News and Information Agency (RIA of Computer Science created a Facebook application that investigations) reported a significant increase, based on that occurred in July and August, related to the Novost) with DDoS attacks. In addition, Estonian officials can create a botnet capable of launching a DDoS attack their monitoring, which is likely indicative of the general Russian-Georgian political conflict. DDoS attacks and offered their support to Georgia, noting that the attacks against a target system.4 This proof-of-concept attack trend. In June 2008, the Shadowserver Foundation site defacements targeted the Web sites of Georgia’s targeting Georgia were similar to those made against was created, in part, to expose the risks that the inherent were aware of about 100,000 machines that were part President, the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Estonian Web sites in 2007. Specifically, according to the trust of others plays in a social network. By exploiting the of a botnet, and by late August this number had more the Georgian Ministry of Defense. The President’s Web Shadowserver Foundation, similar to the attacks against viral nature of application distribution on the Facebook than quadrupled to over 450,000 machines. According site was ultimately moved to a hosting company based Estonia, a number of Russian blogs, forums and Web platform, the researchers demonstrated that a botnet to “Bot Count” statistics7 on the Shadowserver Web in Atlanta, Georgia (in the United States), and the sites spread a Microsoft Windows batch script that was with thousands of users could easily be created, flooding site, this climbed to over 500,000 machines in early Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs chose to provide designed to attack Georgian Web sites by continually a target with a large number of Web requests, causing September before beginning to decline to approximately updates using a site hosted on Google’s Blogger service.9 sending ICMP traffic via the ‘ping’ command to several it to become overloaded and ultimately unavailable. It 350,000 by the end of the quarter, as shown in Figure 3. SQL injection attacks were another attack vector used Georgian websites, the vast majority of which are is important to note that Akamai’s services would help The growth in the number of infected machines, against Georgian sites, as it was reported that Russian government-related.10 customers mitigate the effects of such an attack, as the according to the Internet Storm Center,8 could be related hackers were distributing lists of Georgian Web sites that requests could be absorbed or deflected by Akamai’s to an increase in SQL injection attacks observed during were vulnerable to SQL injection attacks, enabling site servers at the edge of the Internet. the same time frame. defacement to be automated. 6 © 2008 Akamai Technologies, Inc. All Rights Reserved © 2008 Akamai Technologies, Inc. All Rights Reserved 7
  • 6. Section 2: Security (continued) 2.4 Web Site Hacks & Web-Based Exploits Also in late September, Princeton University researchers SQL injection attacks continued during the third quarter, 2.5 DNS-Based Attacks A research report11 published on the “insecurity iceberg” revealed that a number of popular Web sites, including and one high-profile site that became infected belonged In the 2nd Quarter, 2008 State of the Internet report, analyzed browser type (user-agent) data collected by those belonging to ING, MetaFilter, YouTube and the to BusinessWeek. According to a report17 from anti-virus Akamai noted that Internet security researcher Dan Google between January 2007 and June 2008 in an New York Times, were vulnerable to “cross-site request firm Sophos, in September, hundreds of pages were Kaminsky had announced that he had discovered a effort to measure what the authors termed the “world- forgery” (CSRF) flaws.13 By exploiting these flaws, an affected on a section of BusinessWeek’s Web site which vulnerability in the DNS protocol and urged organizations wide vulnerable browser population.” After reviewing attacker can force the user’s browser to request a page offers information about where MBA students might find running BIND and many other name servers to upgrade this user-agent data, the report’s authors concluded, or action without the user knowing, or the Web site future employers. In addition, according to an August immediately to the most recent versions of the software. “The tip of the Web browser insecurity ice-berg was recognizing the request didn’t come from the actual 7 article in The Register,18 a new round of SQL injection According to multiple published descriptions, exploitation measured to be 637 million (or 45.2%) Internet users at legitimate user. The flaw on the ING site would have let attacks has infected millions of Web pages belonging to of the vulnerability would allow attackers to “poison” risk worldwide due to not running the latest, most secure an attacker move funds from the victim’s account to businesses and government agencies, including those DNS caches by maliciously causing DNS servers to cache browser version. Meanwhile, hidden below the surface, another account, while the flaws on the Metafilter and that belong to the National Institute of Health and incorrect information. If this were to occur, users could be the iceberg extends further, encompassing users that rely YouTube sites would have let the attacker essentially Department of Education in the United States, as well sent, unbeknownst to them, to fake Web sites controlled on outdated vulnerable browser plug-ins.” Ultimately, take over a victim’s account. The flaw on the New York as UK Trade & Investment. A search highlighted in the by an attacker, where usernames, passwords and other these findings indicate that targeted exploitation of a Times site let an attacker grab e-mail addresses of users article noted that at least 1.45 million Web pages had personally identifiable information could potentially known security problem in