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Disordered Minds/Minding Disorder
- 1. Bryan Miller JHU Philosophy Dept.
Notas del editor
- A broad notion of philosophy as “love of wisdom”—Its what philosophers do. But not just philosophers do it. Continuous with science—conceptual analysis may proceed by looking to how things in the world are Natural kinds as opposed to social constructs—would these classes exist even if there were no humans around to classify as such i.e., oak trees would be a class but things weighing more than 25 kg would not be.
- Look to mental disorders and the findings of psychiatry in order to shed light on philosophical issues.
- Address issues from phil science—laws, explanation, demarcation, evidence—in psychiatry. Explore the central concepts of psychiatry. Also may be considered part of philosophy of mind insofar as it deals with the mind-brain and makes reference to topics such as belief, perception, cognition.
- These are questions about what makes a discipline a science instead of a pseudo-science—problems of objectivity, progress, theory-underdetermination—and these are problems for sciences in general.
- What are commonly posed as problems for psychiatry as a science are problems that all sciences must address. Just because one way of understanding psychiatry fails, does not mean psychiatry fails. A science of ghosts is not a science if there are no ghosts.
- Potentially nothing!
- Cure mental disorder by helping one come to terms with unconscious drives. Difficult to say what would show psychoanalysis to be wrong. Desire for the science of mental disorder to be more objection and worry that interpretation is too subjective.
- Here we have a denial that there are mental disorders. Instead, we have problems with living and/or neurological problems. The problem is that there do seem to be true mental disorders that are not problems in living.
- A mental mechanism that is naturally selected because it is adaptive in our past environments. Depression mechanism—triggered in certain circumstances where depressive behavior may have proven beneficial. However, such a mechanism may malfunction—it may cause depression even when the circumstances are not appropriate from the point of view of evolutionary history—This would be malfunctioning mechanism. Society determines whether the state resulting from the malfunction is harmful or not.
- It’s a philosophical question which position best captures mental disorder—i.e., the job of conceptual analysis which looks to the world (this is not armchair conceptual analysis)for relevant findings and guidance. And, it may turn out that no account captures all of the intuitively obvious cases of mental disorder—this would suggest that the class ‘mental disorders’ is not a natural kind.
- Mature = somewhat successful. Mature sciences tend to investigate categories that support scientifically interesting inductive generalizations.
- Causal mechanism in Dogs is (perhaps) the dog-genome and this explains why all members share property cluster. Note that this requires a lot of philosophical work to say what a natural kind is—i.e., What is a cause? What is a natural kind?
- If psychiatry is a science, then the categories it investigates should support inductive generalizations. We want to be able to investigate a few instances of a category and project what we learn to all members of the category.
- Depression—similar symptoms from different causes. Role of intervention and a proper taxonomy (classification scheme).
- To appreciate the problem, we will consider the case of delusions. Delusions, some claim—often implicitly (and this commitment is revealed by how they investigate the class)—constitute a natural kind. There are counterexamples to all of these properties but this is to be expected since o property from the cluster is supposed to be necessary. Nonetheless, we might wonder whether there is a common causal mechanism in delusions. If not, this would suggest the class does not constitute a natural kind.
- Real self: self as an existent thing. Vs. Fictive selves : “explanatory fictions”, “centers of narrative gravity”. Fictive self as representative or speaker of the person. Use MPD to suggests a particular view—the fictive self view.
- Philosophers are interested in what beliefs are. That is to say, what conditions must a state meet to be a belief? Can look to states that are prima facie similar to beliefs (i.e., delusions) to see what traits they have.
- It may be that most disorders are just outliers on a continuum