Android Security Overview and Safe Practices for Web-Based Android Applications
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Android Security Overview and Safe Practices for Web-Based Android Applications presentation given at xda:devcon 14' at Manchester
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Android Security Overview and Safe Practices for Web-Based Android Applications
- 1. Android security overview and safe practices for web-based Android applications Incalza Dario @h4oxer
- 2. Contents • Introduction • Overview Android platform • Attack surfaces in Android • Security in web-based applications xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 3. Introduction • XDA – recognized Developer • Student M. Sc. Computer science, majoring in Development of Secure Software @ KU Leuven • Android enthusiast/developer • Blogger (http://h4oxer.wordpress.com) xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 4. Introduction • Not technical • Call for action • Security is also your responsibility • No need to be a security expert xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 5. The Android platform • Components in five main layers – Android applications – Android Framework – Dalvik Virtual Machine (since 4.4 ART) – User-space native code – The Linux kernel xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 6. The Android platform xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 7. Android Applications • Android Applications – Allows third party developers to add functionality – Interaction through Android Framework API – Applications are signed with keys • Creates a trusted relationship between updates – Application components • AndroidManifest.xml, Intents, Activities, Broadcast Receivers, Services and Content Providers xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 8. Android Framework • Interface for Android applications • Allows developers to perform common tasks • Standard and third-party libraries – i.e. Apache HTTP and SAX XML Parser • Framework managers – i.e. Activity Manager, View System, Package Manager, etc. xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 9. The Dalvik Virtual Machine • Based on Java Virtual Machine • Register-based <-> stack-based • Pretty close to Java but not quite the same • DEX- and O (ptimized) DEX-files • Zygote – Shared core classes and libraries – Loader for Dalvik processes xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 10. User-Space Native Code • Native code in operating system user-space • Comprised of two primary groups – Libraries: • Shared libs, access through JNI • Vendor-specific <-> non-vendor-specific • Bionic • Interesting for security researchers – Core system services • Init • Radio Interface Layer (RIL) • ADB xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 11. The Kernel • Linux Kernel but Android Fork • Binder – IPC mechanism – Client-server model – PID and UID identification for access control • Logger – Four buffers: main, system, radio, event – LogCat xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 12. The Android Platform: Conclusion • Very complex system • Principle of least privilege • Exploit on Android is a collection of vulnerabilities – i.e. ‘diaggetroot’ – HTC J Butterfly xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 13. Attack Surfaces in Android • Terminology – Attack Vector: methods used to carry out an attack – Attack Surface: a target’s ‘open flanks’ • Classification attack surfaces – Physical Adjacency – Local – Physical – Remote xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 14. Attack Surfaces in Android • Surface properties – Attack Vector – Privileges Gained – Memory Safety – Complexity • General Rule: as much privilege possible with as little investment as possible xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 15. Attack Surface – Physical Adjacency • Attacker in range of victim • Wireless supported communication channels – GPS – Baseband – Bluetooth – Wi-Fi – NFC xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 16. Attack Surface – Physical Adjacency • Global Positioning System (GPS) – One-way communications mechanism – Accessible through android.location.* or Google Play Services – End-user privacy not always respected – Location spoof attacks xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 17. Attack Surface – Physical Adjacency • Baseband – Communicate with mobile networks – Baseband firmware – Mostly Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks • Set-up a base station with strong signal • Rogue Base Station Attack – Based on protocols • Every protocol is an attack surface • Resource intensive to exploit!! xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 18. Attack Surface – Physical Adjacency • Bluetooth – Rich attack surface – Based on profiles; +30 profiles! – Requires pairing • Numeric code • Hard-coded codes => interesting! – Possible Attacks: bluejacking, bluesnarfing, bluebugging xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 19. Attack Surface – Physical Adjacency • Wi-Fi – Rich attack surface – Similar attack surface as Bluetooth – Very extensive xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 20. Attack Surface – Physical Adjacency • NFC (Near Field Communication) – Build on RFID – Three main use cases • Tags • ‘beam’ data • Contactless payments – Successful attacks on NFC • Charlie Miller – setup connections BT or Wi-Fi • Georg Wicherski and Joshua J. Drake – browser attack • MWR Labs – exploit file format parsing in Polaris Office xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 21. Attack Surface –Local • Ultimate goal: privileged code execution • Android security architecture based on least privilege • Use code already running on device to gain more privileges • Interesting when rooting? xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 22. Attack Surface –Local • The File System – Unix based – Attack surfaces exposed via entries in fs – Exposed IPC functionality – Determining code behind an endpoint xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 23. Attack Surface –Local • System Calls – Kernel is responsible for handling system calls – Kernel handles malicious data in system call – Search for “SYSCALL_DEFINE” in kernel source code xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 24. Attack Surface –Local • Binder – Unique for Android – Basis of Intents – Driver in kernel – Service in native code on top of Binder => Deeper attack surfaces => privilege escalation? xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 25. Attack Surface –Local • Other local attack surfaces – Shared memory – Baseband interface – Sockets xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 26. Attack Surface –Physical • Require physical touching • Most people consider physical attacks impossible to defend against xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 27. Attack Surface –Physical • Dismantling devices – Disassembling device and attacking the very hardware – Hardware not adequately protected – Attack surfaces: • Exposed serial ports • Exposed JTAG debug ports – Check Adam Outler on XDA TV!! xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 28. Attack Surface –Physical • Android Debug Bridge (ADB) – USB debugging – “Juice Jacking “ – Now authentication with RSA keypair xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 29. Attack Surface –Remote • Largest attack surface • Can be devastating • Holy grail for attacker xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 30. Attack Surface –Remote • Browser Attacks – Browsers are complex systems – A lot of web technologies and protocols • All attack surfaces!! – Drive-by attack = trick user to load url – MitM-attacks – Cross-site scripting (XSS) and Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) – Same-Origin-Policy (SOP) xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 31. Attack Surface –Remote • Other Attacks – Ad networks – Media and document processing – Google infrastructure – Malicious apps – third party app ecosystems xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 32. Security in web-based application • Webview component • Webkit web browser engine • Extensive use in hybrid applications • Remote attack surface => security issues xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza Source: MWR Infosecurity
- 33. Security in web-based application • Disable Support for Plugins – Additional attack surfaces -> needed? – webview.getSettings().setPluginsEnabled(false) • Disable File System Access – Access local resources – Enabled by default! – webview.getSettings().setAllowFileAccess(false) • Disable Javascript – webview.getSettings().setJavaScriptEnabled(false) xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 34. Security in web-based application • Webview issues – is JS necessary ???? – Nothing against MitM => use crypto – Origin checking! – Only load 3rd party trusted content – Java-Javascript bridge is dangerous!!!! • SOP not enforced over bridge xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 35. Security in web-based application • Webview issues Executing Java code in the context of your app! xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 36. Security in web-based application • Resource inspection – Intercept pageloads – Check against whitelist of trusted parties – Override native methods in WebViewClient xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 37. Security in web-based application xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 38. Security in web-based application • Resource inspection – What about IFrames or content between script tags or XmlHttpRequests? – Not intercepted by shouldOverrideUrlLoading – Override shouldInterceptRequest xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 39. Security in web-based application A list of useful methods (http://xda-devcon.com/index.html) • getHost – Gets the encoded host from the authority for the URI xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza • xda-devcon.com • getScheme – Gets the scheme of the URI • http • getPath – Gets the decoded path • index.html
- 40. Security in web-based application • addJavaScriptInterface – Dangerous – SOP is not enforced for the bridge! – IFrames => nightmare – Hybrid software stacks use this! • Apache Cordova • Sencha Touch – Fracking attacks => generic for all hybrid frameworks xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 41. Security in web-based application: Conclusion – Difficult to get right – Pattern matching for whitelist of extreme importance – Watch out for hybrid mobile apps – Consider the effort of developing native xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza
- 42. Thanks!! Q & A ? xda:devcon '14 -‐ Manchester -‐ Dario Incalza