an older version of a Web registered on the site and use them for spamming or been infected as part of this new round of attacks. A be stolen. In addition to simply sending users to fake browser could ultimately impact millions of Internet other malicious purposes. As of October 1, all of these post19 on SecureComputing’s TrustedSourceTM blog on Web sites, other targets could include FTP services, mail users, resulting in potential compromise of end-user sites had addressed their CSRF vulnerabilities.14 August 10th also reported the appearance of a new SQL servers, spam filters and SSL, which is used to make systems, or the creation of a so-called botnet used to injection attack; noting that it was targeting machines Web-based transactions more secure. implement large-scale DDoS or SQL injection attacks, System “clipboards” were also getting hijacked by an running Microsoft SQL Server, and possibly also Web such as those described in Akamai’s 1st Quarter, 2008 attack discovered in August. According to a post15 servers with Sybase database backends, as they use a Described in Kaminsky’s presentation21 to the Black Hat and 2nd Quarter, 2008 State of the Internet reports. on ZDNet’s Zero Day security blog, “In the Web attacks, similar SQL syntax and table structure to Microsoft’s SQL conference in August, as well as in multiple published which target Mac, Windows and Linux users running Server. The post’s authors also stated that infected Web reports related to Kaminsky’s findings, the vulnerabilities In late September, word began to spread about a new Firefox, IE and Safari, hackers are seizing control of the pages were found on government sites, sales sites, real in DNS that he found concerned two key points: Web-based attack vector known as “clickjacking” that machine’s clipboard and using a hard-to-delete URL estate sites and financial information sites. 1. Randomized DNS request transaction IDs — if the pool affects all the major desktop platforms, including that points to a fake anti-virus program. According to of random numbers used for transaction IDs is smaller Microsoft Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Apple Safari, victims on several Web forums, the attack is coming In addition to the Russian/Georgian aggression that than is defined in the DNS protocol specification, or Opera and Adobe Flash. Published descriptions12 of from Adobe Flash-based advertising on legitimate sites resulted in DDoS attacks on Georgian Web sites and transaction IDs are insufficiently random (and thus, clickjacking note, “With this exploit, once you’re on the — including Newsweek, Digg and MSNBC.com.” Georgian network infrastructure, Russian hackers also more easily predictable), it becomes significantly easier malicious web page, the bad guy can make you click on According to a September 19 post16 on the same blog, targeted Lithuanian Web sites. According to the Web for an attacker to return a forged reply to a query any link, any button, or anything on the page without Adobe will mitigate these attacks in the final version Host Industry News,20 the 300 affected Web sites were before the genuine reply arrives. you even seeing it happening.” Browser vendors of the upcoming release of Flash Player 10 by demanding hosted at Hostex, and the sites were defaced with 2. Source port randomization — some DNS server including Microsoft and Mozilla “concur independently user interaction when a Shockwave (.swf) file attempts recently banned Soviet symbols and profane messages. implementations use a fixed port for all outgoing that this is a tough problem with no easy solution at the to set data on a user’s clipboard. It is believed that the Web site defacements may have queries, or insufficiently randomize the source port moment,” according to one of the researchers that been a precursor to a planned DDoS attack against sites used. This too makes it easier for an attacker to inject discovered the exploit. in Latvia, Ukraine, Lithuania and Estonia, according to a a fraudulent reply that is accepted by the resolving report from an Estonian television network. nameserver as legitimate. 8 © 2008 Akamai Technologies, Inc. All Rights Reserved © 2008 Akamai Technologies, Inc. All Rights Reserved 9
  • 7. Section 2: Security (continued) In each case, the attacker’s reply then pollutes the cache While the patches issued by software vendors addressed routing table. The described attack exploits BGP to of the authentication solution, as described above, of the resolving nameserver. Notably, just one type of the immediate issue, longer-term fixes are required, fool routers into re-directing data to an eavesdropper’s would require the use of Secure BGP, developed by forged reply can cause all future DNS queries to be and one technology that will help drive such longer- network, allowing the attacker to intercept data Kent and colleagues at BBN Technologies. Unfortunately, directed to the attacker’s nameservers so that it is not term fixes is known as DNSSEC. DNSSEC is short for headed to a target IP address or group of addresses. many current routers lack the memory and processing necessary to continually compromise the resolver’s DNS Security Extensions which, as the name suggests, The innovation in this attack, as noted on Wired’s power to generate and validate signatures. In addition, cache for other names in the target domain. For instance, are a set of extensions used to add an additional layer “Threat Level” security blog,32 is that the intercepted router vendors have resisted upgrading the hardware an attacker could poison www.google.com, and give of security to the Domain Name System by providing data is silently forwarded to the actual destination, because their customers (ISPs) haven’t demanded it, the “false” record a time-to-live (TTL) value lasting several a form of cryptographically signed verification for DNS so that no outage occurs. due to the cost and effort involved in replacing existing years, so the resolving nameserver effectively never information, which is intended to assure the authenticity deployed routers. (While Secure BGP would fix the needs to ask Google again for the “real” IP address. of DNS responses.27 .ORG and .GOV are the first generic Ultimately, the issue highlighted by Pilosov and Kapela problem, it is not the only possible solution.) top level domains to take steps toward implementing exists because the underlying architecture of BGP is According to CNET,22 Kaminsky first warned security DNSSEC. According to a July 22 press release28 from based on trust — that is, when a router says that it is the 2.7 TCP-Based Attacks software vendors about the problem in March, so they the Public Interest Registry, “A request by .ORG, The best path to a given destination network, BGP assumes In late September, Outpost24, a Swedish vulnerability could start writing patches to address the problem. In Public Interest Registry to bolster Internet security via the that it is telling the truth. A rogue router could advertise firm, publicized an attack framework developed by their an unprecedented, synchronized multivendor effort, implementation of Domain Name Security Extensions a more specific path to a destination network, and other researchers that exploits several fundamental issues with many leading vendors of DNS server software and other (DNSSEC) was unanimously approved by the board of the routers, as directed by BGP, would begin directing traffic TCP (Transmission Control Protocol — one of the key Internet infrastructure components all released patches Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers through that rogue router, where it could be intercepted, foundational protocols of the Internet) to cause denials of on July 8. Exploit code for the Metasploit Framework (ICANN) at the recent Paris meeting.” Similarly, according or in the case of the Pakistan Telecom/YouTube incident service and resource consumption on virtually any remote (a development platform for creating security tools and to an August 22 memorandum29 from the Office of described in the 1st Quarter, 2008 State of the Internet machine that has a TCP service listening for remote exploits) became available in late July,23 and security firm Management and Budget in the Executive Office of the report, simply black-holed. connections.34 According to the researchers, the problem MessageLabs recorded a 52 percent increase in suspicious President, “The Federal Government will deploy DNSSEC stems from issues in the way that Internet-connected DNS traffic between July and August.24 Akamai to the top level .gov domain by January 2009. The top Several recognized Internet security experts, including devices (routers, computers, etc.) handle TCP connection advised customers that our Enhanced DNS and Global level .gov domain includes the registrar, registry and DNS Peiter “Mudge” Zatko and Stephen Kent, both requests from unknown, remote systems. While the Traffic Management services were not affected by the server operations. This policy requires that the top level currently with BBN Technologies, noted that they underlying issues with TCP are well known within the vulnerabilities described by Kaminsky. .gov domain will be DNSSEC signed and processes to had described similar attack models for United States networking and security community, the development of enable secure delegated sub-domains will be developed.” government agencies a number of years ago. Solutions the attack framework received publicity, as expected, on Enterprises and Internet Service Providers scrambled Country domains for the United Kingdom (.UK), Sweden to the problem, as described33 by Kapela, Kent and industry Web sites and blogs. to patch their DNS servers, while many end user systems (.SE), Brazil (.BR) and Bulgaria (.BG) have already others, include: were patched automatically. An article published on adopted DNSSEC, according to Internet infrastructure • ISPs aggressively filtering to allow only authorized The attack framework developed by the researchers, InternetNews.com25 noted, “Based on data from a news site CircleID.30 peers to draw traffic from their routers, and only for called “Sockstress”, enabled them to produce DoS tool that Kaminsky posted on July 8th, when the first specific IP prefixes attacks on target systems, exploiting these flaws patches for the DNS server were made available, 2.6 BGP-Based Attacks • Implementation of processes to authenticate in TCP. One of the researchers noted that the attack, 86 percent of people that came to his site were vulner- A presentation31 by Alex Pilosov and Tony Kapela at ownership of IP blocks, and validation of the advertise- which can be carried out in less than five minutes, able. As of July 24th that number had dropped down Defcon 16 in August was titled “Stealing the Internet: ments that ASes send to routers so they don’t just takes advantage of the way resources are allocated to 52 percent.” Based on data from Kaminsky’s An Internet-Scale Man In The Middle Attack”, and send traffic to whomever requests the traffic immediately after a successful three-way handshake, research, Clarified Networks developed a “DNS Repair illustrated the exploitation of a design vulnerability in making it possible to claim so many resources that However, it is likely that it will take some time for any Visualization”26 video that illustrated where patches BGP that has existed since the protocol’s inception: if not the compromised system crashes as a result. The true solution to be implemented. Filtering, as described were being applied over time. properly filtered by its service provider, a customer can researchers noted that this makes conventional measures above, is labor intensive, and if just one ISP decides not to inject whatever routes it wishes into the global Internet to counteract DoS attacks ineffective.35 filter, then the system breaks down. One implementation 10 © 2008 Akamai Technologies, Inc. All Rights Reserved © 2008 Akamai Technologies, Inc. All Rights Reserved 11